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Abstract 
The reporting of non-GAAP profit figures (profits calculated other than by using 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP)) is a phenomenon that has been observed worldwide over the past two 
decades. Two possible motives for the practice have been suggested: either management is 
attempting to provide incremental, value-relevant information to assist shareholders and 
potential investors in decision making, or it is behaving opportunistically and attempting to 
mislead shareholders and investors by managing their impression of the company’s 
performance. Prior studies into the practice of reporting non-GAAP profits have been 
concentrated in the United States, where strict regulation has been in place since 2003, and in 
Europe, while little research has taken place in an Australian context.   
This study contributes to the literature by investigating the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures 
by Australian companies. Initially, a broad approach to the topic is adopted, with two research 
questions developed to investigate which company characteristics and specific events might 
influence the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure. The study then narrows the 
investigation to concentrate on the issue of opportunistic behaviour and the use of impression 
management tactics by companies to emphasise non-GAAP profit figures compared to the 
GAAP profit figures. Two further research questions investigate which company characteristics 
and specific events might influence the use of impression management tactics by non-GAAP 
profit reporting companies. 
The study uses a population of the top 200 companies (based on market capitalisation) on the 
ASX, and data was collected from the years 2004 to 2015 inclusive. The chosen timeframe 
allows investigation into the effect specific events, including the introduction of IFRS, the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the release of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s (ASIC) Regulatory Guide 230, had on the reporting of non-GAAP profit 
figures. The effect of these events on the use of impression management tactics to emphasise 
the non-GAAP profit figure compared to the GAAP profit figure is also investigated. Content 
analysis of press releases concerning annual results, and annual reports was used to determine 
vii 
the extent of disclosure and emphasis given to both the GAAP and non-GAAP profit figures. 
Quantitative analysis was then undertaken to explore each of the research questions.  
The results indicate that the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures by Australian companies 
increased steadily over the twelve-year period. Larger companies and those that were more 
highly leveraged were more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures for most years of the 
study. Reporting bad news in the form of a decrease in GAAP profits or a GAAP loss was 
also a significant factor influencing the decision to report a non-GAAP profit in several years. 
The specific events investigated did not affect the decision to report a non-GAAP figure 
significantly with the exception of the GFC, which saw a significant increase in companies 
reporting a non-GAAP profit figure.  
Results concerning the use of impression management tactics show more highly leveraged 
companies and those reporting bad news were significantly more likely to use tactics to 
emphasise the non-GAAP profit figure over the GAAP profit figure in the total sample and 
some individual years of the study. The GFC and the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide 230 also significantly influenced the use of impression management tactics to highlight 
the non-GAAP profit figure compared to the GAAP profit figure. The GFC saw an increase 
in the emphasis towards the non-GAAP figure and the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 
prompted a change in emphasis towards the GAAP figure.  
The study highlights issues concerning the use of impression management tactics and 
opportunistic behaviour and the need to inform shareholders and potential investors of this 
potentially misleading practice. It also highlights the need for ASIC to remain vigilant in its 
pursuit of both informing companies of regulations and enforcing Regulatory Guides so that 
the positive changes to reporting practices observed with the release of the Regulatory Guide 
continue.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The reporting of earnings or profit figures which are calculated other than by using 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) is a phenomenon that has been observed worldwide over the past two 
decades. The practice is particularly prevalent in company press releases issued to report the 
annual results (i.e., annual results press releases) and in annual reports. In Australia, concern 
has been expressed by regulators, professional bodies and auditors regarding the practice. 
Extant literature has proposed two possible motives for the practice, either management is 
attempting to provide incremental, value-relevant information to assist shareholders and 
potential investors in decision making, or it is behaving opportunistically and attempting to 
mislead shareholders and investors by managing their impression of the company’s 
performance. This study uses an agency theory perspective to investigate this phenomenon in 
an Australian context by examining the practice of reporting non-GAAP profit figures by 
Australian companies, registered schemes and disclosing entities (for simplicity hereafter 
referred to collectively as ‘companies’). The term ‘non-GAAP’ rather than ‘non-IFRS’ is used in 
this study as the timeframe covers the period before the introduction of IFRS in Australia. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
The practice of reporting of non-GAAP profit figures is prevalent across many parts of the 
world, with a number of studies into the practice having been conducted in the United States 
of America (US) (e.g. Black et al. 2017; Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2006b; Frederickson & Miller 2004; Johnson & Schwartz 2005; 
Lougee & Marquardt 2004) and a limited number in European countries (e.g. Andersson & 
Hellman 2007; Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques 2017; Hitz 2010; Isidro & Marques 
2013; Koning, Mertens & Roosenboom 2010). The findings of studies from the US are not 
necessarily applicable to the situation in Australia as, unlike in Australia, the practice of 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures has been highly regulated in the US since 2003. Industry 
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studies have reported the prevalence of the practice in Australia (Deloitte 2009; KPMG 
2010a, 2011). However, to date there has been little academic research into this phenomenon, 
and the reasons for the practice, in an Australian context.  
In extant literature, arguments both in favour of and against the practice have been put 
forward. Arguments in favour support the incremental, value-relevant motive, maintaining 
that the resulting figures better represent underlying, core or operating earnings of companies 
(Black et al. 2012). The non-GAAP profit figures are considered more informative numbers 
which allow better evaluation of a company’s performance (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2004). Arguments against the practice raise concerns about a lack of transparency, definition 
or consistent format for the figures which makes comparison between companies difficult 
(Brody & McDonald 2004; Halsey & Soybel 2002; Heitger & Ballou 2003). Non-GAAP 
profit figures are both company-specific and time-specific (Bryan & Lilien 2004; Sek & 
Taylor 2011) with critics suggesting companies can report earnings ‘any way they want’ 
(Brody & McDonald 2004, p. 37).  
These concerns prompted a response in Australia, with the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors (AICD) and the Financial Services Institute of Australia (FINSIA) issuing the 
guideline: Underlying Profit: principles for reporting of non-statutory profit information 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors [AICD] & Financial Services Institute of 
Australasia [FINSIA] 2009) in March 2009. These guidelines are voluntary guidelines from 
professional bodies that members are encouraged to follow. In December 2011, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued Regulatory Guide 230: 
Disclosing non-IFRS financial information (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission [ASIC] 2011). It is anticipated that the ASIC guidelines will have a marked 
influence on how non-GAAP profits are reported in Australia, being issued by the corporate 
regulator. Even so, it should be noted that ASIC Regulatory Guides provide an explanation of 
how ASIC interprets the law and are not actual law. 
The study investigates the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures in Australia focusing on the 
opportunistic behaviour perspective, as concerns surrounding the phenomenon of reporting 
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these figures were significant enough to prompt responses from AICD, FINSIA and ASIC. 
The presence of opportunistic behaviour is identified through the use of impression 
management tactics concerning emphasis. Impression management tactics concern how 
companies present information in order to manage, influence and persuade readers to 
perceive the company more favourably (Godfrey, Mather & Ramsay 2003; Hooghiemstra 
2000; Neu 1991; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998; Samkin & Schneider 2010). As noted 
above there have been several studies concerning non-GAAP profit reporting in the US and 
this study responds to calls for more research into the phenomenon in an Australian context 
(Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Marques 2017) where, until 2011, the practice 
was not constrained by regulation as it was in the US.  There has been little to no research 
into the use of impression management tactics and non-GAAP profit figures in an Australian 
setting, particularly their use in press releases. Two Australian studies that did take an 
opportunistic perspective were Cameron, Percy and Stevenson-Clarke (2012), who looked at 
annual reports only and covered a period before the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide, 
and Johnson et al. (2014), who conducted an experiment using university students thereby not 
investigating actual disclosure documents. 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
As noted above, two contrasting motives have been proposed to explain the practice of 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures. Either management is attempting to provide value-
relevant information incremental to that provided by the financial report or it is behaving 
opportunistically and using impression management to report and emphasise what is 
generally a better result. Although these contrasting perspectives could form ‘two competing 
schools of thought’ (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007, p. 117) and be considered mutually 
exclusive, some have argued that the two explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
It is possible that managers are attempting to provide incremental, value-relevant information 
in the form of non-GAAP profits but at the same time are deliberately or inadvertently 
presenting the information in a misleading manner by using impression management tactics 
(Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006b; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, 
Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Libby & Emett 2014; Young 2014). Young (2014, p. 451) 
argues that ‘informative reporting and strategic disclosure do not represent mutually 
exclusive explanations’ for non-GAAP reporting behaviour and proposes that both motives 
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likely co-exist with particular motivations and reporting incentives varying depending on 
time and the firms involved. He further explains:  
(T)he dilemma for investors and regulators is how to give management freedom 
to use non-GAAP earnings to communicate their private information regarding 
key earnings components while simultaneously limiting management’s ability to 
employ such disclosures opportunistically (Young 2014, p. 447). 
Non-GAAP profit figures may be strategically emphasised to influence perceptions of the 
company’s performance and may mislead shareholders and prospective investors, particularly 
those that are less experienced or less ‘sophisticated’ (Elliott 2006; Frederickson & Miller 
2004; Godfrey, Mather & Ramsay 2003; James & Michello 2010; Marques 2010; Merkl-
Davies & Brennan 2007). Attempting to address this opportunistic behaviour was a key 
objective of both the guidelines on reporting non-GAAP profits released by AICD and 
FINSIA and the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 (AICD & FINSIA 2009; ASIC 2011). This 
study provides valuable information for both regulators and shareholders/potential investors 
by investigating which company characteristics and specific events influence not only a 
company’s decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure, but also the use of impression 
management tactics when reporting such a figure. 
 
The study initially adopts a broad approach to the topic of non-GAAP profit reporting by 
investigating what characteristics and events might influence the decision to report a non-
GAAP profit figure. This is examined through the following two research questions:  
RQ1 Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit figures influenced by 
specific firm characteristics? 
RQ2  Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit figures influenced by 
specific events?  
Drawing on agency theory, the first question will determine if the size of a company, 
ownership concentration, amount of leverage and good/bad news years influence a 
company’s decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure. The second question will determine 
whether certain events influence the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure, including, 
the introduction of IFRS, the GFC, the release of guidelines by AICD and FINSIA and the 
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release of Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. These research questions look at the choice to 
report or not to report a non-GAAP profit figure.  
 
The study then focusses on the issue of opportunistic behaviour and the use of impression 
management tactics by companies that report non-GAAP profit figures. Company characteristics 
and specific events that might influence the use of impression management tactics to emphasise 
the non-GAAP profit figure compared to the GAAP profit figure are examined through the 
following research questions: 
RQ3 Is the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP and 
GAAP profit figures influenced by specific firm characteristics?  
RQ4  Is the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP and 
GAAP profit figures influenced by specific events?  
Using the same firm characteristics as those investigated in Research Question 1, Research 
Question 3 will determine the particular characteristics that influence the use of impression 
management tactics to emphasise the non-GAAP profit compared to the GAAP profit. Research 
Question 4 will determine which of the events investigated in Research Question 2, influence 
the use of impression management tactics concerning emphasis of the non-GAAP profit 
compared to the GAAP profit. It is expected that the influence of some events such as the 
GFC will be reflected in an increase in the use of tactics to emphasise the non-GAAP figure 
compared to GAAP whereas other events such as the introduction of Regulatory Guide 230 
by ASIC will act to mitigate the use of such tactics. 
 
1.4 Contributions of the Study 
This study aims to make several contributions to the literature concerning non-GAAP profit 
figures. It contributes to the growing literature on non-GAAP profits generally by studying 
the phenomenon over an extended timeframe and in an Australian context. Marques (2017) 
highlights the lack of Australian studies, particularly those covering the release of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide, as a gap in the literature, and also calls for studies to investigate the effect 
of IFRS. This study addresses this gap by investigating the influence particular events such as 
the introduction of IFRS, the GFC and the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
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have on the decision to report a non-GAAP profit. Previous studies have generally covered a 
period of between one and three years, with those including more than one year sometimes 
totalling the data from the years and not reporting each year separately (e.g. Allee et al. 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2007; Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques 2017; Lougee & Marquardt 
2004). This study will provide novel insights into the practice by not only looking at the 
sample as a whole, but also investigating each year separately and comparing the results for 
individual years in line with the events that were occurring at the time. 
 
The study also contributes to the impression management literature, particularly the literature 
focusing on the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profits. 
Investigating the use of impression management tactics in the voluntary disclosure of non-
GAAP profit figures constitutes an important area of accounting research as the use of 
impression management tactics can mislead users of financial information and adverse capital 
allocations may result (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). By using an Australian context, new 
insights will be provided into the use of impression management in an environment not 
constrained by regulation (unlike the US). There are a limited number of studies concerning 
non-GAAP profit figures in Australia with some only focussed on the incremental, value-
relevant information perspective (e.g. Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Sinnewe, Harrison & 
Wijeweera 2017). The two studies that took an opportunistic behaviour perspective were 
Cameron, Percy and Stevenson-Clarke (2012), who looked at emphasis of the non-GAAP 
figure in the annual reports of 50 companies, and an experimental study by Johnson et al. 
(2014) where undergraduate accounting students were found to rely on non-GAAP rather 
than GAAP figures when analysing reports. This study answers the call of Cameron, Percy 
and Stevenson-Clarke (2012, p. 24) to use a larger sample in an Australian context and to 
investigate ‘whether particular firm characteristics are associated with efficient versus 
opportunistic pro forma disclosures’.  
 
The study will also provide valuable insights to shareholders, professional bodies and 
regulators. The results will apprise and educate shareholders and prospective investors about 
the practice of non-GAAP profit reporting in Australia.  In particular, it will highlight how 
emphasis of particular figures could be misleading and constitute opportunistic behaviour on 
the part of companies. It will also inform professional bodies and ASIC, the corporate 
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regulator, about the effect of guidelines on the practice and help guide future developmental 
processes relating to the practice. One outcome of the study will be to determine whether the 
release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 has been sufficient to change opportunistic 
behaviour or whether a tougher regulatory stance is needed. This could ultimately lead to an 
improvement in practice from both companies and ASIC to the benefit of shareholders and 
other stakeholders who rely on financial information. 
 
1.5 Research Method 
To investigate the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures by Australian companies, this study 
uses a population comprising the Standard & Poor’s ASX 200 Index (based on market 
capitalisation). The data set spans twelve years from 2004 to 2015 in order to capture the 
influence of various events including the introduction of IFRS, the GFC and the release of the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230.  
 
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyse the research questions 
and employs content analysis of annual results press releases and annual reports in order to 
determine the extent of disclosure and emphasis given to both the GAAP and non-GAAP 
profit figures. Impression management tactics concerning emphasis are measured through a 
comprehensive impression management index developed for this study and adapted from 
Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005), Hitz (2010) and Marques (2010). Instances of both 
non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures are coded for emphasis, looking at both location of 
disclosure and repetition, and a relative emphasis score is calculated. Quantitative analysis, 
including logistic and multiple regression techniques, is then undertaken to explore each of 
the four research questions.  
 
1.6 Findings 
The study found that the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures by Australian companies has 
increased steadily over the twelve-year period, with 79% of companies in the sample 
reporting such a figure in the final year of the study. The majority of companies in the study 
reported a non-GAAP profit figure higher than the GAAP profit in all but two years of the 
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study. Larger companies and those that were more highly leveraged were significantly more 
likely to report non-GAAP profit figures for most years of the study. Reporting bad news in 
the form of a decrease in GAAP profits or a GAAP loss was also a statistically significant 
factor influencing the decision to report a non-GAAP profit in several years. The GFC was 
the only specific event that had a statistically significant effect on the decision to report a 
non-GAAP profit figure.  
 
Focussing on the use of impression management tactics, results showed that more highly 
leveraged companies and those reporting bad news were more likely to use tactics to 
emphasise the non-GAAP profit figure over the GAAP profit figure. These results were 
statistically significantly for the total sample and for some individual years of the study. 
When investigating the specific events over the twelve year period, the GFC and the 
introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 significantly influenced the use of impression 
management tactics to highlight the non-GAAP profit figure compared to the GAAP profit 
figure. The GFC saw an increase in the emphasis towards the non-GAAP figure and the 
release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide prompted a change in emphasis towards the GAAP 
figure. The results also highlight issues with companies failing to provide a clear 
reconciliation between the non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures, a requirement of both the 
AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the ASIC Regulatory Guide.  
 
The results highlight the various practices of Australian companies with regard to the 
reporting of non-GAAP profit figures. This is important for shareholders and potential 
investors when making investment decisions and also for other stakeholders such as ASIC 
who monitor and regulate the practices of listed companies. The results also highlight the 
need for ASIC to remain vigilant in its pursuit of both informing companies of regulations 
and enforcing Regulatory Guides so that potential opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
companies can be monitored and addressed.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters and is organised as follows: 
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Chapter 1 introduces the study by providing a background to the research. The research 
questions investigated in the study are briefly discussed along with the contributions the 
study makes to the literature and practice. The research methods adopted in the study and a 
brief description of the findings are also provided.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of prior literature concerning voluntary disclosure in general, 
and the disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures in particular. The phenomenon of reporting 
non-GAAP profits is discussed drawing on the two motives that have been postulated in 
extant literature for the practice. The chapter reports on the incremental information motive 
and the opportunistic motive, including a detailed discussion of impression management. 
This chapter also reviews literature concerning the reaction of investors to non-GAAP profit 
disclosure and the effect regulation has had on the practice in countries other than Australia.  
 
Chapter 3 reports on the regulatory environment in Australia and discusses how particular 
law and accounting standards affect the practice of disclosing non-GAAP profits. The 
guidelines released by AICD and FINSIA and the Regulatory Guide released by the ASIC are 
reviewed in detail. Previous industry reports into the practice are also discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 explores a theoretical framework for the study and develops a conceptual model 
based on agency theory. From this conceptual model, four research questions and sixteen 
related hypotheses are developed to investigate the reporting of non-GAAP profits in 
Australia and the use of impression management tactics by companies reporting these figures. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the research methods employed in the study. It explains the four phases of 
data collection and describes the statistical tests used during the analysis. The development of 
an impression management index for emphasis through location and repetition is explained 
along with a detailed set of coding rules and procedures. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 report the results for the study. General results relating to the practice of 
reporting non-GAAP profits in Australia are presented along with descriptive statistics for the 
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sample. Chapter 6 reports on the results for Research Questions 1 and 2 concerning the 
company characteristics and events that influence the decision to report a non-GAAP profit 
and Chapter 7 reports the results for Research Questions 3 and 4 regarding the use of 
impression management tactics when reporting these profit figures. 
 
Chapter 8 provides an in-depth discussion of these results and relates the findings to those of 
previous studies and to agency theory.  
 
Chapter 9 concludes the study and summarises its contributions and implications. Limitations 
of the study are discussed along with suggested directions and opportunities for future study.  
 
1.8 Summary 
This chapter introduced the topic of this study and outlined the background and the research 
questions to be investigated. Recognising the limited amount of longitudinal research, and 
research in an Australian context, concerning non-GAAP profit figures, the contributions the 
study will make to both literature and practice were discussed. The methods to be employed 
to investigate the research questions were outlined along with a brief discussion of the key 
findings. The structure of the thesis was then provided. In the next chapter, a literature review 
concerning the voluntary reporting of non-GAAP profit figures is undertaken.   
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review: Voluntary Reporting  
of Non-GAAP Profit Figures 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The reporting of non-GAAP profits has been prevalent over the previous two decades in 
many countries. Two contrasting motives for this practice have been postulated by extant 
literature: either management is endeavouring to overcome information asymmetry by 
providing incremental, value-relevant information or it is behaving opportunistically and 
attempting to mislead investors and other stakeholders. These two motives have often been 
presented as mutually exclusive (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007) but some researchers have 
questioned whether the motives can indeed coexist (e.g. Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2006b; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; 
Libby & Emett 2014; Young 2014). Previous literature concerning voluntary disclosure, and 
in particular the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, is explored in this chapter.  
 
A general overview of voluntary disclosure is provided in Section 2.2, with Section 2.3 
specifically discussing non-GAAP profits. The two possible motives postulated for the 
disclosure of non-GAAP profits are then examined, with Section 2.4 presenting the 
incremental information perspective and Section 2.5 presenting the opportunistic behaviour 
perspective. Studies concerning the reactions of investors to the disclosure of non-GAAP 
figures are discussed in Section 2.6. The effect of regulation on the practice of reporting these 
figures is explored in Section 2.7 and the chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.8. 
 
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure  
The reporting of non-GAAP profit figures is a form of voluntary disclosure, with companies 
choosing whether to calculate such a figure, and where and how to report it. This section 
provides a general background on the practice of voluntary disclosure by companies (it does 
not relate specifically to non-GAAP profit reporting). Literature concerning the voluntary 
disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures specifically will be discussed from Section 2.3 
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onward. Voluntary disclosures are discretionary disclosures of information made by 
companies in excess of information required by law or regulations (Lev 1992; Meek, Roberts 
& Gray 1995). These disclosures represent free choice on the part of the management to 
‘provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users’ 
(Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995, p. 555). Voluntary disclosures may cover a range of different 
quantitative and qualitative information including strategic information such as corporate 
characteristics, strategy and future prospects; financial information such as various non-
GAAP profit measures (the topic of this study) and non-financial information such as 
information about directors, employees and social and environmental disclosures. The 
disclosures may be retrospective or prospective and can be made through a variety of 
communication tools including the annual report, press releases and websites. 
 
2.2.1 Motives for Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosures can be used for strategic purposes and motives for disclosure practices 
provide interesting empirical questions (Healy & Palepu 2001) which have been approached 
from a range of theoretical perspectives depending on the type of disclosure (Williams 2008). 
Studies have variously used agency theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory, amongst others, in an attempt to explain possible motives for voluntary 
disclosure (An, Davey & Eggleton 2011). The theories differ in the type of disclosures they 
attempt to explain, the presumed audience for the disclosures and the incentives for the 
disclosures (Brennan & Merkl-Davies 2013; Cotter, Lokman & Najah 2011). These theories 
will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
 
As far as financial disclosures (such as the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures) are 
concerned, extant literature has often used an agency theory perspective to argue that the 
demand for extra information provided by voluntary disclosure arises due to information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders of the company (or outsiders, e.g. 
prospective investors) (Healy & Palepu 1993, 2001; Lev 1992). This perspective assumes that 
managers have superior information to shareholders and prospective investors and that these 
shareholders and investors demand information to assist in valuing firms and making 
investment decisions (Healy & Palepu 2001). Management may have extra incentive to 
reduce information asymmetry at certain times, for example, when planning to make a public 
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equity offering. Various studies have found that firms planning to issue equity increased their 
disclosure activity prior to the offering (Gibbins, Richardson & Waterhouse 1990; Heitzman, 
Wasley & Zimmerman 2010; Lang & Lundholm 1993, 2000). Lang and Lundholm (2000, p. 
627) found that firms dramatically increased disclosure in the six months leading up to an 
equity issue and that results were strongest for discretionary disclosure ‘suggesting that the 
disclosure changes reflect conscious decisions by managers’. 
 
Other factors may also be at play in the decision to participate in voluntary disclosure. 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990) conducted interviews with both internal 
management and external consultants using grounded theory to develop an empirically 
derived structure in an attempt to explain and predict corporate financial disclosures. They 
identified two disclosure positions which motivate managers and may exist within the same 
firm, ritualism and opportunism. Under the ritualism dimension, managers disclose 
information in accordance with the norms, rules, standards and procedures of the 
organisation. The disclosure process in this dimension is repetitive and largely passive. In 
contrast, under the opportunism dimension managers actively seek to gain a firm-specific 
advantage through specific disclosure strategies. This would include the increase in financial 
disclosures of various types leading up to an equity offering as discussed above. Voluntary 
disclosure is likely to have an impact on the strategic decision making of those both inside 
and external to the organisation and on the company’s competitiveness (Williams 2008). 
Therefore, any disclosure decision needs to be informed by the possible benefits and costs 
associated with voluntary disclosure. 
 
2.2.2 Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure practices have been associated with certain benefits for companies. 
Globalisation has meant increased competition for capital, and long-term investors are likely 
to attempt to reduce risk and uncertainty by focusing on companies with higher levels of 
disclosure (Schuster & O’Connell 2006). Several studies assert that voluntary disclosure 
leads to improvements in stock liquidity (usually indicated by a reduction in the bid-ask 
spread) and in turn reductions in the cost of equity capital through increased demand for the 
firm’s securities and reduced transaction costs (e.g. Amihud & Mendelson 2000; Botosan 
2006; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Healy, Hutton & Palepu 1999; Lakhal 2008). Some of 
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these studies are based on models developed by the authors and not on empirical evidence as 
such (e.g. Beyer & Guttman 2012; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991). Others have attempted to 
show relationships between increased disclosure, lower cost of capital and improved stock 
liquidity using empirical data (e.g. Botosan 1997; Botosan & Plumlee 2002; Healy, Hutton & 
Palepu 1999; Lakhal 2008; Leuz & Verrecchia 2000; Petersen & Plenborg 2006). Indeed, the 
results of studies that show how management increases the level of voluntary disclosure 
leading up to equity offerings suggest that management themselves behave as if greater 
disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital (Botosan 2006). There is some evidence that 
increased disclosure may also lower the effective interest cost of debt, the argument being 
that timely and detailed disclosure reduces lenders’ and underwriters’ perceptions of default 
risk (Sengupta 1998). 
 
The effect of analyst following has been used as an extra explanatory variable in some 
research. Botosan (1997) conducted an empirical study using annual reports of manufacturing 
firms and found that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for 
firms with low analyst following only. The findings were not significant for firms with high 
analyst following and Botosan explained this may be due to the of annual reports as the only 
disclosure measure in the study (she surmised that annual reports are a weaker proxy for 
overall disclosure where analysts play a substantial role in communicating company 
performance). A Canadian study by Richardson and Welker (2001) supported this finding of 
a negative relationship between financial disclosure and cost of capital for firms with low 
analyst following only. 
 
Another benefit of disclosure explored in extant literature is the effect it has on analyst 
following itself and studies have combined this with the cost of equity capital investigations 
(Healy, Hutton & Palepu 1999; Lang & Lundholm 1996). Analysts are an important part of 
the capital market and provide earnings forecasts, buy/sell recommendations and other 
information to interested parties including investors and brokers. Studies show that increased 
disclosure leads to growth in analyst following (Healy, Hutton & Palepu 1999; Lang & 
Lundholm 1996), more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual 
analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions (Lang & Lundholm 1996). 
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2.2.3 Costs of Voluntary Disclosure  
As well as the benefits discussed above, there are costs involved in disclosure. These costs 
may be both direct and indirect (Lev 1992). Direct costs include collection, 
production/processing, distribution and in some cases auditing of the information to be 
disclosed (Lev 1992; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995; Verrecchia 1983). These costs may 
increase with firm size as larger companies tend to produce more information, however the 
fixed cost component of information production means the cost may be proportionally greater 
for smaller firms (Amihud & Mendelson 2000).  
 
Indirect costs or proprietary costs can be harder to measure and involve parties external to the 
organisation. They relate to the impact the disclosures have on the company’s activities and 
competitive position due to additional information being revealed to competitors (Healy & 
Palepu 1993; Schuster & O’Connell 2006). Those outside the organisation may receive and 
use data to their advantage (Healy & Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 1983) or information may be 
revealed that potentially damages the firm by resulting in increased competition or 
government regulation (Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). Managers will therefore only disclose 
competitive information when the expected increase in firm value exceeds the cost of 
disclosure (Verrecchia 1983). There is also a possibility that the disclosure of certain 
information, particularly earnings forecasts, may expose the company to litigation (Amihud 
& Mendelson 2000; Petersen & Plenborg 2006; Schuster & O’Connell 2006). It has also been 
suggested that potential conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders may mean 
some disclosures may not be viewed as credible by shareholders (Healy, Hutton & Palepu 
1999). Therefore, the decision to provide voluntary disclosures, and the type and extent of 
those disclosures, involve consideration of whether the benefits exceed the direct and indirect 
costs involved (Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995).  
 
2.2.4 Characteristics of Disclosing Firms  
Apart from the motives discussed above, companies with certain characteristics may be 
potentially more likely to voluntarily disclose information. Studies from a wide range of 
countries have investigated the association between levels of voluntary disclosure and firm 
characteristics. These studies have typically developed some type of disclosure index to 
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measure the quantity and/or quality of disclosure and have most commonly used the annual 
report as the medium for the disclosure. 
 
Previous studies have overwhelmingly found that the size of a company is significantly, 
positively related to the amount of voluntary disclosure in the annual report (Ahmed & 
Courtis 1999; Boesso & Kumar 2007; Chow & Wong-Boren 1987; Hossain, Perera & 
Rahman 1995; Lang & Lundholm 1993; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). Various reasons have 
been proposed for this finding. Agency theory suggests larger firms, with a greater proportion 
of outside capital, have greater agency costs and information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). They are also likely to be more complex and have a wider ownership base than small 
firms (Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). More disclosure is therefore required to mitigate 
information asymmetry and inform investors. Larger firms are also better able to bear the 
direct costs of voluntary disclosure and are therefore more likely to disclose more 
information than smaller firms (Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995; Meek, Roberts & Gray 
1995). 
 
Industry type has also been hypothesised as an influencing factor on disclosure levels due to 
differing levels of proprietary costs across various industries. The results for the influence of 
industry have been mixed. Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) found that companies in the 
metals, building and construction industry as well as the oil, chemicals and mining industry 
made significantly more voluntary disclosure of financial information with the latter industry 
also disclosing significantly more non-financial information particularly social and 
environmental. They suggest industry patterns may exist, where companies mimic what their 
competitors in the same industry are doing with regards to disclosure. Another study using 
data from the US and Italy found that evidence for industry was generally weak but was 
significant for the utilities industries in the US and Italy and for the clothing industry in Italy 
(Boesso & Kumar 2007).  
 
The effect of leverage on quantity of disclosure has often been included in studies, again with 
mixed results ranging from significant (Ahmed & Courtis 1999), marginally significant 
(Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995), not significant (Chow & Wong-Boren 1987) to significant 
but not in the predicted direction (less leveraged firms disclosed more while it was predicted 
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that highly leveraged firms would have higher disclosure) (Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). In 
relation to the effect leverage has on the disclosure of earnings figures in particular, Wong 
and Wong (2010) looked at the voluntary disclosure of Earnings Before Interest and Taxation 
(EBIT) in New Zealand firms and found that firms that were highly leveraged were more 
likely to voluntarily disclose EBIT in the financial statements. 
 
Other characteristics that have been found to have no significant association with increased 
disclosure include profitability (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995), 
assets-in-place (Chow & Wong-Boren 1987; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995) and type of 
auditor/audit firm size (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995). In a study 
based in Hong Kong and Singapore, countries with traditional Chinese influences and a large 
degree of concentrated, family ownership, Chau and Gray (2002) found a significant, positive 
relationship between dispersed ownership and more disclosure and a negative, significant 
relationship between family ownership and disclosure.  
 
The sometimes conflicting results of these studies should be considered in light of their 
methodology. The studies discussed in this section have all used annual reports as the 
medium to investigate disclosure practices. However, voluntary disclosures may be provided 
in a range of mediums including much more timely vehicles than annual reports such as 
earning press releases and websites. Firms choosing to convey good financial news, for 
example, may use one of these other mediums. The conflicting results between studies for 
certain characteristics (e.g. leverage) may be explained by the wide range of different 
disclosures included in the study, disclosure index construction, differences in measures used 
for explanatory variables and differences in research settings. The next section narrows the 
discussion of voluntary disclosure to the topic of this study - the voluntary disclosure of non-
GAAP profit figures.  
 
2.3 Voluntary Disclosure of Non-GAAP Profit Figures 
In Australia, as in the US and many other countries, the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures 
and other non-GAAP financial information is voluntary. Management and other preparers of 
disclosure documents have discretion (particularly outside the financial statements) as to 
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what figures to report and how to report them. Importantly these non-GAAP profit figures are 
usually unaudited. Various terms are used for these figures in disclosure documents. In 
Australia the most commonly used terms include ‘underlying profit’, ‘normalised profit’, 
‘cash earnings’ and ‘EBITDA/EBIT’ (KPMG 2010b). Studies conducted in the US generally 
concern the reporting of alternative profit figures collectively termed ‘pro forma’ profits, a 
figure which differs from GAAP and is a ‘flexible and unaudited measure of firm 
performance’ (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006b, p. 355). In the early to mid-1990s, the 
term ‘pro forma’ was used in the US to describe earnings figures that represented ‘as if’ 
results, that is, the results if a proposed merger or takeover had taken place (Brody & 
McDonald 2004; Heitger & Ballou 2003; James & Michello 2003). The use of these figures 
was then expanded with companies using the term to describe profits calculated excluding 
unusual, non-cash and transitory or one-off expenses. In the US these earnings have many 
labels and are variously described as, for example, ‘core’, ‘adjusted’, ‘recurring’ and 
‘ongoing’ earnings (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004). In Australia, the term ‘pro forma’ 
usually refers to non-GAAP financial information appearing in transaction documents such as 
the prospectus and takeover documents. It is designed to show the effects of proposed or 
completed transactions for illustrative purposes (Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission 2011). For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘non-GAAP’ will be used as a 
collective noun for profits calculated other than in accordance with IFRS.  
 
Industry studies have shown that the practice of reporting such figures is prevalent in 
Australia and arguments have been postulated in extant literature for and against the practice 
(industry studies are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4). Those arguing in favour of the 
practice maintain that the resulting figures better represent the underlying, core or operating 
earnings of a company which are more likely to persist in the future (Black et al. 2012). It has 
been argued that these non-GAAP profit figures are more informative numbers which enable 
analysts and shareholders to better evaluate a company’s performance (Entwistle, Feltham & 
Mbagwu 2004). It has also been suggested that excluding one-time items actually enables 
better comparisons between companies, particularly in developing industries (Heitger & 
Ballou 2003). However, in the past, concerns regarding the use of these alternative profit 
figures have been raised due to a lack of transparency, definition or consistent format for the 
figures (making comparison between companies difficult) plus a lack of any rules governing 
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their use (Brody & McDonald 2004; Halsey & Soybel 2002; Heitger & Ballou 2003). The 
reported figures are both company-specific and time-specific (Bryan & Lilien 2004; Sek & 
Taylor 2011) with some suggesting that companies can report earnings ‘any way they want’ 
(Brody & McDonald 2004, p. 37). These concerns prompted a response from regulators in 
the US with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issuing Regulation G in 2003 to 
control the way such figures are reported and to require non-GAAP figures to be reconciled 
to GAAP. In Australia, ASIC issued Regulatory Guide 230: Disclosing non-IFRS financial 
information (ASIC 2011), in December 2011 (discussed in Section 3.3.2). 
 
To understand this phenomenon of reporting non-GAAP profit figures it is important to 
consider how these figures are calculated. Studies have shown that the majority of firms that 
report such a figure calculate an amount higher than the GAAP profit or loss for the period 
(Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; James & Michello 2003; KPMG 2010b). The question 
arises as to what is excluded from the GAAP profit to arrive at the non-GAAP profit figure 
and how ‘informative’ is this excluded information for investors and other stakeholders? 
 
2.3.1 Items Excluded from Non-GAAP Profit Figures 
Guidelines released in Australia in 2009 by the AICD and FINSIA (AICD & FINSIA 2009) 
(discussed in detail in Section 3.3.1) list suggested items which may be excluded from GAAP 
profit to arrive at a non-GAAP profit figure. These suggestions include: significant one-off 
transactions; one-off provisions such as costs of redundancies; fair value adjustments from 
revaluing assets; impairment losses; income tax settlements from previous years; defined 
benefit pension plans that need a ‘top up’ and revaluation of long-term liabilities. The 
guidelines suggest that certain items should not be included in the adjustments such as 
employee share schemes, depreciation and amortisation.  
 
What Australian companies have actually been including and excluding in their non-GAAP 
profit figures, and the persistence of and relevance to users of these excluded items, has to 
date received little attention in academic studies. Two exceptions are studies by Sek and 
Taylor (2011) and Malone, Tarca and Wee (2016). Sek and Taylor (2011) provided 
descriptive evidence on the items excluded from non-GAAP profits by the top four 
Australian banks, listing fair value adjustments, goodwill amortisation, adjustments for 
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gains/losses on asset sales and distributions from other equity instruments as the most 
common. Malone, Tarca and Wee (2016) investigated adjustments made to non-GAAP 
figures for fair value remeasurements and asset impairments. Industry studies have attempted 
to determine the most common adjustments made by companies. In 2009, for example, 
common adjustments made by Australian companies included: impairment/revaluation of 
assets including goodwill; purchase/disposals of assets and businesses; restructuring and 
redundancy costs and ‘one-off’ tax items (Deloitte 2010; KPMG 2010b). Potential problems 
arise because management chooses which items to include and exclude; different companies 
may choose different items. Even within one company the exclusions may vary from one 
period to the next which makes comparisons between companies, or within one company but 
between periods, very difficult.  
 
Studies in the US have generally found that the type of items excluded from the calculation of 
these alternative profit figures are non-recurring, extraordinary or ‘non-persistent’ expenses, 
some non-cash expenses and in some cases non-recurring or extraordinary income (Doyle, 
Lundholm & Soliman 2003; Halsey & Soybel 2002). Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003, 
p. 145) describe the example of the fourth quarter, 2001 earnings press release of AT&T 
which excluded from its non-GAAP earnings restructuring charges, asset impairment 
charges, losses on the sale of businesses and assets, goodwill amortisation and losses on 
equity method investments. By excluding these items, income was boosted from a loss of 
0.39 cents per share under GAAP to a profit of 0.5 cents per share. Halsey and Soybel (2002) 
refer to the management discussion and analysis of Enron’s 2000 annual report. The report 
discloses ‘after tax results before items impacting comparability’. The figure excludes asset 
write-downs, one-time gains and the ‘cumulative effect of accounting changes’ (Enron 
Corporation 2000, p. 21). Whilst some argue that sustainable or recurring earnings form the 
basis for forecasting future earnings and therefore assist in firm valuation (Entwistle, Feltham 
& Mbagwu 2010), the terminology used by companies varies greatly, as does the items 
included or excluded. This may cause confusion to investors and, as argued above, difficulty 
in comparing results. 
 
The motivation for disclosing non-GAAP profit information has been explained using two 
contrasting perspectives. Extant literature argues that preparers may be attempting to provide 
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value-relevant information incremental to that provided by the financial report and aimed at 
improving stakeholder decision making. Alternatively, the motive may be opportunistic and 
may constitute impression management. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007, p. 117) state that 
these contrasting perspectives form ‘two competing schools of thought’ thus implying they 
are mutually exclusive. However, others argue that the two theories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and may overlap if managers deliberately or inadvertently select and 
present incremental value-relevant information for impression management purposes, that is 
in a misleading manner (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006b; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 
2011; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Libby & Emett 2014; Young 2014). As 
Young (2014, p. 451) proposes, ‘informative reporting and strategic disclosure do not 
represent mutually exclusive explanations’ for non-GAAP reporting behaviour. He proposes 
that it is likely both motives co-exist with particular motivations and reporting incentives 
varying depending on time and the firms involved. This current study adopts the position that 
the two motives may coexist and not be mutually exclusive. The next two sections will 
discuss these two motives.  
 
2.4 Incremental Information Motive 
The first perspective argues that the discretionary disclosure choices made by managers 
constitute incremental information aimed at improving the decision making of various 
stakeholders (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). A consistent argument for the rise in the 
reporting of non-GAAP profit figures worldwide is the demand for more value-relevant 
information, especially where the value relevance of GAAP earnings is low (Bowen, Davis & 
Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2010; Lougee & Marquardt 2004).  
 
2.4.1 Definition and Background 
Value relevance studies investigate how accounting variables are associated with the market 
value of equity (Barth 2000; Beaver 2002; Ohlson 1995) and therefore reflect the 
fundamental value of the firm (Fung, Su & Zhu 2010). Accounting amounts are considered 
value relevant if they have ‘a predicted association with equity market values’ (Barth, Beaver 
& Landsman 2001, p. 79), that is, if they relate to value in the predicted manner. This 
valuation approach has been used in many studies addressing financial reporting and 
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accounting standard setting (Barth 2000; Holthausen & Watts 2001). Proponents of this type 
of research argue that it essentially concerns the qualitative characteristics of relevance and 
reliability of various accounting measures (Gaffikin 2008). 
 
Value relevance studies require an underlying measure of value and a valuation model. Share 
prices are one of the most common measures used in this area of research as, even if markets 
are not totally efficient, they ‘reflect the consensus belief of investors’ (Barth 2000, p. 11). 
Many studies use an earnings or dividend discount model based on seminal works by Miller 
and Modigliani (1966), Beaver (1968) and Ball and Brown (1968). This model links share 
price to accounting amounts by regressing stock returns on alternative measures of earnings. 
The performance measure resulting in the regression with the highest R2 is considered the 
best or most value relevant (Holthausen & Watts 2001). This model has been criticised for its 
reliance on accounting numbers to construct the valuation model (Beaver 2002; Holthausen 
& Watts 2001). For example, some items affect retained earnings but are not included in the 
income statement and this creates a ‘dirty surplus’ as opposed to the situation where all 
changes in retained earnings are reflected in the income statement, a ‘clean surplus’.  
 
Another model, based on the balance sheet, assumes the market value of equity is equal to the 
market value of assets less the market value of liabilities with the market values of the assets 
and liabilities being the present value of the expected dividends or cash flows associated with 
the underlying rights and obligations (Barth 2000). A criticism of this model is that 
accounting assets and liabilities do not reflect all the assets and liabilities of the firm, for 
example some intangibles are not included in the balance sheet (Barth & Landsman 1995) 
and therefore the model may need to include additional variables. 
 
The Ohlson and Feltham Model (Feltham & Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 1995, 1999) provides a 
direct link between accounting amounts and firm value and has been described as ‘perhaps 
the most pervasive valuation model in accounting research today’ (Barth 2000, p. 13) The 
underlying assumption of the model is the ‘clean surplus’ and it specifies how to estimate 
firm value from accounting amounts rather than relying on market prices (Barth 2000). One 
criticism of the model is that it assumes a non-strategic setting where there is no information 
asymmetry and no assumed strategic use of accounting data (Beaver 2002). This is a concern 
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as many financial reporting issues, including the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures, arise 
from concerns about information asymmetry and management incentives to exploit such 
asymmetry to their advantage.  
 
2.4.2 Incremental Information and Non-GAAP Profit Figures 
It is argued that non-GAAP profit figures are needed to help shareholders and investors make 
informed decisions, with managers maintaining that the reporting of such figures provides 
incremental information in addition to the information already available to shareholders and 
investors (Black et al. 2012; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Heitger & Ballou 2003). 
Incremental information studies usually view one or more accounting measures as given 
(GAAP profit) and assess the incremental contribution and value relevance of another 
measure (Biddle, Seow & Siegel 1995). Some studies have used models such as those 
developed by Ohlson and Miller and Modigliani to measure value relevance of the various 
earnings figures. Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2010) found that non-GAAP earnings, 
GAAP earnings and Broker’s Estimate earnings (analyst-adjusted GAAP earnings metrics) 
are all value relevant but non-GAAP earnings are significantly more value relevant than the 
other figures. Brown and Sivakumar (2003) used a variety of tests and concluded that non-
GAAP earnings reported by managers and analysts are more value relevant than GAAP.  
 
Brown and Sivakumar (2003) and Lougee and Marquardt (2004) explored the predictive 
ability of the different measures in an attempt to assess how well past values of an earnings 
figure predict future values of the measure. Brown and Sivakumar (2003) assumed an 
efficient market and concluded that non-GAAP measures provided significantly more 
accurate predictions than GAAP measures. Lougee and Marquardt (2004) obtained mixed 
results on predictive ability and questioned whether the reaction of investors is market 
efficiency or mispricing. Cornell and Landsman (2003) argued that tests used in predictive 
studies are significantly biased against GAAP earnings due to the presence of one-time or 
non-persistent figures. Indeed, the comparability of earnings measures depends on the extent 
to which the measure effectively captures persistent components of earnings (Cornell & 
Landsman 2003). Some argue that non-GAAP figures are therefore more informative and are 
value relevant as they show sustainable earnings as opposed to GAAP which may contain 
non-persistent, one-off figures (Bhattacharya et al. 2003). 
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Others have used event studies, regressing abnormal returns and earnings surprises to 
determine if the release of the particular non-GAAP profit figure is associated with price 
reactions. These studies usually examine share price reactions over short windows of time 
around the date when the earnings figures are disclosed (Beaver 2002; Brown & Warner 
1980, 1985) and associations between the release of the figure and price reactions may be 
considered evidence of value relevance (Holthausen & Watts 2001). Non-GAAP figures have 
been found to be more useful to investors when the informativeness of GAAP is low (Lougee 
& Marquardt 2004), with market participants perceiving them to be more representative of 
core earnings (Bhattacharya et al. 2003). Using long window returns, Bradshaw and Sloan 
(2002) conclude that the value relevance of non-GAAP earnings has increased significantly 
over time with investors showing an increased preference for such earnings figures. Table 2.1 
presents a summary of studies concerning the reporting of non-GAAP earnings information 
and value relevance. 
 
As explained above, the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures is a form of voluntary 
disclosure in most countries. However, South Africa provides an interesting setting to 
investigate the value relevance of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, as the reporting of a non-
GAAP figure is mandatory. The figure is audited, and its calculation is defined in great detail, 
thereby making it comparable. Venter, Emanuel and Cahan (2014) investigated South 
African companies using data from 2002-09 and found that non-GAAP is relatively more 
value relevant than GAAP particularly when exclusions are large. 
 
There are several limitations to the empirical studies discussed in this section. Firstly, non-
GAAP figures are not ‘unambiguously defined’ with different companies calculating the 
figure in different ways (Cornell & Landsman 2003, p. 20). This gives rise to the issue where 
studies using non-GAAP figures and comparing them to GAAP figures are not comparing the 
same measure for all the companies in the study. This issue may have influenced the decision 
of some researchers to use other data as a proxy for the non-GAAP figures reported by   
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Table 2.1: Summary of studies concerning non-GAAP earnings  
information and value relevance 
Author/Year Objective/Sample/Model Used Findings 
Bradshaw and 
Sloan (2002) 
To investigate the use of non-GAAP earnings 
figures and the market response to these figures. 
Uses earnings per share (EPS) from US 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
data and press releases from 1985-97. Event study 
using long window returns and time series 
analysis of forecast errors. 
Investors show an increasing 
preference for non-GAAP earnings. 
The value relevance of non-GAAP 
earnings has increased significantly 
over time. 
Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) 
To assess the relative informativeness and 
persistence of non-GAAP earnings reported by 
managers relative to GAAP and I/B/E/S. Uses 
EPS from US non-GAAP press releases from 
1998-2000. Event study regressing short-window 
abnormal returns and earning surprise measures.  
Non-GAAP significantly more 
informative than GAAP and appear 
more permanent than GAAP. Market 
participants perceive them to be more 
representative of core earnings.  
Brown and 
Sivakumar (2003) 
To determine if non-GAAP earnings reported by 
managers and analysts are more value relevant 
than those derived from firms’ financial 
statements. Uses EPS from US I/B/E/S data and 
EPS from operations from 10-K and 10-Q filings 
from 1989-97. Uses predictive ability, association 
with share prices and correlation of earning 
surprises with share returns to measure value 
relevance. 
Using all three methods, non-GAAP 
income reported by managers and 
analysts is more value relevant than 
the one derived from financial 
statements by S&P Compustat. (the 
study assumes efficient markets – if 
not efficient investors may focus too 
much on non-GAAP earnings 
reported by managers and analysts.) 
Lougee and 
Marquardt (2004) 
To investigate investor response to non-GAAP 
earnings and whether this response is consistent 
with market efficiency or mispricing. Uses US 
press releases from 1997-99. Event study 
regressing abnormal stock returns on earnings 
measures. 
Investors find non-GAAP more useful 
when GAAP informativeness is low 
and strategic considerations 
(attempting to meet or beat a 
benchmark) are absent. Results for 
tests of predictive ability of non-
GAAP are mixed and therefore it is 
unclear whether the reaction of 
investors is due to market efficiency 
or mispricing. 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2010) 
To explore whether non-GAAP, I/B/E/S and 
GAAP are value relevant and which has the 
greatest value relevance. Uses US press releases 
from 2000-2004, a timeframe which straddles the 
introduction of regulation. Uses permanent 
earnings model (Miller & Modigliani 1966) and 
accounting-based valuation model (Ohlson 1995) 
Non-GAAP, GAAP and I/B/E/S 
earnings are all value relevant with 
non-GAAP being significantly more 
value relevant than I/B/E/S which are 
more value relevant than GAAP.  
Venter, Emanuel 
and Cahan (2014) 
To investigate the value relevance of GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings in a setting where the 
reporting of non-GAAP earnings is mandatory, 
and the calculation of the figure is defined in detail 
and subject to audit. Uses accounting-based 
valuation model (Ohlson 1995) and data from 
South African firms from 2002-09. 
Non-GAAP value relevant and 
exclusions from GAAP value 
irrelevant. Non-GAAP has relatively 
higher value relevance than GAAP 
particularly where exclusions are 
large. 
 
companies themselves, see Section 2.4.3 for a discussion on this phenomenon. Secondly, 
some previous studies only include companies that have disclosed a non-GAAP figure (e.g. 
Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2004). This does not allow any comparison with 
firms that disclose only GAAP earnings and the results do not provide any indication of 
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whether analysts and investors would have arrived at the same conclusions and decisions by 
adjusting GAAP earnings.  
 
2.4.3 The Use of Analyst Tracking Services Data 
An important consideration when interpreting particular studies from the US (e.g. Bradshaw 
& Sloan 2002; Brown & Sivakumar 2003; Doyle, Lundholm & Soliman 2003; Heflin & Hsu 
2008; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008) is the use of data from American analyst tracking 
services such as Zacks, First Call and particularly Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) as a proxy for non-GAAP earnings figures released by the firms themselves. These 
figures (often called ‘street’ earnings) are analyst-adjusted GAAP earnings metrics. Studies 
on non-GAAP earnings often choose to use tracking services’ figures as a proxy for the non-
GAAP figures management themselves report, as the tracking service provides a ‘readily 
accessible large sample of observations’ (Easton 2003, p. 180). Although the figures reported 
by these tracking services are analyst adjusted, it is proposed that management can in fact 
influence and ‘guide’ the figures as they are based on ‘operating earnings’ reported to the 
services by the companies involved and then adjusted by the analysts (Bradshaw & Sloan 
2002). It is important when considering the results of previous studies to note whether the 
data was acquired from an analyst tracking service or from actual documents such as 
quarterly press releases.  
 
While studies using these figures can provide some evidence on the value relevance and 
investor perceptions of alternative, non-GAAP earnings figures, the results do not apply to 
actual figures reported by managers of companies. The use of I/B/E/S or other analyst 
tracking services therefore has several limitations when exploring the motivations for and 
reporting of non-GAAP earnings. Most importantly firms included in the tracking services 
become de facto reporters of non-GAAP figures even if they do not actually choose to report 
this type of figure in their press releases or other disclosure documents. This could lead to 
invalid inferences being drawn (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). 
Secondly, there may be a significant difference between the non-GAAP figure reported in 
firms’ press releases and the tracking service figure. In their study involving non-GAAP press 
releases from 1998-2000, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) found the average I/B/E/S earnings per 
share was 0.047 whereas the average non-GAAP figure reported by firms in their press 
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releases was 0.085. Thirdly, the use of tracking services figures makes it difficult to draw 
inferences about managerial motivations for non-GAAP reporting because the use and 
reporting of such a figure by management is not actually investigated (Black et al. 2012). The 
fact that managers may make further adjustments beyond those made by analyst tracking 
services suggests an opportunistic motive on the part of management (Black & Christensen 
2009). The next section discusses the opportunistic motive and the use of impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP figures. 
 
2.5 Opportunistic Motive 
2.5.1 Impression Management 
Management in the corporate sector can use the voluntary, narrative sections of annual 
reports and other documents to present certain information in more detail and provide 
explanations that should increase its decision usefulness. However, the inclusion of this 
voluntary information also presents an opportunity for managers to exploit information 
asymmetry and to engage in opportunistic behaviour concerning disclosure choices. This is 
facilitated by the fact that corporate narratives are largely unregulated (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007). It is argued that some shareholders and potential investors may be unable to 
assess managerial bias in the short term and may be misled concerning the underlying 
economic performance of the firm which may in turn result in potential adverse capital 
allocations (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). One form of opportunistic behaviour 
concerning the way information is presented by managers involves the use of impression 
management. 
 
Impression management has its origins in social psychology and is ‘concerned with studying 
how individuals present themselves to others in order to be perceived favourably by others’ 
(Hooghiemstra 2000, p. 60). Indeed, it has been stated that impression management is 
‘organised communication, which is controlled and managed, influential and persuasive’ 
(Samkin & Schneider 2010, p. 264). From a reporting perspective, studies usually involve 
investigating narrative disclosures in documents such as annual reports and attempt to 
determine whether, under which particular circumstances, and to what extent, organisations 
engage in impression management. Impression management can be used to conceal or 
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highlight certain information by manipulating the information that is conveyed through these 
narratives (Solomon et al. 2013). Importantly, although impression management cannot be 
observed ‘directly’ in accounting narratives, one can observe disclosure practices ‘consistent 
with it’ (García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011, p. 191). These observations may lend 
support to the argument that managers are acting in a self-serving and opportunistic manner 
rather than reporting performance objectively.  
 
Various impression management strategies have been investigated in extant literature. Some 
studies have analysed narratives such as CEO and Chairman’s letters and social and 
environmental reports to identify strategies such as syntactical manipulation or readability 
(e.g. Adelberg 1979; Li 2008; Rutherford 2003), rhetorical manipulation using persuasive 
language (e.g. Jameson 2000; Sydserff & Weetman 2002), thematic manipulation using 
positive/negative language (e.g. Abrahamson & Park 1994; Clatworthy & Jones 2003) and 
attribution of organisational outcomes (e.g. Aerts 2005; Baginski, Hassell & Hillison 2000; 
Clatworthy & Jones 2003; Henry 2008; Lang & Lundholm 2000; Staw, McKechnie & Puffer 
1983). In a financial disclosure context, impression management may occur when 
management selects which information to disclose and presents that information in a manner 
that is intended to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Godfrey, Mather & 
Ramsay 2003; Neu 1991; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998). The manner in which numerical 
information is presented in documents such as annual reports and press releases, and the 
choice of which figures to include, may constitute impression management (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007; Schleicher 2012).  
 
2.5.2 Impression Management and Earnings Information 
Earnings are an important focus for shareholders and investors and therefore ‘constitute the 
most worthwhile information to manipulate in corporate narrative sections’ (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007, p. 158). In particular the prominence sometimes given to the disclosure of 
non-GAAP financial measures in press releases and annual reports indicates that they may be 
‘strategically emphasised by managers in order to influence the perception of the firm’s 
financial results’ (Marques 2010, p. 131). As discussed in Section 2.3, different companies 
use different names for these earnings figures and the calculation of the figures may differ 
between companies and within the same company over different periods. This means that the 
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mere presence of these figures may cause confusion for some investors. That being said, the 
fact that a non-GAAP figure has been disclosed does not, of itself, constitute impression 
management. It is the manner in which these figures are presented in press releases and 
annual reports which may constitute impression management.  
 
The reporting of non-GAAP figures has been widespread throughout several countries and 
earnings press releases have been the dominant disclosure medium used in the literature 
concerning this phenomenon (e.g. Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brown, Christensen & 
Elliott 2012; Doyle, Jennings & Soliman 2013; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2005, 
2006b; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 
2012; Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques 2017; Hitz 2010; Lougee & Marquardt 2004; 
Marques 2010). The earnings press release is seen to serve a dual purpose, ‘(T)he 
informational purpose is to impart facts about the company’s performance, and the 
promotional (or even persuasive) purpose is to favourably influence readers’ views of that 
performance’ (Henry 2008, p. 368). A limited number of studies concerning the reporting of 
non-GAAP figures have used annual reports (e.g. Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; 
Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Rainsbury 2016; Rainsbury, Hart & Buranavityawut 2015), 
perhaps due to their being less ‘timely’ than press releases. 
 
Impression management strategies used in the disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures include 
the choice of which figure to disclose, the use of benchmarks and the manner in which the 
information is presented. Strategies may be visual or structural and involve the emphasis, 
ordering and repetition of information and the use of fonts and styles in order to make a piece 
of information more obvious to readers (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brennan, 
Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007). It may also involve conveying certain information in a positive light and 
selectively omitting other information (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). These strategies are 
discussed in detail in the following sections (Sections 2.5.2.1 to 2.5.2.5). 
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2.5.2.1 Selectivity 
Disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information may be manipulated through firms choosing 
which earnings amounts to use in order to portray current financial performance. There are a 
range of financial results that could be reported by companies and the impression 
management strategy of selectivity involves reporting the most favourable items from the 
information available (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & 
Guillamón-Saorín 2011). The performance of the company and whether it has achieved 
previous forecasts may affect the choice of which figures to highlight. For example, 
Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2004) found that although the use of non-GAAP figures 
dominated GAAP figures in their study, if the GAAP result was a record figure or met 
analysts’ forecasts then the company was less likely to report the non-GAAP figure. This 
finding that non-GAAP figures are used strategically when a firm fails to reach an earnings 
benchmark based on GAAP is supported by other studies (e.g. Lougee & Marquardt 2004). 
Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma and Jones (2012) found that good performers are more likely 
to stress their profitability in press release headlines and use figures from the Profit and Loss 
Account. However, when GAAP earnings have decreased from the previous period, the 
company is more likely to emphasise sales or a non-GAAP metric whose components are not 
defined in the press release. 
 
2.5.2.2 Emphasis, ordering and repetition 
Once the particular figures to be disclosed have been chosen, presentational and visual 
techniques can then be used to emphasise positive performance while downplaying negative 
outcomes (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; 
García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011). Techniques may include positioning the positive 
information (e.g. a non-GAAP measure which is higher than the statutory or GAAP figure) in 
a prominent position such as a heading or the first paragraph, repeating the figure throughout 
the disclosure or reinforcing it with a qualifier such as ‘excellent’, ‘improved’ or ‘strong’. 
Emphasis can also be achieved using bullet points and particular fonts and typefaces. Studies 
have shown that people are strongly influenced by the first piece of information to which they 
are exposed, and this information biases their evaluation of subsequent information (Asch 
1946; Hirshleifer & Teoh 2003; Huang, Nekrasov & Teoh 2012; Lim, Benbasat & Ward 
2000). In an experimental study using president’s letters, subjects relied most on the first 
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information they read when assessing both the past performance and future prospects of 
companies (Baird & Zelin 2000). Ordering and emphasis are therefore important, and several 
studies have found that management emphasises the earnings measure that presents the 
company’s financial performance in the best light – in the majority of cases this is the non-
GAAP figure (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; 
Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Marques 2010). As an example, a study using US press 
releases from 2001-02 found that the non-GAAP figure was given greater prominence than 
the GAAP figure in 79% of cases. The two figures were given equal prominence in 16% of 
cases and in only 4% of cases did the GAAP figure dominate (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2004). The non-GAAP figure disclosed was higher than the GAAP figure in 87% of the cases 
and on average was over twice as large.  
 
Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2005) examined US press releases from 2001-02 which 
contained both non-GAAP and GAAP earnings. Using a self-developed emphasis scoring 
system, they found that companies emphasise the metric that most favourably portrays 
company performance especially those reporting a non-GAAP profit and a GAAP loss. 
Interestingly they conclude that the firms are also emphasising the metric that is the most 
‘value relevant’ and chose to use the word ‘deliberate’ rather than ‘opportunistic’ when 
describing the manager’s choice of which metric to emphasise. The measure of value 
relevance used, however, is rather rudimentary with the authors assuming that for firms with 
a history of prior losses, earnings variability or membership in a high-tech industry, the 
GAAP results would have low value relevance.  
 
In an extension on this study Marques (2010) also found that firms position the non-GAAP 
measure first when they wish to provide a positive performance signal. This was particularly 
the case when non-GAAP earnings were higher than strategic earnings benchmarks and 
GAAP earnings did not meet the benchmark. In an experimental study, Elliott (2006) found 
that non-professional investors were influenced to make investment decisions by the 
emphasis, and not mere presence, of non-GAAP earnings. Using trading reactions as an 
indicator, Allee et al. (2007) found that less sophisticated investors rely significantly more on 
press releases with a non-GAAP figure than those without such a figure, and their reliance 
increases when the non-GAAP figure is placed before the GAAP figure. In both these studies, 
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which are discussed in more detail in Section 2.6, more sophisticated investors such as 
analysts appear to be unaffected by the presence or emphasis of the non-GAAP figure. 
 
In one of the few Australian studies into the phenomenon, Cameron, Percy and Stevenson-
Clarke (2012) found that more than twice as many companies emphasised non-GAAP profit 
over GAAP profit in their annual reports and also that the trend was increasing over the years 
2007-09 despite the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines, Underlying Profit: 
Principles for Reporting of Non-Statutory Information in March, 2009 (AICD & FINSIA 
2009). 
 
2.5.2.3 Use of benchmarks 
Another impression management strategy used in the reporting of non-GAAP earnings 
figures is the selection of a prior-period benchmark that allows for a favourable comparison 
of performance. It is common for companies to compare the current year’s results with those 
of the prior period and this can be useful for the decision making of investors. However, 
management may strategically focus on a benchmark that allows the most favourable period-
to-period comparison, which could mislead investors in their evaluations of company 
performance (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 
2011; Henry 2008; Schrand & Walther 2000). There may be an assumption on the part of 
managers that investors do not use other publicly available information (that is, are not 
rational) and are misled by the use of a carefully chosen benchmark (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007; Schrand & Walther 2000). For example, Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma and 
Jones (2012), in their investigation of press release headlines from Spanish firms, found 
about half of the firms in the study positively reinforced performance using a prior period 
benchmark but in no case was a decrease in performance noted using a benchmark. 
 
Schrand and Walther (2000) argue that managers lower prior-period earnings benchmarks 
against which current earnings will be compared, by strategically reporting or not reporting 
separate components of the prior-period earnings. They found that companies are more likely 
to separately disclose a prior year non-recurring gain on property, plant and equipment than a 
prior year loss. Reminding investors of a previous gain allows them to adjust the previous 
period’s earnings and therefore provides the lowest possible benchmark against which to 
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evaluate the current earnings of the company. By not reminding investors of a prior period 
loss on property, plant and equipment, firms can emphasise a larger increase in earnings. 
Further, the likelihood that managers will employ this strategy is stronger when doing so 
prevents a negative earnings surprise. To further investigate the findings of Schrand and 
Walther (2000), Krische (2005) conducted an experiment using MBA and accounting 
students, involving whether firms incurred a prior period gain or loss on the sale of 
equipment and then repeated the information concerning the gain or loss in the current 
period. She found participants in the experiment made lower valuation judgements when 
prior year losses were repeated and higher valuation judgements when prior year gains were 
repeated. These results suggest that investors adjust for prior-period events when reminded of 
the event in the current year, but not when reminders are absent, even though investors have 
previously been made aware of the information. Krische (2005) found evidence to suggest 
that limitations in the memories of investors is the likely cause of this finding. 
 
2.5.2.4 Reconciliation to GAAP profit 
As discussed above, extant literature has contended that the use of impression management 
strategies to emphasise non-GAAP earnings over GAAP figures may mislead investors, 
particularly non-professionals. However, this confusion may be mitigated by the presence of 
a clear reconciliation between the figures (Elliott 2006; Marques 2010). Although studies 
have found that the presence and ordering of non-GAAP figures affected the trading 
decisions of less sophisticated investors, the presence of a reconciliation to GAAP mitigated 
this effect (Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006).  
 
2.5.2.5 Other strategies  
A range of other potential impression management strategies employed in the disclosure of 
non-GAAP figures have been investigated in previous literature. Entwistle, Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2006b) examined the use of GAAP terminology to describe what was revealed 
later in the press release to be a non-GAAP amount. Their study focused on headlines in the 
press releases of S&P 500 firms in the US from 2001-03 and found 14% used this misleading 
GAAP terminology in 2001. This decreased to only 1% in 2003 after the introduction of 
Regulation G by the SEC (see Section 2.8). The authors suggest that the results indicate that 
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prior to regulation, managers were either careless or intentionally attempting to mislead 
investors with inappropriate terminology. 
 
A longitudinal study into the relationship between the timing of quarterly earnings press 
releases containing non-GAAP earnings figures and the manipulation of reported earnings by 
managers was conducted by Brown, Christensen and Elliott (2012). Managers were found to 
accelerate the release of press releases in quarters where the release contained a non-GAAP 
figure compared to quarters where it did not. This acceleration increased with the level of 
exclusion of recurring expenses and the use of less transparent reconciliation formats. Taking 
all their results into consideration they concluded that the acceleration of earnings results 
containing non-GAAP figures is indicative of managerial opportunism. 
 
The above discussion presents the findings of various studies into the impression 
management tactics that may be used to convey non-GAAP earnings information. Prior 
research has also investigated the association between corporate governance and impression 
management with regard to the reporting of these figures and has concluded that companies 
with stronger corporate governance are less likely to disclose this information in a misleading 
manner. In a study involving Spanish firms, García Osma and Guillamón-Saorín (2011) 
found that stronger governance (measured by several proxies including the number of 
independent directors) lowers the incidence of disclosure practices consistent with both 
quantitative and qualitative impression management. In particular firms with stronger 
governance are more likely to issue an annual results press release and are more likely to 
include negative information rather than only information which is positive in nature. 
Frankel, McVay and Soliman (2011) investigated earnings announcements from US 
companies over the years 1998-2005. They found that companies with less independent 
boards are more likely to exclude recurring items from their non-GAAP earnings figures, a 
finding that supports opportunistic behaviour. This association declines following the 
introduction of Regulation G (see Section 2.8) which the researchers conclude provides an 
alternative monitoring mechanism to independent directors. These findings are supported by 
Jennings and Marques (2011), also a US study, who additionally found that investors were 
misled by the non-GAAP figures (which were relatively persistent and positively associated 
with future returns) reported by firms with weaker governance. They also found that pre-
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Regulation G (but not post), firms with weaker governance were more likely to make 
adjustments to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, a phenomenon discussed in the next section. 
Table 2.2 presents a summary of studies concerning impression management and the 
reporting of non-GAAP earnings information. 
 
Table 2.2: Summary of studies concerning impression management  
and non-GAAP earnings information 
Author/Year Objective and Sample Results 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2004) 
To investigate the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings figures and whether they are being 
used strategically to affect investors’ 
perceptions of performance. Uses EPS from 
US press releases from 2001-2002.  
Emphasis of non-GAAP dominated GAAP in 
79% of sample. Non-GAAP figure > GAAP 
87% of time - on average over twice as large. If 
there was strong performance, record GAAP or 
met analyst forecast then less likely to report 
non-GAAP figures. 
Bowen, Davis and 
Matsumoto (2005) 
To explore the use of managerial emphasis 
of various earnings figures as a disclosure 
tool. Uses US press releases from 2001-
2002 which disclosed both GAAP and non-
GAAP measures. 
Firms emphasise metric that most favourably 
portrays company performance with media 
coverage affecting manager’s emphasis 
decisions. There was a shift away from non-
GAAP emphasis in 2002 – before Reg G but 
after SEC scrutiny. 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2005) 
500 US and 300 Canadian firms – used 
year-end press releases from 2001 and 2002. 
Used EPS and looked at strategies including 
emphasis. Emphasis measured by 
appearance in headline and relative 
prominence over the whole press release. 
 
Non-GAAP in headline – US 51%, Canada 
26%. Non-GAAP disclosed before and is main 
figure discussed – US 79%, Canada 65%. 
US firms make significantly more adjustments 
than Canadian firms to non-GAAP figure. Non-
GAAP > GAAP US 86%, Canada 75%. 
Sometimes earnings figures in headline were 
not obviously GAAP or non-GAAP – needed 
full reading of press release. 
Elliott (2006) To investigate how presentational 
characteristics of non-GAAP earnings 
announcements influence users’ 
judgements. Experiment using MBA 
students and analysts in US. 
Non-professional investors influenced by 
emphasis and not mere presence of non-GAAP 
figures and tend to anchor their earnings 
judgements on the first earnings information 
presented. Reconciliations mitigate effect of 
emphasis. 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2006b) 
To investigate whether firms were 
disclosing non-GAAP figures in a 
potentially misleading manner and whether 
Reg G affected this behaviour. Uses US 
press releases from S&P 500 from 2001-
2003.  
In 2001, 77% disclosed a non-GAAP figure in 
their headline of which 14% were potentially 
misleading as they used GAAP terminology 
when reporting the non-GAAP result. In 2003, 
54% disclosed figure but only 1% misleading. 
The cessation of the practice post Reg G 
suggests that firms understood that the 
disclosures had the potential to mislead. 
Allee et al. (2007) To externally validate and extend 
experimental evidence by investigating non-
GAAP disclosure and investor 
sophistication. Uses US transaction data and 
trade-size-based proxies to distinguish 
between classes of investor.  
Less sophisticated investors trade significantly 
more when a non-GAAP figure is present in 
press release. Price reactions are higher when 
non-GAAP reported before GAAP. More 
sophisticated investors not affected. 
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Table 2.2: Summary of studies concerning impression management  
and non-GAAP earnings information (continued) 
Author/Year Objective and Sample Results 
Marques (2010) To investigate if firms strategically 
emphasise non-GAAP figures when they 
portray a better performance. Uses press 
releases for a sample from S&P 500 in US 
from 2001-2003.  
Firms give significant prominence to non-
GAAP figures when they are higher than 
GAAP. This emphasis is negatively associated 
with SEC scrutiny. 
 
García Osma and 
Guillamón-Saorín 
(2011) 
To study the association between corporate 
governance and impression management 
relating to the disclosure of results in press 
releases. Uses press releases from Spanish 
firms from 2005-2006.  
Stronger governance lowers incidence of 
disclosure practices consistent with both 
quantitative and qualitative impression 
management.  
 
Brown, 
Christensen and 
Elliott (2012) 
To investigate the timing of earnings 
releases containing non-GAAP figures as an 
impression management tactic. Uses EPS 
from US press releases 1998-2006. 
Firms accelerate earnings announcements that 
contain non-GAAP figures compared to those 
that do not and this acceleration increases with 
the level of managers’ exclusions of recurring 
expenses and their use of less transparent 
reconciliation formats.  
Cameron, Percy 
and Stevenson-
Clarke (2012) 
To investigate the presence and prominence 
of non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Uses 
Australian annual reports from 2007-2009 
from the top 50 non-mining companies.  
 
48 firms in 2007 and all 50 firms in 2008 and 
2009 disclosed non-GAAP figures using many 
different names and methods of calculation. 
There was more emphasis on non-GAAP 
figures and this trend increased in 2009.  
Guillamon-Saorin, 
Garcia Osma and 
Jones (2012) 
To examine managerial, self-serving 
disclosure practices in annual results press 
release headlines. Uses Spanish press 
releases from 2005-06 but only looked at 
the headlines. 
There is evidence of persistent impression 
management in press release headlines. Firms 
do not include negative information no matter 
what their overall performance and used 
‘framing’ and benchmarks to emphasise 
positives even with poor performance. 
 
 
2.5.3 Calculation of Figures and Manipulation to Meet or Beat Analysts’ Forecasts 
Apart from selecting which figures to disclose to users, and using emphasis to highlight 
certain figures, managers who choose to disclose non-GAAP earnings figures must decide on 
which income and expenses to exclude in the calculation. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, this 
usually involves the exclusion of less persistent, transitory or one off expenses and income in 
an attempt to reflect core earnings. However, several studies have documented cases where 
recurring expenses that may have predictive value have been excluded from the non-GAAP 
figure (Black & Christensen 2009; Brown, Christensen & Elliott 2012; Doyle, Lundholm & 
Soliman 2003; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques 2017; 
Johnson & Schwartz 2005). Johnson and Schwartz (2005) looked at US press releases for one 
quarter in 2000 (before any bad press or regulation) and found that, contrary to claims that 
non-GAAP figures were more persistent, adjustments made to GAAP were large in 
magnitude, encompassed more than just the elimination of nonrecurring items and often 
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exceeded adjustments made by analyst tracking services. Additionally, they found no 
difference in the persistence of the GAAP figures reported by firms that disclosed non-GAAP 
figures and firms that did not. Therefore, there may be other reasons firms choose to exclude 
certain expenses from non-GAAP earnings and then report these earnings figures.  
 
Studies have found that firms with GAAP losses, decreases in GAAP earnings or earnings 
that miss benchmarks are significantly more likely to report non-GAAP figures than firms 
with GAAP profits or increases in GAAP (Ciccone 2002; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2004, 2005; Isidro & Marques 2015; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). Managers may have 
incentives to meet or beat earnings targets as there are capital market benefits when firms 
meet or surpass targets and forecasts (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal 2005; Isidro & Marques 
2015). These earnings targets include avoiding losses, reporting increases in earnings and 
meeting analysts’ expectations for the quarter or year (Dechow & Skinner 2000). Firms may 
attempt to manage earnings expectations by revising forecasts downward or may use actual 
earnings management to manipulate GAAP earnings (Burgstahler & Eames 2006).  
 
Earnings management involves the exercise of judgement in accounting calculations and 
financial reporting (also referred to as accruals management) or the manipulation of real 
activities (Davidson et al. 2004; Doyle, Jennings & Soliman 2013; Elshafie, Yen & Yu 2010; 
Healy & Wahlen 1999; McVay 2006). The first form of earnings management, accruals 
management, can occur for example when estimating items such as expected useful lives, 
salvage values, obligations for leave benefits, doubtful debts and asset impairments. This 
actually affects the amount of GAAP profit reported and is different to calculating a non-
GAAP figure by eliminating certain expenses contained in the GAAP. The second form of 
earnings management involves managing real activities to change reported GAAP profits and 
could involve, for example, increasing production to lower cost of goods sold or lowering 
spending on discretionary expenses such as advertising or research and development. If 
earnings management is not possible or not successful in adjusting GAAP earnings to meet 
targets, then other strategies such as impression management may possibly be employed.  
Elshafie, Yen and Yu (2010) looked at the association between actual earnings management 
and managing investor perception using non-GAAP figures. They found that managers report 
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more aggressive non-GAAP earnings numbers when the GAAP result does not meet earnings 
targets and the firm has limited ability to use actual earnings management as explained 
above. As Schrand and Walther (2000, p. 152) explain, ‘(s)trategic disclosure in earnings 
announcements is related to earnings management, but the manager is managing the 
perception of earnings rather than managing actual earnings’. This strategic manipulation of 
non-GAAP profits to meet or beat earnings targets, particularly when the exclusion of 
recurring items is involved, can be considered a form of impression management.  
 
There have been several studies investigating the apparent practice of firms adjusting non-
GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat forecasts that GAAP earnings failed to reach. Some 
studies found that the practice increased significantly in years prior to the introduction of 
Regulation G in the US. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2004) found the occurrences of 
non-GAAP earnings per share meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts when the GAAP figure 
did not, increased from 18% to 63% over their sample period of 1998-2000. The involvement 
of various types of impression management tactics is also evident. Studies have variously 
found the strategic exclusion of recurring items in order to meet or beat forecasts (Doyle, 
Jennings & Soliman 2013; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Isidro & Marques 2015), 
strategic emphasis and positioning of non-GAAP earnings which meet or beat when GAAP 
did not (Marques 2010) and the acceleration of announcements containing non-GAAP figures 
which increases with the level of exclusions and less transparent reconciliations (Brown, 
Christensen & Elliott 2012). Of concern is that analysts and investors do not appear to fully 
incorporate this behaviour into their forecasts and decision making (Chen 2010; Doyle, 
Jennings & Soliman 2013). The practice of excluding recurring items from non-GAAP 
figures appears to have been constrained by the introduction of Regulation G in the US (see 
Section 2.7 for a discussion on the effect of regulation). Table 2.3 provides a summary of 
studies into the calculation of non-GAAP earnings figures and the use of such figures to 
strategically meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
 
An interesting insight into how managers can manipulate non-GAAP figures without 
necessarily inviting the scrutiny of auditors and regulators is provided by McVay (2006) who 
investigated classification shifting by firms. This practice involves ‘shifting’ items down the 
income statement from core, recurring expenses such as Cost of Goods Sold to special items.   
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Table 2.3: Summary of studies into exclusion of recurring items from  
non-GAAP figures and calculation of such figures to meet or beat 
Author/Year Objective and Sample Results 
Ciccone (2002) To investigate the use of non-GAAP earnings to 
manipulate the perception of performance. Used 
earnings per share (EPS) from 1990-2000 from 
First Call tracking service (US data). 
Firms with GAAP losses and decreases in 
GAAP report significantly higher non-GAAP 
earnings. These are reported more frequently 
and with higher magnitude than firms with 
GAAP profits and increases in GAAP. 
Doyle, 
Lundholm and 
Soliman (2003) 
To investigate whether expenses excluded from 
non-GAAP provide incremental information 
about future cash flows and whether stock 
market prices these exclusions. Uses I/B/E/S 
EPS 1988-99 (US data). 
Found statistically and economically 
significant relationships between future cash 
flows and expenses excluded. Market does 
not fully appreciate the predictive power of 
these exclusions. 
Bhattacharya et 
al. (2004)  
To provide descriptive evidence on non-GAAP 
reporting including expense exclusions and 
meet or beat behaviour. Uses US press releases 
containing non-GAAP EPS issued between Jan 
1998 and Dec 2000.  
Firms exclude multiple expenses from non-
GAAP EPS and exclusions differ in 
subsequent quarters. Non-GAAP meeting or 
beating analyst forecast when GAAP did not, 
increased from 18% to 63% over sample 
period. GAAP decrease but non-GAAP 
increase increased from 12% to 44%. 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2004) 
To investigate the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings figures and whether they are being 
used strategically to affect investors’ 
perceptions of performance. Uses EPS from US 
press releases from 2001-2002.  
If there was strong performance, record 
GAAP or GAAP met analyst forecast then 
less likely to report non-GAAP figures. 
Entwistle, 
Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2005) 
To compare the voluntary disclosure of non-
GAAP earnings in the US and Canada. Uses 
EPS from 500 US and 300 Canadian firms’ 
year-end press releases from 2001 and 2002.  
Both US and Canadian firms are significantly 
more likely to report a non-GAAP figure 
when their GAAP figure failed to meet 
earnings forecasts. 
Johnson and 
Schwartz (2005) 
To investigate whether investors are misled by 
non-GAAP disclosures. Looks at the share price 
investors assign to non-GAAP firms compared 
to other firms but also analyses the non-GAAP 
disclosures themselves. Uses US press releases 
June to August 2000. 
Adjustments made go beyond the elimination 
of nonrecurring or special items. Exclusions 
are described using vague nomenclature and 
there are few reconciliations (data pre Reg G). 
No difference in the persistence of GAAP 
between disclosing and non-disclosing firms. 
McVay (2006) To investigate classification shifting – shifting 
items down the income statement from core, 
recurring expenses to special items, thereby 
allowing easier manipulation of non-GAAP 
earnings. Uses US data from 1988-2003 from 
I/B/E/S and Compustat. 
Core items are moved to special items, 
especially to enable firms to meet analysts’ 
forecasts.  
Black and 
Christensen 
(2009) 
To investigate the type of adjustments managers 
use to achieve strategic earnings benchmarks 
that were missed based on GAAP earnings. 
Uses EPS from US press releases 1998-2003.  
Managers often exclude recurring items. Most 
firms using non-GAAP to meet or beat do so 
by excluding recurring items. Firms that 
report non-GAAP sporadically are more 
likely to be attempting to meet or beat.  
Chen (2010) To investigate the persistence of items excluded 
from non-GAAP earnings, particularly in order 
to meet or beat. 
Uses I/B/E/S and Compustat (US data) from 
1992 to 2005 and differentiates between meet or 
beat exclusions and non-meet or beat 
exclusions. 
Analysts underestimate persistence of non-
meet or beat exclusions but not meet or beat 
exclusions. Underestimation declined post 
Reg G. Investors underestimate persistence of 
all exclusions in pre but not post period. Reg 
G constrained practice of excluding recurring 
expenses to meet or beat. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of studies into exclusion of recurring items from  
non-GAAP figures and calculation of such figures to meet or beat (continued) 
Author/Year Objective and Sample Results 
Elshafie, Yen 
and Yu (2010) 
To investigate association between actual 
earnings management and managing investor 
perception using non-GAAP figures. Uses US 
2001-07 non-GAAP earnings announcements. 
Managers report more aggressive non-GAAP 
earnings numbers when they do not meet 
earnings objectives or have limited ability to 
use earnings management.  
Marques (2010) To investigate if firms strategically emphasise 
non-GAAP figures to meet or beat when GAAP 
does not. Uses press releases for a sample from 
S&P 500 in US from 2001-2003. 
Firms strategically emphasise non-GAAP 
earnings by positioning them first when non-
GAAP meets or beats analyst forecast and 
GAAP does not. 
Frankel, McVay 
and Soliman 
(2011) 
To investigate the association between board 
independence and the quality of non-GAAP 
earnings. Uses variety of US data from 1998-
2005. 
Firms with less independent boards are more 
likely to opportunistically exclude recurring 
items from non-GAAP figures. Association 
declines and is not significant following Reg 
G. Insider selling increases when non-GAAP 
meets or beats analyst forecast. 
Brown, 
Christensen and 
Elliott (2012) 
To investigate the timing of earnings releases 
containing non-GAAP figures as an impression 
management tactic. Uses EPS from US press 
releases 1998-2006. 
Firms accelerate earnings announcements that 
contain non-GAAP figures. This acceleration 
increases with the level of exclusions of 
recurring expenses and the use of less 
transparent reconciliation formats. 
Doyle, Jennings 
and Soliman 
(2013) 
To investigate whether managers use their 
discretion to define non-GAAP earnings that 
meet or beat analyst forecasts. Uses US EPS 
from 1988-2009 from I/B/E/S and a dataset 
from press releases. 
Managers opportunistically define non-
GAAP earnings to exceed analyst forecasts 
and analysts do not fully incorporate this 
behaviour into their forecasts.  
Isidro and 
Marques (2015) 
To investigate whether country level 
institutional and economic factors influence 
meet or beat behaviour. Uses European press 
releases from 316 firms from 2003-07. 
When GAAP misses benchmark more likely 
to report non-GAAP, have non-GAAP meet 
or beat and exclude recurring items. This is 
more likely in countries with stronger law and 
investor protection and developed financial 
markets where it is more difficult to 
manipulate GAAP. 
Guillamon-
Saorin, Isidro 
and Marques 
(2017) 
To investigate market reaction to non-GAAP 
earnings measures, which are combined with 
high levels of impression management. Uses 
European press releases from 243 firms from 
2003-09. 
Non-GAAP measures are generally 
informative to capital markets. However, 
adjustments are more persistent where high 
impression management is evident. Investors 
in sophisticated markets decipher this tactic 
and penalise these firms while investors in 
less sophisticated markets do not react to 
these tactics. 
 
Although this does not change the actual GAAP profit reported it does allow easier 
manipulation of non-GAAP figures as ‘special items’ are usually excluded from GAAP in the 
calculation of the non-GAAP profit. She found the practice is especially evident in firms 
where the non-GAAP figure just meets the analyst forecast (and the GAAP figure did not) 
indicating that this may have been the objective of the practice. Manipulating the calculation 
of non-GAAP profits to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts or to obfuscate a GAAP loss or 
decrease in GAAP earnings, has the potential to mislead shareholders and investors, 
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particularly less sophisticated ones. Insight into how shareholders and investors react to the 
disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures is provided in the next section.  
 
2.6 The Reaction of Investors 
Whether the reporting of non-GAAP profits provides value relevant, incremental information 
or is in fact misleading, it is important to determine if and how shareholders and investors 
react to the disclosure of such figures and whether they perceive them to be useful in their 
decision making. Previous studies have found that investor’s perceptions of the usefulness, 
relevance and reliability of the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP figures depends on their 
level of sophistication. James and Michello (2010) conducted a survey to examine investor 
perceptions of non-GAAP earnings compared to GAAP earnings. Participants were divided 
into professionals (analysts and fund managers) and non-professionals (MBA students) and 
surveyed with regard the decision usefulness of both types of earnings figures. The key 
finding of the study was that both groups perceived the reporting of non-GAAP earnings as 
less useful than GAAP reporting. Although this result was significant for all groups in the 
study, it was less evident in the non-professional investors. Despite the results of this survey, 
experimental studies have found that investors do use, and are influenced by, the presence of 
non-GAAP profit figures, particularly less sophisticated investors. 
 
Experimental studies, where participants are given a set of results and asked to make 
investment decisions based on the information, have rendered interesting results which 
indicate that the way investors are actually affected by, and react to the disclosure of non-
GAAP figures may differ from their perceived usefulness of such figures. Frederickson and 
Miller (2004) conducted an experiment to examine the effect of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures on the judgements of sophisticated users (analysts) and less sophisticated users 
(MBA students). Less sophisticated users who received both non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
assessed a higher stock price than those who received only GAAP figures. However, 
analysts’ stock price judgements were not affected by the disclosure of non-GAAP figures. 
Follow up questions revealed that these results may be explained by the different valuation 
models and information processing between the two groups. The analysts used well-defined 
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valuation models based on either earnings-multiples or cash flows whereas the less 
sophisticated investors used simpler, heuristic-based models.  
 
Elliott (2006) extended Frederickson and Miller’s work by including the effect on investment 
decisions of emphasis (rather than mere presence) of non-GAAP earnings and the presence of 
reconciliation to GAAP earnings (as required in the US by Regulation G). Interestingly, non-
professionals were influenced by the emphasis of non-GAAP earnings figures and not merely 
by their presence whereas professionals were unaffected by this manipulation. The results for 
non-professional participants where GAAP earnings were emphasised over non-GAAP were 
similar to those where only GAAP earnings were reported, confirming that it was emphasis 
and not merely the presence of the non-GAAP figure that influenced the non-professionals. 
This influence was mitigated by the presence of a reconciliation to GAAP figures with non-
professional participants assessing earnings to be lower and investing a smaller amount when 
a reconciliation was included. In contrast, professional investors (analysts) assessed 
performance as higher and invested more when non-GAAP earnings were emphasised and 
reconciled to GAAP with further analysis revealing that the reconciliation provided 
transparency and thereby affected the analysts’ perceptions of the reliability (rather than 
relevance) of the number.  
 
An important finding of both these studies is that the influence of the non-GAAP number on 
less sophisticated users appears to be the result of an unintentional cognitive effect rather than 
their reliance on the number due to the perceived informativeness of the figure. This finding 
was established through questioning of participants on how relevant and informative they 
perceived the non-GAAP figure to be. In both studies, participants in the non-professional 
groups stated that they found the non-GAAP earnings no more relevant or informative than 
the GAAP earnings, a finding that supports the survey conducted by James and Michello 
(2010) (see discussion above). However, although non-professionals did not perceive the 
non-GAAP figure to be any more informative, its presence (or emphasis) still caused the 
participants to make higher valuations of the fictitious firms leading the authors to conclude 
that it affected their perceptions of the overall favourableness of the earnings announcement 
(Frederickson & Miller 2004) and unintentionally affected their decision making.  
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The findings of a Swedish based experiment (Andersson & Hellman 2007) using only 
professional investors (analysts) did not support the findings of Frederickson and Miller 
(2004) and Elliott (2006). Participants who received both non-GAAP and GAAP earnings 
announcements made significantly higher earnings per share predictions than those who only 
received GAAP statements. The difference between the two sets of figures was substantial 
and included a non-GAAP profit and GAAP loss and the authors considered this may be one 
reason for the differing results. It is possible that the analysts simply found the extra 
information provided in the non-GAAP sample to be value relevant in a situation where the 
figures were so different. The studies conducted in the US made sure the GAAP information 
was detailed enough to enable calculation the non-GAAP information, even if a non-GAAP 
figure was not provided but it is unclear if this was the case in the Swedish study. 
 
Although the external validity of these studies is questionable due to small sample size and 
the use of MBA students as a proxy for less sophisticated investors in some of the 
experiments, the results call into question the claims by management that non-GAAP 
earnings figures provide incremental, value-relevant information. The studies instead infer 
that less sophisticated investors may in fact be misled by the disclosure of such figures 
whereas professional investors have more expertise, approach investment tasks differently 
and better understand the difference between GAAP and non-GAAP figures. Professionals 
are therefore less likely to intentionally or unintentionally rely on the non-GAAP figure 
simply because it is emphasised.  
 
One of the few Australian studies concerning non-GAAP profits sheds further light on the 
manner in which these figures affect investors, particularly less sophisticated investors. 
Johnson et al. (2014) used an experimental design involving undergraduate accounting 
students but did not investigate the making of investment decisions. Instead, participants were 
required to demonstrate their understanding of earnings information by identifying some 
basic financial measures such as current year profit, movement in profit and earnings per 
share. Those who were provided with both types of earnings information tended to focus on 
the emphasised non-GAAP information when answering the questions. The authors conclude 
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that there is a positive association between the prominent disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
information and the reliance by non-sophisticated investors on this information. Indeed, the 
findings implied that some less sophisticated investors may have had difficulty in perceiving 
the difference between the two types of earnings figures. 
 
These experimental studies have been extended into a real world setting with research 
investigating who trades on non-GAAP earnings information. Using transaction data and 
trade size to distinguish between larger, sophisticated investors and smaller, less sophisticated 
investors, Bhattacharya et al. (2007) examined who responded to quarterly earnings press 
releases containing non-GAAP disclosures. They found that abnormal trading by less 
sophisticated users was significantly positively related to non-GAAP earnings disclosure but 
there was no association between the earnings reported and sophisticated investors’ trading. 
Sophisticated investors either avoided trading altogether in the days surrounding the 
announcement or traded late in the period. Interestingly, further study of a matched group of 
earnings announcements that did not contain any non-GAAP figures showed professionals 
did trade significantly around these particular announcements.  
 
Similar results were attained by Allee et al. (2007) who found less sophisticated investors 
trade significantly more, and in the direction of the earnings surprise, when a non-GAAP 
earnings number was present in a press release. These reactions were higher when the non-
GAAP figure was reported before GAAP earnings. Sophisticated investors actually traded 
less, or in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise. Extending the work of Elliott 
(2006), Allee et al. also investigated the effect of the presence of a reconciliation to GAAP 
and found that the reactions of both non-sophisticated and sophisticated investors were no 
longer significant. However, this result must be considered in light of the variable used for 
the presence of a reconciliation; that is, a simple proxy which assumed all announcements in 
2003 contained a reconciliation and all announcements before this date did not.  
 
In a more recent European study, Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro and Marques (2017) investigated 
market reaction to the disclosure of non-GAAP figures, which were combined with high 
levels of impression management, in earnings announcement press releases. While they 
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found that non-GAAP measures were generally informative to the market, firms using high 
levels of impression management made adjustments that were more persistent. This practice 
was interpreted as managers attempting to distort the perceptions of users when non-GAAP 
earnings figures are of lower quality. Contrary to results from US studies, their results show 
that market participants were able to recognise the use of impression management and 
discount the non-GAAP information. Investors in more sophisticated markets penalised the 
firms that combined non-GAAP measures with high impression management. 
 
The results from these various studies into how investors react to the disclosure of non-
GAAP profit figures generally find that non-professional or less sophisticated investors seem 
to be more affected than professionals such as analysts. However, this reaction may be 
tempered by the presence of a reconciliation between the non-GAAP figure and GAAP 
earnings. Studies have also concluded reactions to non-GAAP figures may be due to 
unintentional cognitive effects rather than a perception that the figure is more relevant. The 
finding by Elliott (2006) that it is emphasis rather than presence of the non-GAAP figure that 
affects investor’s decision making is of particular interest. Managers may exploit this salience 
effect by emphasising the better performance metric in an attempt to influence the decisions 
of investors. The fact that emphasis placed on non-GAAP earnings, and the need for a clear 
reconciliation, is specifically addressed by both Regulation G in the US and the Regulatory 
Guide 230 in Australia suggest that the SEC and ASIC regard emphasis as an important 
disclosure tool which may be open to manipulation.  
 
2.7 The Effect of Regulation 
ASIC has attempted to regulate the reporting of non-GAAP profits in Australia with the 
release of Regulatory Guide 230 Disclosing non-statutory financial information in December 
2011 (to be discussed in Chapter 3). Regulation of the practice in the United States occurred 
much earlier than in Australia. Concerns were raised by the SEC as early as 2000 (Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a) about the way non-GAAP earnings were estimated and the lack 
of comparability between firms, and between periods for individual firms. Especially 
concerning was the lack of any reconciliation to GAAP figures and, in some instances, a total 
lack of disclosure of the GAAP results (Levinsohn 2002). The use of non-GAAP earnings 
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was regulated through section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which 
directed the SEC to issue regulations to ensure non-GAAP financial information is not 
misleading and is reconciled to GAAP. To implement the provisions of SOX, the SEC issued 
‘Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures’ which led to the creation of 
Regulation G in 2003. This regulation did not prohibit the use of non-GAAP income 
measures or imply that their use should be reduced (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a). 
Rather, it attempted to increase transparency by requiring companies to explain how any non-
GAAP measures are calculated and why the company considered the measures useful 
(Holtzman, Fonfeder & Yun 2003). In addition, non-GAAP figures must not be given 
prominence over GAAP numbers. The literature shows that immediately following the 
introduction of Regulation G there was a ‘substantial change’ (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2006a, p. 51) to the way many US companies reported non-GAAP results, changes which 
were not explained by other considerations such as changes in accounting standards. 
 
Firstly, although Regulation G did not prohibit the use of non-GAAP measures, research has 
found that the introduction of the regulation led to a decrease in the use of such figures in 
press releases. Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2006a) found the reporting of non-GAAP 
earnings per share by S&P 500 firms decreased in a highly significant manner from 77% in 
2001 to 54% in 2003. Breaking the sample into industry type revealed that each industry 
other than energy (which remained constant) showed a decline in the percentage of firms 
reporting non-GAAP earnings after regulation. Consumer goods had the largest decrease of 
45%, closely followed by financial (43%) and technology (40%). Taking a broader approach 
by looking at all non-GAAP financial measures, Marques (2006) found a clear decrease from 
63% in 2001 to 50% in 2003. Specifically, for non-GAAP earnings the percentage of firms 
using these figures in press releases decreased from 52% to 32%.  
 
Although research shows there were changes in the number of firms using non-GAAP 
amounts, different possible reasons for this decline have been postulated. Some studies 
propose that the decline in use may be due to a reduction in the opportunistic use of such 
figures, especially as the new regulation required reconciliation to GAAP figures which made 
manipulation of non-GAAP figures more transparent (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; 
Jennings & Marques 2011; Marques 2006; Yi 2012; Zhang & Zheng 2011). Kolev, 
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Marquardt and McVay (2008) investigated the ‘quality’ of the exclusions made (whether the 
exclusions were more transitory) to arrive at the non-GAAP figures. Comparing firms that 
stopped disclosing non-GAAP figures with those that continued to do so, they found 
significantly poorer exclusions pre-regulation in firms that stopped disclosing post-regulation. 
They suggest this alludes to regulation halting some opportunistically motivated firms from 
continuing with the practice, a finding supported by Yi (2012). Another suggestion was that 
the decline may be due to the bad press the use of the figures had received leading up to, and 
at the time of regulation (Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008; Marques 2006). As one study 
contends ‘there are potential reputation costs if investors now question the motives of 
managers who release non-GAAP performance measures’(Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008, 
p. 162). However, this suggestion is contradicted by findings that investors perceive post-
regulation non-GAAP disclosures as more transparent and consider them more useful than 
GAAP figures (Black et al. 2012; Yi 2012). 
 
Secondly, firms not only changed whether or not they reported non-GAAP information but 
some of those who chose to continue reporting non-GAAP figures changed the magnitude 
and type of variations made to GAAP figures. Studies have variously found: a sharp decrease 
in the difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings per share (Entwistle, Feltham & 
Mbagwu 2006a; Heflin & Hsu 2008); an increase in the quality of items excluded from non-
GAAP figures, that is, the exclusions were more transitory (Frankel, McVay & Soliman 
2011; Jennings & Marques 2011; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008); a significant decrease 
in the proportion of firms reporting a non-GAAP figure greater than the GAAP figure (85% 
in 2001 to 67% in 2003 for earnings per share figures) (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2006a); and a decline in the probability that firms disclose earnings that meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts (Black et al. 2012; Black et al. 2017; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Jennings & 
Marques 2011). Chen (2010) concludes that the introduction of Regulation G constrained the 
practice of excluding recurring expenses from non-GAAP results in order to meet or beat 
earnings targets and that analysts and investors were better able to understand these 
exclusions in the post-regulation period. A stark example of the change in magnitude between 
non-GAAP and GAAP figures is provided by Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2006a) in 
their study of S&P 500 firms, where they note that the average difference between non-
GAAP and GAAP earnings per share in 2001 was 0.76 cents. This figure rose to $1.23 in 
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2002 but declined quite astoundingly in 2003 to 0.33 cents (they propose a possible 
explanation of the increase in 2002 as large write-offs to GAAP resulting from the post-
Enron stock market downturn).  
 
Finally, Regulation G requires that non-GAAP figures not be given prominence over GAAP 
figures and studies have found that disclosing firms generally changed the way they 
presented non-GAAP information in their press releases (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2006a, 2006b; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Marques 2010). For example, Entwistle, Feltham and 
Mbagwu (2006a) reported a 77% decrease in the extent that non-GAAP discussion dominated 
GAAP and noted the shift was to giving equal prominence to both figures. They found that 
44% of firms reporting non-GAAP figures were less likely to put the figures in the headlines 
of the press release compared to before regulation. They also noted a significant decrease in 
the use of ‘traditional GAAP terminology’ being used to report non-GAAP figures in 
headlines, from 38 firms in 2001 to only three in 2003 (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a, 
p. 48). As part of the presentation requirements, Regulation G requires all non-GAAP figures 
to be reconciled to GAAP figures. Zhang and Zheng (2011) found that the presence of 
reconciliation has a significant effect on mispricing of non-GAAP disclosures. Prior to 
Regulation G, mispricing of securities in non-GAAP reporting firms was limited to those that 
provided little or no reconciliation. However, after the introduction of the regulation there 
was no further evidence of mispricing due to non-GAAP disclosures, indicating that 
improved reconciliations reduced the extent of security mispricing by investors.  
 
The above discussion documents research into the immediate reaction to the introduction of 
regulation concerning the use of non-GAAP earnings figures in the US and shows a decrease 
in the use of such figures in quarterly press releases in 2003. Interestingly, however, more 
recent studies have investigated beyond this initial post-regulation period and have reported 
that the significant decline in the disclosure of non-GAAP figures coinciding with the 
passage of Regulation G was only temporary and use of the figures rose sharply after 2003 
(Black et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2012). Black et al. (2012) found that by the end of 2006, the 
frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures in quarterly press releases exceeded the pre-
Regulation G period. Despite this they conclude that post-regulation non-GAAP disclosure 
has improved in ‘quality’ and that regulation has brought heightened awareness to investors 
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about the use of such disclosures. They found that investors continued to pay more attention 
to non-GAAP figures compared to GAAP figures in the post-regulation period and suggest 
investors may feel safer doing so due to the increased transparency provided by regulated 
reconciliation of the two figures. It is important to remember that neither Regulation G in the 
US or Regulatory Guide 230 released by ASIC in Australia prohibit the use of non-GAAP 
earnings figures, they simply dictate how they are to be reported.  
 
In Europe the practice of disclosing non-GAAP earnings figures is also prevalent. Studies 
involving press releases in European countries including Germany and the Netherlands have 
found that the practice is frequent and prominent with the non-GAAP figure generally being 
given greater emphasis than GAAP results (Hitz 2010; Isidro & Marques 2015; Koning, 
Mertens & Roosenboom 2010). Concerns have been raised by organisations such as the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the European Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group (EFRAG), and by some national authorities, with CESR issuing voluntary 
recommendations on alternative performance measures in October 2005 (Isidro & Marques 
2015). However, unlike Regulation G in the US, ‘guidance is not mandatory and national 
regulation is either absent or incomplete’ (Isidro & Marques 2015, p. 98). The studies by Hitz 
(2010) and Koning, Mertens and Roosenboom (2010) provide an interesting contrast on the 
effect of recommendations issued by a regulatory body as opposed to negative media 
coverage. The study conducted in Germany (Hitz 2010) straddles the introduction of 
guidelines on presenting alternative profit measures by the CESR. The findings indicate that 
the guidelines had no discernible influence on the practice of reporting alternative profit 
figures, with no decline in frequency or emphasis nor increased quality of reconciliation to 
GAAP. On the other hand, the study conducted in Holland (Koning, Mertens & Roosenboom 
2010) looked at the effect of negative media attention on the practice and found that the 
decisions of both managers on how to report the figures and of investors on whether to use 
the figures was influenced by the media attention. The magnitude of the adjustments to 
GAAP became smaller and the effect was stronger in firms that were specifically criticised in 
the press.  
 
New Zealand does not have mandatory guidelines on the reporting of non-GAAP earnings, 
but the New Zealand Financial Markets Authority did introduce a Guidance Note on the 
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practice effective from 1 January 2013. Similar to other guidelines it suggests the non-GAAP 
figure not be given undue prominence, be reconciled to GAAP earnings and be calculated 
consistently from period to period. Rainsbury (2016) examined the influence of these 
guidelines and found they had little effect on the number of companies reporting non-GAAP 
earnings. She did find that the guidelines improved reporting practices, particularly with 
regard to giving non-GAAP figures undue prominence. However, the research raised 
concerns about the lack of explanations concerning non-GAAP calculations and adjustments 
and also about the reporting of multiple adjusted earnings figures being used to explain 
performance. 
 
The underlying motivation of any regulation or guidelines has been to make the reporting of 
non-GAAP information more transparent and less ‘misleading’ in order to protect the 
interests of shareholders and investors. Whether this goal has been achieved in the Australian 
context with the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines, Underlying Profit: Principles 
for Reporting of Non-Statutory Information (AICD & FINSIA 2009), and ASIC’s Regulatory 
Guide 230 Disclosing non-statutory financial information (ASIC 2011), is yet to be 
determined. 
 
2.8 Summary 
Voluntary disclosure of information by management is seen as an attempt to overcome 
information asymmetry. Management argue that they are providing incremental information 
demanded by shareholders and other stakeholders to assist in decision making. Alternatively, 
it has been argued that management is exploiting information asymmetry by providing, and in 
particular emphasising, information that portrays the company in the best light. Studies have 
found that unsophisticated investors are misled by non-GAAP profit figures when they are 
emphasised over other figures. However, this is not the case when they are given equal 
prominence with GAAP figures or when a reconciliation to the GAAP figure is provided. 
Therefore, it appears that ASIC and the SEC are on the right track with regulation that states 
it is acceptable to use these figures, but they should not be given undue prominence and a 
reconciliation should be provided. However, the fact that companies calculate the figures in 
different ways, using different terminology and perhaps differing in calculation from year to 
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year is still of concern. Although some studies suggest the incremental information and 
strategic impression management explanations for the reporting of non-GAAP profit are 
mutually exclusive, it is likely both motives co-exist ‘with the particular driver varying across 
firms and time conditional on prevailing reporting incentives’ (Young 2014, p. 451). 
 
The majority of literature discussed in this chapter relates to the situation in the US, where 
strict regulation has been in place since 2003, or in Europe and to date there has been limited 
investigation of this phenomenon in Australia, exceptions include Cameron, Percy and 
Stevenson-Clarke (2012); Islam et al. (2018); Johnson et al. (2014); Malone, Tarca and Wee 
(2016); Sek and Taylor (2011); Sinnewe, Harrison and Wijeweera (2017). This study aims to 
help fill this gap in the literature by studying the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures in 
Australia where, unlike the US, the practice remained unregulated until the release of the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 in December 2011. In the next chapter, the regulatory and 
institutional influences on the reporting of non-GAAP profits in Australia will be described. 
The effect of the Corporations Act 2001, which governs accounting and financial reporting, 
along with accounting standards and the introduction of guidelines from both professional 
bodies and ASIC will be discussed.  The results of industry studies into the practice will also 
be reported.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The Regulatory Environment and the  
Reporting of Non-GAAP Profits in Australia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the regulatory and institutional influences on the reporting of profits, 
including non-GAAP profits, by Australian companies. The practice of reporting non-GAAP 
profit figures by Australian companies became prevalent in the early 2000s and by the end of 
that decade some industry members were calling the practice ‘well and truly entrenched’ 
(Deloitte 2009, p. 4). Reasons put forward for the trend include changes to accounting 
standards, including the adoption of IFRS, and economic volatility both during and 
subsequent to the GFC (Deloitte 2009, 2010; Smith 2010). The regulatory requirements 
dictated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), including the associated accounting standards, 
are discussed in Section 3.2. Concern over the use of non-GAAP profit figures has prompted 
a response from regulators and other bodies. Section 3.3 reports on the release of guidelines 
by professional associations followed by the release of a Regulatory Guide by ASIC. Reports 
by industry bodies into the practice of reporting non-GAAP profit figures are discussed in 
Section 3.4 and the chapter concludes with a summary in Section 3.5.  
 
3.2 The Regulatory Environment 
Accounting and financial reporting by companies in Australia is governed by the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and principles contained in Accounting Standards. The effect 
this statute and the standards have on profit calculation is discussed below. 
 
3.2.1 The Corporation Law 
Profit is calculated and disclosed as part of the financial report of a company. In Australia, 
financial reports of companies are comprised of financial statements, notes to the financial 
statements and the directors’ declaration about the statement and notes. These contents are 
stipulated by s295 (for annual financial reports) and s303 (for half-yearly annual reports) of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  
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The annual and half-yearly financial reports must comply with accounting standards under 
s296 and s304 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The financial statements and notes for a 
financial year and half-year must give a ‘true and fair view’ of the financial position and 
performance of the entity (s297 and s305 Corporations Act 2001) but this requirement does 
not affect the obligation to comply with accounting standards. If a situation arises where the 
financial statements and notes prepared in accordance with the accounting standards would 
not give a true and fair view, the standards must still be followed but additional information 
must be included in the notes to the financial statements (s295(3)(c) and s303(3)(c) 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)). This legal requirement to follow accounting standards, 
combined with the introduction of IFRS in Australia, may have affected the decision to report 
(and perhaps emphasise) alternative non-GAAP profit figures. 
 
3.2.2 Australian Accounting Standards 
Australia adopted IFRS effective from annual reporting periods commencing on or after 
1 January 2005. From this date all Australian listed entities were required to adopt the 
Australian equivalents to IFRS (that is, AIFRS) and no early adoption of the standards was 
permitted. The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) issues Australian 
Accounting Standards which contain requirements, content and wording of IFRSs. The 
wording of an IFRS may be changed if there is a need to account for the Australian 
legislative environment, for example to refer to the Corporations Act 2001. The AASB may 
also require additional disclosures or limit the number of options and disclosure requirements 
of IFRSs to meet Australian conditions.  
 
At the time of adoption of IFRSs there were a number of major differences between existing 
Australian Accounting Standards and those issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). The removal of these differences ‘had major implications for how financial 
accounting is undertaken within Australia’ (Deegan 2010, p. 7) and it has been suggested that 
the change to IFRS compelled companies to adopt different ways of expressing earnings and 
profits (Deloitte 2009). Differences in some of the standards from the previous Australian 
standards affected the way specific transactions were recognised, measured and disclosed, 
which in turn affected the resulting reported profits. In particular it was expected that 
accounting for goodwill, intangible assets, non-current assets (impairment testing), share-
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based payments, taxation and financial instruments would be affected (Chalmers, Clinch & 
Godfrey 2011; Cotter, Tarca & Wee 2012). It follows that the adoption of IFRS was expected 
to have significant effects on reported net profit and shareholders’ equity (Wang & Welker 
2011). Due to the notable differences between existing Australian Accounting Standards and 
IFRS, companies may have felt the need to adopt different ways of expressing earnings and 
profits (Deloitte 2009) including the use of non-GAAP profit figures.  
 
While several standards affect the way transactions, and therefore profits, are measured and 
calculated, some standards have a direct impact on the manner in which companies present 
their financial results to stakeholders. For example, AASB 101 Presentation of Financial 
Statements prescribes the basis for presentation of general purpose financial statements and 
sets out requirements for their content and presentation, along with guidelines for their 
structure. It requires financial statements to be presented fairly and presumes the application 
of AIFRSs will achieve a fair presentation. However, although some items to be disclosed 
concerning profit or loss are listed in the standard (see para 82, Australian Accounting 
Standards Board 2015), there is scope to present extra information in the financial statements. 
The standard states that a fair presentation requires an entity ‘to provide additional 
disclosures when compliance with the specific requirements in Australian Accounting 
Standards is insufficient to enable users to understand the impact of particular transactions, 
other events and conditions on the entity’s financial position and financial performance’ 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board 2015, par. 17(c)).  
 
With regards to the Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income in 
particular the standard encourages the presentation of ‘additional line items, headings and 
subtotals …… when such presentation is relevant to an understanding of the entity’s financial 
performance’ (Australian Accounting Standards Board 2015, par. 85). This may have enabled 
some companies to present some non-GAAP figures in the financial statements themselves. 
However, it is worth noting that paragraph 87 of the standard, having effect from 2004, does 
not permit the presentation of any items of income or expenses as ‘extraordinary’ items. 
There has been concern over a number of decades in Australia regarding the potentially 
opportunistic classification of operating expense items as extraordinary or abnormal 
(Cameron & Gallery 2008; Coulton et al. 2016) and a series of restrictions on how these 
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items are measured and reported have been introduced since the late 1990s (Coulton et al. 
2016). Paragraph 87 of AASB101 has been in effect since 2004. The practice of including 
non-GAAP profit figures in financial statements is not permitted except in exceptional 
circumstances under ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, released in 2011 (see discussion below). 
However, the disclosure of non-GAAP figures outside the financial statements is permitted 
and there is no requirement that the figures be audited. As discussed in Section 2.3.1, these 
figures are often calculated by removing expenses that would have been considered 
‘abnormal’ or ‘extraordinary’ in the past. 
 
3.3 Guidelines and Regulatory Guides 
While the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) along with AIFRSs help regulate the preparation and 
presentation of annual and financial reports in Australia, they do not provide specific 
guidance on the use of non-GAAP profits or other non-GAAP financial information. To fill 
the gap, professional bodies and ASIC have specifically responded to the practice of 
disclosing such information. 
 
3.3.1 AICD and FINSIA Guidelines 
In March 2009 the AICD and the FINSIA issued Underlying Profit: principles for reporting 
of non-statutory profit information on the reporting of non-GAAP profit information (AICD 
& FINSIA 2009). FINSIA is a professional association representing the financial services 
industry in Australia and in 2009, when the guidelines were produced, the association had 
more than 17,000 members. AICD is a member-based, not-for-profit organisation for 
directors and when the guidelines were produced this organisation had more than 23,000 
members. The guidelines define the term ‘underlying profit’ as a figure adjusted from 
statutory profit which ‘reflects the directors’ assessment of the result for the ongoing business 
activities of the company’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 7). Interestingly, the guidelines appear 
to encourage companies to report an underlying profit figure. The guidelines state that the 
issuing bodies ‘believe that the market is assisted by the additional reporting of an underlying 
profit figure’ (p. 15) but suggest it should be clearly differentiated from the statutory profit 
and be transparent, consistent and reconciled to the statutory figure. The guidelines also state 
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that there should be an indication of whether the figure has been audited (p. 18). The 
guidelines comprise seven principles which are summarised in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Principles for reporting underlying profit (AICD and FINSIA) 
Principle Summary of Recommendation 
Principle 1 – Report on the 
underlying profit, where 
relevant, in addition to the 
statutory profit 
Encourages the reporting of an underlying profit figure. 
Companies should clearly differentiate the underlying 
profit figure from the statutory profit and not give undue 
prominence to the underlying profit figure. The figure 
should be transparent and consistent. 
Principle 2 – Use the term 
‘underlying profit’ 
For consistency between companies, the term ‘underlying 
profit’ should be used in preference to other terms. Terms 
such as ‘normalised’ and ‘sustainable’ are discouraged as 
they have other connotations. 
Principle 3 – Reconcile the 
underlying profit figure to the 
statutory profit figure and 
present the adjustments in 
tabular form, with any 
accompanying explanation that 
may be necessary 
The underlying profit figure should be reconciled to the 
statutory profit in a table that shows each significant 
adjustment (impacts net profit after tax by more than 5%), 
both gross and net of tax, and include explanatory notes. 
The reconciliation should be transparent, logical and 
justifiable. 
Principle 4 – Present the 
underlying profit and 
accompanying explanation in 
the directors’ report or other 
management discussion and 
analysis of the profit result 
The underlying profit reconciliation should be clearly 
differentiated from the statutory profit by location 
(suggested location is Directors’ Report) and should be 
made available in communications to shareholders and the 
wider investment community. The extent to which the 
underlying profit figure has been audited or reviewed 
should be disclosed. It should not be incorporated in or 
associated with IFRS-based financial statements. 
Principle 5 – Include both 
positive and negative 
adjustments to the statutory 
profit figure 
Companies should not ‘window dress’ their financial 
results and transparency requires both positive and 
negative adjustments to be included in the calculation. 
Principle 6 – Maintain 
consistent adjustments to the 
statutory profit figure between 
reporting periods 
The types of adjustments made should be consistent 
between reporting periods and comparative figures should 
be reported. To avoid the list of adjustments becoming too 
large, it is acceptable to discontinue reporting an item as 
an adjustment once it becomes ‘insignificant’ for the 
second consecutive year. 
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Table 3.1: Principles for reporting underlying profit (AICD and FINSIA) (continued) 
Principle 7 – Disclose whether 
these principles have been 
relied on in reporting an 
underlying profit figure 
AICD and FINSIA are not seeking to mandate the 
reporting of an underlying profit figure but where one is 
reported the company should state whether these 
principles have been applied in reporting of the figure. A 
statement to that effect should be included with the 
underlying profit table. 
Source: Adapted from Underlying Profit: Principles for Reporting of Non-statutory Profit Information (AICD & FINSIA 
2009) 
 
Appendix 1 of the guidelines provides suggested potential adjustments that could be made to 
statutory profit to arrive at the underlying profit figure as well as an illustrative example of 
the tabular format suggested for use in identifying these adjustments. It is acknowledged that 
adjustments may vary from company to company and the listed items are considered to be 
‘appropriate’ for inclusion. Suggested items to be included in adjustments are: 
• Significant transactions or events which are not expected to be repeated consistently 
over a number of years; 
• One-off provisions that are not expected to recur such as costs of redundancies or 
restructuring; 
• Fair value adjustments from revaluing assets; 
• Impairment losses; 
• Income tax settlements that do not relate to the current year’s profit; 
• Defined benefit pension plans that need a ‘top up’; and 
• Revaluation of long-term liabilities (AICD & FINSIA 2009, pp. 20-22). 
 
The guidelines issued by the AICD and FINSIA are not law or regulation but are simply 
guidelines on best practice that companies are encouraged to follow. There are no direct 
consequences for non-compliance with the guidelines. However, it is reasonable to expect, 
given the bodies involved and their membership, that the guidelines may have had an impact 
on the practice of reporting non-GAAP profits in Australia. 
 
3.3.2 ASIC Regulatory Guide 
The release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines was followed in 2011 by the release of ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230 on disclosure of non-IFRS (non-GAAP) financial information. ASIC, 
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Australia’s corporate regulator, has the role of enforcing and regulating company and 
financial services law. ASIC is an independent Commonwealth Government body set up 
under the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), and carries out 
most of its work under the Corporations Act 2001.  
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 requires ASIC to:  
• Maintain, facilitate and improve the performance of the financial system and entities 
in it;  
• Promote confident and informed participation by investors and consumers in the 
financial system;  
• Administer the law effectively and with minimal procedural requirements; 
• Enforce and give effect to the law; 
• Receive, process and store, efficiently and quickly, information that it is given; and  
• Make information about companies and other bodies available to the public as soon as 
practicable (ASIC 2012c). 
 
ASIC issue a range of regulatory documents that explain its approach to specific areas it 
regulates. These include Consultation Papers which seek feedback from stakeholders on 
matters ASIC are considering, and Regulatory Guides which guide regulated entities by 
explaining how ASIC interprets the law. Regulatory Guides give practical guidance and 
describe the principles underlying ASIC’s approach. They also explain when and how ASIC 
will exercise specific powers under legislation (ASIC 2007).  
 
In March 2011, ASIC released Consultation Paper 150 Disclosing financial information other 
than in accordance with accounting standards. After receiving 33 responses to the 
Consultation Paper, ASIC released Regulatory Guide 230 Disclosing non-IFRS financial 
information and an accompanying Regulation Impact Statement in December 2011. The 
Regulatory Guide is aimed at directors and preparers of financial information and sets out 
ASIC’s view on the use of financial information in financial reports and other corporate 
documents, such as annual reports, market announcements, briefing to analysts and 
prospectuses, where the information is presented other than in accordance with IFRS. The 
Guide uses the term ‘non-IFRS financial information’ to describe such information. 
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According to the Regulatory Guide ‘the purpose of our guidance is to promote full and clear 
disclosure for investors and other users of financial information and minimise the possibility 
of those users being misled by such information’ (ASIC 2011, p. 1).  
 
The Guide deals with two types of non-IFRS financial information: non-IFRS profit 
information and pro forma financial information. Non-IFRS profit information is information 
concerning profits which have been calculated other than in accordance with IFRS, or using 
IFRS but adjusted in some manner. This type of information is the topic of this thesis and the 
term ‘non-GAAP’ is used in this study in line with other literature on the topic and also as the 
study includes some years before IFRS was introduced. Pro forma financial information is 
non-IFRS information used to show the effects of transactions for illustrative purposes in 
documents such as a prospectus or takeover document (pro forma financial information in 
prospectuses and takeover documents are beyond the scope of this study).  
 
Whilst there is an acknowledgement that non-IFRS financial information can be useful for 
investors and other users in certain circumstances, the Regulatory Guide provides guidance 
on areas where non-IFRS financial information should not appear or be used. As far as 
financial reports are concerned, the guide states that non-IFRS financial information should 
not be included in financial statements in any way. Specifically, with regards to non-IFRS 
profit figures, the following guidelines are stipulated: 
• Must not be included as a separate line item in the Income Statement or Statement of 
Comprehensive Income; 
• Must not be included as a subtotal in the Income Statement or Statement of 
Comprehensive Income; 
• Must not be included as additional columns; and 
• Must not be included in a separate section below a financial statement or as a 
continuation of the statement to remove particular expenses to show a ‘bottom line’ non-
IFRS profit (ASIC 2011). 
  
ASIC’s view is that these guidelines are in line with ss295(2) and 303(2) of the Corporations 
Act which specify that financial statements should follow accounting standards. Specifically, 
this part of the Regulatory Guide provides ASIC’s interpretation of key sections of AASB101 
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Presentation of financial statements. However, as previously discussed in Section 3.2.2, 
AASB101 permits and requires additional line items in the Statement of Profit or Loss and 
Other Comprehensive Income. Companies use various additional line items in their Statement 
of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income such as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) and it is unclear from the Regulatory Guide whether 
such items will no longer be allowed.  
 
Under the guidelines, non-IFRS profit information may only be included in the notes to the 
statements in rare circumstances where it is needed to give a true and fair view of the 
financial performance or position of the entity under ss295(3)(c) and 303(3)(c) of the 
Corporations Act. In such circumstances, the Director’s Report must give reasons for this 
opinion and the auditor must also form an opinion as to whether the additional information 
was necessary. In exceptional circumstances, ASIC may exercise its discretionary relief 
powers under ss340 and 341 of the Corporations Act to allow an entity to include non-IFRS 
financial information in financial reports. The guidelines also apply to concise financial 
reports prepared in accordance with s314 of the Corporations Act. 
 
ASIC acknowledge that there may be times when extra information may be needed to help 
users better understand aspects of an entity’s performance (ASIC 2011, p. 17). The guidelines 
therefore allow the presentation of non-IFRS financial information in documents other than 
the financial report, such as documents that accompany the financial report (e.g. Director’s 
Reports), market announcements, presentations to investors and briefings to analysts. 
However, the information should follow the guidelines on presentation, inclusion and 
explanation so that it is not ‘misleading’ (ASIC 2011, p. 17). These include giving IFRS 
financial information equal or greater prominence, explaining non-IFRS information and 
reconciling it to IFRS results, calculating the information consistently from period to period 
and making sure the information is unbiased and has not been used to remove ‘bad news’. 
There is a major emphasis on presentation of the non-IFRS information with 
recommendations contained in a detailed table. These guidelines on presentation in the 
Regulatory Guide suggest that ASIC consider the use of emphasis to be a disclosure tactic 
that should be addressed. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the presentation guidelines. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of guidelines for presenting non-IFRS information – ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230 
Guideline Summary of Explanation 
Prominence IFRS financial information should be given equal or greater 
prominence, emphasis and authority than non-IFRS financial 
information. This includes factors such as order and manner of 
presentation and providing a similar level of attention to reconciling 
items between the figures.  
Examples of not giving equal or greater prominence include: 
• Only including commentary on non-IFRS profit information; 
• Only showing IFRS profits in a footnote; 
• Changing emphasis between figures from period to period to 
highlight most favourable result; and 
• Not presenting IFRS profit and reconciliation at least once in each 
document containing non-IFRS information. 
Appropriate label Non-IFRS financial information should be clearly labelled and 
distinguished from IFRS financial information (no particular label 
suggestions are made in the guide).  
Calculation Any calculation should be clearly explained. 
Reconciliation A reconciliation between IFRS and non-IFRS financial information 
should be provided. Significant adjustments should be separately 
itemised and explained.  
Why information is 
useful 
A clear, understandable and specific statement should be included 
explaining why the directors believe the non-IFRS financial 
information is useful. 
Consistency The approach and calculation should be consistent from period to 
period and, if not, an explanation of the change, with reasons, should 
be provided. 
Adjustments Any adjustments made to IFRS financial information should have 
corresponding adjustments in any comparative information. 
Unbiased The non-IFRS financial information should be unbiased and not used 
to avoid presenting ‘bad news’. 
One-off items Items which have occurred in the past or are likely to occur again in 
the future should not be described as ‘one-off’ or ‘non-recurring’. 
Audited or reviewed A clear statement as to whether the non-IFRS information has been 
audited or reviewed should be made. 
Source: Adapted from Regulatory Guide 230 – Disclosing non-IFRS financial information (ASIC 2011)  
 
It is important to note that ASIC administers, enforces and gives effect to the law – it is not a 
lawmaker. Regulatory Guides such as the one discussed above provide ASIC’s interpretation 
of the law but are not actual law and do not have the force of law. They form part of a ‘soft 
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regulation approach’ adopted by ASIC which are seen as placing high expectations on codes, 
guidelines and policy statements (Kingsford Smith 2006, p. 466). Non-compliance may result 
in ASIC taking action which may begin with an educative letter but may end in court action 
(ASIC 2013b). 
 
Both the AICD and FINSIA Guidelines and the ASIC Regulatory Guide concerning the use 
of non-GAAP profit figures do not prohibit the calculation and reporting of such figures. 
They do however provide guidance on the presentation of such figures including the 
provision of a reconciliation to the IFRS profit and the recommendation that the figure not be 
given undue prominence over the IFRS figure. It is therefore expected that these documents 
may not have affected the decision to report such figures but may have affected the use of 
impression management when reporting the figures.  
 
ASIC conduct six-monthly reviews of financial reports to determine compliance with 
Regulatory Guides. Reports on the findings from these reviews are released each six months. 
A media release is also issued each six months to itemise the focus areas ASIC will be 
concentrating on in their reviews. In the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, the reporting of non-
IFRS financial information was listed as an area of focus for ASIC in their review of financial 
reports (ASIC 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b). For each of these years, ASIC 
indicated that they contacted a small number of companies with the main concerns being: 
• Giving prominence to non-IFRS financial information over IFRS; 
• Disclosing non-IFRS figures in the financial statements; 
• Using multiple non-IFRS measures in a confusing way; 
• Failing to disclose a clear reconciliation; 
• The use of the term ‘extraordinary items’;  
• Describing items as ‘one off’ or ‘non-recurring’ even though they occur every year; 
and 
• The application of the Guide in presenting information outside the financial report. 
(ASIC 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2015a).  
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However, from 2015 to 2017 there was no mention of non-IFRS information in the 
documents concerning areas of focus (ASIC 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c).   
 
3.4 Industry Reports into Practice 
Between 2009 and 2011, descriptive research into the practice of disclosing non-GAAP profit 
figures was undertaken by firms including Deloitte and KPMG. Research by Deloitte 
(Deloitte 2009) revealed that 68% of companies in the ASX top 100 reported a non-GAAP 
profit figure in their annual report in 2009. A similar study by KPMG (KPMG 2010b) 
revealed that in the same period, the number of companies in the ASX 100 reporting a non-
GAAP profit figure in any medium (annual reports, profit announcements, press releases) 
was 84%. The Deloitte’s survey revealed that of the companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures, only 21% actually reported a lower figure than the GAAP profit. In all other cases the 
non-GAAP profit figure was higher with 25% of companies actually converting a GAAP loss 
to a non-GAAP profit. The practice continued in 2011 (KPMG 2011) with results similar to 
past years in many respects. Eighty-two per cent of companies in the top 100 reported a non-
GAAP profit figure. Of these, 73% reported a non-GAAP profit higher than the GAAP profit 
with 11% converting a loss into a profit.  
 
A more recent, comprehensive report into non-GAAP disclosure in Australia was released by 
Chartered Accountants in November 2016 (Coulton et al. 2016). The study covered the years 
2000-14 and shows a steady increase in the reporting of non-GAAP figures by the ASX500 
companies in earnings announcements over that time, with a peak of 42% in 2014. The 
frequency of the provision of a reconciliation to GAAP also increased over the period with 
91% of reporters of non-GAAP figures providing a reconciliation of some type in 2013.  
 
Anticipating that the release of the ASIC released Regulatory Guide 230 Disclosing non-
IFRS financial information would have an effect on the practice of reporting non-GAAP 
profit information, KPMG analysed disclosures made the year before the release and reported 
that several companies in the ASX top 100 would need to adapt their practices in order to 
comply (KPMG 2011). They noted that 41% of companies in the top 100 would need to start 
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providing justification for the inclusion of non-GAAP profit information and 98% would 
need to explicitly state if their non-GAAP profit had been audited or reviewed.  
 
Whilst these descriptive studies are of interest and have served to highlight the prevalence of 
the practice in Australia, they did not attempt to investigate why companies reported these 
non-GAAP profit figures or if their reasons were justified. There were, and still are, major 
concerns with the reporting of these figures and the type of adjustments made to the GAAP 
profit figure. There is often a lack of consistency and comparability between different 
companies reporting such figures and also within particular companies from year to year. The 
2010 study conducted by KPMG found that the majority of companies did not explain why 
they presented a non-GAAP measure of performance and some did not define the measure 
used or reconcile the figure to the statutory profit. It is hoped that the introduction of 
Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC in 2011 went someway to addressing these concerns. 
 
3.5 Summary 
The current regulatory and institutional regimes that govern the reporting of profits, including 
non-GAAP profits, by Australian companies were discussed in this chapter. The 
Corporations Law 2001 (Cth) in conjunction with AIFRSs provide regulation with regard to 
preparing financial reports. Guidelines from AICD and FINSIA and Regulatory Guide 230 
from ASIC provide more specific guidance on how and where non-GAAP profits and other 
non-IFRS financial information should be reported.  
 
In the next chapter, various theories used in extant literature to explain voluntary disclosure 
will be explored. Agency theory will be used to develop a theoretical framework and 
conceptual model to explain the motives for reporting non-GAAP profit figures, including the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour. From this conceptual model, four research questions 
and sixteen hypotheses relating to the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures and the use of 
impression management tactics when reporting the figures will be formulated.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Theoretical Framework and Development of  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will develop a theoretical framework and associated research questions and 
hypotheses for the current study. Several theories have been used to explain the use of 
voluntary disclosure by organisations and a brief discussion of these theories, along with their 
similarities and differences, is contained in Section 4.2. Due to the type of disclosure being 
investigated by this study and the disclosure’s presumed purpose and presumed audience, 
agency theory is argued to be the most appropriate for use as a theoretical basis. This theory 
is described in more detail in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, the concepts of agency theory are 
used to develop a conceptual model which is used to explain the phenomenon of reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures. The use of non-GAAP profit figures to provide incremental 
information is explored in Section 4.5 along with the development of the first two research 
questions and related hypotheses. Section 4.6 investigates the use of impression management 
in the reporting of non-GAAP profits and develops the second two research questions and 
related hypotheses. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 4.7.  
 
4.2 Theories Used in Voluntary Disclosure Studies 
As evident in the literature, the use by organisations of various types of voluntary disclosure 
can be explained by a number of different theories. The theories differ with regard to the type 
of information being disclosed, the proposed reasons for disclosure and the particular 
audience involved. In order to explore this, and to assist in the development of a theoretical 
framework for the current study, an explanation of the relevant theories is required. Common 
theories used in previous literature concerning voluntary disclosure are briefly explained 
along with a discussion of the relationship between the theories. 
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4.2.1 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is a systems-oriented theory predominantly used in research concerning 
social and environmental accounting and reporting. It is based on the concept that an 
organisation is assumed to be impacted by, and have an impact upon, the society in which it 
operates (Deegan 2002). Organisations wish to ensure their activities are perceived as 
legitimate with legitimacy defined as ‘a generalised perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). The theory revolves around 
the concept of a ‘social contract’ and gives consideration to societal expectations which can 
change over time (Deegan 2006). Organisations failing to comply with these expectations 
may face a threat to their legitimacy and in extreme cases, to their ongoing survival. Hence 
the theory suggests that voluntary disclosure may be used as a strategy by organisations in an 
attempt to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy.  
 
4.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is also a systems-oriented theory and is similar to legitimacy theory in that 
the organisation is seen as part of a broader social system, impacting on and being affected by 
others in society (Deegan 2002). However, while legitimacy theory considers the 
organisation’s relationship with society as a whole, stakeholder theory considers the 
relationship between the organisation and particular identifiable groups of stakeholders 
(Rankin et al. 2012). The theory has two branches, the ethical or moral branch and the 
managerial branch.  
 
The ethical branch relates to the ethical or moral treatment of the organisation’s stakeholders. 
This is a normative branch of the theory which suggests that the organisation should be 
managed to benefit all stakeholders and that all stakeholders should be treated fairly (Hasnas 
1998). The importance of stakeholders should not be determined by the resources they 
control and any one group should not be considered more important than other groups 
(Hasnas 1998). This branch of stakeholder theory suggests that all stakeholders have a right 
to be provided with information, including that which is voluntarily disclosed, and that this 
disclosure should be responsibility-driven (Gray, Owen & Adams 1996; O'Dwyer 2005). 
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The managerial branch seeks to explain how stakeholders may have influence on the actions 
of the organisation. Under this positive theory, different stakeholder groups are perceived to 
have different levels of power and influence in relation to the organisation and this is related 
to the control the particular group has over the resources required by the organisation 
(Ullmann 1985). Therefore, some stakeholder groups are perceived to be more important and 
it is proposed that it is more likely that the concerns of these groups will be addressed by the 
organisation. Under the managerial branch of stakeholder theory, it is suggested that 
voluntary disclosure of information is a strategic decision and is used to manage these more 
important stakeholder groups in order to meet their needs and expectations and to gain 
support and approval (Gray, Owen & Adams 1996). 
 
4.2.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory has its roots in the labour market, where it was suggested that prospective 
employees signalled their superior qualities to employers by completing higher education 
(Spence 1973). The theory has been applied to other markets where information asymmetry 
between two parties is present (Connelly et al. 2011; Morris 1987). It proposes that 
information asymmetry is reduced when one party, with more information, signals the 
information to the party or parties with less information (Morris 1987). Sellers in a market 
(e.g. employees looking for jobs, companies floating shares, retail outlets selling goods) are 
assumed to have more information than buyers, and if buyers have no information they may 
value all products the same. Sellers of high quality products may incur an opportunity loss 
and therefore have incentive to ‘signal’ or communicate their product’s superior quality to 
buyers, thereby increasing the price of their product (Watson, Shrives & Marston 2002). The 
signal must be confirmable and not easily copied by poor quality sellers (Morris 1987). 
Signals may be in the form of tangible actions such as the consistent, long-term payment of 
dividends, the obtaining of a particular certification or accreditation, or the provision of 
generous product warranties (Connelly et al. 2011; Cotter, Lokman & Najah 2011; Morris 
1987). However, to be effective, signalling of this type should also be enhanced by using a 
variety of different signals (Connelly et al. 2011). The use of voluntary disclosure to 
communicate and reinforce tangible actions is one such signal (Cotter, Lokman & Najah 
2011) and signalling theory has been used to explain the voluntary disclosure of various types 
of information including accounting ratios (Watson, Shrives & Marston 2002), auditor’s 
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internal control reports (Bin & Jing 2009), and management earnings forecasts in 
prospectuses (Jog & McConomy 2003). The signal must be credible and management who 
attempt to falsely signal high quality run the risk that when the true quality of the firm is 
revealed, no subsequent disclosures will be seen as credible (Watson, Shrives & Marston 
2002).  
 
4.2.4 Agency Theory 
Agency theory concerns the delegation of control in organisations and focuses on agency 
relationships where one party (the principal) delegates the authority to make decisions to 
another party (the agent) (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In a corporate setting the shareholders 
(owners) are usually considered to be the principal and the management of the company is 
considered the agent. This separation of the decision making and control functions between 
owners and managers may produce conflicts, particularly if individuals act in their own self-
interest (Morris 1987). These conflicts, known as agency conflicts, are exacerbated by the 
fact that, because of their position in the organisation, managers have access to information 
not available to owners (information asymmetry) (Eisenhardt 1989). Management may use 
this information to undertake actions beneficial to themselves rather than the owners. It is 
assumed that principals are aware of these potential conflicts and will introduce bonding and 
monitoring measures to control or mitigate agency conflict and to overcome information 
asymmetry (Fama & Jensen 1983a). The theory suggests that the agents will ultimately bear 
some of these costs and managers therefore have incentive to decrease the amount of 
information asymmetry (Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976). Some information 
asymmetry is overcome by mandatory disclosures such as regulated financial statements 
prepared under IFRS. However, voluntary disclosure also plays an important role in assisting 
management demonstrate to shareholders that they are acting in their best interests (Watson, 
Shrives & Marston 2002).  
 
4.2.5 The Relationship Between the Theories  
The theories discussed above have similarities. All the theories have been used in extant 
literature to explain the use of voluntary disclosures of different types of information by 
organisations. Depending on the theory involved, voluntary disclosure may be used to reduce 
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information asymmetry (agency and signaling theory), to discharge accountability 
(stakeholder theory) or to signal legitimacy (legitimacy theory) or quality (signaling theory) 
(An, Davey & Eggleton 2011). The existence of information asymmetry is an implicit feature 
of agency theory as it is one of the conditions that leads to agency conflicts. Similarly, 
information asymmetry is a feature of signaling theory as without it there would be no need 
to send a signal (Morris 1987).  
 
The theories also differ in certain regards. Firstly, they differ in the presumed audience or 
users of voluntary disclosures, which may be defined quite narrowly as shareholders (agency 
theory), or in a much broader sense to include all stakeholders and even society as a whole 
(stakeholder and legitimacy theory) (Brennan & Merkl-Davies 2013). The theory adopted 
therefore affects and determines the focus of analysis. Secondly, the theories differ in the type 
of disclosure they have been used to explain and the incentives influencing disclosure (Cotter, 
Lokman & Najah 2011). Legitimacy and stakeholder theory are most commonly used to 
explain the voluntary disclosure of non-financial information by organisations, such as 
corporate governance information and social and environment reporting (Cotter, Lokman & 
Najah 2011). Social and political factors are seen as the determinants of voluntary disclosure 
behavior with firms attempting to respond to these factors or to legitimise their actions. In 
contrast, agency and signaling theory have been used to explain the voluntary disclosure of 
various types of information, often with a stronger emphasis on financial information. Wealth 
maximisation is seen as a major factor affecting disclosure behaviour in these theories 
(Cotter, Lokman & Najah 2011). Agency and signaling theories differ in the use of the 
concept of ‘quality’. Signaling theory assumes firms with higher quality products will signal 
to the market and that the signal will be difficult for others to copy. Agency theory does not 
involve this concept of ‘quality’ concerning voluntary disclosures (Morris 1987).  
 
The theories discussed above seek to explain the use of voluntary disclosure of information. 
However, only agency theory and signaling theory emphasise the reduction of information 
asymmetry as the main purpose of this disclosure. This study concerns the reporting of non-
GAAP profit figures by Australian companies and is therefore concerned with the voluntary 
disclosure of financial information. As previously discussed, the two schools of thought that 
attempt to explain this disclosure state the existence of information asymmetry as a major 
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incentive for the disclosure. The presumed organisational audience for the reporting of these 
figures is also narrowly defined as shareholders and prospective investors and not a broader 
range of stakeholders or society at large (as in stakeholder and legitimacy theory). Again, 
agency theory focuses on this narrowly defined audience compared to wider systems-oriented 
theories (Brennan & Merkl-Davies 2013). Therefore, this research utilises agency theory to 
develop a theoretical framework and conceptual model to guide this study. 
 
Although information asymmetry and opportunistic versus incremental information motives 
are usually briefly discussed, extant literature on non-GAAP profits has often been silent as 
to an actual theoretical basis, with many studies not expressly expounding any particular 
theory (e.g. Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Cameron, Percy & 
Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2006a; Johnson & Schwartz 
2005; Marques 2010). Previous literature on non-GAAP earnings that has identified a theory 
has overwhelmingly used agency theory to explain the reporting of the figures (e.g. Frankel, 
McVay & Soliman 2011; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Isidro & Marques 2013; 
Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016). By using agency theory, this study concurs with prior literature 
on the topic. The theory is explored in more detail in the next section.  
 
4.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is primarily concerned with organisations where owners (principal) are 
separate from, and therefore have to delegate control for decision making to, management 
(agent) (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In public companies, for example, management is 
responsible for formulating and implementing strategies while shareholders contribute capital 
and are willing to bear the risk of losses (Fama & Jensen 1983a; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
 
Agency theory assumes that all actions of rational individuals are driven by self-interest and 
are undertaken in an attempt to maximise the individual’s own wealth. Conflicts arise 
because the interests of the two parties (agent and principal) may not be aligned (Eisenhardt 
1989; Kiser 1999). Managers who initiate and implement decisions in the firm are the agents 
in the agency relationship and ‘do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their 
decisions’ (Fama & Jensen 1983b, p. 304). Therefore, managers may use their position to 
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further their own interests rather than the interests of the owners (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
It may also be difficult and expensive for principals to verify what the agent is doing 
(Eisenhardt 1989). This creates agency problems which are exacerbated by the time horizon 
problem, differential risk aversion and dividend retention (Lambert 2001; Lewellen, Loderer 
& Martin 1987; Smith & Watts 1982).  
 
4.3.1 Agency Problems 
The time horizon problem relates to the differing time horizons used by the agents and 
principals when making decisions. Shareholders generally have longer time horizons, valuing 
long-term growth and increased firm value. They are interested in managers making 
decisions to enhance future cash flows. Managers on the other hand are generally more short-
term focused, particularly if they do not expect to be employed long term by the firm or they 
are about to retire (Lambert 2001; Smith & Watts 1982). If a career move is being 
considered, for example, the manager may wish to look effective by achieving good profits 
and may employ tactics such as earnings management or delaying the incurring of some 
expenses.  
 
Differential risk aversion is a problem where managers are assumed to prefer less risk than 
shareholders, who are generally considered to be risk neutral (Belghitar & Clark 2015; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Kiser 1999; Wright, Mukherji & Kroll 2001). This is due to shareholders 
usually having diversified investments and therefore being able to bear more risk in one 
single investment (Fama 1980). Shareholders may also have other sources of income such as 
salaries and wages and are not as reliant on the income from a single investment. Most 
importantly, shareholders have limited liability. Managers on the other hand have a large 
investment in the firm in the form of human capital (Fama 1980). Their perceived expertise, 
reputation and their job security may be at stake. Unlike shareholders, managers cannot 
diversify risk easily and this leads to a different level of risk aversion between the two parties 
(Eisenhardt 1989). Differential risk aversion can lead to inappropriate investment decisions 
where, for example, good investment proposals which carry more risk may be rejected by 
management who, under agency theory, are considered more risk averse (Belghitar & Clark 
2015).  
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The issue of dividend retention involves managers wanting to keep funds in the firm in order 
to have more resources under their control to expand the firm and to pay their own salaries, 
whereas shareholders want more funds paid out as dividends (Jensen 1986).  
 
Agency problems are exacerbated by the presence of information asymmetry (Eisenhardt 
1989; Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman & Dykes 2005). Due to their position in the organisation, 
managers have access to information not available to owners. This may further enable 
management to act opportunistically and undertake actions beneficial to themselves rather 
than the owners. Opportunistic behaviour on the part of management acting as the agent may 
include: 
• Excessive perquisites, where the agent makes unnecessary or excessive expenditure 
on items such as company cars and expense accounts; 
• Empire building, where the agent may expand the firm or a part of the firm under the 
agent’s control beyond a point where the wealth of the principal is maximised; and 
• Shirking, where the agent does not work hard or finds ways to reduce workload 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). This is termed moral hazard which refers to a lack of 
effort on behalf of the agent (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
4.3.2 Agency Costs 
Under agency theory, it is assumed that principals are aware of agency problems and will 
take actions to control or mitigate agency conflict (Fama & Jensen 1983a; Smith & Warner 
1979). Introducing these measures involves three types of agency costs, which are the costs 
of monitoring and bonding managers so that they pursue the shareholders’ interests, and the 
residual loss which constitutes any remaining costs (Fama & Jensen 1983b; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976).  
 
Monitoring costs are incurred to monitor the agent’s behaviour in order to align that 
behaviour with the interests of the principal. They consist of expenditure aimed at measuring, 
observing and controlling the agent’s behaviour. Examples of monitoring costs include 
auditing costs, the instigation of operating rules and control systems, budget restrictions and 
appointing independent directors on the board (Cotter, Lokman & Najah 2011; Fama 1980; 
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Jensen & Meckling 1976; Morris 1987). In the first instance, monitoring costs are incurred by 
the principal. However, as the costs increase they are passed on to the agent (manager) in the 
form of reduced remuneration. This is known as price protection. Managers who perform 
well may require less monitoring and will therefore be remunerated well. However, poor 
performers will require more monitoring and their remuneration will be reduced accordingly. 
 
Under agency theory, price protection ensures that agents ultimately bear the costs of 
monitoring in the form of reduced remuneration. Agents are therefore assumed to have an 
incentive to enter into contractual arrangements to act in the best interests of the principals 
and to reduce their ability to act opportunistically (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The costs of 
entering into such contracts and/or of providing extra information are known as bonding 
costs. Bonding costs are costs incurred by the agent to bond him/herself to the principal. 
Examples of bonding costs include the costs of preparing more frequent financial reports (e.g. 
quarterly reports), linking management remuneration payments to performance (based on 
profits or share price) and offering managers a share of equity so that their interests are 
aligned (Smith & Watts 1982). Accounting information therefore plays an integral role in 
much of the monitoring and bonding mechanisms as it is used to design contracts and 
monitor performance. It is predicted that agents will attempt to provide extra information to 
show they are working for the benefit of the principals to avoid high monitoring costs and 
receive higher remuneration. Some researchers have argued that non-GAAP profit figures are 
more informative than GAAP profit figures and therefore enable shareholders to better 
evaluate performance (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bradshaw & Sloan 2002; Entwistle, Feltham 
& Mbagwu 2004, 2010; Venter, Emanuel & Cahan 2014). The costs of preparing such 
figures could therefore be considered a bonding cost as they provide extra information on the 
performance of the company to the principal in the agency relationship.  
 
As discussed above, devices such as management bonus plans linked to profits and 
managerial ownership of equity, bond the interests of managers to those of the owners. 
Linking executive remuneration to profits or share price and providing management with 
shares in the entity can have an effect on the problems raised by different time horizons, 
differential risk aversion and dividend retention (Belghitar & Clark 2015; Smith & Watts 
1982). The horizon problem may be partly overcome by linking remuneration to long-term 
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performance, e.g. share price, or by issuing managers with equity in the firm, thereby 
aligning their interests more with those of the shareholders. However, share based 
compensation does not usually resolve the risk aversion problem as it ties the manager’s 
income even more to the one organisation (Smith & Watts 1982). Paying bonuses based on 
profits may help with the risk aversion problem as it encourages more risky choices in order 
to increase profits. Managerial ownership of the firm’s equity may help reduce the dividend 
retention issue as the managers will also get any dividends they approve. 
 
Despite the use of monitoring and bonding strategies, agency theory predicts that an optimum 
amount of monitoring and bonding will be reached, and residual agency costs will remain 
(Fama & Jensen 1983a; Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976). This is because costs will 
only be incurred to the extent that marginal costs equal marginal benefits and therefore the 
interests of the principal and the agent may still not be perfectly aligned. These residual 
agency costs are known as the residual loss and represent the opportunistic behaviour unable 
to be eliminated by monitoring and bonding. Agents may perceive that they will not be fully 
penalised for behaviour that is contrary to the interests of the principals and may therefore 
have incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviour which increases the residual loss. The 
residual loss is borne by both the principal and the agent.  
 
4.3.3 Criticisms and Extensions of Agency Theory 
Some researchers have criticised agency theory for being narrowly conceived, namely the 
emphasis placed on the contract between principal and agent and the attempt by the principal 
to make this more efficient (Eisenhardt 1989; Kiser 1999). Critics of the theory have argued 
that the social and institutional context surrounding the agency relationship is ignored in this 
narrow setting (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia 2012). The assumption that 
individuals will only ever act in their own self-interest is also challenged by some authors. 
Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001, p. 414) for example, argue that the theory does not reflect 
all contingencies that may be present in an economic relationship; particularly that ‘diverse 
individuals in various situations may behave differently’. However, others have challenged 
this criticism and argued that even if the assumption of unmitigated self-interest is relaxed, 
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the theory still provides an effective tool to analyse situations involving agency relationships 
(Jensen 1994; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia 2012).  
 
Jensen (1994) has defended the assumption of self-interest and the use of incentives 
postulated by the theory. While acknowledging that there are many factors that influence 
behaviour, including altruism, Jensen argues that none of these turn people into ‘perfect 
agents’ and that rational individuals, although perhaps not acting entirely through self-
interest, will still usually choose options that are in their interests or make them better off. 
Ultimately, he proposes that ‘rational self-interested people involved in cooperative 
endeavours always have incentives to reduce or control conflicts of interest so as to reduce 
the losses resulting from them’ (Jensen 1994, p. 45). Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez and 
Gomez-Mejia (2012, p. 202) also defend the use of the theory, stating that its  
flexibility allows for its application to a variety of non-traditional settings 
where the key elements of agency theory, such as self-interest, information 
asymmetry, and the mechanisms used to control agency costs can vary 
beyond the narrow assumptions implied in traditional agency-based research.  
They propose that conflicts between agents and principals are always a possibility due to 
contrasting views about desired outcomes and that the theory only requires there to be the 
potential for differences in interests to be applicable. This is particularly so as information 
asymmetry means it is often difficult for principals to know when the agent’s interests differ 
from theirs. 
 
In their development of a conceptual framework of impression management, Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan (2011) discuss the predominant use of agency theory in research concerning the 
topic. They argue that the motivation to manipulate the presentation and disclosure of certain 
voluntarily disclosed information, that is to use impression management tactics, is not always 
easily explained using the economic-based perspectives of agency theory. However, they do 
acknowledge that for research focusing on information asymmetry and possible reporting 
bias concerning financial performance, and on the relationship between managers and 
investors, agency theory provides a particular view of impression management. This study 
focuses on the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures and the use of impression 
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management in the course of this disclosure. As the figures relate to the financial 
performance of a company, an agency theory model is adopted and is discussed below. 
 
4.4 The Voluntary Disclosure of Non-GAAP Profits – a Conceptual Model 
In this section, agency theory will be used to develop a conceptual model to illustrate how 
this theory relates to the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures and the potential for 
opportunistic reporting of such figures. Agency conflicts and information asymmetry 
between agents and principals provide incentives for the agents to act in a manner that is 
contrary to the interests of the principal. However, monitoring costs, which are ultimately 
borne by the agent, encourage agents to bond with the principal and reduce agency problems. 
It is acknowledged that not all agency costs can be eliminated by monitoring and bonding and 
a residual loss will remain. With this in mind, research using agency theory has often taken 
either an efficiency perspective or an opportunistic perspective (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Watts & Zimmerman 1978).  
 
The efficiency perspective maintains that if contracts used to bond agents are efficient, the 
interests of agents and principals will be aligned and any actions that benefit the agent will 
also benefit the principal and increase firm value (Fama 1980). Taking a long-term view, this 
approach argues that agents recognise that any opportunistic behaviour will be penalised by 
future settling up (Godfrey et al. 2006). The efficiency perspective is termed ex ante (before 
the fact) as agents behave as if certain mechanisms were in place from the beginning (e.g. as 
if contracts had been negotiated at the start) to limit their behaviour. Managers are therefore 
more likely to report the firm’s underlying economic circumstances as accurately as possible 
as this keeps the shareholders (principals) informed, reduces monitoring costs and enhances 
the manager’s reputation. The first school of thought proposed by previous literature on non-
GAAP profits has argued that this is the motive for reporting such profit figures, to provide 
incremental, value-relevant information not evident from reviewing the financial statements 
prepared under IFRS or GAAP (Black et al. 2012; Brown & Sivakumar 2003; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2010; Heitger & Ballou 2003). Proponents of the incremental 
information school of thought argue managers provide these discretionary earnings figures to 
overcome information asymmetry and lower the cost of capital (Baginski, Hassell & Hillison 
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2000) and thereby bond management to shareholders. The reporting of such figures can 
therefore be viewed as a bonding cost under agency theory. 
 
Other research has argued that incentives to act in one’s own best interest are still present and 
that agents will still behave opportunistically while attempting to bond themselves to the 
principals, as the effect of any residual loss means monitoring and bonding mechanisms are 
incomplete (Fama & Jensen 1983a; Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling 1976). This approach is 
termed the ex post (after the fact) approach. Contractual arrangements are taken as given and 
ex post, or after the contracts are in place, agents have incentives to transfer wealth as the 
contracts are unlikely to completely remove any benefits they could derive from opportunistic 
behaviour (Fama 1980; Godfrey et al. 2006). The use of impression management tactics to 
highlight certain information, which could potentially mislead some users, is a form of 
opportunistic behaviour (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & 
Guillamón-Saorín 2011). Companies that engage in impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures may be calculating and/or emphasising figures that do not 
fully and transparently reflect the firm’s financial situation. This may affect the ability of 
shareholders and potential investors to make financial decisions and could be considered an 
agency cost (Davidson et al. 2004; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011). Due to the effect 
of any residual loss from the resulting shortfall in monitoring and bonding activities, 
shareholders and prospective investors may be misled by, and make non-optimal decisions 
based on, these figures. The use of impression management is therefore a manifestation of the 
agency problem.  
  
Some studies have suggested that these two motives for reporting non-GAAP figures, 
incremental information versus opportunistic behaviour, are mutually exclusive (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan 2007). However, others have suggested that it is likely both motives co-
exist and that a company may wish to provide some incremental information but may also 
use impression management tactics to highlight and emphasise a particular figure (e.g. 
Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006b; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, 
Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Libby & Emett 2014; Young 2014). As Young (2014, p. 451) 
points out, ‘informative reporting and strategic disclosure do not represent mutually exclusive 
explanations. Instead, both motives likely co-exist with the particular driver varying across 
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firms and time conditional on prevailing reporting incentives’. Non-GAAP earnings may be 
calculated and reported as a bonding mechanism by management, but the effect of any 
residual loss may also mean the figures and their presentation can be manipulated in order to 
control perceptions and potentially mislead users. Drawing from this reasoning, a conceptual 
model has been developed and is shown in Figure 4.1 below. This model introduces four 
research questions which will be formulated, along with sixteen related hypotheses, in the 
remainder of the chapter. 
 
4.5 Non-GAAP Figures and Incremental Information 
Management may voluntarily report non-GAAP figures in order to bond themselves to 
shareholders and prior research has found that non-GAAP figures can provide information 
that is relevant to shareholders and investors (e.g. Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bradshaw & 
Sloan 2002). The idea that these additional profit figures provide useful information is 
supported in Australia by some professional bodies with guidelines from AICD and FINSIA 
(discussed in Chapter 3) stating that the bodies ‘believe that the market is assisted by the 
additional reporting of an underlying profit figure’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 15). 
Regulatory Guide 230 from ASIC takes a more tempered view but still acknowledges that 
‘there are cases where non-IFRS financial information in documents . . . . . . is necessary or 
useful to investors and other users of information’ (ASIC 2011, p. 17). Despite this, not all 
firms report such figures. Taking a broad approach to the topic of non-GAAP profit figures, 
the first two research questions investigate what factors may influence a company’s decision 
to calculate and report these figures. Research Question 1 relates to specific firm 
characteristics: 
Research Question 1: Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific firm characteristics? 
 
 To assess this research question, four hypotheses are developed that relate to specific firm 
characteristics which may influence a company’s choice to report additional voluntary 
financial information, in this instance non-GAAP profit figures. Agency theory and the 
concept of bonding costs will be used to develop predictions as to how these characteristics  
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual model 
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will affect the choice to report such a figure. The particular firm characteristics that will be 
investigated are size, ownership concentration, leverage and good/bad news firms.  
 
4.5.1 Size 
The size of the firm may exacerbate the effects of the separation of ownership and control 
with larger firms, with a greater proportion of outside capital, having greater agency costs and 
information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Larger firms are likely to be more 
complex and have a wider ownership base than small firms (Fama & Jensen 1983b; Meek, 
Roberts & Gray 1995). They are also likely to have less monitoring potential from 
concentrated share ownership since shareholders need to own a larger market value of shares 
to have influence in a larger company compared to smaller companies. Indeed, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p. 348) hypothesised that ‘the larger the firm becomes the larger are the total 
agency costs because it is likely that the monitoring function is inherently more difficult and 
expensive in a larger organization’. If the monitoring function is more difficult in larger 
firms, management may choose to provide more disclosure to mitigate information 
asymmetry and inform investors. The cost of providing this information, which includes the 
calculation and disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures, would be considered a bonding cost. 
 
Previous studies concerning voluntary disclosure in general have overwhelmingly found that 
the size of a company is significantly positively related to the amount of voluntary disclosure 
in the annual report (Ahmed & Courtis 1999; Boesso & Kumar 2007; Chow & Wong-Boren 
1987; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995; Lang & Lundholm 1993; Meek, Roberts & Gray 
1995). It has been proposed that larger firms are better able to bear the direct costs of 
voluntary disclosure and are therefore more likely to disclose more information than smaller 
firms (Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). However, the 
majority of studies into non-GAAP profit figures have not investigated the effects of firm 
characteristics such as size on disclosure. Any measure for size has generally been used as a 
control variable only. A few of these studies have reported results on the variable and have 
found that larger firms are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures (Johnson & 
Schwartz 2005; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Marques 2010). It is therefore predicted that 
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larger firms are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than smaller firms with the 
first hypothesis stating:  
Hypothesis 1: 
 
Larger companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than smaller companies. 
 
4.5.2 Ownership Concentration 
From an agency theory perspective, larger shareholders, including institutional investors, 
have more incentive and are better able to monitor and influence management compared to 
those with small shareholdings. When share ownership is more dispersed, there are a greater 
percentage of small shareholdings and these shareholders have less power or influence to 
demand information. Therefore, information asymmetry is higher, and these shareholders in 
particular may need more information provided to them by management. It is therefore 
predicted that companies with more dispersed ownership are more likely to report a non-
GAAP profit figure in an attempt to overcome information asymmetry and to bond 
themselves to shareholders. Thus, the second hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 2: 
 
Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures 
than companies with concentrated ownership. 
 
4.5.3 Leverage 
Extant agency theory literature suggests that debt can be useful in reducing agency conflicts 
because it bonds the firm to make regular payments thereby reducing the amount of free cash 
flow available for managers to invest in low-return projects or to engage in self-interest 
activities (Bathala, Moon & Rao 1994; Jensen 1986; Lasfer 1995). Increased debt can also 
provide incentive for managers to work harder and make better investment decisions 
(Grossman & Hart 1982; Lasfer 1995). However, debt can exacerbate the conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders as higher debt and the presence of debt covenants can reduce 
returns to shareholders and lead to higher risk of bankruptcy (Hodgson & Stevenson-Clarke 
2000; Jensen 1986; Lasfer 1995; Smith & Warner 1979). Management of highly leveraged 
firms may therefore wish to provide extra information on profits as shareholders and 
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investors may perceive earnings to be less informative due to increased risk that comes with 
higher levels of leverage (Lougee & Marquardt 2004). 
 
Previous studies into voluntary disclosure in general have reached conflicting conclusions 
concerning the effects of leverage on the amount of disclosure (e.g. Ahmed & Courtis 1999; 
Chow & Wong-Boren 1987; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). 
Studies specifically about the reporting of non-GAAP or other earnings figures have 
generally used leverage only as a control variable (e.g. Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & 
Jones 2012; Heflin & Hsu 2008). Studies that reported the results for leverage found that 
more highly leveraged firms were more likely to report a non-GAAP figure (the significance 
was weak in the study by Lougee and Marquardt (2004)) (Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Lougee & 
Marquardt 2004). Wong and Wong (2010) looked at firms reporting EBIT in New Zealand 
and found those that were highly leveraged were more likely to disclose the figure. The 
argument presented above using agency theory predicts that companies which are more 
highly leveraged are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures in order to bond 
themselves to shareholders and allay any concerns shareholders may have about the high 
leverage. Accordingly, the third hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 3: 
 
Highly leveraged companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than 
lower leveraged companies.  
 
4.5.4 Good/bad News Firms 
Under agency theory, one mechanism to overcome information asymmetry involves 
principals monitoring agent’s performance. The agents (or management) will in turn enter 
into contracts and provide extra information in an attempt to bond themselves to the principal 
(or shareholders) and reduce agency costs. Companies that have bad news to report, for 
example a drop in GAAP profits from the previous period or a GAAP loss, may be more 
likely to report an alternative non-GAAP profit figure particularly if the drop was because of 
extraordinary, one-off items. In this situation, management may attempt to provide this extra 
information to show they are working for the benefit of the principals so as to avoid high 
monitoring costs and receive higher remuneration. Previous studies have confirmed this 
assumption with less profitable firms, firms that have reported a decrease in GAAP earnings 
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and firms that have missed analysts’ forecasts, being more likely to report non-GAAP figures 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Isidro & Marques 2015; 
Johnson & Schwartz 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu 
(2004), for example, found that strong performers, firms with record GAAP earnings and 
firms meeting analysts’ forecasts were less likely to report a non-GAAP figure. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2004) found that firms reporting non-GAAP profits were significantly less profitable 
than the median for firms in their industry. It is therefore predicted that companies reporting a 
drop in GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP loss, are more likely to report a 
non-GAAP profit figure. The fourth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 4: 
 
Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP 
loss, are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an 
increase in GAAP profits. 
 
Apart from firm characteristics it is also possible that particular events may influence or drive 
a firm’s decision to report non-GAAP profit figures as the events may exacerbate the 
information asymmetry between principles and agents. Research Question 2 concerns the 
effect specific events may have had on this decision: 
Research Question 2: Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific events?  
 
To assess this research question, four hypotheses are developed that relate to specific events 
which may have influenced a company’s choice to report additional voluntary financial 
information, in this instance non-GAAP profit figures. This research question (and Research 
Question 4) concerns the effect certain specific events may have had on the decision to report 
non-GAAP profit figures and the use of impression management when reporting such figures. 
These specific events are the introduction of IFRSs in Australia, the GFC, the release of the 
AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide. These events 
are shown on the timeline presented in Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2: Sample Period Timeline – specific  
events that may influence disclosure decisions 
 
 
The introduction of IFRSs in Australia, the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and 
the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide were previously discussed in detail in Sections 3.2 
and 3.3. 
 
4.5.5 The Introduction of IFRS in Australia 
Australia adopted IFRS effective from annual reporting periods commencing on or after 
1 January 2005, with Australian listed entities required to comply with the Australian 
equivalents to IFRS from this date (Australian Accounting Standards Board 2004a). 
Therefore, companies with a year-end of 31 December would fully implement the standards 
in the 2005 report. For companies with a year-end other than 31 December, the year 2005 
was a transition year and the 2005 annual report was still prepared under the previous regime. 
However, companies were to provide certain disclosures concerning the effect of IFRS 
adoption as mandated by AASB 1047 Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting Australian 
Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards (Australian Accounting 
Standards Board 2004b). According to this standard ‘(t)he manner of presentation of 
quantified financial information about the impacts of adopting Australian equivalents to 
IFRSs is not specific in this Standard and is a matter for the entity to determine’ (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board 2004b, p. 9) which implies companies were given ‘considerable 
discretion’ in complying with the requirements of the standard (Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 
2008, p. 257).  
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The standard predicted that adopting IFRS ‘may result in changes to accounting policies that 
have significant impacts on the reported financial position and financial performance of an 
entity’ (Australian Accounting Standards Board 2004b, p. 6). As discussed in Section 3.2.2, it 
was expected that there would be significant changes to the way companies accounted for 
goodwill, intangible assets, non-current assets (impairment testing), share-based payments, 
taxation and financial instruments (Chalmers, Clinch & Godfrey 2011; Cotter, Tarca & Wee 
2012) and therefore the introduction of the standards would have a major impact on financial 
statements including the income statement (AICD & FINSIA 2009). The adoption of IFRS 
was expected to have significant effects on reported net profit and shareholders’ equity and it 
is likely management would have known about these effects before investors and 
shareholders (Wang & Welker 2011). Information asymmetry caused by the introduction of 
IFRS and the calculation of financial results using the standards would therefore have been 
high in the transition and adoption years and this would have been incentive for managers to 
provide extra disclosure concerning its effect (Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 2008). Due to the 
notable differences between existing Australian Accounting Standards and IFRS, companies 
may have felt the need to adopt different ways of expressing earnings and profits (Deloitte 
2009). It is predicted that the number of companies reporting a non-GAAP profit figure 
increased with the introduction of IFRS with the fifth hypothesis developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 5: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase with the 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards in Australia. 
 
4.5.6 The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
The usefulness of non-GAAP figures could potentially increase during times of economic 
crises when markets and asset prices used in fair value accounting are more volatile (Malone, 
Tarca & Wee 2016; Sinnewe, Harrison & Wijeweera 2017). The GFC, along with the 
resulting drop in GAAP profits for many companies, may have prompted managers to 
provide extra information concerning the economic downturn and its effect on their results. 
The first signs of the crisis emerged in the middle of 2007 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2010). 
The crisis intensified around March 2008 and reached a peak in September 2008, with 
conditions improving over the course of 2009 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2010). An 
Australian study by Malone, Tarca and Wee (2016) investigated the disclosure of non-GAAP 
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earnings adjustments for fair value measurements around the time of the GFC. They found 
that the release of non-GAAP figures was less likely in the pre-crisis period compared to the 
crisis period, consistent with companies making more use of non-GAAP earnings in the 
volatile crisis period. They argue that companies may have reported a non-GAAP figure due 
to the many asset write-downs during the crisis that were not expected to recur in the future 
with companies therefore wanting to report a figure more reflective of earnings without these 
write-downs. In another Australian study Sinnewe, Harrison and Wijeweera (2017) 
considered whether non-GAAP earnings contain statistically significant information on future 
cash flow predictability before, during and after the GFC. They found that non-GAAP 
earnings did provide important information on future cash flows but only in the pre-crisis and 
crisis period. These findings suggest that companies did increase the use of non-GAAP 
earnings during the GFC, possibly in an attempt to provide more value relevant information. 
It is therefore predicted that the use of non-GAAP profit figures will increase during the years 
of the GFC with the sixth hypothesis developed as follows:  
 Hypothesis 6: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase during the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
 
4.5.7 The AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit 
AICD and FINSIA issued guidelines on the reporting of underlying (non-GAAP) profit 
information in March 2009 (AICD & FINSIA 2009). Principle 1 of these guidelines 
encourages the reporting of a non-GAAP profit figure and reads ‘report on the underlying 
profit, where relevant, in addition to the statutory profit’ (p. 15). These guidelines encourage 
the reporting of such figures as a way of overcoming information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and other stakeholders. As these professional bodies have a large 
membership (more than 40,000 in total for both bodies in 2009) and the guidelines 
recommend the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures, it is predicted that the number of 
companies reporting such figures increased after the release of these guidelines. Thus, the 
seventh hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 7: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase after the 
release of guidelines on reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
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4.5.8 ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
ASIC released Regulatory Guide 230 Disclosing non-IFRS financial information and an 
accompanying Regulation Impact Statement in December 2011. The Regulatory Guide 
acknowledges that non-IFRS (non-GAAP) financial information ‘can be useful for investors 
and other users of this information in certain circumstances’ (ASIC 2011, p. 4). It also states 
that ‘ASIC is not seeking to prohibit the use of non-IFRS financial information in documents 
related to the financial result’ (ASIC 2011, p. 6) and does not, therefore, forbid the use of 
non-GAAP profit figures. Instead the Guide attempts to regulate the manner in which the 
figures are reported, as it states that the figures have the ‘potential to be misleading’ (ASIC 
2011, p. 4). This stance is similar to that taken by the SEC in the US with the introduction of 
Regulation G. This Regulation did not prohibit the use of non-GAAP figures but required 
increased transparency and that GAAP figures are given equal prominence. Interestingly, the 
introduction of Regulation G in the US did lead to an immediate decrease in the use of non-
GAAP figures by companies (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Marques 2006) but this 
decrease appears to have been temporary with more recent studies showing their current use 
exceeding levels of the pre-Regulation G period (Black et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2012). 
 
The conceptual model developed in this study predicts that companies may provide non-
GAAP profit figures to overcome information asymmetry. As the ASIC Regulatory Guide 
230 did not prohibit the use of these figures, it is predicted its release will not affect the 
number of companies choosing to report the figures. Thus, the eighth hypothesis is developed 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 8: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will not be influenced by 
the release of Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. 
 
 
4.6 Non-GAAP Figures and Impression Management 
When calculating and reporting non-GAAP figures, managers may behave opportunistically 
and employ impression management tactics to mislead shareholders and investors. 
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Shareholders and investors may be unable to detect and decipher the impression management 
tactics due to the effect of a residual loss. Indeed these assumptions of opportunistic 
behaviour and the use of impression management tactics to mislead investors and 
shareholders are validated by the introduction in Australia of the AICD and FINSIA 
guidelines concerning the reporting of such figures (AICD & FINSIA 2009) and the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230 which aims ‘to promote full and clear disclosure for investors and 
other users of financial information and minimise the possibility of those users being misled 
by such information’ (ASIC 2011, p. 1). It can be deemed from the aims of these guidelines 
that these bodies are not so much concerned with the actual reporting of non-GAAP profit 
figures but with the use of impression management tactics to emphasise these alternative 
figures over figures calculated using IFRS, thereby making the figures potentially misleading.  
 
Some studies concerning non-GAAP figures have questioned whether the actual method of 
calculating the figure is opportunistic in itself, particularly if the figure excludes recurring 
expenses (Black & Christensen 2009; Brown, Christensen & Elliott 2012; Doyle, Lundholm 
& Soliman 2003; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Johnson & Schwartz 2005) or is 
manipulated to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Doyle, Jennings & 
Soliman 2013; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Isidro & Marques 2015; Marques 2010). 
This study does not investigate the calculation of the figure and assumes that if the figure is 
reported transparently, with clear reconciliations and explanations then its reporting is not 
considered impression management. Rather this study is concerned with how the figure is 
presented to the shareholders and potential investors, that is, the use of prominence and 
emphasis compared to the GAAP result. The aim of this part of this study is to identify which 
drivers affect (either instigate or mitigate) the use of impression management when reporting 
non-GAAP figures. 
 
In this study, including the research questions and hypotheses below, the term ‘impression 
management’ relates to strategies which are visual or structural and involve the emphasis, 
ordering and repetition of information and the use of fonts and styles in order to make a piece 
of information more obvious to readers (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brennan, 
Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007). Previous literature has questioned whether the use of impression management 
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tactics in company reports is a conscious decision or not, although most studies assume it is a 
conscious behaviour (Abrahamson & Park 1994; Clatworthy & Jones 2006; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan 2007; Staw, McKechnie & Puffer 1983). As the AICD and FINSIA Guidelines and 
ASIC Regulatory Guide specifically address the issue of prominence in reporting non-GAAP 
profit figures it could be assumed that any companies that continued to use these impression 
management tactics after the release of these guidelines did so deliberately and consciously. 
This is an important contribution of the current study. 
 
The third and fourth research questions investigate what factors influence a firm’s decision to 
engage in impression management tactics (as defined above) when reporting non-GAAP 
figures. Research Question 3 concerns firm characteristics that may influence this decision 
and asks:  
Research Question 3: Is the use of impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures influenced by specific firm 
characteristics?  
 
To assess this research question, four hypotheses are developed that relate to specific firm 
characteristics (the same characteristics investigated in Research Question 1) which may 
influence whether a company uses impression management tactics when reporting non-
GAAP profit figures.  
 
4.6.1 Size 
As discussed in Section 4.5.1, the size of a firm can exacerbate agency problems and 
information asymmetry. Previous studies have found that larger firms are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose information including non-GAAP profit figures (Johnson & Schwartz 
2005; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Marques 2010). As larger firms are more complex, 
agency costs are increased. It is therefore more likely that monitoring and bonding costs will 
not completely eliminate opportunistic behaviour and a residual loss will remain. Due to 
complexity and lack of monitoring, it is predicted that larger firms are not only more likely 
than smaller firms to report a non-GAAP profit figure but also more likely to use impression 
management tactics when reporting the figure. Thus, the ninth hypothesis is developed as 
follows:  
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Hypothesis 9: 
 
Larger companies are more likely to use impression management tactics when reporting 
non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than smaller companies. 
 
4.6.2 Ownership Concentration 
As discussed in Section 4.5.2, larger shareholders, including institutional investors, have 
more incentive and are more able to monitor management. They are usually more 
experienced or ‘sophisticated’ and have more power and influence with regards to 
management decisions. Smaller investors have less control over the information necessary to 
verify agents are acting in their interests (Abrahamson & Park 1994; Eisenhardt 1989) and 
may be more inexperienced (or ‘less sophisticated’) and therefore unable to decipher some of 
the information presented to them due to the effect of any residual loss. Young (2014, p. 453) 
explains that smaller, non-professional investors ‘lack the necessary sophistication and 
experience to understand fully the precision and reliability of their information set’ and their 
judgements may be particularly susceptible to mispricing of non-GAAP earnings. Indeed, 
previous studies have found that shareholder’s (and potential investor’s) perceptions of the 
usefulness, relevance and reliability of these figures, and the manner in which shareholders 
react to the disclosure, depends on their level of sophistication (Allee et al. 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2007; Frederickson & Miller 2004; James & Michello 2010). More 
importantly for this current study is the finding that the effect these figures have on less 
sophisticated investors increases with the prominence given to the figure over the GAAP or 
IFRS result (Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006). It follows that management, if behaving 
opportunistically, may take advantage of dispersed ownership and the presence of smaller 
shareholders by using impression management tactics to emphasise the better performance 
figure and influence the shareholder’s and other investor’s decision making. It is therefore 
predicted that firms with a more dispersed ownership are more likely to use impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures than firms with concentrated 
ownership. Thus, the tenth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 10: 
 
Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to use impression management 
tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. 
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4.6.3 Leverage 
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, previous studies have found an association between high 
leverage and the disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures. This disclosure may be an attempt 
by management to provide incremental information to shareholders, who are concerned about 
the risk involved in high levels of debt, or even to the debtholders themselves. However, 
managers may still behave opportunistically when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. 
Shareholders may perceive a higher risk in more highly leveraged firms and feel more 
vulnerable due to creditor’s claims over profits. These firms may attempt to allay any 
concerns and promote the appearance of good performance by emphasising a non-GAAP 
figure, particularly when it exceeds the GAAP result.  
 
Management may also be attempting to influence debtholders by emphasising the non-GAAP 
profit figure. This has been found to be the case if the company is not subject to debt 
covenants or if existing covenants have not been violated (Christensen et al. 2017). 
Christensen et al. (2017) found a significant decrease in non-GAAP profit disclosures 
following debt covenant violations, with any disclosures that were made being of a higher 
quality. They surmised that pre-violation non-GAAP disclosures were used opportunistically 
but that the closer scrutiny following the violation, by both creditors and shareholders, 
tempered the opportunistic behaviour. It is therefore predicted that highly leveraged firms are 
more likely to use impression management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures with the 
eleventh hypothesis developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 11: 
 
Highly leveraged companies are more likely to use impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged companies. 
 
4.6.4 Good/bad News Firms 
As discussed in Section 4.5.4, management may enter into contracts and provide extra 
information in an attempt to bond themselves to shareholders and reduce agency costs. When 
there is bad news to report in the form of lower profits or indeed a loss, management may 
provide extra information in the form of non-GAAP profits to avoid higher monitoring costs 
or the possibility of receiving lower remuneration. The reputation of CEOs and other 
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management may suffer during periods of decreased earnings and compensation packages are 
usually based on performance (Davidson et al. 2004). Therefore, there may be incentive to 
disguise bad news through the use of impression management tactics to highlight a higher 
non-GAAP figure. As Rutherford (2003, p. 189) suggests, ‘(a)gency theory holds that, in an 
environment in which their remuneration and wealth is linked to the financial performance of 
the companies that employ them, managements have economic incentives to disclose 
messages conveying good performance more clearly than those conveying poor 
performance.’ The few previous studies that have investigated emphasis of non-GAAP 
figures when there is bad news have confirmed this assumption. Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia 
Osma and Jones (2012) investigated press release headlines and found that when there was a 
bad news year companies highlighted the non-GAAP figure or revenue rather than GAAP 
profits. In good news years, GAAP profit was highlighted in the headlines. Bowen, Davis and 
Matsumoto (2005) found that firms with a history of prior year losses place more emphasis 
on non-GAAP figures. They also found that firms emphasise the figure that portrays the 
better performance, a finding confirmed by other studies (e.g. Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-
Clarke 2012; Marques 2010). It is therefore predicted that firms reporting a decrease in 
GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP loss, are more likely to use impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. The twelfth hypothesis is developed 
as follows:  
Hypothesis 12: 
 
Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP 
loss, are more likely to use impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an increase in GAAP profits. 
 
Research Question 4 concerns the effect the specific events shown in Figure 4.2 may have 
had on the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. 
Some of the events may have led to a significant change in the GAAP profit figure which in 
turn may have initiated a decision to exploit the effect of any residual loss and use impression 
management tactics to highlight an alternative, perhaps more favourable non-GAAP figure. 
Other events may have mitigated the use of impression management. This research question 
therefore asks: 
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Research Question 4: Is the use of impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures influenced by specific 
events?  
 
To assess this research question, four hypotheses are developed that relate to these specific 
events (the same events investigated in Research Question 2).  
 
4.6.5 The Introduction of IFRS in Australia 
As discussed in Section 4.5.5, Australia adopted IFRS effective for annual reporting periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2005 and listed entities were required to comply with the 
Australian equivalents to IFRS from this date. As Wang and Welker (2011) reported, it is 
likely that management would have known about the significant effects the introduction of 
the standards would have on the reported net profit before shareholders and investors. They 
also predicted that managers may exploit this exogenously imposed information asymmetry 
to their advantage. It is therefore predicted that not only would companies have reported a 
non-GAAP profit figure, but it is likely the figure would have been given more prominence 
than the IFRS (or GAAP) figure. The thirteenth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 13: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will increase with the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards in Australia. 
 
4.6.6 The Global Financial Crisis 
As discussed in Section 4.5.6, management may have felt the need to report non-GAAP 
profits during the GFC in an attempt to provide more value relevant information on earnings. 
However, as information asymmetry was high and potential investors wary, this would also 
have been a time when opportunistic disclosures may have increased. Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan (2007) explain that the motivation to engage in impression management is 
connected to the desired outcome from its use, which in itself is a function of resources. The 
use of impression management may be more prevalent when resources are scarce. Therefore 
‘impression management should be stronger during economic downturns and when firms are 
in heightened competition for funds’ (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007, p. 170). It is predicted 
94 
 
that the use of impression management when reporting non-GAAP figures will increase 
during the GFC and the fourteenth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
 Hypothesis 14: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
4.6.7 The AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit 
Although the guidelines on the reporting of non-GAAP profit information released by AICD 
and FINSIA (AICD & FINSIA 2009) encourage the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures, 
they also provide principles on the calculation and in particular the presentation of such 
figures. The first principle recommends companies report an underlying profit but notes that 
this should be done ‘without giving undue prominence to the underlying profit figure’ (AICD 
& FINSIA 2009, p. 15). The term ‘undue prominence’ is not explained. Principle 3 of the 
guidelines recommends that the underlying profit figure (non-GAAP) should be reconciled to 
the GAAP profit. It is predicted that the guidelines may have had some effect in reducing the 
use of impression management, particularly with the requirement of providing a 
reconciliation to GAAP profit and the call for no undue prominence. However, it should be 
noted that the guidelines only espoused best practice and are not mandatory and therefore 
there may have been little effect on the use of impression management following their 
release. The fifteenth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
Hypothesis 15: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will decrease with the release of guidelines on 
reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
 
4.6.8 ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
As stated in Section 4.5.8, the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 acknowledges that non-IFRS 
financial information can be useful for investors but also attempts to regulate the manner in 
which the information is reported. In particular, companies reporting non-IFRS financial 
information (including non-GAAP profit figures) should give IFRS financial information 
equal or greater prominence, should explain non-IFRS information and reconcile it to the 
IFRS results, should calculate the information consistently from period to period and should 
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make sure the information is unbiased and has not been used to remove ‘bad news’ (ASIC 
2011).  
 
The introduction of Regulation G by the SEC in the US brought about a ‘substantial change’ 
(Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a, p. 51) to the way many companies reported non-
GAAP results, particularly with regard to the use of impression management tactics. It is 
suggested that the introduction of Regulation G stopped some firms reporting non-GAAP 
figures as they could no longer do so in an opportunistic, less transparent fashion (Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Jennings & Marques 2011; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008; 
Marques 2006; Yi 2012; Zhang & Zheng 2011). Several companies that did continue to 
report a non-GAAP figure appeared to adapt the calculation and presentation of the figure to 
show more transparency and lessen the magnitude of variations from GAAP, perhaps due to 
the requirement for a reconciliation to GAAP figures (Black et al. 2012; Entwistle, Feltham 
& Mbagwu 2006a; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Jennings & 
Marques 2011; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008). Regulation G required non-GAAP figures 
not be given prominence over GAAP figures and studies found companies generally changed 
the way they presented non-GAAP information (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a, 
2006b; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Marques 2010).  
 
The release of Regulatory Guide 230 in Australia suggests that ASIC considers the use of 
emphasis to be a disclosure tactic that needed to be addressed and, along with the release of 
Regulation G in the US, brought the issue of non-GAAP figures to prominence. This means 
the effect of any residual loss may no longer be as relevant in relation to these figures as 
principles (shareholders) and potential investors have been made aware of the opportunistic 
practices of some agents in this regard. Although Regulatory Guide 230 is not law, ASIC is 
Australia’s corporate regulator and the body can take action against companies not complying 
with the Guide. It is therefore predicted that the use of impression management tactics by 
Australian companies in the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures will have decreased after 
the release of Regulatory Guide 230 and the sixteenth hypothesis is developed as follows:  
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Hypothesis 16: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will decrease with the release of Regulatory Guide 
230 by ASIC. 
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter developed a theoretical framework and conceptual model to explain the 
reporting of non-GAAP profit figures by Australian companies and the possible use of 
impression management to influence shareholder’s perceptions of performance. Agency 
theory has been used to develop the model and this, along with existing literature discussed in 
Chapter 2 and the regulatory environment in Australia discussed in Chapter 3, has led to the 
development of four research questions and 16 hypotheses. The first two research questions 
and related hypotheses investigate what specific firm characteristics or specific events may 
influence a firm’s decision to calculate and report non-GAAP profit figures. The third and 
fourth research questions and related hypotheses investigate what specific firm characteristics 
or specific events influence a firm’s decision to engage in impression management tactics 
when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. These research questions and hypotheses are 
summarised in Table 4.1 below and the methods that will be implemented to examine these 
questions are explained in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Research questions and hypotheses 
The reporting of non-GAAP profit figures in Australia 
Research Question 1: Is the company’s 
choice to report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific firm 
characteristics?  
H1: Larger companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profit 
figures than smaller companies. 
H2: Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to report 
non-GAAP profit figures than companies with concentrated 
ownership. 
H3: Highly leveraged companies are more likely to report non-
GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged companies. 
H4: Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the 
previous period, or a GAAP loss, or more likely to report non-
GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an increase in 
GAAP profits. 
Research Question 2: Is the company’s 
choice to report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific events?  
H5: The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will increase with the introduction of International Financial 
Reporting Standards in Australia. 
H6: The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
H7:  The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will increase after the release of guidelines on reporting 
underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
H8:  The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will not be influenced by the release of Regulatory Guide 230 
by ASIC. 
The use of impression management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
Research Question 3: Is the use of 
impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP and GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific firm 
characteristics?  
H9: Larger companies are more likely to use impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to 
GAAP profit figures than smaller companies. 
H10: Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to use 
impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. 
H11: Highly leveraged companies are more likely to use impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to 
GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged companies.  
H12: Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the 
previous period, or a GAAP loss, are more likely to use 
impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an 
increase in GAAP profits. 
Research Question 4: Is the use of 
impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP and GAAP profit 
figures influenced by specific events? 
H13: The use of impression management tactics by companies when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures will 
increase with the introduction of International Financial 
Reporting Standards in Australia. 
H14: The use of impression management tactics by companies when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures will 
increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
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Table 4.1: Research questions and hypotheses (continued) 
 
H15: The use of impression management tactics by companies when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures will 
decrease with the release of guidelines on reporting underlying 
profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
H16: The use of impression management tactics by companies when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures will 
decrease with the release of Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Method 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research method employed to answer the research questions and 
test the hypotheses that were developed in Chapter 4. An overview of the research design for 
the study is provided in Section 5.2 and this is followed by an explanation of the four stages 
of data collection in Sections 5.3 to 5.6. The variables used to investigate the research 
questions and related hypotheses are listed and described in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 describes 
the statistical tests to be used in the study and the chapter concludes with a summary in 
Section 5.9 
 
5.2 Overview of Research Design 
This study investigates the decision by companies to report non-GAAP profit figures 
including the use of impression management when reporting such figures. This study is an 
empirical archival study that employs content analysis and quantitative techniques to 
determine the influence of certain company characteristics and specific events on reporting 
decisions concerning non-GAAP profits. The study is longitudinal, covering twelve years 
from 2004 to 2015. This enabled the investigation of the specific events covered by the study, 
from the introduction of IFRS through to the release and subsequent effect of the Regulatory 
Guide 230 from ASIC.  
 
5.2.1 Manual and Computer Assisted Data Collection and Analysis 
A combination of manual and computer assisted data collection and analysis is used in the 
study, in line with some previous studies on organisational performance and/or impression 
management (Abrahamson & Park 1994; Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2005; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Rainsbury, Hart & Buranavityawut 
2015; Smith & Taffler 1992). Computer aided data collection and content analysis has 
advantages over manual collection and analysis including the use of larger data sets, 
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reliability and speed (Duriau, Reger & Pfarrer 2007). However, this method is not suited to 
all aspects of this study. Initially, the presence of any non-GAAP profit figures needed to be 
determined and as the terminology used to describe non-GAAP figures varies greatly across 
companies and different time periods, machine reading of text is inefficient for this purpose 
compared to manual collection (Marques 2017). Therefore, manual content analysis was used 
to identify occurrences of non-GAAP and GAAP figures which formed the basis of analysis 
for all four Research Questions. Research Questions 3 and 4 relate to the use of impression 
management tactics and as ‘impression management techniques are subtle and sophisticated, 
and therefore complex’ the use of manual content analysis may be warranted depending on 
the type of analysis being performed (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009, p. 801). 
Manual content analysis was therefore used to code for the use of impression management 
techniques for these questions, as subjective judgement was required to apply coding rules to 
location and visual presentation effects. Computer assisted data collection and analysis was 
used to search for occurrences of non-GAAP and GAAP figures (using terms identified 
during the manual content analysis), to collect data concerning company characteristics, and 
to conduct the analysis of the data using Microsoft Excel 2010 and IBM SPSS Statistics 24.  
 
5.2.2 Population of Study 
The population used in this study comprises the Standard & Poor’s ASX 200 Index (hereafter 
‘Top 200’) which are the largest 200 Australian listed public companies ranked by market 
capitalisation. The list of the Top 200 was obtained on 31 August, 2015 and accounted for 
72% of the Australian equity market as at that date (Market Index 2015). Companies in the 
Top 200 are more likely to be followed by security analysts and also more likely to have 
diverse shareholders and financing needs (Malone, Tarca & Wee 2012). In order to reliably 
analyse changes in behaviour, it was important that the companies in the final sample were 
listed for the entire twelve years of the study.  Also, the analysis for Research Questions 3 
and 4 only involved the companies reporting a non-GAAP profit figure.  The Top 200 was 
chosen as the population so as to obtain a large enough data set to perform the analysis once 
these other contingencies had been accounted for. 
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5.2.3 Phases of Data Collection 
Once the population was established, the data collection proceeded in four phases. The first 
phase involved locating and downloading relevant historical documents and establishing the 
final sample of companies by eliminating those not meeting specific criteria (explained in 
Section 5.3.3). The second phase involved identifying which companies in the sample 
reported a non-GAAP figure and which did not (required for all research questions), and 
recording the amounts of the figures and their location in the documents. The third phase 
involved collecting data on the company characteristics investigated in Research Questions 1 
and 3. In the fourth and final phase, a set of coding rules was applied to the documents 
containing non-GAAP figures in order to determine the use of impression management 
tactics and to arrive at a relative emphasis score to analyse Research Questions 3 and 4. 
These four phases of the data collection, including how the final sample was determined from 
the population, will now be explained in detail. 
 
5.3 Data Collection Phase One  
In the first phase of the data collection process, the list of the Top 200 companies was used to 
locate and download the relevant documents to be employed in the study. Companies may 
use a range of disclosure outlets to communicate current financial conditions and results 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies 2013; Mayew 2012). These outlets include annual reports, press 
releases, shareholder presentations and conference calls, prospectuses, takeover documents, 
websites and in some cases, social media outlets. As this study involved archived documents 
from 2004 onward, some of these outlets (such as information provided on websites or social 
media at various times) were no longer available. For the purposes of this study, annual 
results press releases, annual reports and annual reviews were used with justification for this 
choice provided below. 
 
5.3.1 Press Releases 
Press releases are voluntary disclosures that offer a timely, easily accessible vehicle for 
management to communicate with shareholders, potential investors and other stakeholders on 
a range of topics, including the reporting of annual results (Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma 
& Jones 2012). Timeliness is an important factor in voluntary disclosure (García Osma & 
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Guillamón-Saorín 2011) with the annual results press release usually the first document that 
highlights company performance for the year. As press releases are largely unregulated, there 
is potential for managers to attempt to influence the perceptions of readers by employing 
impression management tactics (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brennan, Guillamon-
Saorin & Pierce 2009; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). The contents are often covered by the 
national press and television which gives them a wider audience than annual reports 
(Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009).  
 
In Australia, most public companies issue an annual results press release, which reports on 
the results in a narrative manner. The document is given various names such as ‘media 
statement’, ‘media release’, ‘news release’ and ‘results announcement’. The format, content 
and length of the document vary greatly from company to company with no particular 
standard format being used. As they are voluntary, unaudited and with no set format, these 
documents provide an opportunity to report a range of profit figures and to employ 
impression management tactics when doing so (Hitz 2010). As this study involved analysing 
the GAAP and non-GAAP profit figures reported by companies as part of its annual results, 
annual results press releases were used as one of the disclosure documents investigated. 
Previous studies into the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings figures have overwhelmingly 
used only press releases (e.g. Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brown, Christensen & 
Elliott 2012; Doyle, Jennings & Soliman 2013; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2005, 
2006b; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 
2012; Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques 2017; Hitz 2010; Lougee & Marquardt 2004; 
Marques 2010). 
 
As there are other documents released to the market at the same time, it is important to define 
what was classified as an annual results press release in this study. Annual results press 
releases are voluntary documents where companies report their financial results and other 
aspects of performance in a narrative style. They do not follow any particular format. In 
Australia, companies must comply with ASX listing rules when releasing annual results to 
the market. Entities admitted to the ASX list sign an agreement to comply with these rules, 
which are enforceable under ss 793C and 1101B of the Corporations Act 2001. Listing rule 
4.3A requires entities (except mining or gas and oil exploration entities) to supply the 
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information set out in Appendix 4E of Chapter 4 (Periodic Disclosure) of the listing rules to 
the ASX. The information provided and the accounts on which it is based must use the same 
accounting policies and comply with accounting standards. Appendix 4E requires particular 
results to be released, including revenue and profit from ordinary activities, along with 
financial statements and other information concerning items such as dividends, controlling 
entities, joint ventures, etc. A commentary on the results must also be provided. Appendix 4E 
is usually released on the same day (and sometimes in the same document) as the annual 
results press release. However, Appendix 4E is not a voluntary report and the format is 
dictated by the ASX requirements, which means that the setting out and contents of the 
Appendix is basically the same for each company. For these reasons this document was not 
included in this study, and only annual results press releases that are reported in a narrative 
style were used.  
 
5.3.2 Annual Reports and Annual Reviews 
Annual reports are a ‘primary information source’ for many stakeholders including investors 
and shareholders (Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998, p. 269) and are one of the most commonly 
researched documents in impression management studies (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007), 
particularly the Chairman’s and CEO or President’s letter (e.g. Abrahamson & Park 1994; 
Clatworthy & Jones 2003; Clatworthy & Jones 2006; Rutherford 2003; Smith & Taffler 
1992). They are considered an effective platform for using impression management as they 
are viewed as credible documents but control over the content of the narrative section lies 
with the preparers (Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998).  
 
Although annual reports have often been used in general impression management studies, 
most previous studies into the reporting of non-GAAP earnings figures in particular, have 
only examined press releases (see Section 5.3.1 above). This could be explained by their 
release providing a timelier vehicle for the use of impression management than annual 
reports. However, there have been a few studies concerning non-GAAP earnings that have 
examined annual reports (e.g. Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Malone, Tarca & 
Wee 2016; Rainsbury 2016; Rainsbury, Hart & Buranavityawut 2015).  
 
104 
 
In Australia, some companies choose to release an annual review or shareholder review and a 
separate annual or financial report. These annual reviews generally comprise the narrative 
sections of annual reports such as performance highlights, the Chairman’s and CEO’s letters, 
and the Directors’ Report or Review of Operations. Often the accompanying annual report is 
simply a financial report containing the financial statements and notes thereto or it may repeat 
the Chairman’s letter and Directors’ Report. Both the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 cover the use of non-GAAP figures in press releases, annual 
reports and other disclosure documents such as presentations to investors and briefings to 
analysts. As this study provides a comprehensive investigation into the practice of disclosing 
non-GAAP figures in Australia, including the effect of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and 
the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, annual results press releases, annual reports and annual 
reviews were all considered relevant and formed part of the data set. For the purposes of this 
study, where annual reviews were issued, both the annual review and the annual or financial 
report were downloaded and used when collecting data. In the analysis and results for this 
study, the annual review and annual report/financial report were considered collectively as 
one document, the ‘annual report’, and the potential for repetitive data was considered during 
analysis with processes put in place to avoid double-counting.  
 
5.3.3 Collection of the Documents and Sample Determination 
The annual results press releases and annual reports were downloaded and saved to a 
computer for the period 2004 to 2015 from the Top 200. The majority of the reports were 
sourced from the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database. In the few instances where 
reports were not available from this database, the individual company’s website was used to 
obtain the documents.  
 
During this first phase of the data collection, a total of 91 companies were eliminated from 
the population as explained below: 
• As this is a longitudinal study, companies in the final sample needed to be listed for 
the entire period so that changes in behaviour could be assessed (Sinnewe, Harrison & 
Wijeweera 2017). Sixty-nine companies were not listed on the Exchange for the full 
twelve years of the study and were eliminated. 
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• As some variables are expressed in dollar values it was necessary that all reports be in 
Australian dollars. Twenty-one companies reported in a foreign currency at some 
stage in the twelve-year timeframe.  
• One company was eliminated due to its complicated trust structure where reports 
covered multiple trusts and did not report single figures for Net Profit.  
 
This left a total of 109 companies (1,308 firm years) from the population of companies that 
met all criteria for inclusion in the next three phases of the data collection process. A list of 
companies in the final sample, and the industry they belong to, is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
5.4 Data Collection Phase Two 
In the second phase of the data collection process, the downloaded documents were searched 
in order to establish which companies reported non-GAAP profit figures and which did not. 
This information formed the basis for more in-depth analysis of the research questions and 
hypotheses and provided descriptive statistics on the prevalence of the use of non-GAAP 
profit figures in Australia over the period of the study. Some previous studies concerning 
non-GAAP earnings have not always been clear on what they included in the definition of 
non-GAAP earnings (e.g. Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Choi & Young 2015; 
Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Rainsbury 2016; Sinnewe, Harrison & Wijeweera 
2017). Differences in the definition of the term, and in the sample itself, have led to differing 
results, particularly concerning descriptive statistics, for studies covering the same timeframe. 
In order to carry out this phase of the data collection, it was first necessary to define what 
would be considered a non-GAAP profit figure for this study. 
 
5.4.1 Definition of ‘Non-GAAP’ Profit Figure 
This study defines non-GAAP profit figures as figures that purport to be a representation of 
profit, but which have been calculated other than in accordance with relevant IFRS/GAAP. 
This includes, for example, figures that exclude significant or non-recurring items. For the 
purpose of this study the figures must be expressed in the same manner as the net profit after 
tax calculated under IFRS/GAAP, that is, as a total profit figure. Therefore, this study does 
not include non-GAAP earnings per share, a figure that has been studied in extant literature 
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on non-GAAP reporting (e.g. Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Black & 
Christensen 2009; Bradshaw & Sloan 2002; Brown, Christensen & Elliott 2012; Ciccone 
2002; Doyle, Jennings & Soliman 2013; Doyle, Lundholm & Soliman 2003; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2005, 2006b). The reason these 
figures are not included is because various earnings per share figures are required to be 
calculated and reported under AASB133 (Australian Accounting Standards Board 2012) and 
the ASIC Regulatory Guide does not include these amounts in its definition of non-GAAP 
information (ASIC 2011, p. 8).  
 
Although many studies are unclear on their definition of non-GAAP earnings, some studies 
have clearly stated that they did not include EBIT and EBITDA. Reasons for their exclusion 
include that the figures are commonly used and understood by investors, are sometimes 
included in the income statement, and were in use long before the trend in non-GAAP 
earnings began in the late 1990s (Allee et al. 2007; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bowen, Davis & 
Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006b, 2010; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016). 
Using the same reasoning, this study does not include EBIT and EBITDA in the definition of 
a non-GAAP profit figure. However, for completeness during this second phase of data 
collection, a note was made as to which companies reported either or both of these figures 
and the actual amount of the figures was recorded. 
 
Once the definition of a non-GAAP profit figure was determined, the annual results press 
releases and annual reports were analysed to locate the presence of any such figures, as well 
as the presence of EBIT or EBITDA figures. Firstly, the annual results press release was read 
in total to determine if such a figure had been reported. If so, the name given to the figure 
was used to search the annual report. In addition to this, a search of each annual report was 
conducted using the following terms:  
Underlying operating profit after tax but 
Normalised exceptional after tax adjusted 
Significant non-recurring after tax attributable 
Adjusted after tax pre profit excluding  
Core after tax before after tax excluding  
Unusual after tax and before EBIT (this also enabled 
location of EBITDA) 
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This list was based on search terms used in previous studies and also terms discussed in the 
AICD and FINSIA guidelines and ASIC Regulatory Guide concerning non-GAAP profits. 
Where a company reported more than one non-GAAP profit figure, the ‘after tax’ figure was 
used as this was considered to be the figure that would be most comparable to the GAAP 
after tax profit. For example, the 2012 annual results press release for the Bank of 
Queensland began with these highlights: 
 
Figure 5.1: Highlights section of Bank of Queensland 
annual results press release 2012 
 
 Source: Bank of Queensland ASX Release 2012, page 1. 
 
The ‘normalised cash net profit after tax’ was selected as the non-GAAP figure for this study 
as it was ‘after-tax’ and was also the figure used to reconcile the non-GAAP figure to GAAP 
in the years where detailed reconciliations were disclosed.  
 
The data in this phase was hand-collected and recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for 
each of the years from 2004 to 2015. A record was made of whether or not the company 
reported a non-GAAP profit figure, the amount of the GAAP profit and the non-GAAP profit, 
the name given by the company to the non-GAAP profit, and whether or not EBIT and 
EBITDA were disclosed and their relevant amounts. A note was then made of the location 
where the non-GAAP profit was disclosed, whether it was in the press release and/or the 
annual report and in which sections of the annual report. The GAAP profit recorded was the 
amount from the income statement that was attributable to members of the parent entity as 
this is the amount commonly reported in the press release and the voluntary sections of the 
annual report.  
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5.5 Data Collection Phase Three 
In the third phase of data collection, information was gathered concerning the measures used 
for the independent variables for Research Questions 1 and 3 (specific firm characteristics) 
and also for descriptive statistics (see Section 5.7 for a discussion on how each variable was 
defined and measured). Once again, the Morningstar DatAnalysis Premium database was 
used to gather data on industry, market capitalisation, total assets, total liabilities and total 
equity for the twelve years included in the study. The percentage of shares owned by the top 
20 shareholders (used to measure ownership concentration) was individually collected from 
the annual reports of the companies for each year of the study. This was necessary as only the 
current year and the prior year are available from the database and this data was collected in 
2018 (therefore data from 2004 to 2015 was not available). 
 
5.6 Data Collection Phase Four  
Research Questions 3 and 4 concern the use of impression management tactics by companies 
when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. Impression management studies have 
predominantly focused on the content analysis of discretionary narrative disclosures released 
by companies (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). 
Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) identified seven impression management strategies that 
have been investigated in prior literature. One such strategy involves the choice of earnings 
number (e.g. non-GAAP profits) with previous studies using content analysis and quantitative 
methods to investigate the use of impression management in presenting such figures (e.g. 
Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2004, 2005, 2006b; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Marques 
2010). The fourth and final phase of data collection involved applying a set of coding rules to 
determine a score for the use of impression management tactics relating to emphasis through 
the use of location/prominence and repetition when presenting non-GAAP profit figures. This 
phase involved locating instances of both non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures in the 
disclosure documents for any firm years where a non-GAAP figure was reported. The coding 
rules were then applied to assign a score for location/prominence and repetition of figures. 
These scores were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and were used to determine an 
impression management index to indicate relative emphasis. The development of the 
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impression management index and the procedures for coding of the reports are described in 
detail below. 
 
5.6.1 Impression Management – Emphasis Through Use of Location/Prominence 
and Repetition  
Studies have revealed that people are strongly influenced by the first piece of information 
they read, which can then bias their evaluation of subsequent information (Asch 1946; 
Hirshleifer & Teoh 2003; Huang, Nekrasov & Teoh 2012; Lim, Benbasat & Ward 2000). In 
Australia, guidelines from professional bodies and ASIC have expressed concern that non-
GAAP profit figures may be misleading and thus should not be given undue prominence or 
greater emphasis than GAAP figures (AICD & FINSIA 2009; ASIC 2011).  
 
The first principle in the AICD and FINSIA guidelines suggests companies report non-GAAP 
figures in a manner that ‘clearly differentiates underlying profit from statutory profit without 
giving undue prominence to the underlying profit figure’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 15). 
This is furthered by the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 that requires that ‘IFRS financial 
information should be presented with equal or greater prominence, emphasis or authority 
compared to the corresponding non-IFRS financial information’ (ASIC 2011, p. 18). The 
Regulatory Guide explains that determining whether this requirement is met is a matter of 
judgement and should take whole documents into account. It suggests that factors such as the 
order of the reported figures and the manner in which the two figures are presented should be 
considered (ASIC 2011, p. 20). This is operationalised in this study as it develops and 
implements an impression management index incorporating impression management tactics 
relating to emphasis (measured by location/prominence and repetition) as an indicator of the 
extent of impression management used in the reporting of non-GAAP profit information by 
Australian companies.  
 
There are multiple ways in which to emphasise or give prominence to a particular figure, and 
these take the form of visual or presentational techniques (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; 
Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011). These 
techniques include using a prominent location in the document such as in the headlines or 
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first few paragraphs, or using visual emphasis such as bullet points, bold text, etc. (Brennan, 
Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009). Repeating a particular figure can also serve to emphasise 
it to readers. As Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin and Pierce (2009, p. 813) explain, repetition of a 
piece of information, particularly in a short document such as a press release, ‘can cause the 
reader to focus on that specific issue while diverting attention from other issues’, which may 
be misleading if only one piece of information (e.g. the higher earnings figure) is repeated.  
 
Previous studies concerning non-GAAP figures have examined emphasis through 
presentation techniques with varying levels of sophistication being applied to the measure. 
Some studies document only which measure was mentioned first (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; 
Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Koning, Mertens & Roosenboom 2010). Others 
have used a scoring system to arrive at a level of emphasis. For example, Bowen, Davis and 
Matsumoto (2005) used a four-point scale which ranged from a four awarded to a figure in 
the headline to a one awarded to a figure in the financial statements. Marques (2010) 
extended this to a six-point scale, awarding points for other sections and types of emphasis in 
the press release. These studies only coded and scored the prominence of the very first time 
the non-GAAP figure was mentioned in the document. Therefore, a company that reports a 
non-GAAP figure once only in a press release (e.g. in the headline) would receive the same 
score as a company that reported the figure five times including once in the headline. Using 
the arguments from Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin and Pierce (2009) the second example has 
given more emphasis to the non-GAAP figure than the first due to repetition, but the scoring 
system used in these prior studies did not take repetition into account. 
 
Some studies only coded the disclosure of non-GAAP figures (e.g. Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro 
& Marques 2017) and therefore provided no comparison to the emphasis or prominence 
given to the GAAP figure. However, others have attempted to measure or determine the 
relative emphasis of the non-GAAP figure compared to the GAAP figure (Bowen, Davis & 
Matsumoto 2005; Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2004, 2006a; Hitz 2010; Marques 2010). Cameron, Percy and Stevenson-Clarke (2012) and 
Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2004) made subjective determinations as to relative 
emphasis by reading the documents involved and making a decision. Other studies have used 
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a more objective method, scoring both types of figures and then subtracting one score from 
the other (Hitz 2010; Marques 2010).  
 
This study exams whether non-GAAP profits were given undue prominence or emphasis 
relative to GAAP profits and therefore developed a scheme which coded both non-GAAP and 
GAAP figures for impression management tactics relating to emphasis (Bowen, Davis & 
Matsumoto 2005; Hitz 2010; Marques 2010). A relative emphasis score was calculated by 
subtracting the resulting impression management score for GAAP profits from the score for 
non-GAAP profits (Hitz 2010; Marques 2010). Unlike many previous studies, all occurrences 
of the figure in question were coded when calculating either the location/prominence and/or 
the repetition score (except those in and beyond the Financial Statements in the annual 
report). The coding rules and procedures are explained in the next section, with a detailed set 
of coding rules contained in Appendix 2. 
 
5.6.2 Coding Rules and Procedures 
The coding and calculation of the impression management scores involved content analysis, a 
research technique that makes ‘replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other 
meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use’ (Krippendorff 2004, p. 18). Techniques used 
should be reliable and the results obtained should be able to be replicated by others 
(Krippendorff 2004; Milne & Adler 1999). This study analysed the content of the disclosure 
documents for emphasis of non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures through location/prominence 
and repetition of the figures and did not attempt to analyse the meaning of other text in the 
documents. The coding followed clear techniques and was therefore relatively objective as 
there was no attempt to interpret surrounding text and its meaning. 
 
5.6.2.1 Emphasis through presentation effects: location of information, special 
characters, type of font 
Both the press release and the annual report were coded for location/prominence of the non-
GAAP and GAAP figure through the use of presentation effects. Press releases were coded 
for the location and prominence of the particular figures through the use of headlines, 
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subheadings, bullet points, tables, bold, italics or underlining and plain text paragraphs as 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of examples of location and prominence 
used in coding of annual results press releases  
 
Headline 
 
    Subheading 
 
• Bullet points 
• Bullet points 
 
Table   
   
   
   
 
    Bold text, italics, underlining 
 
    Paragraphs of plain text 
 
 
 
In the press release, all non-GAAP and GAAP figures in the relevant locations were coded 
and not just the first occurrence of the figure. The figures received a score ranging from a 
four if in the headline at the top of the press release to a one if in paragraphs three or four of 
the plain text (see Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the presentation effects and 
scoring system). As impression management techniques relating to location/prominence are 
usually employed early on in a document, any plain text beyond paragraph four was not 
coded for location/prominence (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009). Some press 
releases have a ‘summary results’ table at the end of the press release as an appendix. These 
tables were also not coded for location/prominence as they were at the end of the release after 
the signature. As it is possible that each type of figure, non-GAAP and GAAP, could appear 
equally in sections of the press release and the resulting emphasis scores could be equal, a 
score of 0.5 was awarded to the figure that appeared first in the document as an indication of 
which figure had prominence (Marques 2010). It is of note that it is possible for a score of 
zero to be allocated to a non-GAAP or GAAP figure even though it appeared in the press 
release if it was not located until after paragraph four. 
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Annual reports are considerably longer documents than press releases. For example, the 2015 
annual report from Westpac Bank was 284 pages in length. To assist with the coding for 
presentation effects and location, the annual report, was divided into sections such as 
‘highlights’ (located at the beginning of the annual report and usually containing bullet 
points, graphs and/or tables), Chairman’s letter, CEO letter, Directors’ Report, Financial 
Statements, etc. Scores were then awarded for the section of the report in which the non-
GAAP and GAAP profit figures appeared. Due to the length of the document, scores were 
not awarded for presentation effects such as headings, bold, tables, bullet points, italics or 
underlining.  
 
In the annual reports, the first occurrence of a non-GAAP figure and the first occurrence of a 
GAAP figure in each section were scored for location/prominence. Repeated occurrences 
within the sections were not scored for location, however every non-GAAP and GAAP profit 
figure was scored for emphasis through repetition, see section 5.6.2.2 below. Higher scores 
were awarded for sections that came earlier in the reports as previous studies have found that 
people are strongly influenced by the first piece of information they see and that this 
information biases their evaluation of subsequent information (Asch 1946; Hirshleifer & 
Teoh 2003; Huang, Nekrasov & Teoh 2012; Lim, Benbasat & Ward 2000). The scores for 
location ranged from three to one as follows: 
• ‘Highlights’ section = 3 
• Chairman’s letter = 2 
• CEO letter = 2 
• Key financials (section after Chairman’s and CEO letters) = 1 
• Directors’ Report and/or the Review of Operations = 1 
 
As impression management is most likely to be utilised in the unaudited, narrative sections of 
annual reports, the Financial Statements, Notes to the Statements and any sections beyond the 
Notes were not coded (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998). As 
with press releases, the type of figure (non-GAAP or GAAP) reported first in the entire 
document received an extra 0.5 score.  
 
114 
 
5.6.2.2 Emphasis through repetition 
To capture emphasis achieved through repetition a separate score was kept for repetition in 
each of the documents for all GAAP and all non-GAAP figures. All occurrences of the non-
GAAP and GAAP figure were coded for repetition in the press release (including occurrences 
beyond paragraph four) and all occurrences up to the Financial Statements were coded in the 
annual reports. The first occurrence of either of the figures received a score of zero with all 
other occurrences (repetitions) receiving a score of 0.5. Three examples of press releases 
coded for both presentation effects and repetition are contained in Appendix 3. 
 
5.6.2.3 Calculation of relative emphasis 
Both GAAP and non-GAAP profit figures were scored using the coding rules and a total 
impression management score (IM score) for each type of figure was calculated by adding the 
score for location/prominence and the score for repetition. The resulting IM score indicates 
the level of emphasis different companies give to each of the figures, non-GAAP and GAAP, 
over the years included in the study. This study aims to determine if one type of figure was 
given emphasis over the other type and so the ‘relative’ emphasis of one figure compared to 
the other is important. Therefore, the total IM scores for each type of figure were used to 
calculate a relative emphasis score which was then used to investigate Research Questions 3 
and 4. The relative emphasis score was calculated by applying the following formula:  
IM score for non-GAAP minus IM score for GAAP = Relative Emphasis Score 
 
If the result of the relative emphasis calculation was a positive number, the non-GAAP figure 
had been emphasised or given more prominence than the GAAP figure by that company for 
that year. If the result was a negative number, the GAAP figure had been emphasised or 
given more prominence over the non-GAAP figure by that company for that year. In order to 
fully investigate differences in the relative emphasis between the various disclosure 
documents, a separate relative emphasis score was calculated for the press release and the 
annual report, as well as a total for both documents. 
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5.6.2.4 Reconciliation of non-GAAP profit figure to GAAP profit figure 
The use of impression management tactics involving emphasis of non-GAAP profits may 
mislead investors, particularly non-professionals, but previous studies have found that the 
presence of a clear reconciliation between the GAAP and non-GAAP figures can mitigate 
this effect (Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006; Marques 2010). It is also noted that both the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230 and the AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting non-GAAP profits 
recommend the inclusion of a reconciliation between the two figures. The AICD and FINSIA 
guidelines suggest the reconciliation should be ‘transparent, logical and justifiable’ (AICD & 
FINSIA 2009, p. 17) and ASIC require significant adjustments to be separately itemised and 
explained (ASIC 2011, p. 18). 
 
The presence of a reconciliation does not form part of the impression management index 
developed in this study, as the index needs to be equally applicable to both GAAP and non-
GAAP figures in order to find the relative emphasis. However, during the coding process it 
was noted whether a reconciliation between the two figures was provided and this is reported 
along with other results in Chapter 6. For a reconciliation to be deemed as having been 
provided in the document, the actual reconciliation must have been included and not simply a 
statement directing the reader to another document. To be deemed a reconciliation in this 
study, the company had to demonstrate how one figure was deduced from the other figure 
with adjustments clearly labelled and itemised. For example, the table located at the end of 
the Ramsay Health Care Ltd press releases from 2012 to 2015 was not considered a 
reconciliation for the purposes of this study (Figure 5.3a shows the 2012 press release table). 
However, a detailed note in each of the annual reports for these years was considered a 
reconciliation (Figure 5.3b). 
 
Figure 5.3a: Illustrative example of when to deem disclosure as a reconciliation  
between non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures 
 
Excerpt from table at end of Ramsay Health Care Ltd 2012 press release (not considered a reconciliation) 
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Figure 5.3b: Illustrative example of when to deem disclosure as a reconciliation  
between non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures 
 
Excerpt from Notes section of Ramsay Health Care Ltd 2012 annual report (considered a reconciliation) 
 
 
 
5.6.2.5 Coding reliability 
The reliability of the coding is important as the results should be replicable and valid 
inferences should be able to be drawn from the analysis (Kassarjian 1977; Krippendorff 
2004; Milne & Adler 1999). The reliability of the analysis can be demonstrated by having a 
reliable and detailed set of coding rules and also experienced coders (Kassarjian 1977). The 
coding rules should specify what and how to code and how to measure and record the data 
being coded (Milne & Adler 1999). Krippendorff (2004, pp. 215-216) explains that there are 
three types of reliability when using content analysis techniques: 
1. Stability – this is the degree to which the process does not change and attains the same 
results over time. It can be assessed using a test-retest procedure where the same data 
is recoded by the same coder after an intervening period of time. This reliability data 
is the easiest to obtain but provides the weakest form of reliability.  
2. Reproducibility – this is the degree to which the process can be replicated by a 
different coder working at a different location. Differences between coders are usually 
due to differences in the interpretation and application of the coding rules or random 
errors in coding and recording. Most differences should be resolved by discussing the 
results, clarifying the rules and recoding the data. This is a stronger measure of 
reliability than stability. 
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3. Accuracy – this is the degree to which the coding of data conforms to a standard or 
norm. Data is compared to the performance of a procedure or a standard that is taken 
to be correct.  
Both stability and reproducibility were used to measure reliability of the coding instrument 
for the impression management index in this study. The content analysis techniques for 
locating and recording the GAAP and non-GAAP figures in phase two of the data collection, 
described in Section 5.4, were not tested for reliability as the identification of these figures 
was considered to be capable of objective coding (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 
2009).  
 
To measure reliability using stability, a test-retest procedure was used. The documents for six 
companies randomly selected from the 109 companies in the sample (5.5%) were re-coded by 
the initial coder (the author of this thesis) after a period of four months from the initial 
coding. Of the 283 instances of a non-GAAP or GAAP number, 270 resulted in the same 
coding result, a reliability coefficient of 95.4%. The largest difference (six differences) 
concerned a company which was coded early in the original coding. In most instances both 
the GAAP and non-GAAP numbers were equally different from the original coding so the 
overall relative emphasis either did not change or changed only slightly. 
 
A second test of reliability of the coding instrument was also conducted using reproducibility. 
A pre-test of the coding and calculation of the impression management index was conducted 
using annual results press releases and annual reports from ten different companies in the 
population by two researchers (the author of this study and a supervisor). The companies in 
question were not included in the final sample as they were not listed in 2004 (and therefore 
eliminated for not being listed for the entire twelve years) but were listed for the other eleven 
years. Pre-testing with companies not in the final sample also enabled the category reliability, 
that is, the definitions for the specific sections of the press release and annual report used in 
the coding rules, to be tested (Kassarjian 1977; Kolbe & Burnett 1991). Data concerning 
whether a non-GAAP figure was reported by the companies in each of the eleven years from 
2005 to 2015 was collected and recorded by the author. Of the 110 firm years in this pre-test 
sample there were 58 firm years in which a non-GAAP profit figure was reported by a 
company in either the press release or annual report or both documents. From these 58 firm 
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years, ten firm years were randomly selected and the press releases and annual reports from 
these years were downloaded. 
 
To conduct this pre-test, the two researchers held an initial meeting to discuss the coding 
rules and category definitions and clarify any misunderstandings. The second coder was 
provided with the coding rules, copies of the documents to be coded, a spreadsheet listing the 
amount of the non-GAAP and GAAP figures for each year and a spreadsheet to record the 
results. The researchers then worked independently from each other (Kolbe & Burnett 1991) 
and used the impression management index coding rules to code the ten press releases and 
ten annual reports. A second meeting was then held to compare the resulting scores from the 
application of the impression management index. The individual documents included in the 
pre-test sample were also compared to make sure the coding of each occurrence of a number 
was consistent; there were 99 occurrences of either a non-GAAP or GAAP number in the 
twenty documents. This process enabled clarification of the coding rules and procedures and 
of the category definitions. For example, the setting out of an annual report was discussed 
and the difference between a ‘highlights’ section and a ‘key financial data’ section was 
clarified. It was also decided that the Chairman’s letter and the CEO letter should be coded 
separately, and both counted as a different section.  
 
From this process, the coding rules were revised. The procedure for searching the documents 
and recording the location and repetition scores was also discussed and modified so that all 
recording for both location and repetition was completed progressively and the document 
only had to be searched and analysed once. It was agreed this modification would avoid 
potential errors such as missing repetitions. 
 
After the initial coding process, the results for the coding of the press releases were 100% 
identical between the two coders. However, for the overall coding the coefficient of 
agreement (total number of agreements divided by total number of coding decisions) was 
80.81% due to issues in the annual reports. One issue was how to code the ‘key financial 
data’ as the initial coding rules did not have this section of the annual report as a separate 
category. However, the level of disagreement was found to be mainly due to a 
misunderstanding of a coding rule by one of the coders. The coder only recorded prominence 
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results for the first number (either GAAP or non-GAAP) that appeared in the annual report. If 
the first number was a non-GAAP figure, then the GAAP figures were not coded for 
prominence and the score was recorded as a zero. From this misunderstanding, the coding 
rules were revised and made clearer and the coder involved recoded the reports. In comparing 
results, the two coders matched 98.99% for the 99 instances of a number coded, with the only 
difference being where one coder had mistakenly given a repeated number a score for 
prominence in the annual report when it was the second occurrence of the number in the 
particular section. The low level of disagreement from this second round of coding indicates 
a high level of reliability (Kassarjian 1977; Kolbe & Burnett 1991). 
 
Locating, coding and recording the impression management scores for both the non-GAAP 
and GAAP figures concluded the data collection process. The measurement of the variables 
and the statistical tests used to investigate the research questions will now be discussed. 
 
5.7 Measurement of Variables 
Research Questions 1 relates to the effect certain specific firm characteristics may have on 
the decision of management to disclose non-GAAP profit figures and Research Question 3 
adds to this by including the use of impression management tactics. Research Question 2 
relates to examining whether certain specific events influenced the decision by companies to 
report a non-GAAP profit figure and Research Question 4 furthers this by including the use 
of impression management tactics. The variables used to investigate these research questions 
will now be discussed.  
 
5.7.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables for Research Question 1 represent firm characteristics which, 
consistent with agency theory, have the potential to influence a company’s decision to report 
a non-GAAP profit figure and for Research Question 3 the variables that may influence the 
use of impression management when reporting such figures. The independent variable for 
Research Questions 2 and 4 (examining the influence of specific events) is a categorical 
variable representing the particular year in question. The specific firm characteristics 
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investigated in Research Questions 1 and 3, and the approach taken in their measurement, are 
discussed below.  
 
5.7.1.1 Size 
Size was investigated as, under agency theory, larger firms are more complex and have a 
wider ownership base and can therefore be more difficult for principals to monitor (Fama & 
Jensen 1983b; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). This leads to greater 
agency costs and information asymmetry. Following agency theory, large firms are more 
likely to report non-GAAP profit figures in order to bond with shareholders but are also more 
likely to use impression management tactics due to the greater information asymmetry and 
the effect of any residual loss.  
 
There are different methods for measuring the size of a company. The most common methods 
used in previous literature concerning non-GAAP and other earnings disclosure are log of 
total assets (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2012; Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; 
Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Heflin & Hsu 2008) and log of market 
capitalisation (Isidro & Marques 2013, 2015; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016). In the current 
study, as total assets were used in the calculation of the measure for leverage (Section 
5.7.1.3), it was not used to measure size in order to reduce any potential multicollinearity 
amongst the independent variables. Instead, log of market capitalisation was used as a 
measure for company size (SIZE). The log of market capitalisation was used as the actual 
market capitalisation figures were significantly, positively skewed. It is important to note that 
the size of the companies in the Top 200 varies greatly with regards to market capitalisation 
and in 2015, when the sample was determined, the figures ranged from $167 million to $123 
billion.  
 
5.7.1.2 Ownership Concentration 
In companies with concentrated ownership, larger shareholders, including institutional 
investors, are more able to monitor and influence management compared, to those with 
smaller shareholdings. Information asymmetry is therefore higher when ownership is more 
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dispersed as there is a greater percentage of small shareholders who are less able to demand 
information. Therefore, to overcome information asymmetry and bond with shareholders, 
companies with more dispersed ownership are more likely to report extra information 
including non-GAAP profits. Ownership concentration has been measured in a variety of 
ways in previous literature including the percentage of shares held by shareholders who hold 
a particular minimum percentage of equity (Alves 2012), the percentage of shares owned by 
the single largest shareholder (Gul, Kim & Qiu 2010), and the percentage of shares held by 
the top twenty shareholders of the firm (Barako, Hancock & Izan 2006; Lange & Sharpe 
1995). In Australia, ASX Listing Rule 4.10.9 requires listed entities to disclose their top 
twenty shareholders, and the percentage of shares they hold, in their annual report. As this 
information was readily available, ownership concentration (OWN) was measured by the total 
percentage of shares held by the top twenty shareholders. The higher the percentage, the more 
concentrated is the ownership of the organisation. 
 
5.7.1.3 Leverage  
High levels of leverage are associated with increased risk and shareholders and investors may 
perceive earnings to be less informative in highly-leveraged companies. Management may 
therefore wish to provide extra information on profits in the form of non-GAAP figures and 
may allay any fears of shareholders by emphasising good performance if these figures exceed 
the GAAP figures (Lougee & Marquardt 2004). Leverage has been measured using a variety 
of methods in previous literature including the ratio of total debt to equity (Guillamon-Saorin, 
Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Lougee & Marquardt 2004), the ratio of 
long term debt to equity (Chua, Cheong & Gould 2012; Hossain, Perera & Rahman 1995; 
Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995) and the ratio of total debt to total assets (Gallery, Cooper & 
Sweeting 2008; Isidro & Marques 2013, 2015; Wong & Wong 2010). Both total debt 
(liabilities) to total equity and total debt (liabilities) to total assets were considered in this 
study and the relevant data was analysed. The measures for total debt to total equity for each 
year were significantly skewed whereas total debt to total assets were normally distributed. 
Therefore, total debt (liabilities) to total assets was used as a measure of leverage (LEV).  
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5.7.1.4 Good/bad News Firms 
In order to avoid higher monitoring costs or lower remuneration, agency theory predicts that 
managers may provide extra information such as non-GAAP profit figures in years that could 
be considered ‘bad news’ years, with previous studies confirming this assumption 
(Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Isidro & Marques 2015; 
Johnson & Schwartz 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). Previous studies have defined ‘bad 
news’ companies in different ways, most commonly as companies with a decrease in GAAP 
profits from the previous year (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; Clatworthy & 
Jones 2003; García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Smith & Taffler 1992) and as 
companies with a GAAP loss (Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Malone, Tarca & Wee 
2016; Wong & Wong 2010). In bad news years, management has incentive to emphasise any 
messages conveying good news and may therefore use impression management to highlight a 
higher non-GAAP figure (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Cameron, Percy & Stevenson-
Clarke 2012; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012; Marques 2010). This study 
combines both of the above definitions to determine ‘bad news’ companies. A dichotomous 
variable (BAD) was used, with companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the 
previous period, or a GAAP loss, classified as bad news companies and given a value of 1. 
Companies reporting the same or an increase in GAAP profits (result must be a profit and not 
a loss) from the previous period are classified as good news companies and were given a 
value of 0.  
 
5.7.2 Dependent Variables 
5.7.2.1 Report/not report 
For Research Question 1, the dependent variable (REPORT) is a dichotomous variable. The 
variable takes the value of 1 if the company reports a non-GAAP profit figure in any of the 
disclosure documents under investigation, and the value of 0 for companies that do not report 
a non-GAAP profit figure.  
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5.7.2.2 Impression management index 
For Research Questions 3 and 4 the dependent variable (RE) is a ratio variable representing 
the relative emphasis given to non-GAAP figures compared to GAAP figures. The 
calculation of this score is explained in Section 5.6.2 with the dependent variable RE equal to 
the score for the non-GAAP figure minus the score for the GAAP figure.  
 
5.8 Statistical Tests and Sample Selection 
5.8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The data collected during phases one to four described above was recorded using Microsoft 
Excel 2010 and analysed using Microsoft Excel 2010 and IBM SPSS Statistics 24. Descriptive 
statistics were used to analyse the reporting of non-GAAP figures, and the use of impression 
management when reporting these figures, over the twelve-year period of the study. These 
included frequency statistics on industry and the independent and dependent variables. 
Graphical representations showing trends in non-GAAP and GAAP reporting, presence of 
reconciliations, and average impression management and relative emphasis scores were also 
produced.  
 
Throughout this study results were reported as statistically significant if they were significant 
at the 0.05 level.  
 
5.8.2 Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 concerns the influence that specific firm characteristics have on the 
choice to report a non-GAAP profit figure, with Hypotheses 1 to 4 each relating to a 
characteristic. The dependent variable in this case was categorical, report or not report, and 
therefore multiple regression analysis was not considered appropriate. Instead, a non-
parametric logistic regression was considered most appropriate to investigate this research 
question and its related hypotheses for the total sample and for each of the years in the study. 
The following model was developed:  
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Model 1:  
 REPORT = β0 + β1SIZE + β2OWN + β3 LEV + β4 BAD + ϵ 
Where: 
REPORT = Reporting of a non-GAAP profit figure: 1 if report, 0 if do not report 
SIZE = Size of the organisation, as measured by log of market capitalisation  
OWN = Ownership concentration, as measured by percentage shares owned by top twenty 
shareholders 
LEV = Leverage, as measured by debt (total liabilities) to total assets 
BAD = Bad news firm: 1 if decrease in IFRS profit from previous period or IFRS loss, 0 if same or 
increase in profit 
 
A summary of the variables in this model is included in Table 5.1 after Section 5.8.4.  
 
Each model was tested for significance. A Pearson Correlation Matrix was analysed to check 
for multicollinearity of the ratio independent variables. The existence of possible outlying 
cases was also investigated. Outliers are particular cases which are substantially different 
from the majority of other cases in the sample (Hair et al. 2013; Pallant 2013). Having values 
well above or below the majority of cases means their representativeness of the population 
may be an issue (Hair et al. 2013). The logistic models for the total sample, and for each year 
separately, were assessed for possible outliers by examining the standardised residuals, 
leverage values and Cook’s distance. The standardised residual is a measure of the strength of 
the difference between observed and expected values. Standardised residuals have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one. Hence, if residuals are normally distributed it is 
expected that 95% of the residuals will fall between 2 and -2 and cases outside these 
measures are considered outliers (Hair et al. 2013; Hosmer, Lemeshow & Sturdivant 2013). 
Leverage values measure how far an individual case deviates from the mean of that variable. 
For smaller samples, the leverage score is calculated as 3p/n where p is the number of 
independent variables plus one and n is the number of cases (Hair et al. 2013). Cook’s 
distance is a measure of influence that combines information on the residual and leverage. It 
measures the impact individual cases have on the predictive value of the model as a whole 
(Allen & Bennett 2012). Larger values (values greater than 1) indicate the case has 
substantial influence in affecting the estimated regression coefficients (Hair et al. 2013). The 
model was run for each year with all cases included and then the influence of any potential 
outliers identified by any of the three methods described above was analysed. Outliers were 
removed for the analysis of Research Question 1. 
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5.8.3 Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 concerns the influence specific events may have had on the decision to 
report a non-GAAP profit figure. A series of McNemar’s tests were conducted to investigate 
the effect each of the events under investigation had on the number of firms reporting a non-
GAAP profit figure. This test is a non-parametric test used to compare categorical variables 
recorded at two different times such as before and after an event or intervention. A t-test 
requires a continuous dependent variable and so was not suitable for this research question. 
The categorical variable for Research Question 2 was whether the company reports a non-
GAAP profit or not (REPORT) and the test was used to determine if there was a significant 
change in this variable between two time periods, that is, whether the number of companies 
that changed their reporting behaviour in either direction was significant.  
 
Hypothesis 5 concerns the introduction of IFRS in Australia. IFRS was not used by 
Australian companies in 2004. As explained in Section 4.5.5, the standards were effective 
from annual reporting periods commencing on or after 1 January 2005. The year 2005 was 
therefore a transition year for companies with a year-end other than 31 December. Although 
the annual report for these companies was still prepared under the previous regime, 
companies were to provide disclosures concerning the effect of IFRS adoption. IFRS had to 
be fully implemented in 2005 for year-end 31 December companies and in 2006 for other 
year-end companies. Of the 109 companies in the final sample, 14 had a year-end of 
31 December. The other 95 companies would have had 2005 as a transition year. To explore 
the effect of this adoption period, three McNemar’s tests were conducted to compare the 
years from 2004 to 2006. 
 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will 
increase during the GFC. The crisis began in the middle of 2007, reaching a peak in 
September 2008 with recovery beginning during 2009 (Reserve Bank of Australia 2010; 
Sinnewe, Harrison & Wijeweera 2017). For companies with a year-end of 30 June, the year 
2009 contained the peak period of the GFC. Therefore 2007 is considered a lead up to the 
crisis and the years 2008 and 2009 are considered years of the crisis. To investigate this 
prediction, three McNemar’s tests were conducted to compare the years from 2007 to 2009. 
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Hypothesis 7 concerns the issuance of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines in March 2009 
concerning the reporting of underlying (non-GAAP) profit information. To investigate the 
effect of these guidelines three McNemar’s tests were conducted to compare the years from 
2008 to 2010. 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 8 concerns the release of the ASIC released Regulatory Guide 230 
Disclosing non-IFRS financial information and an accompanying Regulation Impact 
Statement in December 2011, and predicts there will be no effect from the release. Due to the 
date of its release it is expected that any effect there may have been will be seen in 2012. 
However, it is possible that some 2011 reports, particularly for companies with year-end of 
31 December, may have been affected by the release of the Guide. To investigate this 
introduction period, McNemar’s tests were conducted to compare the years from 2010 to 
2012. Further, as previously discussed in Section 2.7, previous studies in the US found that 
there was an immediate reaction to the issuance by the SEC of Regulation G concerning non-
GAAP financial measures in 2003 (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Heflin & Hsu 
2008; Jennings & Marques 2011; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008; Marques 2006; Zhang 
& Zheng 2011). Studies found a decrease in the use of the figures (Entwistle, Feltham & 
Mbagwu 2006a; Marques 2006) and an increase in the quality of the exclusions made to 
calculate the figure (Frankel, McVay & Soliman 2011; Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 2008; Yi 
2012). However, studies investigating beyond the initial post-regulation period report a sharp 
rise in the use of the figures in the years since regulation (Black et al. 2012; Brown et al. 
2012). To investigate the ongoing effect of regulation in the Australian context, the years up 
to 2015 were included in the study and the results from these years were compared to the first 
year of the Regulatory Guide, 2012. A summary of the years investigated in Research 
Question 2 is provided in Table 5.2 after Section 5.8.5. 
 
5.8.4 Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 concerns whether the use of impression management tactics when 
reporting a non-GAAP profit figure compared to a GAAP profit figure is influenced by 
specific firm characteristics. The dependent variable in this question is the relative emphasis 
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score (RE) for impression management calculated during the fourth phase of the data 
collection. As the dependent variable in this case is a ratio number, a multiple regression was 
used to investigate this research question and its related hypotheses, employing the following 
model for each of the years in the study: 
Model 2:  
 RE1-3 = β0 + β1SIZE + β2OWN + β3LEV + β4 BAD + ϵ 
Where: 
RE1 = Press release relative emphasis = emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure in press  
   releases – emphasis score for GAAP profit figure in press releases 
RE2 = Annual report relative emphasis = emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure in annual  
   reports – emphasis score for GAAP profit figure in annual reports 
RE3 = Total relative emphasis = total emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure – total  
   emphasis score for GAAP profit figure 
SIZE = Size of the organisation, as measured by log of market capitalisation  
OWN = Ownership concentration, as measured by percentage shares owned by   
   top twenty shareholders 
LEV = Leverage, as measured by debt (total liabilities) to total assets 
BAD = Bad news firm: 1 if decrease in IFRS profit from previous period or IFRS loss, 0 if  
   same or increase in profit 
 
In order to provide comprehensive results concerning disclosure documents, three versions of 
this model were run for each year, one for relative emphasis in the press release, one for 
relative emphasis in the annual report and one for the total of both documents. As with 
Research Question 1, each model was tested for significance and the results of this test 
reported. Where models were not significant, the results for the hypotheses for that particular 
model were not reported. A Pearson Correlation Matrix and various tests for outliers were 
also performed for each year and the results analysed for any implications. The variance 
inflation factor (VIF) was also measured to assess multicollinearity. Outliers were removed 
for the analysis of Research Question 3. A summary of the variables for the two models used 
in this study is provided in Table 5.1 below.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of variables used in Models 1 and 2 for  
Research Questions 1 and 3 
Variable 
Predicted Direction 
Variable Description 
Model 1 (RQ1) Model 2 (RQ3) 
Independent Variables    
SIZE + + Size measured as log of market capitalisation 
OWN - - Ownership concentration measured as percentage 
shares owned by top 20 shareholders 
LEV + + Leverage measured as total debt (liabilities) 
divided by total assets 
BAD + + Bad news companies: 
Coded 1 if GAAP profit < prior period or is a loss 
Coded 0 if GAAP profit ≥ prior period and is 
positive 
Dependent Variables    
REPORT   Reported a non-GAAP figure: 
Coded 1 if non-GAAP figure reported 
Coded 0 if no non-GAAP figure reported 
RE   Relative Emphasis score =  
Non-GAAP impression management score minus 
GAAP impression management score 
 
5.8.5 Research Question 4 
Research Question 4 concerns the influence specific events may have on the use of 
impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP compared to 
GAAP profit figures. A series of independent t-tests were conducted to investigate the effect 
that each of the events under investigation had on the use of impression management in the 
press release, annual report and in total over both documents. T-tests were appropriate as the 
dependent variable was a continuous ratio number, the relative emphasis score. The number 
of companies reporting a non-GAAP figure changes each year as do some of the actual 
companies themselves. Each year’s sample was therefore considered independent from any 
other year. The presence of possible outliers was also investigated using z scores which 
convert scores for variables to standard scores, with possible outliers being cases with a z 
score of <-3 or >3 (Seo 2006; Vijendra & Shivani 2014). Identified outliers were removed for 
the analysis of Research Question 4. The particular years used to test the hypotheses 
concerning each event are the same as those used and explained for Research Question 2 
above. A summary of this information is contained in Table 5.2 below. 
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Table 5.2: Summary of specific events and years of analysis for  
Research Questions 2 and 4 and related hypotheses 
Event Year 
Predicted Direction Years 
Compared  RQ2 RQ4 
Introduction of IFRS in 
Australia 
2005 – transition year  
2006 – fully implemented 
+ 
(H5) 
+ 
(H13) 
2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2004-2006 
Global Financial Crisis 
Began late 2007 and 
continued to 2009 
+ 
(H6) 
+ 
(H14) 
2007-2008 
2008-2009 
2007-2009 
AICD and FINSIA Guidelines 
on Underlying Profit 
Released in March 2009 
+  
(H7) 
- 
(H15) 
2008-2009 
2009-2010 
2008-2010 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 Released in December 2011 
no influence 
predicted 
(H8) 
- 
(H16) 
2010-2011 
2011-2012 
2010-2012 
2012-2013 
2012-2014 
2012-2015 
 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter described the method employed to assess the research questions and to test the 
hypotheses in this study. Sample selection and data collection procedures were described and 
explained including a detailed explanation of the coding and calculation of the impression 
management index. Independent and dependent variables used to investigate the research 
questions and related hypotheses were described. The statistical tests employed in the study 
were also discussed. The results of these statistical tests along with descriptive statistics of 
the data collected will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Results – The Reporting of Non-GAAP Profits in Australia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The results of this study are presented in two separate chapters. This chapter presents the 
results for Research Questions 1 and 2 which concern the company characteristics and 
specific events that influence a company’s decision to report non-GAAP profit figures. 
Descriptive statistics and results regarding the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures in 
Australia generally are provided in the chapter, while results for the use of impression 
management are reported in the next chapter. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the sample 
used in the study. Statistics, including industry sector statistics, and other information on the 
frequency, location and amount of non-GAAP profit figures reported by the sample 
companies over the period of the study are presented in Section 6.3. Results for Research 
Questions 1 and 2 and related hypotheses are then reported.  Descriptive statistics concerning 
the variables used are reported in Section 6.4 and the results of the analysis are reported in 
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 respectively. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 6.7.  
 
6.2 Overview of Sample 
The population used in this study is the Standard & Poor’s ASX 200 Index as at 31 August 
2015. From this population, 91 companies were eliminated as detailed in Section 5.3.3, 
leaving a study sample of 109 companies. Table 6.1 shows the industry sector of the sample 
companies classified by the first level of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
The Consumer Discretionary sector has the highest representation with 19 companies (17.4% 
of total) followed by Materials with 18 companies (16.5%). The least represented sectors 
include Utilities with two companies and Information Technology and Telecommunications 
with three companies each. To ensure the results are current and relatable, this table includes 
the Real Estate sector, which was created in 2016. The eleven companies classified as Real 
Estate were previously classified as Financials before 2016. A detailed list of the final sample 
companies and their GICS industry sector is contained in Appendix 1. 
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Table 6.1: Industry sector membership  
of sample companies 
Industry n = % 
Energy  9 8.3 
Materials  18 16.5 
Industrials  15 13.8 
Consumer Discretionary  19 17.4 
Consumer Staples  8 7.3 
Health Care  6 5.5 
Financials  15 13.8 
Information Technology  3 2.8 
Telecommunication Services  3 2.8 
Utilities  2 1.8 
Real Estate  11 10 
Total  109 100 
 
 
Table 6.2 provides details on the size of the companies in the sample, as measured by market 
capitalisation. Although the Top 200 was used as the population in this study, the descriptive 
statistics in Table 6.2 indicate that the size of the companies in the sample varies greatly. In 
2004, for example, the minimum market capitalisation was $5 million, and the maximum was 
$63.5 billion. In 2015, the last year of the study, the minimum market capitalisation was $198  
 
Table 6.2: Market Capitalisation of Sample Companies 
Year 
Minimum 
($mil) 
Maximum 
($mil) 
Mean  
($mil) 
Standard 
Deviation 
($mil) 
2004 5 63,521 4,007 9,596 
2005 4 62,962 4,851 10,912 
2006 5 59,928 5,410 11,340 
2007 6 71,825 6,780 13,412 
2008 5 53,237 5,415 10,398 
2009 2 78,161 5,842 13,425 
2010 11 75,415 6,112 13,351 
2011 100 81,625 6,062 12,860 
2012 74 84,635 6,338 14,636 
2013 160 111,696 7,707 19,095 
2014 298 131,396 8,398 20,251 
2015 198 138,911 8,634 20,399 
 
million, and the maximum was $138.9 billion. The mean increased over the twelve-year 
period from $4 billion in 2004 to $8.6 billion in 2015. The standard deviation also increased 
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over the course of the twelve years, indicating that the market capitalisation figures for the 
sample companies are spread over an increasingly wider range. The next section provides a 
discussion of the initial findings regarding the phenomenon of non-GAAP profit reporting in 
the Australian context, and provides the background for the more in-depth discussion and 
analysis that follows. 
 
6.3 Reporting of Non-GAAP Profits  
As this study concerns the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures, an overview of such reporting 
across the sample is warranted. This section provides insights into the frequency of non-GAAP 
profit figures as well as EBIT/EBITDA figures and reports and analyses descriptive statistics for 
the industry sectors of the sample companies. It also provides information on the location and 
amount of non-GAAP profit figures disclosed in the sample documents, along with the 
terminology used when reporting such figures. 
 
6.3.1 Frequency of Non-GAAP Profit Figures and EBIT/EBITDA 
Figure 6.1 shows the trend in the percentage of companies from the total sample that reported 
a non-GAAP profit figure as compared to those reporting an EBIT/EBITDA figure (not 
included in the definition of non-GAAP profit figures in this study) over the twelve years of 
the study. The reporting of non-GAAP profit figures has generally increased steadily over the 
twelve years, with 50 companies (46%) reporting a figure in 2004 increasing to 86 companies 
(79%) in 2015. The year 2014 had the highest number of companies reporting a non-GAAP 
profit, with 88 (81%) of companies reporting a figure in that year. The reporting of 
EBIT/EBITDA results was more constant over the twelve-year period, ranging from 66 
companies (61%) in 2004 to 83 (76%) in 2015. More companies reported EBIT/EBITDA 
figures than non-GAAP figures each year until the last three years of the study (2013 to 
2015), where the number reporting a non-GAAP figure equalled or exceeded those reporting 
EBIT/EBITDA. 
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Reporting of these two types of figures is not mutually exclusive and several companies 
reported both types of figures each year . The results for frequency are also reported in 
tabular form in Appendix 4, which shows the number (and percentage of the total sample) of 
companies in the sample that reported a non-GAAP profit figure and the number that reported 
an EBIT/EBITDA figure for each year in the study.  
 
6.3.2 Industry 
Further insights into the frequency of reporting non-GAAP profit figures is provided by a 
breakdown of the results based on industry sector. Table 6.1 listed the number of companies 
in each GICS industry sector comprising the total sample for the study. Table 6.3 provides 
detailed statistics on how many of these companies reported non-GAAP profit figures and 
how many did not for each industry category for each year of the study. Panel A reports the 
number of companies in each industry that did not report a non-GAAP profit figure. Panel B 
of the table shows the number of companies in each industry reporting a non-GAAP profit 
figure each year with about 80% doing so in the final two years of the study. The total row 
shows that the overall number of companies reporting non-GAAP figures increased steadily 
over the twelve years from 50 out of 109 (46%) in 2004 to a high of 88 out of 109 (81%) in 
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
to
ta
l s
am
p
le
Year
Figure 6.1: Frequency of non-GAAP profit and EBIT/EBITDA 
reporting
EBIT/EBITDA figure
reported
Non-GAAP profit figure
reported
134 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for industry sector according to GICS industry classification 
Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Panel A: Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Energy (n=) 8 7 7 7 5 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 
Materials (n=) 11 9 10 10 8 7 7 8 7 6 3 4 
Industrials (n=) 9 10 10 10 7 7 7 5 4 4 3 2 
Consumer Discretionary (n=) 9 11 10 7 7 7 6 5 9 8 6 5 
Consumer Staples (n=) 4 4 3 6 6 4 4 5 3 2 1 2 
Health Care (n=) 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 
Financials (n=) 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Information Technology (n=) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Telecommunication Services (n=) 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 3 1 2 1 2 
Utilities (n=) 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Real Estate (n=) 5 6 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total (n=) 59 56 52 52 45 40 38 37 34 30 21 23 
Panel B: Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Energy (n=) 1 2 2 2 4 5 5 6 6 7 8 8 
Materials (n=) 7 9 8 8 10 11 11 10 11 12 15 14 
Industrials (n=) 6 5 5 5 8 8 8 10 11 11 12 13 
Consumer Discretionary (n=) 10 8 9 12 12 12 13 14 10 11 13 14 
Consumer Staples (n=) 4 4 5 2 2 4 4 3 5 6 7 6 
Health Care (n=) 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 
Financials (n=) 11 11 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 13 
Information Technology (n=) 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Telecommunication Services (n=) 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 1 
Utilities (n=) 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Real Estate (n=) 6 5 8 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 
Total (n=) 50 53 57 57 64 69 71 72 75 79 88 86 
Panel C: Companies reporting non-GAAP profit as percentage of total companies in each industry in sample 
Energy (%) 11 22 22 22 44 56 56 67 67 78 89 89 
Materials (%) 39 50 44 44 56 61 61 56 61 67 83 78 
Industrials (%) 40 33 33 33 53 53 53 67 73 73 80 87 
Consumer Discretionary (%) 53 42 47 63 63 63 68 74 53 58 68 74 
Consumer Staples (%) 50 50 63 25 25 50 50 38 63 75 88 75 
Health Care (%) 33 67 50 50 50 50 50 50 67 50 67 67 
Financials (%) 73 73 87 80 87 87 87 87 87 93 93 87 
Information Technology (%) 67 67 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Telecommunication Services (%) 0 67 33 33 0 0 33 0 67 33 67 33 
Utilities (%) 50 50 100 100 100 50 50 50 50 100 100 100 
Real Estate (%) 55 45 73 82 82 100 100 100 100 100 91 91 
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2014. Lastly, Panel C shows the non-GAAP reporters as a percentage of total companies in 
each industry in the sample.  
 
Industries showing the largest increase in non-GAAP reporting companies over the twelve-
year period include Energy, which increased from a low of one out of nine (11%) in 2004 to 
eight out of nine (89%) in 2014 and 2015 and Industrials, which increased from a low of five 
out of 15 companies (33%) in 2005-07 to 13 out of 15 (87%) in 2015. Industries that 
consistently had a high percentage of non-GAAP reporters over the twelve years include 
Financials, with its lowest years (2004 and 2005) still having 11 out of 15 companies (73%) 
reporting a non-GAAP figure. Real Estate (which was part of the Financials category until 
2016) also had a consistently high number of non-GAAP reporters with all companies in this 
industry reporting a non-GAAP profit figure from 2009 to 2013 and 10 out of 11 reporting a 
figure in 2014 and 2015. 
 
6.3.3 Location of Non-GAAP Profit Figures  
Figure 6.2 shows trends in the locations of non-GAAP profit figures reported by companies in 
the sample. It indicates the percentage of companies reporting a non-GAAP profit in the press 
release and/or various sections of the annual report. The figure shows the number of reporting  
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companies using each location as a percentage of total non-GAAP reporters in that particular 
year (rather than the total companies in the sample). The number of companies reporting a 
figure in the various locations generally increased each year along with the overall trend of 
the increasing use of non-GAAP profits. However, Figure 6.2 shows that when expressed as 
percentages, the results for some locations such as the press release are reasonably consistent 
across the twelve years.  
 
The press release is clearly the favoured location for reporting non-GAAP profits with 
between 88% and 94% of all companies that reported such a figure using this disclosure 
outlet. For example, in 2004, 46 of the 50 non-GAAP reporters for that year (or 92%) reported 
the figure in the press release. In 2015, 77 of the 86 non-GAAP reporters for that year (or 
90%) reported the figure in the press release. It should be noted that not all companies in the 
sample issued annual results press releases. It was very uncommon for non-GAAP reporting 
companies to issue a press release and not report the non-GAAP figure in the document, with 
two companies at most doing so in some years.  
 
Within the annual report, the Directors’ Report or Review of Operations was the most 
favoured location most years, with a steady increase in disclosure in this section over the 
twelve years of the study. This is closely followed by the Chairman’s or CEO letter and the 
highlights section at the beginning of the annual report, noting that not all annual reports have 
such a section. Reporting of non-GAAP figures in both these sections decreased after 2013. 
Very few companies reported the figure in the financial statements with the number ranging 
from 7 (13%) in 2005 to only 2 (2%) in 2015. However, reporting non-GAAP profit figures as 
part of the Notes to the financial statements increased in frequency over the twelve years. 
Sections of the annual report classified as ‘other’ include extra sections at the end of the 
annual report after the notes. Most commonly this was a five-year or ten-year summary table 
but also includes ‘financial history’ sections or a ‘glossary’. The results for location are also 
shown in tabular form in Appendix 5, which shows the number of companies that report a 
non-GAAP figure in each location and the percentage of companies using each location as a 
percentage of total non-GAAP reporters in that particular year.  
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6.3.4 Terminology Used 
Concerns have been raised as to the variety of terminology used by companies when reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures, which causes confusion for unsophisticated investors and 
shareholders when reading reports and comparing results across different companies (Brody 
& McDonald 2004; Heitger & Ballou 2003). During the second phase of the data collection, a 
record was made of the name given to the non-GAAP profit by each non-GAAP reporter for 
each year of the study. The names given varied greatly between companies, and within 
companies across the years. Figure 6.3 summarises the results of this analysis, grouping the 
terminology used by companies according to the key word/s in the term. The figure shows the 
percentage of companies using each term as a percentage of total non-GAAP reporters for each 
particular year in the study. These results are shown in tabular form in Appendix 6. 
 
For ease of analysis, the many different terms companies used were grouped by a key word/s but 
there was some variety within each category. For example, ‘net profit after tax before …’ had a 
number of possible endings including: 
• significant items; 
• non-recurring items; 
• individually material items; 
• noteworthy items; and  
• tax consolidation.  
 
In 2004 and 2005 ‘profit after tax before’ was the most common term used. Only five 
companies used the term ‘underlying’ in 2004. However, by 2015, 44 companies, or 51% of 
non-GAAP reporters for that year, used the term ‘underlying’ making it the most common 
term used in recent years. Using the term ‘operating’ has also been a common practice over 
the twelve-year period. Some of the more unusual terms categorised as ‘other’ in Figure 6.3 
included:  
• net aggregated income; 
• margin on services net profit after tax but before goodwill; 
• adjusted group profit; 
• earnings after tax and before noteworthy items; and  
• insurance profit.  
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Reporting behaviour concerning the use of terminology also varied greatly between 
companies over the years. Some companies, such as Fairfax Media Ltd, consistently used the 
one term, ‘underlying net profit after tax’, for the entire twelve years. Others used up to five 
different terms over the twelve-year period, some using more than one term for the same 
figure in the same year. For example, Village Roadshow Ltd used the following terms at 
various times during the twelve years and also reported an EBITDA figure each year: 
• operating profit after tax excluding specific items and discontinuing operations;  
• attributed profit after tax before specific items and discontinuing operations; 
• profit after tax before material items and discontinued operations; 
• operating profit after tax excluding one-off material items and discontinued operations; 
and 
• normalised profit after tax. 
 
TPG Telecom Ltd only reported a non-GAAP figure in six of the twelve years but used a 
different term almost every year: 
• net profit after tax before goodwill;  
• normalised earnings AND net profit after tax but before significant items (both terms 
used in same year for the same figure); 
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• normalised net profit after tax; 
• adjusted net profit after tax; and 
• net profit after tax excluding intangible amortisation. 
 
Another practice noted in some companies was the use of more than one term to describe the 
same figure in the same year (as in the second bullet point above for TPG Telecom Ltd). 
Examples of the two (or three) terms used for the same figure in the same year include the 
following, with the ‘AND’ indicating the second term in use: 
• operating profit after tax AND underlying profit; 
• operating pre-abnormal profit after tax and minority interests AND normalised profit 
after tax; 
• profit after tax excluding non-core items AND profit after tax excluding significant 
items; 
• profit after tax before significant items AND underlying profit after tax; 
• underlying net profit after tax AND normalised profit; 
• underlying net profit after tax AND net profit after tax but before specific non-recurring 
items; 
• underlying profit AND profit after tax before provisions AND profit after tax before 
significant items; 
• cash profit AND underlying profit; 
• adjusted group profit AND underlying profit after tax; 
• standalone net profit after tax AND net profit after tax excluding Jaya costs and 
earnings contribution; (Note: ‘Jaya costs’ refers to costs associated with a takeover) 
• normal net profit after tax AND net profit after tax and before significant items; 
• normalised net profit AND net profit before noteworthy items; 
• normalised net profit before noteworthy items AND underlying normalised net profit 
from continuing operations; 
• net profit after tax before exceptionals AND adjusted net profit after tax; 
• net profit after tax for distribution to ordinary shareholders AND normalised, 
distributable net profit; 
• net profit after tax excluding individually material items AND underlying profit; 
• net profit after tax before non-recurring items AND normalised profit after tax; and 
• net profit after tax from continuing operations AND reported after tax profit. 
 
 
The second label in the last bullet point is particularly concerning as this may appear to many 
readers of the reports to be the GAAP or IFRS profit. 
 
The discussion above has concentrated on the disclosure of one particular non-GAAP figure 
by companies and the terminology used to report it. However, some companies reported a 
range of different figures with different names, all different from the GAAP profit figure. For 
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example, in 2005 the Bank of Queensland reported an underlying profit of $143.5 million and 
a net profit after tax excluding significant items of $76.2 million. In the same year Lend Lease 
Group reported a profit after tax excluding one-off items of $310.4 million and an underlying 
operating profit after tax of $281.6 million. In 2009, Invocare Ltd reported a normalised profit 
after tax of $33.5 million and an underlying profit AND operating profit after tax of $31.9 
million. Adding to the ambiguity is the fact that many of these companies also reported EBIT 
and EBITDA figures as well as underlying EBIT and underlying EBITDA, with the amounts 
all differing to the other non-GAAP figures.  
 
Although not common, instances where companies used the term ‘net profit after tax’ or ‘net 
profit’ to label what was a non-GAAP figure, as it differed from the GAAP profit reported in 
the income statement, are very concerning. For example, in 2011 and 2012, Cabcharge 
Australia Ltd reported a ‘normalised net profit after tax’ in the press release. In the annual 
report the same figure was called ‘profit after tax’ while the GAAP profit was called ‘reported 
profit after tax’. The various practices discussed in this section validate the concerns raised 
over the variety of terminology used by companies and highlight how these practices may 
cause confusion for unsophisticated investors and shareholders. 
 
6.3.5 Amount of Non-GAAP Profit versus GAAP Profit 
The difference in amounts between the reported non-GAAP and GAAP profits varied greatly 
between companies and within companies from year to year. The mean of the GAAP and 
non-GAAP profit figures, for companies reporting a non-GAAP profit, is shown in Figure 
6.4. In all years except 2006 and 2007, the mean non-GAAP profit was higher than the mean 
GAAP profit. The largest differences between the means occurred in 2009 (a difference of 
$182.7 million) and 2013 (a difference of $179.8 million). The smallest difference was in 
2004 with a difference of just $10 million between the two means. It is interesting to note that 
the mean non-GAAP figure appeared to remain reasonably consistent after the introduction of 
the ASIC Regulatory Guide in December 2011.  
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When considering individual companies, the difference between the two figures varies 
greatly. In some years, some companies labelled the exact same figure as both a non-GAAP 
and GAAP figure, meaning the difference between the two was nil. In 2008 for example, four 
companies reported the same figure as both a GAAP and non-GAAP profit. This will be the 
case if the company is using the same ‘definition’ of non-GAAP profit each year and in that 
particular year there were no significant or unusual items. In contrast, one example of a large 
difference between the two figures is provided by the GPT Group, a member of the Real 
Estate sector, which in 2008 reported a GAAP loss of $3,254 million but a non-GAAP profit 
of $469 million, a difference of $3.7 billion. A reconciliation of the two figures was provided 
by the company and showed that the difference between the two figures was due to changes in 
the value of the investment portfolio, goodwill impairment, and unrealised losses on 
derivatives and foreign exchange losses on borrowings. Another example of a large difference 
between the figures is Santos Ltd (a member of the Energy sector) in 2015, with a GAAP loss 
of $2,698 million and a non-GAAP profit of $50 million, a difference of $2.7 billion 
explained as after tax impairment losses.  
 
In reviewing individual industry sectors, companies from Financials and Real Estate 
represented the majority of companies where the non-GAAP profit exceeded the GAAP profit 
by the greatest amount for most years of the study. The years 2011, 2014 and 2015 were 
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exceptions to this with the Energy and Materials sector having the majority of companies 
where non-GAAP exceeded GAAP by the greatest amount. Interestingly, the Real Estate 
sector also had the most companies where the GAAP profit exceeded the non-GAAP profit by 
the greatest amount in the majority of years in the study. 
 
Although the mean non-GAAP profit exceeded the mean GAAP profit in all but two years of 
the study (Figure 6.4), there were companies that, on an individual company basis, reported a 
higher GAAP profit. Figure 6.5 illustrates which figure, GAAP or non-GAAP, was the higher 
for each of the companies which reported a non-GAAP figure. In 2004, there were 29 
companies where the non-GAAP figure exceeded the GAAP figure and 21 where the GAAP 
figure was higher, a difference of eight companies. The years 2006 and 2007 were the only 
years in the study where the number of companies reporting a higher GAAP figure exceeded  
 
 
the number of companies reporting a higher non-GAAP figure. This correlates with the years 
where the mean GAAP profit was higher than the mean non-GAAP profit as seen in Figure 
6.4.  
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During 2008 and 2009, the years of the GFC, the number of companies where the non-GAAP 
profit figure was the higher figure far exceeded those where GAAP profit figure was higher. 
In 2009, for example, 56 companies reported a higher non-GAAP profit figure with only 13 
reporting a higher GAAP profit figure. The years 2009 and 2012 show the greatest difference 
with 43 more companies having a higher non-GAAP profit figure than the companies where 
the GAAP profit figure was higher. From an individual industry sector perspective, Health 
Care, Information Technology and Telecommunications were industries where almost all the 
companies reporting a non-GAAP figure reported one higher than the GAAP figure (note that 
these three sectors had a small representation in the total sample).  
 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics  
6.4.1 Independent Variables 
Table 6.4 shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables for Research Question 1 
and its accompanying hypotheses. A more detailed version of this table showing quartiles is 
provided in Appendix 7. Each panel in Table 6.4 shows the mean and standard deviation for 
each year of the study for each of the independent variables. The table shows the division 
between companies that did not report a non-GAAP profit and companies that did report a 
non-GAAP profit and reports the statistics for the total companies in the sample. Panel A 
provides the descriptive statistics for the size of the company. Over the years investigated in 
the study, the mean size of all companies in the sample, as measured by the log of market 
capitalisation, increased from the lowest result in 2004 (𝑥2004 = 8.8734) to the highest result in 
2015 (𝑥2015 = 9.4233). In each year of the study, the companies reporting a non-GAAP profit 
are, on average, larger than companies that did not. Univariate results show this difference is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level for each year except 2013 to 2015, see Appendix 8 for 
these results. 
 
Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for ownership concentration as measured by the 
percentage of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders. As with size, the mean ownership 
concentration for all companies increased over the course of the years involved, ranging from 
the lowest result in 2005 (𝑥2005 = 61.61%) to the highest in 2015 (𝑥2015 = 73.44%). When 
comparing the means of companies that did and did not report a non-GAAP profit, the results 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for independent variables for Research Question 1 
Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Panel A: SIZE (log of market capitalisation) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 8.5490 8.6579 8.8094 9.0086 8.8844 8.7502 8.8893 9.0283 9.1120 9.2790 9.3053 9.3998 
Standard Deviation 0.8985 0.8615 0.8908 0.9065 1.0006 0.8757 0.7856 0.6855 0.5198 0.5426 0.5475 0.6056 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Mean 9.2562 9.3591 9.4095 9.5179 9.3302 9.3531 9.4210 9.4228 9.3650 9.3790 9.4505 9.4295 
Standard Deviation 0.7118 0.7207 0.5941 0.5495 0.6001 0.6640 0.5847 0.5484 0.6291 0.6228 0.5775 0.6060 
All companies  
Mean 8.8734 8.9988 9.1232 9.2749 9.1461 9.1318 9.2356 9.2889 9.2861 9.3515 9.4225 9.4233 
Standard Deviation 0.8881 0.8672 0.8052 0.7860 0.8165 0.7998 0.7055 0.6242 0.6063 0.6010 0.5722 0.6032 
Panel B: OWN (ownership concentration = percentage shares owned by top twenty shareholder) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 61.47 60.55 65.32 65.51 68.61 68.80 67.69 68.64 73.73 75.11 77.42 75.78 
Standard Deviation 16.68 16.19 17.37 16.76 14.75 13.71 14.15 14.01 12.26 13.64 10.00 12.61 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Mean 62.38 62.73 60.08 62.87 62.55 64.64 68.04 70.21 69.56 69.87 71.87 72.82 
Standard Deviation 19.17 18.70 17.05 17.93 17.31 15.64 14.75 14.34 14.18 13.83 14.11 14.36 
All companies 
Mean 61.89 61.61 62.58 64.13 65.05 66.17 67.92 69.68 70.86 71.31 72.94 73.44 
Standard Deviation 17.79 17.41 17.32 17.35 16.51 15.03 14.48 14.18 13.69 13.91 13.56 14.00 
Panel C: LEV (leverage = total liabilities to total assets) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 0.4186 0.4468 0.4549 0.4703 0.4310 0.4202 0.4374 0.4220 0.4126 0.4173 0.3954 0.4112 
Standard Deviation 0.2137 0.2321 0.2148 0.2258 0.2481 0.2458 0.2287 0.2000 0.2264 0.1872 0.2160 0.1979 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 0.5551 0.5563 0.6280 0.6097 0.5994 0.5453 0.5251 0.5273 0.5405 0.5389 0.5173 0.5242 
Standard Deviation 0.2101 0.2100 0.2079 0.2057 0.1990 0.2222 0.2253 0.2199 0.2051 0.1992 0.1927 0.2014 
All companies  
Mean 0.4818 0.5000 0.5454 0.5432 0.5299 0.4994 0.4945 0.4916 0.5006 0.5055 0.4938 0.5004 
Standard Deviation 0.2219 0.2274 0.2275 0.2256 0.2348 0.2378 0.2293 0.2182 0.2192 0.2026 0.2022 0.2050 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for independent variables for Research Question 1 (continued) 
Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Panel D: BAD (bad news firm = decrease in GAAP profit or GAAP loss, good news firm = same or increase in profit) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Bad News Companies  n (%) 19  (32) 17  (30) 17  (33) 21  (40) 21  (47) 19  (48) 12  (32) 12  (32) 13  (38) 7  (23) 8  (38) 6  (26) 
Good News Companies n (%) 40  (68) 39  (70) 35  (67) 31  (60) 24  (53) 21  (52) 26  (68) 25  (68) 21  (62) 23  (77) 13  (62) 17  (74) 
Total                n (%) 59 (100) 56 (100) 52 (100) 52 (100) 45 (100) 40 (100) 38 (100) 37 (100) 34 (100) 30 (100) 21 (100) 23 (100) 
             
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Bad News Companies  n (%) 6  (12) 17  (32) 17  (30) 13  (23) 35  (55) 45  (65) 13  (18) 36  (50) 43  (57) 35  (44) 31  (35) 38  (44) 
Good News Companies n (%) 44  (88) 36  (68) 40  (70) 44  (77) 29  (45) 24  (35)  58  (82) 36  (50) 32  (43) 44  (56) 57  (65) 48  (56) 
Total                n (%) 50 (100) 53 (100) 57 (100) 57 (100) 64 (100) 69 (100) 71 (100) 72 (100) 75 (100) 79 (100) 88 (100) 86 (100) 
             
All companies 
Bad News Companies  n (%) 25  (23) 34  (31) 34  (31) 34  (31) 56  (51) 64  (59) 25  (23) 48  (44) 56  (51) 42  (39) 39  (36) 44  (40) 
Good News Companies n (%) 84  (77) 75  (69) 75  (69) 75  (69) 53  (49) 45  (41) 84  (77) 61  (56) 53  (49) 67  (61) 70  (64) 65  (60) 
Total                n (%) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 
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year by year are varied. In eight of the twelve years, the mean ownership concentration of 
companies reporting a non-GAAP profit was lower, meaning that in those years, on average, 
non-GAAP reporters had more dispersed ownership. This mean difference was statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level in 2008, 2013 and 2014 (Appendix 8).  
 
Panel C reports the descriptive statistics for leverage as measured by total liabilities to total 
assets. The mean leverage for all companies in the study did not vary greatly over the years 
and was the highest in 2006 (𝑥2006 = 0.5454) and 2007 (𝑥2007 = 0.5432). When comparing the 
companies that did and did not report a non-GAAP figure, those that reported a figure were 
more highly leveraged, on average, in every year of the study. This result was statistically 
significant for every year of the study (Appendix 8). 
 
In Panel D, the numbers of companies classified as ‘bad news’ companies or ‘good news’ 
companies are reported along with percentages. In this study, bad news companies in a 
particular year are those that reported a lower GAAP profit than the previous period or 
reported a GAAP loss (see Section 5.7.1.4). Overall, the number of bad news companies 
increased greatly in 2008 (56 companies or 51.4% of the sample) and 2009 (64 companies or 
58.7% of the sample), the two years of the GFC. The year 2012 also saw a large increase in 
‘bad news’ companies with 56 companies or 51.4% matching the definition. The years 2004 
and 2010 had the lowest number of bad news companies with 25 companies or 22.9% of the 
sample in each of these years. The breakdown of the numbers between companies that did and 
did not report a non-GAAP profit provides mixed results, particularly in the early years. 
However, non-GAAP reporting companies had a higher percentage of bad news companies in 
six of the eight years since 2008.  
 
While there are four independent variables for Research Question 1, Research Question 2 has 
only one, a categorical variable representing the particular year in question. Research 
Question 2 explores the effect certain events may have had on the decision by companies to 
report or not report a non-GAAP profit figure. Analysis therefore involves changes between 
the particular years involving these events.  
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6.4.2 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for both Research Questions 1 and 2 is whether or not the company 
reported a non-GAAP profit figure. An overview of this variable in the sample is presented 
graphically in Figure 6.6 with the full detail in Table 6.5, reflecting the number and 
percentages of companies that reported a non-GAAP profit and those that did not in each of 
the years of the study. The number of companies reporting a non-GAAP figure rose steadily 
over the period of the study from 50 companies (or 45.9%) in 2004 to a high of 88 companies 
(or 80.7%) in 2014. This means of the 109 companies in the sample, only 21 or 19.3% did not 
report a non-GAAP figure in 2014. The reporting of this type of figure has therefore become 
common place in recent years.  
 
 
 
The descriptive statistics above provide an overview of the variables used to analyse Research 
Questions 1 and 2.  The results of the analysis of these two research questions is now 
presented. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable for Research Questions 1 and 2 
Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
REPORT (reporting of a non-GAAP profit figure) 
Reported a non-GAAP figure     n (%) 50  (46) 53  (49) 57  (52) 57  (52) 64  (59) 69  (63) 71  (65) 72  (66) 75  (69) 79  (72) 88  (81) 86  (79) 
Did not report a non-GAAP figure n (%) 59  (54) 56  (51) 52  (48) 52  (48) 45  (41) 40  (37) 38  (35) 37  (34) 34  (31) 30  (28)  21  (19) 23  (21) 
Total                        n (%) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 
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6.5 Research Question 1 – Influence of Company Characteristics on  
     Non-GAAP Reporting 
6.5.1 General Overview  
Research Question 1 concerns whether specific firm characteristics influence a company’s 
choice to report non-GAAP profit figures. As the dependent variable (REPORT) is 
categorical, the company either did or did not report a non-GAAP profit figure, logistic 
regression analysis was used to evaluate Model 1: 
Model 1:  
 REPORT = β0 + β1SIZE + β2OWN + β3 LEV + β4 BAD + ϵ 
Where: 
REPORT = Reporting of a non-GAAP profit figure: 1 if report, 0 if do not report 
SIZE = Size of the organisation, as measured by log of market capitalisation  
OWN = Ownership concentration, as measured by percentage shares owned by   
top twenty shareholders 
LEV = Leverage, as measured by total liabilities to total assets 
BAD = Bad news firm: 1 if decrease in IFRS profit from previous period or IFRS loss, 0 if  
 same or increase in profit 
 
The model was tested for collinearity, the presence of outliers and for significance of the 
model itself. All models were statistically significant for Research Questions 1.  
 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrices of the three independent continuous variables are presented in 
Appendix 9. Leverage is significantly positively related to size in the total sample and all the 
individual years (p < 0.01 for total sample and all years). Leverage is significantly negatively 
related to ownership concentration in the total sample and in all the years from 2007 to 2015 
(p < 0.05 for 2007, 2009 and 2010; p < 0.01 for total sample and for 2008 and 2011 to 2015). 
Size and ownership concentration are significantly negatively related in 2014 (p < 0.01) and 
2015 (p < 0.05). 
 
The model was assessed for possible outliers using Cook’s distance, leverage and 
standardised residuals (see Section 5.8.2). Appendix 10 provides details of the outliers removed 
from the analysis of the total sample.  It lists the company name, industry sector, year and results 
from the three tests used to determine outliers. Appendix 11 provides similar details of the 
outliers removed from the analysis of each individual year of the study. 
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The logistic regression model was first applied to the total sample of companies over the 
twelve years of the study. The model was significant, χ2 (4, n = 1237) = 323.970, p < 0.01, and 
the results are shown in Table 6.6 and discussed below under each hypothesis.  
 
Table 6.6: Logistic Regression Analysis of Reporting of non-GAAP Figures 
as a Function of Company Characteristic – Total Sample 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Test 
(ɀ-ratio) 
p Valuea 
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.230, χ2 (4, n = 1237) = 323.970, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.557 0.139 124.606 0.000** 
Ownership Concentration - -0.005 0.005 1.048 0.157 
Leverage + 0.023 0.004 34.009 0.000** 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.793 0.149 28.285 0.000** 
Constant  -14.528 1.236 138.181 0.000 
 a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Logistic regression analysis was then conducted for each individual year of the study to 
determine if the results changed from year to year, with these finding included in the results 
under each hypothesis. This identified whether different company characteristics were more 
or less influential depending on the year in question. The models for each year were 
significant. The results are presented in Table 6.7 with each year’s results, including the 
model reliability, reported in a separate panel of the table.  
 
6.5.2 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that larger companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profits than 
smaller companies due to increased information asymmetry arising from more complexity and 
a wider ownership base. For the total sample, see Table 6.6, size was statistically significant 
and in the predicted direction (ɀ = 124.606, p < 0.01).  
 
When the model was assessed on a year by year basis, size was statistically significant and in 
the predicted direction for all the years of the study except 2008 and 2013 to 2015, see Table 
6.7. Therefore, for the total sample and in almost every year individually, size is a 
contributing factor to the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure with larger companies 
more likely to   
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Table 6.7: Logistic Regression Analysis of Reporting of non-GAAP Figures 
as a Function of Company Characteristic 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Test 
(ɀ-ratio) 
p Valuea 
Panel A: 2004  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.229, χ2 (4, n = 105) = 27.315, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.117 0.362 9.524 0.001** 
Ownership Concentration - 0.008 0.013 0.315 0.287 
Leverage + 0.015 0.013 1.272 0.130 
Good/Bad News Year + -1.057 0.594 3.162 0.038* 
Constant  -11.080 3.231 11.756 0.001 
Panel B: 2005  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.234, χ2 (4, n = 106) = 28.225, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.557 0.400 15.165 0.000** 
Ownership Concentration - 0.013 0.013 0.963 0.163 
Leverage + -0.003 0.013 0.066 0.399 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.610 0.513 1.415 0.117 
Constant  -14.975 3.510 18.200 0.000 
Panel C: 2006  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.237, χ2 (4, n = 106) = 28.732, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.099 0.391 7.899 0.002** 
Ownership Concentration - -0.026 0.014 3.195 0.037* 
Leverage + 0.024 0.013 3.360 0.034* 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.010 0.495 0.000 0.492 
Constant  -9.478 3.426 7.655 0.006 
Panel D: 2007  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.199, χ2 (4, n = 105) = 23.333, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.001 0.420 5.666 0.009** 
Ownership Concentration - -0.012 0.014 0.723 0.198 
Leverage + 0.021 0.013 2.654 0.051 
Good/Bad News Year + -0.674 0.508 1.762 0.092 
Constant  -9.249 3.707 6.225 0.013 
Panel E: 2008  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.216, χ2 (4, n = 106) = 25.769, p = 0.000 
Size + 0.415 0.362 1.313 0.126 
Ownership Concentration - -0.017 0.014 1.446 0.115 
Leverage + 0.040 0.013 8.896 0.002** 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.809 0.473 2.927 0.044* 
Constant  -4.601 3.197 2.071 0.150 
Panel F: 2009  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.391, χ2 (4, n = 101) = 50.168, p = 0.000 
Size + 2.301 0.591 15.155 0.000** 
Ownership Concentration - -0.038 0.020 3.411 0.033* 
Leverage + 0.042 0.016 6.789 0.005** 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.910 0.644 8.804 0.002** 
Constant  -20.105 5.197 14.967 0.000 
Panel G: 2010  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.270, χ2 (4, n = 103) = 32.377, p = 0.000 
Size + 2.203 0.564 15.262 0.000** 
Ownership Concentration - 0.005 0.018 0.081 0.388 
Leverage + 0.022 0.014 2.510 0.057 
Good/Bad News Year + -0.186 0.612 0.092 0.381 
Constant  -20.472 5.207 15.459 0.000 
Panel H: 2011  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.303, χ2 (4, n = 104) = 37.610, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.885 0.561 11.287 0.000** 
Ownership Concentration - 0.011 0.019 0.345 0.279 
Leverage + 0.048 0.018 7.339 0.004** 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.944 0.632 9.461 0.001** 
Constant  -20.068 5.267 14.519 0.000 
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Table 6.7: Logistic Regression Analysis of Reporting of non-GAAP Figures 
as a Function of Company Characteristic (continued) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Test 
(ɀ-ratio) 
p Valuea 
Panel I: 2012  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.307, χ2 (4, n = 101) = 37.072, p = 0.000 
Size + 1.268 0.666 3.627 0.029* 
Ownership Concentration - -0.024 0.024 0.999 0.159 
Leverage + 0.062 0.019 10.778 0.000** 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.695 0.622 7.422 0.003** 
Constant  -12.005 5.911 4.125 0.042 
Panel J: 2013  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.254, χ2 (4, n = 101) = 29.648, p = 0.000 
Size + -0.778 0.726 1.147 0.142 
Ownership Concentration - -0.051 0.025 4.000 0.023* 
Leverage + 0.067 0.022 9.260 0.001** 
Good/Bad News Year + 2.411 0.795 9.194 0.001** 
Constant  8.610 6.577 1.714 0.191 
Panel K: 2014  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.280, χ2 (4, n = 100) = 32.909, p = 0.000 
Size + 2.179 1.367 2.540 0.055 
Ownership Concentration - -0.139 0.055 6.305 0.006** 
Leverage + 0.146 0.045 10.784 0.000** 
Good/Bad News Year + -0.754 0.797 0.895 0.172 
Constant  -12.013 11.131 1.165 0.281 
Panel L: 2015  
Model Reliability: R2 = 0.246, χ2 (4, n = 100) = 28.257, p = 0.000 
Size + 0.011 0.939 0.000 0.496 
Ownership Concentration - 0.033 0.029 1.252 0.132 
Leverage + 0.070 0.029 5.894 0.008** 
Good/Bad News Year + 19.852 6052.733 0.000 0.499 
Constant  -4.121 7.786 0.280 0.597 
 a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
 
report such a figure than smaller companies. Hypothesis 1 is supported for the total sample 
and in all the individual years except 2008 and 2013 to 2015. 
 
6.5.3 Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 concerned ownership concentration and predicted that companies with dispersed 
ownership are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. Ownership concentration was not significant for the total sample 
when assessed as a whole, see Table 6.6. However, when the years were considered 
individually, it was statistically significant and in the predicted direction in four of the twelve 
years of the study. These years are 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2014, see Table 6.7. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported for one third of the years of the study. 
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6.5.4 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 concerned the influence the extent of a company’s leverage might have on the 
decision to report a non-GAAP profit and predicted that more highly leveraged companies 
were more likely to report such figures. Results for leverage were statistically significant and 
in the predicted direction for the total sample, see Table 6.6, (ɀ = 34.009, p < 0.01). The results 
for the individual years vary across the study with the variable being significant in all the later 
years of the study (from 2011). The variable is statistically significant in 2006, 2008, 2009, 
and 2011 to 2015, see Table 6.7. All results are in the predicted direction meaning that more 
highly leveraged companies are more likely to report a non-GAAP figure in the years where 
leverage is significant. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported for the total sample and for eight 
of the twelve individual years of the study.  
 
6.5.5 Hypothesis 4  
Hypothesis 4 concerns ‘bad news’ companies and whether managers have more incentive to 
report extra information such as non-GAAP profits in order to bond themselves to agents in 
bad years. A ‘bad news’ company was defined as a company reporting a decrease in GAAP 
profits from the previous period, or a GAAP loss. It was predicted that such companies are 
more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an increase in GAAP 
profits (‘good news’ companies). The results show that being a ‘bad news’ company had a 
significant influence on the decision to report a non-GAAP profit for the total sample, see 
Table 6.6, (ɀ = 28.285, p < 0.01). On an individual year basis, being a ‘bad news’ company 
was a significant contributing factor in 2004 but not in the predicted direction, see Table 6.7. 
It was statistically significant and in the predicted direction in 2008 and 2009, the years of the 
GFC. It was also statistically significant and in the predicted direction in 2011 to 2013, the 
years immediately following the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is supported for the total sample and in five of the twelve years of the study. 
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6.6 Research Question 2 – Influence of Specific Events on Non-GAAP 
Reporting 
6.6.1 General Overview  
Research Question 2 concerns whether specific events influence a company’s choice to report 
non-GAAP profit figures. To investigate this research question, a series of McNemar’s tests 
were conducted to establish if the reporting behaviour of companies in the sample concerning 
non-GAAP profits changed significantly between certain years surrounding the events in 
question. The McNemar’s test is a non-parametric test which compares changes in categorical 
variables, in this case the variable REPORT. Companies were deemed to have reported a non-
GAAP figure if they had done so at least once in any of the documents under investigation. 
The results are presented in crosstabs tables which show companies whose reporting 
behaviour did and did not change between two time periods. The McNemar’s test recognises 
that a change in behaviour could be in either direction, from ‘did not report’ to ‘did report’, or 
from ‘did report’ to ‘did not report’. The number of companies that changed behaviour either 
way, the discordant pairs in the crosstabs table, is then measured for significance. If the 
number of companies that have changed their behaviour in one direction is similar or equal to 
those who changed in the other direction, the event in question had no influence on behaviour 
and the results will not be statistically significant. If there is a direction in the movement 
between the years, that is, the discordant pairs are significantly different to each other; the 
overall result will be statistically significant. The results for this research question are 
discussed below under each hypothesis and presented in tables within each section. 
 
6.6.2 Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5 concerned the introduction of IFRS and predicted that the number of companies 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures would increase with the introduction of IFRS in Australia. 
It was argued that the introduction of IFRS would have caused a high level of information 
asymmetry, prompting managers to provide extra disclosure concerning its effect in the form 
of non-GAAP profits. To test this hypothesis, the reporting behaviour concerning non-GAAP 
profits in the years 2004 and 2005, 2005 and 2006 and 2004 and 2006 was compared. The 
year 2005 was a transition year for companies whose year-end is 30 June with 2006 being the 
first year when the new standards had to be fully implemented. The results for these 
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comparisons, presented as crosstabs tables, are shown in Table 6.8. Between 2004 and 2005, 
thirteen companies started reporting a non-GAAP figure and ten companies stopped reporting 
a non-GAAP figure. The differences between the other pairs of years are similar, with several 
companies changing their behaviour in each direction. None of the results are statistically 
significant in one direction. Therefore, the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures did not 
increase with the introduction of IFRS and Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
 
Table 6.8: Effect of introduction of IFRS on Reporting a  
Non-GAAP Profit Figure (predicted sign +) 
 2005  p Valuea 
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2004 
No Non-GAAP Reported 46 13 59 
0.339 Non-GAAP Reported 10 40 50 
 Total 56 53 109 
  
   
 
 2006   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2005 
No Non-GAAP Reported 41 15 56 
0.279 Non-GAAP Reported 11 42 53 
 Total 52 57 109 
  
    
 2006   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2004 
No Non-GAAP Reported 41 18 59 
0.133 Non-GAAP Reported 11 39 50 
 Total 52 57 109 
  
   
 
 
a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
6.6.3 Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 concerned the GFC and predicted that the number of companies reporting non-
GAAP profit figures would increase during the years affected by the GFC. It was argued that the 
usefulness of non-GAAP profit figures might increase during times of economic crises when 
managers may wish to provide extra information concerning the results. The GFC began in 
mid-2007 with the 2008 calendar year being the most affected. Conditions improved during 
the 2009 calendar year but companies reporting with a year-end of 30 June 2009 would have 
the peak of the crisis, September 2008, included in any financial reports. Therefore, to test this 
hypothesis, the reporting behaviour in the years 2007 and 2008, 2008 and 2009 and 2007 and 
2009 were compared. The results are shown in Table 6.9. Between 2007 and 2008, eleven 
companies began reporting non-GAAP profits and only four stopped reporting them. This 
change was not statistically significant. The change from 2008 to 2009 is also not statistically 
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significant; perhaps as both these years were during the crisis itself. The change in behaviour 
between 2007 and 2009 is statistically significant (p < 0.01) with 17 companies reporting a 
figure in 2009 that had not done so in 2007 and only five companies ceasing to report one. 
Therefore, the GFC did have a significant effect on the reporting behaviour of companies 
concerning non-GAAP profits and Hypothesis 6 is supported. 
 
Table 6.9: Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on Reporting a  
Non-GAAP Profit Figure (predicted sign +) 
 2008  p Valuea 
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2007 
No Non-GAAP Reported 41 11 52 
0.059 Non-GAAP Reported 4 53 57 
 Total 45 64 109 
  
    
 2009   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2008 
No Non-GAAP Reported 36 9 45 
0.134 Non-GAAP Reported 4 60 64 
 Total 40 69 109 
  
    
 2009   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2007 
No Non-GAAP Reported 35 17 52 
0.009** Non-GAAP Reported 5 52 57 
 Total 40 69 109 
  
    
a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
6.6.4 Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profits would 
increase following the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines concerning underlying 
profits. The guidelines were released in March 2009 and Principle 1 of the guidelines 
encouraged the reporting of a non-GAAP profit as a way of overcoming information 
asymmetry (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 15). To test this hypothesis, the difference between the 
following years was compared, 2008 to 2009, 2009 to 2010, and 2008 to 2010. Table 6.10 
provides the results, with the first two comparisons being not significant. Between 2008 and 
2010, thirteen companies changed their reporting behaviour and began reporting non-GAAP 
profits with only six companies ceasing to do so. Although this is not a statistically significant 
result, there is a trend towards more companies reporting the figure. As the guidelines were 
released in March 2009 it is feasible that it may have taken some companies until the 2010 
reporting period to make  
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Table 6.10: Effect of introduction of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit  
on Reporting a Non-GAAP Profit Figure (predicted sign +) 
 2009   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total p Valuea 
2008 
No Non-GAAP Reported 36 9 45 
0.134 Non-GAAP Reported 4 60 64 
 Total 40 69 109 
  
    
 2010   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2009 
No Non-GAAP Reported 32 8 40 
0.396 Non-GAAP Reported 6 63 69 
 Total 38 71 109 
  
    
 2010   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2008 
No Non-GAAP Reported 32 13 45 
0.083 Non-GAAP Reported 6 58 64 
 Total 38 71 109 
  
    
a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
any changes suggested. However, as none of the results are statistically significant, it appears 
that the guidelines did not have a large effect on the decision to report or not report a non-
GAAP profit figure for companies in the sample. It could also be argued that the GFC had 
already increased the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures and the 
guidelines were released just as recovery from this event was underway. This may have 
influenced the results for this hypothesis. As the results show that the release of the guidelines 
did not have a significant influence on the reporting of non-GAAP figures, Hypothesis 7 is 
not supported. 
 
6.6.5 Hypothesis 8 
Finally, Hypothesis 8 concerns the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 and predicts 
that its release will not influence a company’s decision to report non-GAAP profits. The guide 
attempts to regulate the calculation and presentation of non-GAAP figures and does not seek 
to prohibit their use, acknowledging that the figures may be useful for users of financial 
information. The guide was released in December 2011, so this may have been too late for 
companies that report at 30 June to adapt their 2011 reports. To test the initial release of the 
guide the following years were compared, 2010 to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 2010 to 2012.  
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Studies in the US initially found a decrease in the reporting of non-GAAP figures after the 
introduction of regulation but those investigating beyond the initial post-regulation period 
found a sharp rise in the use of non-GAAP figures in the years since regulation (Black et al. 
2012; Brown et al. 2012). To investigate this phenomenon in the Australian context, this 
study also considers ongoing behaviour since the release of the Regulatory Guide. The first 
year post regulation (2012) was therefore compared to the three years since then (2013 to 
2015). Table 6.11 shows the results for the Hypothesis 8 comparisons.  
 
Table 6.11: Effect of introduction of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 on  
Reporting a Non-GAAP Profit Figure (no effect predicted) 
 2011  p Valuea 
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2010 
No Non-GAAP Reported 29 9 38 
1.000 Non-GAAP Reported 8 63 71 
 Total 37 72 109 
  
    
 2012   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2011 
No Non-GAAP Reported 28 9 37 
0.607 Non-GAAP Reported 6 66 72 
 Total 34 75 109 
  
    
 2012   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2010 
No Non-GAAP Reported 25 13 38 
0.523 Non-GAAP Reported 9 62 71 
 Total 34 75 109 
  
    
 2013   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2012 
No Non-GAAP Reported 24 10 34 
0.454 Non-GAAP Reported 6 69 75 
 Total 30 79 109 
  
    
 2014   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2012 
No Non-GAAP Reported 19 15 34 
0.002** Non-GAAP Reported 2 73 75 
 Total 21 88 109 
  
    
 2015   
No Non-GAAP Reported Non-GAAP Reported Total  
2012 
No Non-GAAP Reported 17 17 34 
0.035* Non-GAAP Reported 6 69 75 
 Total 23 86 109 
  
   
 
a  Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
Results from the first three tests corresponding to the time of the release of the Regulatory 
Guide are all not statistically significant. While some companies did change their reporting 
behaviour, the changes occurred in both directions and did not show a significant change in 
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one direction. Therefore, the release of the guide did not significantly influence the choice to 
report the figure in one particular direction and Hypothesis 8, which predicted behaviour 
would not be affected, is supported. However, the additional investigation beyond 2012 
shows interesting and statistically significant results. The difference between 2012 and 2014 
(p < 0.01) and between 2012 and 2015 (p < 0.05) are both statistically significant in the 
direction of an increase in reporting behaviour. Therefore, although the release of the 
Regulatory Guide had no significant effect on behaviour initially, it has not discouraged 
companies from making the decision to report a non-GAAP figure in the years since its 
release.  
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter provided introductory statistics and descriptive information on the frequency, 
location and amount of non-GAAP profit figures reported by Australian companies as well as 
the industry sector of companies in the sample. Descriptive statistics and results for Research 
Questions 1 and 2 were also reported and discussed, detailing which hypotheses were 
supported and which were not supported by the results. Table 6.12 provides a summary of the 
research questions and hypotheses analysed in this chapter, along with details of the years in 
which the hypotheses were supported or not supported. In the next chapter, the results and 
descriptive statistics for Research Questions 3 and 4 concerning the use of impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures are reported and discussed.  
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Table 6.12: Summary of Results 
Research Question Hypothesis Supported Not Supported 
Research Question 1: Is 
the company’s choice to 
report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by 
specific firm 
characteristics?  
H1: Larger companies are more likely to report non-GAAP 
profit figures than smaller companies. 
Total Sample 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
H2: Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely 
to report non-GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. 
2006 
2009 
2013 
2014 
 
Total Sample 
2004 
2005 
2007 
2008 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2015 
H3: Highly leveraged companies are more likely to report 
non-GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged 
companies. 
Total Sample 
2006 
2008 
2009 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2004 
2005 
2007 
2010 
 
H4: Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from 
the previous period, or a GAAP loss, or more likely to 
report non-GAAP profit figures than companies 
reporting an increase in GAAP profits. 
Total Sample 
2009 
2011 
2012 
2013 
 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2010 
2014 
2015 
Research Question 2: Is 
the company’s choice to 
report non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by 
specific events?  
H5: The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures will increase with the introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in 
Australia. 
 2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2004-2006 
H6: The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures will increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
2007-2009 2007-2008 
2008-2009 
 
H7:  The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures will increase after the release of guidelines on 
reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
 2008-2009 
2009-2010 
2008-2010 
H8:  The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures will not be influenced by the release of 
Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. 
2010-2011 
2011-2012 
2010-2012 
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Chapter 7 
 
Results – The Use of Impression Management in the  
Reporting of Non-GAAP Profits 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the descriptive statistics and results for Research Questions 3 and 4 
concerning the use of impression management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. Section 
7.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used. The research questions concern the 
influence company characteristics and specific events may have on the use of impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profits and the results for these questions and related 
hypotheses are presented in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. Section 7.5 provides some 
additional analysis concerning the reconciliation of GAAP and non-GAAP profit figures. The 
chapter concludes with a summary in Section 7.6.  
 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 7.2.1 Independent Variables 
Research Question 3 concerns company characteristics that may influence the use of impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profits. The measures for these characteristics form the 
independent variables. Descriptive statistics for company characteristics for the total sample of 
109 companies are provided in Table 6.4. However, for Research Question 3 and its 
accompanying hypotheses, only those companies which reported a non-GAAP profit figure in 
any year of the study were required for the analysis. The number of companies reporting a non-
GAAP profit varied across the years from 50 companies in 2004 to 86 companies in 2015. Table 
7.1 shows the descriptive statistics for those selected companies. A more detailed version of this 
table showing quartiles is provided in Appendix 12.  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics for independent variables for Research Question 3 
Statistic 
2004 
n=50 
2005 
n=53 
2006 
n=57 
2007 
n=57 
2008 
n=64 
2009 
n=69 
2010 
n=71 
2011 
n=72 
2012 
n=75 
2013 
n=79 
2014 
n=88 
2015 
n=86 
Panel A: SIZE (log of market capitalisation) 
Mean 9.2562 9.3591 9.4095 9.5179 9.3302 9.3531 9.4210 9.4228 9.3650 9.3790 9.4505 9.4295 
Standard Deviation 0.7118 0.7207 0.5941 0.5495 0.6001 0.6640 0.5847 0.5484 0.6291 0.6228 0.5775 0.6060 
Panel B: OWN (ownership concentration = percentage shares owned by top twenty shareholder) 
Mean 62.38 62.73 60.08 62.87 62.55 64.64 68.04 70.21 69.56 69.87 71.87 72.82 
Standard Deviation 19.17 18.70 17.05 17.93 17.31 15.64 14.75 14.34 14.18 13.83 14.11 14.36 
Panel C: LEV (leverage = total liabilities to total assets) 
Mean 0.5551 0.5563 0.6280 0.6097 0.5994 0.5453 0.5251 0.5273 0.5405 0.5389 0.5173 0.5242 
Standard Deviation 0.2101 0.2100 0.2079 0.2057 0.1990 0.2222 0.2253 0.2199 0.2051 0.1992 0.1927 0.2014 
Panel D: BAD (bad news firm = decrease in GAAP profit or GAAP loss, good news firm = same or increase in profit) 
Bad News Companies  n (%) 6  (12) 17  (32) 17  (30) 13  (23) 35  (55) 45  (65) 13  (18) 36  (50) 43  (57) 35  (44) 31  (35) 38  (44) 
Good News Companies n (%) 44  (88) 36  (68) 40  (70) 44  (77) 29  (45) 24  (35)  58  (82) 36  (50) 32  (43) 44  (56) 57  (65) 48  (56) 
Total               n (%) 50 (100) 53 (100) 57 (100) 57 (100) 64 (100) 69 (100) 71 (100) 72 (100) 75 (100) 79 (100) 88 (100) 86 (100) 
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Panel A reports the statistics for company size measured by the log of market capitalisation. Over 
the first four years of the study (2004 to 2007), the mean of this variable increased from 𝑥2004 = 
9.2562 to 𝑥2007 = 9.5179. However, the mean decreased in 2008 ( 𝑥2008 = 9.3302) at the height of 
the GFC and then again in 2012 (𝑥2012 = 9.3650) which aligns with when the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide came into effect (released in December 2011). As noted in Section 6.4.1, companies that 
report a non-GAAP profit are, on average, larger than those that do not. The results from logistic 
regression for Hypothesis 1 (Section 6.5.2) also found that larger companies are significantly 
more likely to report a non-GAAP figure than smaller companies for all but three years of the 
study. Therefore, the companies included in this independent variable for Research Question 3 
represent some of the larger companies from the total sample.  
 
Panel B shows the results for ownership concentration as measured by the percentage of shares 
owned by the top twenty shareholders. The mean of this measure remained reasonably constant at 
around 60% over the first five years of the study (2004 to 2008) and then began to increase in 
2009, with the recovery from the GFC, and reached the highest result for the years of the study in 
2015 (𝑥2015 = 72.82%).  
 
Panel C provides the mean leverage for each year measured by total liabilities to total assets. The 
mean leverage of the companies reporting non-GAAP profits did not vary greatly from year to 
year, with results showing a peak in 2006 (𝑥2006 = 0.6280) and then a gradual decline to a low in 
2014 (𝑥2014 = 0.5173), with 2015 rising again slightly (𝑥2015 = 0.5242). The descriptive statistics 
for Research Questions 1 (Section 6.4) indicate that companies reporting a non-GAAP figure 
were more highly leveraged, on average, in every year of the study. The results for Hypothesis 3 
using logistic regression (Section 6.5.4) indicate that more highly leveraged firms were 
significantly more likely to report a non-GAAP figure in seven of the twelve years of the study. 
Therefore, the companies included in this independent variable for Research Question 3 are 
already some of the more highly leveraged firms from the total sample. 
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The number of companies classified as ‘bad news firms’ or ‘good news firms’ are shown in Panel 
D (with the percentages out of total non-GAAP reporters for each year shown in brackets). The 
year with the lowest number of bad news companies reporting a non-GAAP profit was 2004 with 
six out of 50 firms (12%). The highest number of bad news firms for this variable was in 2009 
with 45 out of 69 (65%) of the non-GAAP reporters that year being classified as bad news firms.  
 
Although Research Question 3 has multiple independent variables, Research Question 4 has only 
one. This question concerns the influence certain events may have had on the use of impression 
management tactics relating to emphasis and prominence. The independent variable is a 
categorical variable representing the particular years in question surrounding the relevant events, 
therefore no descriptive statistics are warranted. 
 
7.2.2 Dependent Variables 
The analysis for both Research Questions 3 and 4 was conducted using three different dependent 
variables, the relative emphasis scores for the press release, the relative emphasis scores for the 
annual report and the total relative emphasis scores for both documents together. These scores 
were calculated using the impression management index schema developed in Chapter 5 (Section 
5.6.2). The non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures in both documents were coded for 
location/prominence and repetition. To arrive at the relative emphasis score, the total IM score 
for the GAAP figures was subtracted from the total IM score for the non-GAAP figures. A 
positive relative emphasis score means that the non-GAAP figure was given emphasis over the 
GAAP figure. A negative score means the GAAP figure was emphasised over the non-GAAP 
figure and a score of zero means both figures were emphasised equally (using the coding scheme 
for this study). 
 
Table 7.2 provides descriptive statistics for these dependent variables with a more comprehensive 
table provided in Appendix 13. Panel A shows the results for the annual results press release. The  
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Table 7.2: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables for Research Questions 3 and 4 
Statistic 
2004 
n=50 
2005 
n=53 
2006 
n=57 
2007 
n=57 
2008 
n=64 
2009 
n=69 
2010 
n=71 
2011 
n=72 
2012 
n=75 
2013 
n=79 
2014 
n=88 
2015 
n=86 
IM (Impression Management relative emphasis measure = emphasis score for non-GAAP – emphasis score for GAAP) 
Panel A: Press Release Relative Emphasis 
Mean 1.000 0.368 0.974 0.386 1.531 1.109 0.697 0.028 -0.300 -0.335 -0.489 0.134 
Standard Deviation 3.6309 4.3036 3.7302 4.8200 3.9670 4.1665 4.2084 2.8133 2.5121 2.9218 3.2154 3.3698 
Panel B: Annual Report Relative Emphasis 
Mean 0.420 -0.358 1.009 0.895 1.508 0.507 0.669 0.299 0.200 0.032 0.080 0.221 
Standard Deviation 4.9357 4.7184 4.4806 4.4035 4.2337 4.1749 4.3136 3.6189 3.5641 3.1758 4.0626 3.7050 
Panel C: Total Relative Emphasis 
Mean 1.420 0.009 1.982 1.281 3.039 1.616 1.366 0.326 -0.100 -0.304 -0.409 0.355 
Standard Deviation 7.3202 8.2826 7.2407 8.1837 7.1048 7.5800 7.7418 5.3970 5.1386 5.2984 6.5524 5.8566 
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highest positive mean score, representing when non-GAAP figures were most emphasised over 
GAAP figures, is in 2008 (𝑥2008 = 1.531), with the second highest in 2009 (𝑥2009 = 1.109), the two 
years most affected by the GFC. This finding indicates companies gave a much higher emphasis to 
non-GAAP figures in these years. The lowest mean relative emphasis scores for press releases 
were in 2012 to 2014 (𝑥2012 = -0.300, 𝑥2013 = -0.335, and 𝑥2014 = -0.489), with the mean scores in 
each of these years being negative. This indicates that in those years, on average, the GAAP figure 
was emphasised over the non-GAAP figure. These years were the first three years after the 
introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide, which required equal or greater prominence be given 
to the GAAP figure. It is interesting to note that in 2015, four years after the introduction of the 
Regulatory Guide, the mean becomes positive again (𝑥2015 = 0.134), indicating that on average the 
non-GAAP figure was once again given more emphasis.  
 
The mean relative emphasis for the annual reports is shown in Panel B. Like the press release 
results, the highest positive mean score was in 2008 (𝑥2008 = 1.508), one of the years of the GFC. 
In this year the non-GAAP figure, on average, was the most highly emphasised compared to the 
GAAP figure of all the years in the study. However, unlike the press release, the second highest 
positive mean was in 2006 (𝑥2006 = 1.009), the first year Australian companies had to fully 
implement IFRS. The lowest mean was a negative score in 2005 (𝑥2005 = -0.358), making this the 
only year in the study when the GAAP profit was given more emphasis than the non-GAAP 
profit. In the years 2012 to 2014 (𝑥2012 = 0.200, 𝑥2013 = 0.032, and 𝑥2014 = 0.080) the means were 
close to zero but still positive, indicating the non-GAAP figure was still the more emphasised 
figure in the annual reports. The non-GAAP figure was therefore given more prominence in 
every year of the study in the annual report except in 2005.  
 
The differences between the descriptive statistics for press releases and those for annual reports 
highlight the way companies differentiate between using these two documents to disclose results. 
Panel C provides the overall relative emphasis score, calculated by adding the scores for both the 
press release and annual reports. This score gives an indication of the total emphasis strategy of 
the companies across the two documents. As with the press release and annual report, the highest 
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mean was in 2008 (𝑥2008 = 3.039), one of the years of the GFC, showing a high emphasis of the 
non-GAAP figure as compared to the GAAP figure. The only negative means, indicating an 
emphasis of the GAAP figure as compared to the non-GAAP figure, were in 2012 to 2014 (𝑥2012 = 
-0.100, 𝑥2013 = -0.304, and 𝑥2014 = -0.409) after the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide. As with 
the press release, the mean total relative emphasis score reverted to a positive number in 2015 
(𝑥2015 = 0.355), indicating that the non-GAAP figure was once again the more emphasised figure. 
The year 2005 (𝑥2005 = 0.009), the transition year for IFRS, was an unusual year with the mean 
emphasis being almost equal.  
 
The relative emphasis scores presented in Table 7.2 were calculated by subtracting the IM score 
for GAAP figures from the IM score for non-GAAP figures. The IM score for each type of figure 
was calculated by adding the results of the coding for location/prominence and repetition (as 
explained in Section 5.6.2), with the score providing an indication of the total level of emphasis 
different companies give to each of the figures. In order to provide more insight into these IM 
scores, Table 7.3 examines the scores in more depth by showing the mean location/prominence 
scores and the mean repetition scores for both the non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures in the two 
documents analysed. The difference between the figures is also reported, with a positive result 
indicating that the non-GAAP figure was emphasised more than the GAAP figure and a negative 
result indicating that the GAAP figure was emphasised more than the non-GAAP figure for the 
particular impression management tactic being reported.  
 
In the press release, the mean non-GAAP profit location/prominence score exceeded the mean 
GAAP profit location/prominence score in every year until 2011 when the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide was released. The mean GAAP profit location/prominence score was then higher until 
2015 when the non-GAAP profit score was once again higher. The mean repetition scores also 
show the non-GAAP profit score being higher in all years except 2012 and 2014, meaning this 
number tends to be repeated more in press releases than the GAAP profit figure. The difference 
between the two repetition scores was the highest in 2008 showing that, in the press release, 
companies repeated the non-GAAP figure much more than the GAAP figure in that year. In the  
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Table 7.3: Breakdown of mean “location/prominence” and “repetition” scores for non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
(higher figure each year is shown in bold) 
 Press Release 
 
Annual Report 
Year 
Mean  
Loc/Prom 
Score  
Non-GAAP 
Mean 
Loc/Prom 
Score 
GAAP  
Difference 
Mean 
Repetition 
Score  
Non-GAAP 
Mean 
Repetition 
Score 
GAAP 
Difference 
 
Mean 
Loc/Prom 
Score  
Non-GAAP 
Mean 
Loc/Prom 
Score 
GAAP  
Difference 
Mean 
Repetition 
Score  
Non-GAAP 
Mean 
Repetition 
Score 
GAAP 
Difference 
2004 (n=50) 3.0000 2.0900 0.9100 0.3600 0.2700 0.0900  4.3500 3.8100 0.5400 1.2800 1.4000 -0.1200 
2005 (n=53) 3.1698 2.8585 0.3113 0.4906 0.4340 0.0566  3.9623 3.9151 0.0472 1.1887 1.5943 -0.4056 
2006 (n=57) 3.7368 2.9298 0.8070 0.5789 0.4123 0.1666  4.9649 3.9561 1.0088 1.5614 1.5614 0 
2007 (n=57) 4.0088 3.7544 0.2544 0.6404 0.5088 0.1316  4.8684 4.0351 0.8333 1.6316 1.5702 0.0614 
2008 (n=64) 4.0391 2.7344 1.3047 0.6016 0.3750 0.2266  5.0391 3.8125 1.2266 1.7656 1.4844 0.2812 
2009 (n=69) 4.1522 3.1304 1.0218 0.5797 0.4928 0.0869  4.6739 4.1594 0.5145 1.6812 1.6884 -0.0072 
2010 (n=71) 4.1408 3.5775 0.5633 0.6338 0.5000 0.1338  4.5986 4.0282 0.5704 1.6831 1.5845 0.0986 
2011 (n=72) 3.9792 3.9931 -0.0139 0.6458 0.6042 0.0416  4.5556 4.3958 0.1598 1.9931 1.8542 0.1389 
2012 (n=75) 3.8867 4.1533 -0.2666 0.6533 0.6867 -0.0334  4.7667 4.4400 0.3267 1.9333 2.0600 -0.1267 
2013 (n=79) 4.0127 4.3671 -0.3544 0.6076 0.5886 0.0190  4.7405 4.7785 -0.0380 2.2278 2.1582 0.0696 
2014 (n=88) 3.2898 3.7330 -0.4432 0.5000 0.5455 -0.0455  4.5909 4.3807 0.2102 2.1705 2.3011 -0.1306 
2015 (n=86) 3.6570 3.5814 0.0756 0.5698 0.5116 0.0582  4.3488 4.1512 0.1976 2.2791 2.2558 0.0233 
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annual report, the mean location/prominence score for the non-GAAP figure was higher than 
the score for the GAAP figure in every year of the study except 2013. However, the repetition 
scores show that the GAAP figure was often repeated more than the non-GAAP figure in the 
annual report, with this being the case in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012 and 2014. The repetition 
scores were often quite similar between the two figures in the annual report as both figures 
tended to be discussed together in sections such as the Chairman’s and CEO’s letter, and the 
Directors’ Report or Review of Operations. These descriptive statistics have provided an 
overview of the variables used in Research Questions 3 and 4 and these two research 
questions will now be analysed. 
 
7.3 Research Question 3 – Influence of Company Characteristics on the 
use of Impression Management 
7.3.1 General Overview 
Research Question 3 concerns whether the use of impression management tactics relating to 
emphasis when reporting non-GAAP profits compared to GAAP profits is influenced by 
specific firm characteristics. As the dependent variable is a ratio number, multiple regression 
analysis was conducted to evaluate Model 2:  
Model 2:  
 RE1-3 = β0 + β1SIZE + β2OWN + β3LEV + β4BAD + ϵ 
Where: 
RE1 = Press release relative emphasis = emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure in press  
   releases – emphasis score for GAAP profit figure in press releases 
RE2 = Annual report relative emphasis = emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure in annual  
   reports – emphasis score for GAAP profit figure in annual reports 
RE3 = Total relative emphasis = total emphasis score for non-GAAP profit figure – total emphasis  
   score for GAAP profit figure 
SIZE = Size of the organisation, as measured by log of market capitalisation  
OWN = Ownership concentration, as measured by percentage shares owned by   
   top twenty shareholders 
LEV = Leverage, as measured by total liabilities to total assets 
BAD = Bad news firm: 1 if decrease in IFRS profit from previous period or IFRS loss, 0 if  
   same or increase in profit 
 
The multiple regression analysis was undertaken for the total sample as a whole and then for 
each year of the study individually. All companies that reported a non-GAAP profit in a 
particular year were included in the analysis for that year. As with Research Question 1, the 
model was assessed for outliers using standardised residuals, leverage values and Cook’s 
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distance. Outliers were removed from the final analysis, with information on the company 
name, industry sector, year and results for the three tests used to determine outliers contained 
in Appendix 14 (total sample) and Appendix 15 (individual years). Pearson’s Correlation 
Matrices of the three independent continuous variables for non-GAAP reporters are presented 
in Appendix 16. Leverage is significantly positively related to size in the total sample and all 
the years except 2009 (p < 0.05 for 2008 and 2010; p < 0.01 for the total sample and all other 
years). Leverage is significantly negatively related to ownership concentration in the total 
sample and in all the years except 2006 (p < 0.05 for 2004; p < 0.01 for the total sample and 
all other years). Size and ownership concentration are significantly negatively related in 2005 
and 2014 (p < 0.05 for both years). The variance inflation factor (VIF) was also measured for 
each variable to assess multicollinearity and the results are reported along with the other 
results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6. High VIF values denote high collinearity with the common 
threshold being a VIF value above 10 (Hair et al. 2013). The results of this study indicate that 
high collinearity does not appear to be an issue. 
 
The multiple regression analysis was undertaken for the press release, annual report and total 
relative emphasis for the total sample as a whole, and for each year individually, resulting in 
39 different versions of the model being run for analysis. Of the three models concerning the 
multiple regression analysis for the total sample of companies that reported a non-GAAP 
profit figure, the models for the press release relative emphasis (R2 = 0.018, F (4,759) = 4.470, 
p < 0.01) and for the total relative emphasis (R2 = 0.013, F (4,761) = 3.535, p < 0.01) were 
statistically significant. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 7.4.  
Table 7.4: Multiple regression analysis of use of impression management tactics  
as a function of company characteristic – Total sample 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.018, F (4,759) = 4.470, p = 0.001 
Size + 0.192 -0.084 -2.109* 1.228 
Ownership Concentration - 0.007 -0.032 -0.826 1.151 
Leverage + 0.006 0.109 2.585** 1.372 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.219 0.091 2.505** 1.016 
Constant  1.792  1.931  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.013, F (4,761) = 3.535, p = 0.007 
Size + .366 -.015 -.389 1.222 
Ownership Concentration - .014 -.070 -1.809* 1.157 
Leverage + .011 .058 1.375 1.374 
Good/Bad News Year + .415 .094 2.591** 1.016 
Constant  3.406  0.751  
 a  Reported t values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
    * Significant at the 0.05 level 
  ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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The results for the multiple regression analysis conducted on each individual year for the 
press release, annual report and total relative emphasis are shown for the ten statistically 
significant models in Table 7.5. As only ten of the 36 models were statistically significant and 
due to the number of models involved, a table showing full results with the tests of 
significance for all models in contained in Appendix 17. 
 
Table 7.5: Multiple regression analysis of use of impression management tactics  
as a function of company characteristics for significant models 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Panel A: 2004 
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.233, F (4,43) = 4.568, p = 0.004 
Size + 0.928  0.222  1.516 1.317 
Ownership Concentration - 0.032 -0.023 -0.170 1.122 
Leverage + 0.032 -0.615 -4.123** 1.366 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.778  0.053  0.410 1.031 
Constant  8.477  -0.580  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.165, F (4,44) = 3.371, p = 0.017 
Size +  1.505  0.200  1.338 1.290 
Ownership Concentration -  0.052  0.019  0.138 1.120 
Leverage +  0.052 -0.522 -3.403** 1.352 
Good/Bad News Year +  2.889  0.097  0.723 1.037 
Constant  13.659  -0.619  
Panel B: 2007 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.177, F (4,49) = 3.841, p = 0.009 
Size + 1.121  0.399  2.901** 1.217 
Ownership Concentration - 0.033 -0.367 -2.629** 1.254 
Leverage + 0.032 -0.133 -0.895 1.427 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.261  0.081  0.636 1.034 
Constant  9.983  -2.335  
Panel C: 2009 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.176, F (4,61) = 4.472, p = 0.003 
Size + 0.638 -0.230 -1.997* 1.047 
Ownership Concentration - 0.030  0.192  1.560 1.193 
Leverage + 0.021  0.485  3.913** 1.212 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.891 -0.142 -1.248 1.024 
Constant  6.145   1.072  
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.150, F (4,60) = 3.821, p = 0.008 
Size + 0.631 -0.282 -2.377** 1.057 
Ownership Concentration - 0.029  0.048  0.385 1.164 
Leverage + 0.021  0.419  3.314** 1.206 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.872 -0.127 -1.092 1.019 
Constant  6.074   1.812  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.217, F (4,59) = 5.378, p = 0.001 
Size +  1.082 -0.305 -2.664** 1.055 
Ownership Concentration -  0.050  0.170  1.394 1.200 
Leverage +  0.036  0.506  4.094** 1.228 
Good/Bad News Year +  1.527 -0.181 -1.597 1.030 
Constant  10.409   1.782  
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Table 7.5: Multiple regression analysis of use of impression management tactics  
as a function of company characteristics for significant models (continued) 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Panel D: 2010 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.217, F (4,62) = 5.584, p = 0.001 
Size + 0.720 0.079  0.682 1.130 
Ownership Concentration - 0.029 0.496  4.233** 1.156 
Leverage + 0.020 0.361  3.025** 1.201 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.036 0.138  1.240 1.041 
Constant  7.247  -2.180  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.140, F (4,62) = 3.697, p = 0.009 
Size +  1.368 0.069  0.570 1.131 
Ownership Concentration -  0.055 0.376  3.073** 1.150 
Leverage +  0.038 0.361  2.886** 1.201 
Good/Bad News Year +  2.026 0.002  0.018 1.038 
Constant  13.723  -1.694  
Panel E: 2012 
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.132, F (4,66) = 3.650, p = 0.010 
Size + 0.962  0.093  0.718 1.364 
Ownership Concentration - 0.041 -0.181 -1.475 1.214 
Leverage + 0.030 -0.081 -0.611 1.420 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.145  0.378  3.169** 1.148 
Constant  9.458  -0.366  
Panel F: 2015 
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.072, F (4,77) = 2.579, p = 0.044 
Size + 0.647  0.181  1.341 1.591 
Ownership Concentration - 0.023  0.246  2.141* 1.151 
Leverage + 0.019  0.105  0.792 1.532 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.675 -0.109 -0.932 1.202 
Constant  6.125  -1.875  
 a  Reported t values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
    * Significant at the 0.05 level  
  ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
7.3.2 Hypothesis 9 
Hypothesis 9 concerned size of companies and predicted that larger companies are more 
likely to use impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP 
profit figures than smaller companies. For the total sample, Table 7.4, size was statistically 
significant (t = -2.109, p < 0.05) in the press release but not in the predicted direction. This 
indicates that over the total sample for the twelve years, smaller companies were more likely 
to use impression management tactics to emphasise non-GAAP over GAAP profits in the 
press release than larger companies. Results from analysing each year individually showed 
that size was statistically significant and in the predicted direction for the press release in 
2007, see Table 7.5 Panel B, (t = 2.901, p < 0.01). In 2009, see Table 7.5 Panel C, it was 
statistically significant for the press release (t = -1.997, p < 0.05), annual report (t = -2.377, p 
< 0.01), and the total relative emphasis (t = -2.664, p < 0.01) but, as in the total sample, not in 
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the predicted direction, meaning that smaller companies were more likely to use impression 
management to highlight non-GAAP profits. Therefore, Hypothesis 9 is not supported except 
in the press release in 2007. 
 
7.3.4 Hypothesis 10 
Hypothesis 10 concerned the influence ownership concentration would have on the use of 
impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profits. It was 
predicted that companies with more dispersed ownership are more likely to use impression 
management. For the sample overall, see Table 7.4, ownership concentration was statistically 
significant and in the predicted direction for the total relative emphasis score (t = -1.809, p < 
0.01). This indicates that analysing the total sample over the twelve years, companies with 
more dispersed ownership were more likely to use impression management tactics to 
emphasise non-GAAP profit figures over GAAP profit figures across the press release and 
annual report as a whole. The results for each year individually show that this variable was 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction in the press release for 2007, see Table 
7.5 Panel B, (t = -2.629, p < 0.01). It was also statistically significant but not in the predicted 
direction for the press release (t = 4.233, p < 0.01) and the total (t = 3.073, p < 0.01) in 2010, 
see Table 7.5 Panel D, and the annual report in 2015, see Table 7.5 Panel F, (t = 2.141, p < 
0.05). These results indicate that Hypothesis 10 is supported for total sample for the total 
relative emphasis and in the press release in 2007. 
 
7.3.5 Hypothesis 11 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that highly leveraged companies are more likely to use impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profits than companies 
with lower levels of leverage. For the total sample over the twelve years, see Table 7.4, 
leverage was statistically significant and in the predicted direction in the press release (t = 
2.585, p < 0.01). For individual years, leverage was statistically significant and in the 
predicted direction for the press release (t = 3.913, p < 0.01), annual report (t = 3.314, p < 
0.01) and total (t = 4.094, p < 0.01) in 2009, see Table 7.5 Panel C, and the press release (t = 
3.025, p < 0.01) and total (t = 2.886, p < 0.01) in 2010, see Table 7.5 Panel D. It was 
statistically significant but not in the predicted direction for the annual report (t = -4.123, p < 
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0.01) and total (t = -3.403, p < 0.01) in 2004, see Table 7.5 Panel A. Hypothesis 11 is 
therefore supported for the total sample for the press release. It was also supported for the 
press release in 2009 and 2010, the annual report in 2009 and the total relative emphasis in 
2009 and 2010. These years represent the second year of the GFC and the year immediately 
following. 
 
7.3.6 Hypothesis 12 
Good or bad news companies were the topic of Hypothesis 12, which predicted that bad news 
companies are more likely to use impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profits. For the total sample, see Table 7.4, this variable was statistically 
significant and in the predicted direction in both the press release (t = 2.505, p < 0.01) and 
total (t = 2.591, p < 0.01) relative emphasis scores. This indicates that for the total sample, 
companies reporting bad news in the form of a decrease in profits from the previous period, or 
a loss, were more likely to emphasis the non-GAAP profit figure than the GAAP profit figure. 
For individual years, this variable was statistically significant and in the predicted direction in 
the total relative emphasis for 2012 only, see Table 7.5 Panel E, (t = 3.169, p < 0.01). 
Hypothesis 12 is therefore supported for the total sample but in only one case when the years 
are analysed individually. 
 
7.4 Research Question 4 – Influence of Specific Events on the use of 
Impression Management 
7.4.1 General Overview 
Research Question 4 concerns whether the use of impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP as compared to GAAP profits is influenced by specific events. The 
dependent variables in this case, as in Research Question 3, are the relative emphasis scores 
for the press release, annual report and total for each year. Figure 7.1 shows the trend in the 
mean relative emphasis scores for the press release, annual report and the total of the two 
documents over the twelve-year period of the study and labels the specific events under 
investigation (see Table 7.2 and Appendix 13 for data). As explained previously, the scores 
for each company are calculated by taking the total IM score for GAAP figures from the total 
IM score for non-GAAP figures. A positive result means that the non-GAAP figure was 
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emphasised over the GAAP figure while a negative score means the GAAP figure was 
emphasised. Mean scores around zero indicate equal emphasis according to the coding 
scheme used in the study.  
 
Changes surrounding the events under investigation in Research Question 4 can be identified 
in the graph. There was a sharp trend towards emphasising GAAP figures over non-GAAP 
figures in 2005, the transition year of IFRS. This trend also occurred from 2011 onward after 
 
 
 
the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide (noting however the trend back to emphasising 
non-GAAP figures in 2015). In contrast, there was a sharp increase towards emphasising non-
GAAP figures over GAAP figures in 2006, the first year IFRS had to be fully implemented 
and then in 2008, one of the years of the GFC (the peak of the GFC was in September 2008).  
 
To further investigate Research Question 4 and determine if the trends identified in Figure 7.1 
are statistically significant, a series of independent t-tests were conducted. These tests were 
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used to establish if the mean of the relative emphasis scores for companies reporting a non-
GAAP figure in one year differs from the mean of the score for companies reporting a non-
GAAP figure in a different year. Outliers were removed from the analysis using z scores as 
explained in Section 5.8.5. A list of the outliers that were removed is contained in Appendix 
18. The results as they relate to each hypothesis are discussed below and presented in tables in 
each section of the discussion.  
 
7.4.2 Hypothesis 13 
Hypothesis 13 concerned the introduction of IFRS and predicted that the use of impression 
management tactics concerning non-GAAP profit figures as compared to GAAP profit figures 
would increase during this time. The year 2005 was a transition year for companies whose 
year-end is 30 June, and although the annual report was still prepared under the previous 
regime companies were to provide certain disclosures concerning the effect of IFRS adoption. 
The year 2006 was the first year when the new standards had to be fully implemented. 
Therefore, it was predicted that the introduction of IFRS would have some influence on 
reporting in 2005 and 2006. To test this hypothesis, the relative emphasis scores for the years 
2004 and 2005, 2005 and 2006 and 2004 and 2006 were compared. The results are shown in 
Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6: Effect of introduction of IFRS on relative emphasis  
between non-GAAP and GAAP (predicted sign +)  
 Relative Emphasis Scores 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
2005 Mean  0.3679 -0.3585 0.0094 
2004 Mean  1.0000 0.4200 1.4200 
Difference -0.63208 -0.77849 -1.41057 
 t (101) = -0.803, p = 0.212 t (101) = -0.818, p = 0.208 t (101) = -0.914, p = 0.182 
    
2006 Mean  0.9737 1.0088 1.9825 
2005 Mean  0.3679 -0.3585 0.0094 
Difference 0.60576 1.36726 1.97302 
 t (108) = 0.790, p = 0.216 t (108) = 1.559, p = 0.061 t (108) = 1.332, p = 0.093 
    
2006 Mean  0.9737 1.0088 1.9825 
2004 Mean  1.0000 0.4200 1.4200 
Difference -0.02632 0.58877 0.56246 
 t (105) = -0.037, p = 0.486 t (105) = 0.647, p = 0.256 t (105) = 0.399, p = 0.346 
    
 NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise.  
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Between 2004 and 2005, the mean relative emphasis score decreased in each document and 
overall. In the annual report the score became negative, indicating a relative emphasis 
favouring the GAAP number. The score representing the total of the two documents was 
effectively a zero. However, the results of the t-tests were not statistically significant between 
these two years. Between 2005 and 2006 the results changed in the opposite direction with an 
increase in the relative emphasis favouring the non-GAAP figures. These results were also not 
statistically significant. The results between 2004 and 2006 show a slight decrease in relative 
emphasis in the press release and increases in the annual report and total, although none of the 
results are statistically significant. Therefore, the relative emphasis of non-GAAP and GAAP 
figures was not significantly influenced by the introduction of IFRS and Hypothesis 13 is not 
supported.  
 
7.4.3 Hypothesis 14 
Hypothesis 14 predicted that the use of impression management tactics for reporting non-
GAAP profit figures compared to GAAP profit figures would increase during the GFC. It was 
argued that companies would wish to emphasise the non-GAAP figure at a time when the 
GAAP results would most likely have been affected by the economic downturns. To test this 
hypothesis, the reporting behaviour in the years 2007 and 2008, 2008 and 2009 and 2007 and 
2009 were compared. The results are shown in Table 7.7. 
  
Table 7.7: Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on relative emphasis  
between non-GAAP and GAAP (predicted sign +)  
 Relative Emphasis Scores 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
2008 Mean  1.7222 1.5078 3.0391 
2007 Mean  0.3860 0.8947 1.2807 
Difference 1.33626 0.61308 1.75836 
 t (118) = 1.714, p = 0.045* t (119) = 0.780, p = 0.219 t (119) = 1.265, p = 0.104 
    
2009 Mean 1.1087 0.5072 1.6159 
2008 Mean  1.7222 1.5078 3.0391 
Difference -0.61353 -1.00057 -1.42312 
 t (130) = -0.892, p = 0.187 t (131) = -1.372, p = 0.087 t (131) = -1.115, p = 0.114 
    
2009 Mean  1.1087 0.5072 1.6159 
2007 Mean  0.3860 0.8947 1.2807 
Difference 0.72273 -0.38749 0.33524 
 t (124) = 0.903, p = 0.184  t (124) = -0.506, p = 0.307 t (124) = 0.238, p = 0.406 
    
 NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Between 2007 and 2008, the relative emphasis increased across both documents and the total, 
with the result for the press release being statistically significant (p < 0.05). This indicates the 
relative emphasis shifted towards emphasising the non-GAAP figure. Between 2008 and 2009 
the relative emphasis decreased across both documents and the total, but not to a statistically 
significant level. Between 2007 and 2009 there was an increase in relative emphasis in the 
press release and total score but a decrease in the annual report, again not to a statistically 
significant level. Therefore, the results between 2007 and 2008 were in the predicted direction 
and were statistically significant for the press release and Hypothesis 14 is partially supported. 
 
7.4.4 Hypothesis 15 
The guidelines on the reporting of non-GAAP profit information released in March 2009 by 
AICD and FINSIA encourage the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures but state that this 
should be done ‘without giving undue prominence to the underlying profit figure’ (AICD & 
FINSIA 2009, p. 15). Therefore, Hypothesis 15 predicted that the use of impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profit figures compared to GAAP profit 
figures would decrease with the release of these guidelines. To test this hypothesis, the 
difference between the following years was compared, 2008 to 2009, 2009 to 2010, and 2008 
to 2010 with Table 7.8 showing the results.  
 
Table 7.8: Effect of introduction of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying  
Profit on relative emphasis between non-GAAP and GAAP (predicted sign -)  
 Relative Emphasis Scores 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
2009 Mean  1.1087 0.5072 1.6159 
2008 Mean 1.7222 1.5078 3.0391 
Difference -0.61353 -0.41463 -1.42312 
 t (130) = -0.892, p = 0.187 t (131) = -1.372, p = 0.087 t (131) = -1.115, p = 0.114 
    
2010 Mean  0.6972 0.6690 1.3662 
2009 Mean  1.1087 0.5072 1.6159 
Difference -0.41151 0.16177 -0.24974 
 t (138) = -0.581, p = 0.281 t (138) = 0.225, p = 0.411 t (138) = -0.193, p = 0.424 
    
2010 Mean  0.6972 0.6690 1.3662 
2008 Mean  1.5313 1.5078 3.0391 
Difference -0.83407 -0.83880 -1.67287 
 t (133) = -1.181, p = 0.120 t (133) = -1.138, p = 0.129 t (133) = -1.303, p = 0.098 
    
 NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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The relative emphasis scores for the press release, annual report and the total all decreased 
between 2008 and 2009, and between 2008 and 2010, although none significantly. The press 
release and total score also decreased between 2009 and 2010 but the annual report score 
increased. Again, none of the results were statistically significant. Therefore, although there 
was generally less relative emphasis on non-GAAP profit figures, Hypothesis 15 is not 
supported.  
 
7.4.5 Hypothesis 16 
The ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 required companies to give IFRS (GAAP) financial 
information equal or greater prominence than non-IFRS (non-GAAP) information (ASIC 
2011). Hypothesis 16 predicted that the introduction of these guidelines would cause a 
decrease in the use of impression management tactics relating to emphasis when reporting 
non-GAAP as compared to GAAP profits. As the guide was released in December 2011, its 
full impact may not have been realised until the 2012 reporting period. To test the initial 
release of the guide the following years were compared, 2010 to 2011, 2011 to 2012, and 
2010 to 2012. In order to also assess the ongoing effect of the guide, the first year post 
regulation (2012) was compared to the following three years (2013 to 2015). Table 7.9 shows 
the results for these comparisons.  
 
Between 2010 and 2011, and between 2011 and 2012, the relative emphasis in the press 
release, annual report and the total all decreased meaning the relative emphasis moved away 
from emphasising the non-GAAP figure towards the GAAP figure. Although all in the 
predicted direction, none of the results of the t-tests were statistically significant. However, 
when comparing the relative emphasis between 2010 and 2012 (the two years straddling the 
introduction of the Regulatory Guide), the results for the press release show a statistically 
significant decrease in mean relative emphasis (p < 0.05) with the mean scores decreasing 
from 𝑥2010 = 0.6972 to 𝑥2012 = -0.3000. Hypothesis 16 is therefore supported with regard to the 
press release. 
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Table 7.9: Effect of introduction of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 on relative  
emphasis between non-GAAP and GAAP (predicted sign -)  
 Relative Emphasis Scores 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
2011 Mean  0.0278 0.2986 0.3264 
2010 Mean  0.6972 0.6690 1.3662 
Difference -0.66941 -0.37040 -1.03981 
 t (122) = -1.117, p = 0.133 t (141) = -0.557, p = 0.290 t (125) = -0.931, p = 0.177 
    
2012 Mean  -0.3000 0.3446 -0.1000 
2011 Mean  0.0278 0.2986 0.3264 
Difference -0.32778 0.04598 -0.42639 
 t (145) = -0.746, p = 0.229 t (144) = 0.080, p = 0.469 t (145) = -0.491, p = 0.312 
    
2012 Mean  -0.3000 0.3446 -0.1000 
2010 Mean  0.6972 0.6690 1.3662 
Difference -0.99718 -0.32442 -1.46620 
 t (113) = -1.727, p = 0.044*  t (143) = -0.506, p = 0.307 t (121) = -1.341, p = 0.092 
    
2013 Mean  -0.2051 0.0316 -0.0897 
2012 Mean  -0.3000 0.3446 -0.1000 
Difference 0.09487 -0.31295 0.01026 
 t (151) = 0.225, p = 0.411 t (151) = -0.592, p = 0.278 t (151) = -0.013, p = 0.495 
    
2014 Mean  -0.3678 0.0795 -0.4091 
2012 Mean  -0.3000 0.3446 -0.1000 
Difference -0.06782 -0.26505 -0.30909 
 t (160) = -0.154, p = 0.439 t (160) = -0.447, p = 0.328 t (161) = -0.331, p = 0.371 
    
2015 Mean  0.0059 0.5179 0.5824 
2012 Mean  -0.3000 0.3446 -0.1000 
Difference 0.30588 0.52198 0.68235 
 t (158) = 0.670, p = 0.252 t (156) = 0.332, p = 0.370 t (158) = 0.808, p = 0.210 
    
 NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
The relative emphasis in the press release and the total showed a very small increase between 
2012 and 2013 but the mean result was still negative indicating that the GAAP figure was still 
the more emphasised figure. The relative emphasis in both documents and the total decreased 
between 2012 and 2014 although the difference was not statistically significantly. The year 
2014 marked the lowest result for relative emphasis in the press release and total over the 
course of the study. However, in 2015 this trend was reversed, and the relative emphasis 
increased to a positive result in the press release, annual report and total. Therefore, in 2015 
the relative emphasis score favoured the non-GAAP figure meaning that the GAAP figure, on 
average, was not given equal or greater prominence contrary to the requirements of the 
Regulatory Guide. 
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7.4.6 Additional Analysis for Research Question 4 
In order to further dissect and explore the results obtained from the t-tests on the relative 
emphasis scores discussed above, additional analysis was conducted. Relative emphasis 
scores are the result of subtracting the total GAAP IM score for emphasis from the total non-
GAAP IM score for emphasis. However, the result gives no indication of the size or 
movement in the IM scores for each type of figure. A relative emphasis score close to zero 
means the non-GAAP and GAAP IM scores are relatively the same. But any changes in either 
direction may be due to a change in emphasis of the non-GAAP figure or a change in 
emphasis of the GAAP figure or both. Therefore, patterns observed in the mean IM scores for 
each type of figure may help to explain the behaviour of companies concerning emphasis over 
the twelve years of the study. Figure 7.2 provides some insights into these patterns and shows 
the mean IM scores for both non-GAAP and GAAP figures for each year for the press release, 
annual report and total.  
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Studying the graph reveals that the press release mean IM scores are higher for the non-
GAAP figure each year until 2011 when the scores were virtually equal (ASIC Regulatory 
Guide 230 released in December 2011). From 2012 to 2014 the GAAP figure had a higher 
mean IM score, but the two results were closely aligned. In 2015 the mean non-GAAP IM 
score again exceeded the mean GAAP IM score. The graph reveals that for the annual report, 
the mean GAAP IM score exceeded the mean non-GAAP IM score in 2005, the transition 
year for IFRS. From that year onwards, the mean non-GAAP IM score exceeded the mean 
GAAP IM score in every year, even in the years since the release of the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide 230 (although the scores are very close together from that time).  
 
The IM results from the press release and annual report were then added and are shown in the 
‘Total’ lines on the graph. The mean emphasis score for non-GAAP exceeds the GAAP each 
year until 2012, when the Regulatory Guide came into effect. However, in 2015 the trend 
reverses and non-GAAP is again higher. The greatest difference between the mean emphasis 
scores for the two figures is in 2008, one of the years of the GFC, indicating that the non-
GAAP figure was given much greater prominence than the GAAP figure. Since 2006, the 
year IFRS was fully implemented, the mean total emphasis given to the non-GAAP figure has 
been reasonably steady, ranging from a high in 2013 (𝑥2013 =11.59) to a low in 2014 (𝑥2014 = 
10.55). In contrast, the results for the mean total emphasis given to the GAAP figure have 
fluctuated, ranging from a low in 2008 (𝑥2008 = 8.41) to a high in 2013 (𝑥2013 = 11.89). This 
demonstrates that when the ASIC Regulatory Guide was released companies did not 
necessarily decrease their emphasis of non-GAAP profits (although this did occur in 2014) 
but instead increased their emphasis of GAAP profits to make the GAAP figure more 
prominent. To study the patterns identified in the graph more fully, a series of independent t-
tests were conducted on the mean IM scores for both non-GAAP profit figures and GAAP 
profit figures to determine if any of the changes in reporting around the specific events were 
statistically significant. The results for each event, beginning with the introduction of IFRS, 
are discussed below and are presented in tables in each sub-section of the discussion. 
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7.4.6.1 Introduction of IFRS 
Analysis using the relative emphasis scores during the years surrounding the introduction of 
IFRS in Australia did not yield statistically significant results and Hypothesis 13 was not 
supported (Section 7.4.2). Table 7.10 disaggregates the relative emphasis score and provides 
the results for the non-GAAP and GAAP IM scores individually, thereby giving a better 
understanding of the movements in the individual components of the score. The emphasis 
placed on non-GAAP figures generally increased during the years under investigation (see 
Panel A, Table 7.10). The only decrease in emphasis on non-GAAP during this time was in 
the annual report which was responsible for the decrease in the total between 2004 and 2005. 
This increase in emphasis on non-GAAP figures was statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the 
annual report and the total between 2005 and 2006 and for the press release and the total 
between 2004 and 2006.  
 
Table 7.10: Effect of introduction of IFRS on impression management  
scores for non-GAAP and GAAP figures  
 Impression Management Score  
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
Panel A: Non-GAAP (predicted sign +) 
2005 Mean  3.6604 5.1509 8.8113 
2004 Mean  3.3600 5.6300 8.9900 
Difference 0.30038 -0.47906 -0.17868 
 t (101) = 0.503, p = 0.308 t (101) = -0.755, p = 0.226 t (101) = -0.177, p = 0.430 
    
2006 Mean 4.3158 6.5263 10.8421 
2005 Mean  3.6604 5.1509 8.8113 
Difference 0.65541 1.37537 2.03078 
 t (108) = 1.110, p = 0.135 t (108) = 2.361, p = 0.010* t (108) = 2.045, p = 0.022* 
    
2006 Mean  4.3158 6.5263 10.8421 
2004 Mean  3.3600 5.6300 8.9900 
Difference 0.95579 0.89632 1.85211 
 t (105) = 1.730, p = 0.044* t (105) = 1.497, p = 0.069 t (105) = 1.995, p = 0.025* 
    
Panel B: GAAP (predicted sign -) 
2005 Mean  3.2925 5.5094 8.8019 
2004 Mean  2.3600 5.2100 7.5700 
Difference 0.93245 0.29943 1.23189 
 t (101) = 1.796, p = 0.038* t (101) = 0.414, p = 0.340 t (101) = 1.180, p = 0.122 
    
2006 Mean  3.3421 5.5175 8.8596 
2005 Mean  3.2925 5.5094 8.8019 
Difference 0.04965 0.00811 0.05776 
 t (108) = 0.090, p = 0.465 t (108) = 0.011, p = 0.496 t (108) = 0.055, p = 0.478 
    
2006 Mean  3.3421 5.5175 8.8596 
2004 Mean  2.3600 5.2100 7.5700 
Difference 0.98211 0.30754 1.28965 
 t (104) = 1.970, p = 0.026* t (105) = 0.416, p = 0.339 t (105) = 1.264, p = 0.105 
    
NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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The emphasis on GAAP figures (see Panel B, Table 7.10) also increased in the press release, 
annual report and total for the years under comparison surrounding the introduction of IFRS. 
This increase in emphasis was statistically significant (p < 0.05) for the press release between 
2004 and 2005 and 2004 and 2006. Therefore, although there were some statistically 
significant increases in the emphasis of non-GAAP profits through location and repetition of 
the figures during the years surrounding the introduction of IFRS, there were also some 
statistically significant increases in the emphasis of GAAP figures. The increase in emphasis 
of both figures explains the lack of statistical significance in the relative emphasis scores as 
discussed in Section 7.4.2. 
 
7.4.6.2 The Global Financial Crisis 
The results for Hypothesis 14 (Section 7.4.3) showed a statistically significant increase in 
relative emphasis for the press release only, between the years 2007 and 2008, see Table 7.7. 
The other results for relative emphasis during this period were not statistically significant. The 
results for the disaggregation of the relative emphasis score into IM scores for both non-
GAAP profit figures and GAAP profit figures are shown in Table 7.11. Although the results 
for relative emphasis showed a statistically significant increase in emphasis of the non-GAAP 
profit figure over the GAAP profit figure between 2007 and 2008 (see Table 7.7), Panel A of 
Table 7.11 shows that there were no statistically significant differences in the emphasis of 
non-GAAP figures during this time. In fact, the mean emphasis of non-GAAP figures actually 
decreased for the press release between 2007 and 2008. However, there was a statistically 
significant decrease (p < 0.05) in emphasis of the GAAP figure in the press release (see Panel 
B, Table 7.11) between 2007 and 2008 which is responsible for the statistically significant 
increase in relative emphasis in the press release for this period. Therefore, rather than 
increasing the emphasis on non-GAAP figures in the press release during this time companies 
simply decreased their emphasis on GAAP. 
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Table 7.11: Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on impression management  
scores for non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
 Impression Management Score 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
Panel A: Non-GAAP (predicted sign +) 
2008 Mean  4.6406 6.8047 11.4453 
2007 Mean  4.6491 6.5000 11.1491 
Difference -0.00850 0.30469 0.29619 
 t (119) = -0.016, p = 0.494 t (119) = 0.545, p = 0.294 t (119) = 0.331, p = 0.371 
    
2009 Mean  4.7319 6.3551 11.0870 
2008 Mean  4.6406 6.8047 11.4453 
Difference 0.09126 -0.44962 -0.35836 
 t (131) = 0.191, p = 0.425 t (131) = -0.747, p = 0.228 t (131) = -11.4453, p = 0.340 
    
2009 Mean  4.7319 6.3551 11.0870 
2007 Mean  4.6491 6.5000 11.1491 
Difference 0.08276 -0.14493 -0.06217 
 t (124) = 0.152, p = 0.440 t (124) = -0.235, p = 0.408 t (124) = -0.064, p = 0.475 
    
Panel B: GAAP (predicted sign -) 
2008 Mean  3.1094 5.2969 8.4063 
2007 Mean  4.2632 5.6053 9.8684 
Difference -1.15378 -0.30839 -1.46217 
 t (119) = -1.915, p = 0.029* t (119) = -0.467, p = 0.321 t (119) = -1.375, p = 0.086 
    
2009 Mean  3.6232 5.8478 9.4710 
2008 Mean  3.1094 5.2969 8.4063 
Difference 0.51381 0.55095 1.06476 
 t (131) = 0.997, p = 0.161 t (131) = 0.915, p = 0.181 t (131) = 1.131, p = 0.130 
    
2009 Mean  3.6232 5.8478 9.4710 
2007 Mean  4.2632 5.6053 9.8684 
Difference -0.63997 0.24256 -0.39741 
 t (124) = -1.130, p = 0.130 t (124) = 0.375, p = 0.354 t (124) = -0.386, p = 0.350 
    
NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
7.4.6.3 Introduction of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit 
The results for Hypothesis 15 on relative emphasis surrounding the release of the AICD and 
FINSIA guidelines on underlying profits did not yield statistically significant results (Section 
7.4.4). Although the relative emphasis did decrease between 2008 and 2009 and between 
2008 and 2010 in both documents, the decrease was not statistically significant, see Table 7.8. 
In disaggregating the results for relative emphasis into IM scores for the non-GAAP and 
GAAP profit figures, the emphasis on the non-GAAP figure decreased in the annual report 
during this time, (see Panel A, Table 7.12). However, the emphasis on the non-GAAP figure 
actually increased in the press release over the period. The emphasis of the GAAP figure (see 
Panel B, Table 7.12) also increased, and to a greater extent, in the press release in each of the 
year comparisons and this had the overall effect of decreasing the relative emphasis (see 
Table 7.8). 
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Table 7.12: Effect of introduction of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on  
Underlying Profit on impression management  
scores for non-GAAP and GAAP figures  
 Impression Management Score – non-GAAP 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
Panel A: Non-GAAP (predicted sign -) 
2009 Mean  4.7319 6.3551 11.0870 
2008 Mean  4.6406 6.8047 11.4453 
Difference 0.09126 -0.44962 -0.35836 
 t (131) = 0.191, p = 0.425 t (131) = -0.747, p = 0.228 t (131) = -11.4453, p = 0.340 
    
2010 Mean  4.7746 6.2817 11.0563 
2009 Mean  4.7319 6.3551 11.0870 
Difference 0.04276 -0.07338 -0.03062 
 t (138) = 0.085, p = 0.467 t (138) = -0.111, p = 0.456 t (138) = -0.032, p = 0.488 
    
2010 Mean 4.7746 6.2817 11.0563 
2008 Mean  4.6406 6.8047 11.4453 
Difference 0.13402 -0.52300 -0.38897 
 t (133) = 0.265, p = 0.396 t (130) = -0.851, p = 0.198 t (129) = -0.434, p = 0.333 
    
Panel B: GAAP (predicted sign +) 
2009 Mean  3.6232 5.8478 9.4710 
2008 Mean  3.1094 5.2969 8.4063 
Difference 0.51381 0.55095 1.06476 
 t (131) = 0.997, p = 0.161 t (131) = 0.915, p = 0.181 t (131) = 1.131, p = 0.130 
    
2010 Mean  4.0775 5.6127 9.6901 
2009 Mean  3.6232 5.8478 9.4710 
Difference 0.45428 -0.23515 0.21913 
 t (138) = 0.944, p = 0.174 t (138) = -0.398, p = 0.346 t (138) = 0.246, p = 0.403 
    
2010 Mean  4.0775 5.6127 9.6901 
2008 Mean  3.1094 5.2969 8.4063 
Difference 0.96809 0.31580 1.28389 
 t (133) = 1.885, p = 0.031 t (133) = 0.523, p = 0.301 t (133) = 1.398, p = 0.083 
    
NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
 
7.4.6.4 Introduction of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
Hypothesis 16 (Section 7.4.5) concerned the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 and 
showed a statistically significant decrease in the relative emphasis in press releases between 
2010 and 2012, see Table 7.9. Disaggregated results for the individual IM scores are 
presented in Table 7.13. During the years surrounding the release of the Guide, the emphasis 
on non-GAAP figures decreased in the press release but actually increased in the annual 
report and overall (see Panel A, Table 7.13). It was once again the increase in emphasis on the 
GAAP figures that had the larger effect on the overall result, with this increase statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) in the total between 2010 and 2012 (see Panel B, Table 7.13). The 
emphasis on non-GAAP figures increased slightly across the documents and total between  
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Table 7.13: Effect of introduction of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 on  
impression management scores for non-GAAP and GAAP figures  
 Impression Management Score – non-GAAP 
   Press Release   Annual Report Total 
Panel A: Non-GAAP (predicted sign -) 
2011 Mean  4.6250 6.5486 11.1736 
2010 Mean  4.7746 6.2817 11.0563 
Difference -0.14965 0.26692 0.11727 
 t (141) = -0.297, p = 0.384 t (141) = 0.408, p = 0.342 t (141) = 0.123, p = 0.451 
    
2012 Mean 4.5400 6.7000 11.2400 
2011 Mean  4.6250 6.5486 11.1736 
Difference -0.08500 0.15139 0.06639 
 t (145) = -0.171, p = 0.432 t (145) = 0.245, p = 0.403 t (145) = 0.072, p = 0.472 
    
2012 Mean  4.5400 6.7000 11.2400 
2010 Mean 4.7746 6.2817 11.0563 
Difference -0.23465 0.41831 0.18366 
 t (113) = -0.452, p = 0.326 t (144) = 0.658, p = 0.256 t (121) = 0.192, p = 0.424 
    
2013 Mean  4.6203 6.9684 11.5886 
2012 Mean  4.5400 6.7000 11.2400 
Difference 0.08025 0.26835 0.34861 
 t (152) = 0.168, p = 0.434 t (152) = 0.466, p = 0.321 t (152) = 0.396, p = 0.347 
    
2014 Mean  3.7898 6.7614 10.5511 
2012 Mean  4.5400 6.7000 11.2400 
Difference -0.75023 0.06136 -0.68886 
 t (161) = -1.554, p = 0.061 t (161) = 0.108, p = 0.457 t (161) = -0.774, p = 0.220 
    
2015 Mean  4.2267 6.6279 10.8547 
2012 Mean  4.5400 6.7000 11.2400 
Difference -0.31326 -0.07209 -0.38535 
 t (159) = -0.697, p = 0.244 t (159) = -0.127, p = 0.450 t (159) = -0.463, p = 0.322 
    
Panel B: GAAP (predicted sign +) 
2011 Mean  4.5972 6.2500 10.8472 
2010 Mean  4.0775 5.6127 9.6901 
Difference 0.51976 0.63732 1.15708 
 t (122) = 1.098, p = 0.137 t (141) = 1.115, p = 0.134 t (125) = 1.378, p = 0.085 
    
2012 Mean  4.8400 6.5000 11.3400 
2011 Mean  4.5972 6.2500 10.8472 
Difference 0.24278 0.25000 0.49278 
 t (145) = 0.509, p = 0.306 t (145) = 0.454, p = 0.325 t (145) = 0.594, p = 0.277 
    
2012 Mean 4.8400 6.5000 11.3400 
2010 Mean  4.0775 5.6127 9.6901 
Difference 0.76254 0.88732 1.64986 
 t (113) = 1.577, p = 0.059 t (144) = 1.556, p = 0.061 t (121) = 1.924, p = 0.028* 
    
2013 Mean  4.9557 6.9367 11.8924 
2012 Mean  4.8400 6.5000 11.3400 
Difference 0.11570 0.43671 0.55241 
 t (152) = 0.234, p = 0.408 t (152) = 0.880, p = 0.190 t (152) = 0.672, p = 0.252 
    
2014 Mean  4.2784 6.6818 10.9602 
2012 Mean  4.8400 6.5000 11.3400 
Difference -0.56159 0.18182 -0.37977 
 t (161) = -1.248, p = 0.107 t (161) = 0.353, p = 0.362 t (161) = -0.483, p = 0.186 
    
2015 Mean  4.0930 6.4070 10.5000 
2012 Mean  4.8400 6.5000 11.3400 
Difference -0.74698 -0.09302 -0.84000 
 t (159) = -1.644, p = 0.051 t (159) = -0.179, p = 0.429 t (159) = -1.035, p = 0.151 
    
NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been 
reported. Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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2012 and 2013 but generally decreased between 2012 and 2014 and 2012 and 2015 (the 
annual report 2012-2014 being an exception with an increase). The emphasis of GAAP 
figures also increased between 2012 and 2013 but began to decrease between 2012 to 2014 
and 2012 to 2015. 
 
The results in the above sub-sections, which analysed non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
separately, show that since 2006, impression management tactics relating to emphasis of non-
GAAP figures have been reasonably constant. Even the introduction of ASIC Regulatory 
Guide 230 had little effect on the emphasis scores for non-GAAP figures and companies 
generally did not decrease the emphasis on these figures. Any statistically significant changes 
in behaviour since 2006 relate to the GAAP figure which has been less emphasised (during 
the GFC) or more emphasised (with the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide). The 
emphasis of this figure seems to be the most affected by the specific events in question.  
 
7.5 Reconciliation of Non-GAAP and GAAP Profit Figures 
The use of impression management strategies in the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures can 
mislead shareholders and potential investors, particularly those that are inexperienced, and 
can lead to mispricing of securities (Zhang & Zheng 2011). Previous studies have found that 
the presence and emphasis of non-GAAP profit figures affected the decision making of less 
sophisticated investors but the presence of a clear reconciliation to the GAAP profit mitigated 
this effect (Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006; Marques 2010; Zhang & Zheng 2011). In line with 
these findings, both the AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting non-GAAP profits, and 
the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, recommend the inclusion of a reconciliation between the 
two figures. The AICD and FINSIA guidelines suggest the reconciliation should be 
‘transparent, logical and justifiable’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 17). The ASIC require 
significant adjustments to be separately itemised and explained and that the GAAP figure and 
a reconciliation between the two should appear in each document containing a non-GAAP 
profit figure (ASIC 2011, p. 20). The presence of a clear and detailed reconciliation is 
therefore considered imperative for transparency in the calculation of non-GAAP profit 
figures and to ensure the reporting of the figures in not misleading. 
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The presence of a reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures does not form 
part of the impression management index or relative emphasis score calculated in this study. 
Scores calculated using the IM index need to be equally applicable to both GAAP and non-
GAAP figures so as to affect the relative emphasis score in the same manner. However, the 
presence of a reconciliation in each of the documents under investigation was noted. This is 
important as the absence of a reconciliation may be an impression management tactic 
designed to mislead users who cannot clearly see how the non-GAAP profit figure has been 
calculated. In the later years of the study (2012 to 2015) the lack of a reconciliation reflects 
non-compliance with the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230. In this study, a reconciliation was 
deemed to have been provided if an actual reconciliation was included in the document, 
clearly showing how one figure was deduced from the other figure, with significant 
adjustments clearly labelled and itemised. Some companies only report a non-GAAP figure in 
either the press release or in the annual report but not in both documents. Only documents that 
actually included a non-GAAP figure were used in this part of the analysis.  
 
Figure 7.3 shows the results of the analysis for the presence of a reconciliation in the press 
release. The results do not show a large variation over the twelve-year period. In 2005 for 
example, the transition year to IFRS for most of the companies in the study, 23% (11/47) of  
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the non-GAAP reporters reporting in the press release provided a reconciliation in that 
document. The percentage dropped in 2007, the year leading into the GFC, to 14% (7/51) and 
in 2008, the year the GFC peaked, to 13% (8/60). The introduction of the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide in December 2011 had some effect. However, the highest percentage of companies 
providing a full reconciliation in the press release was 31% in both 2012 (22/70) and in 2015 
(24/77) which is still quite a low percentage of the total companies in the sample.  
 
Figure 7.4 shows the results for the annual report. These results show a much wider range and 
a steady increase over the twelve years, with a low of 30% (14/46) in 2004 to a high of 77% 
in 2015 (63/82). The release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide clearly had more effect in the 
annual report although several companies are still not addressing this requirement. 
 
 
 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter provided descriptive statistics and results for Research Questions 3 and 4, 
detailing which hypotheses were supported and which were not supported by the results. It 
also provided some additional analysis concerning aspects of impression management. Table 
7.14 provides a summary of the research questions and hypotheses analysed in this chapter, 
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along with details of the years in which the hypotheses were supported or not supported. A 
discussion of the results reported in Chapters 6 and 7 is contained in the next chapter. 
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Table 7.14: Summary of Results 
Research Question Hypothesis Supported Not Supported 
Model Not 
Significant 
Research Question 3: Is the 
use of impression 
management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by 
specific firm 
characteristics?  
H9: Larger companies are more likely to use impression 
management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures than smaller companies. 
2007 Press Release 
 
 
Whole Sample Press Release,    
     Total 
2004 Annual Report, Total 
2009 All 
2010 Press Release, Total 
2012 Total 
2015 Annual Report 
Whole Sample Annual  
     Report 
2004 Press Release 
2005 All 
2006 All 
2007Annual Report,  
     Total 
2008 All 
2010 Annual Report 
2011 All 
2012 Press Release,  
     Annual Report 
2013 All 
2014 All 
2015 Press Release, Total 
H10: Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely 
to use impression management tactics when reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. 
Whole Sample Total 
2007 Press Release 
 
Whole Sample Press Release 
2004 Annual Report, Total 
2009 All 
2010 Press Release, Total 
2012 Total 
2015 Annual Report 
H12: Highly leveraged companies are more likely to use 
impression management tactics when reporting non-
GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged companies. 
Whole Sample Press Release 
2004 Annual Report, Total 
2009 Press Release, Annual  
     Report, Total 
2010 Press Release, Total 
Whole Sample Total 
2007 Press Release 
2012 Total 
2015 Annual Report 
H11: Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from 
the previous period, or a GAAP loss, are more likely 
to use impression management tactics when reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an 
increase in GAAP profits. 
Whole Sample Press Release,  
     Total 
2012 Total 
2004 Annual Report, Total 
2007 Press Release 
2009 All 
2010 Press Release, Total 
2015 Annual Report 
Research Question 4: Is the 
use of impression 
management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures influenced by 
specific events? 
H13: The use of impression management tactics by 
companies when reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will increase with the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards in Australia. 
 2004-2005 
2005-2006 
2004-2006 
 
H14: The use of impression management tactics by 
companies when reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
2007-2008 Press Release 2007-2008 Annual Report,  
     Total 
2008-2009 
2007-2009 
H15: The use of impression management tactics by 
companies when reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
will decrease with the release of guidelines on 
reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
 2008-2009 
2009-2010 
2008-2010 
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Table 7.14: Summary of Results (continued) 
Research Question Hypothesis Supported Not Supported Model Not Significant 
 H16: The use of impression management tactics by companies 
when reporting non-GAAP profit figures will decrease 
with the release of Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. 
2010-2012 Press Release 2010-2011 
2011-2012 
2010-2012 Annual Report, 
Total 
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Chapter 8 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The results of the analysis into the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures conducted in this 
study are discussed in this chapter. Section 8.2 discusses the findings within the context of a 
general overview into the practice of reporting non-GAAP profit figures in Australia, 
including their frequency, terminology used for the figures and location within the disclosure 
documents under investigation. The results for the four research questions and related 
hypotheses are discussed in Sections 8.3 to 8.6 respectively. Section 8.7 discusses the findings 
concerning the presence of a reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures and 
the chapter concludes with a summary in Section 8.8. 
 
8.2 Overview of the Use of Non-GAAP Profit Figures in Australia 
The reporting of non-GAAP profit figures and other non-GAAP financial information is 
voluntary in Australia. Over the past two decades, management have generally had wide 
discretion as to what figures to report and how to calculate them, as well as how to report 
them with regard to emphasis and location. Although this discretion has been tempered 
somewhat with the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 in 2011, companies are still 
able to choose whether to report or not to report a non-GAAP figure, what to exclude from the 
calculation and how much emphasis to give the non-GAAP figure (the ASIC guide only 
requires that GAAP be given equal or greater prominence and does not dictate how much 
prominence should be given to the non-GAAP figure). Importantly these non-GAAP profit 
figures are usually unaudited. Those in favour of reporting non-GAAP figures argue that the 
figures represent underlying, core or operating earnings which are more likely to persist in the 
future (Black et al. 2012), and are more informative, enabling analysts and shareholders to 
better evaluate a company’s performance (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004). Others are 
concerned about the lack of transparency, definition, terminology used and consistent format 
of non-GAAP profit figures, which makes comparison between companies difficult (Brody & 
McDonald 2004; Halsey & Soybel 2002; Heitger & Ballou 2003) with the figures being both 
195 
 
company-specific and time-specific (Bryan & Lilien 2004; Sek & Taylor 2011). The 
discussion in this section relates to some general insights identified by this study into the 
practice of reporting non-GAAP profit figures in Australia, including their frequency, 
location, terminology used, and amount compared to GAAP profits as well as the effect of 
industry sector on the practice.  
 
8.2.1 Frequency of Non-GAAP Profit Figures and EBIT/EBITDA 
The frequency of the reporting of both non-GAAP profit figures and EBIT/EBITDA figures 
by Australian companies has changed over the twelve-year period covered by this study (see 
Figure 6.1 and Appendix 4). The practice of reporting non-GAAP profit figures has become 
entrenched in the Australian financial reporting landscape. In 2004, only 46% of the 
companies in the research sample reported a non-GAAP figure. This percentage increased 
each year of the study to a high of 81% in 2014. In fact, 2015 saw the only decrease in the 
number of companies in the sample reporting a non-GAAP profit with two less companies 
reporting a figure than in 2014. Unlike in the US, where the introduction of regulation 
concerning the reporting of non-GAAP profits saw a significant decrease in the number of 
companies reporting the figures (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Marques 2006), the 
release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 did not have a similar effect on the practice in 
Australia. 
 
The reporting of an EBIT and/or EBITDA figure (not included in the definition of non-GAAP 
profit figures for this study) has also increased over the twelve years, although to a lesser 
degree than non-GAAP profits, from 61% in 2004 to 76% in 2015. EBIT and EBITDA are 
commonly used earnings figures which are generally understood by investors and were in use 
long before the trend in non-GAAP earnings began in the late 1990s (Allee et al. 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 
2006b, 2010; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016). Many companies in the sample have chosen to 
continue the reporting of these figures and at the same time report additional non-GAAP 
profit figures, thereby providing a range of different earnings figures each year in addition to 
the GAAP profit calculated under IFRS. Some companies, for example Arrium Ltd 
(OneSteel) in 2009, reported not only EBIT, EBITDA and a non-GAAP profit (‘underlying 
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net profit after tax’ in this case) but also an ‘underlying EBIT’ and ‘underlying EBITDA’, 
adding to the ambiguity of earnings reported and the possibility of misleading less 
experienced shareholders and investors. In the last three years of the study (2013 to 2015), the 
number of companies reporting a non-GAAP profit equalled or exceeded those reporting 
EBIT and/or EBITDA, another indication of the increasing popularity of reporting non-GAAP 
profit figures. EBIT and EBITDA are clearly calculated as ‘earnings before’ specific items, 
namely interest, taxation, depreciation and amortisation. Non-GAAP profit figures, however, 
are more ambiguous and give companies more flexibility as to the calculation and items to 
exclude, leading Brody and McDonald (2004, p. 37) to suggest that companies can report 
earnings ‘any way they want’. From an opportunistic behaviour perspective, this can explain 
the increased popularity of using non-GAAP figures in addition to, or instead of, EBIT and 
EBITDA. 
 
8.2.2 Industry 
Descriptive statistics for industry are reported in Section 6.3.2. Industry type may influence 
disclosure of non-GAAP profits due to a range of factors, including the requirements and 
effect of various accounting standards. Companies, particularly those with a high proportion 
of intangible assets, may wish to provide extra information beyond the GAAP profit figure. 
Industry patterns may also exist, where companies mimic what their competitors in the same 
industry are doing with regards disclosure. Previous studies have found that firms in 
technology or business services industries have the highest rates of disclosure of non-GAAP 
profits (e.g. Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; Johnson & 
Schwartz 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 2004; Marques 2010). Lougee and Marquardt (2004) 
relate this finding to high technology firms having a large proportion of intangibles.  
 
This study grouped companies according to their GICS industry sector with some sectors 
have a small representation in the final sample. Industries with a consistently high proportion 
of non-GAAP reporters included Financials and Real Estate, which often excluded unrealised 
losses and impairment of intangibles from the non-GAAP figure. Energy and Industrials 
showed the largest increase in the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profits over the 
12 years. This may be due to industry patterns where companies in the one industry are 
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mimicking their competitors. Impairment of acquired intangibles is a common difference 
between non-GAAP and GAAP profits for these companies. 
 
8.2.3 Location of Non-GAAP Profit Figures  
Figure 6.2 and Appendix 5 detail results on the location of non-GAAP profit figures in the 
annual results press release and the annual report. When reporting a non-GAAP figure, the 
press release was clearly the favoured location by most of the companies in the sample 
(noting that not all companies issue an annual results press release). Studies have shown that 
the first piece of information to which people are exposed strongly influences their 
understanding and biases their evaluation of subsequent information (Asch 1946; Hirshleifer 
& Teoh 2003; Huang, Nekrasov & Teoh 2012; Lim, Benbasat & Ward 2000). From an 
impression management perspective, companies would wish to highlight their non-GAAP 
profits, particularly if the figures are more favourable than GAAP, and would therefore report 
and emphasise them in the timeliest manner possible, that is, in the unaudited press release.  
 
In 2008 for example, 44 out of the 60 non-GAAP reporters that used the press release to 
report the figure emphasised the non-GAAP figure more than the GAAP. Twelve of these 
companies not only emphasised the non-GAAP figure but did not actually report the GAAP 
figure in the body of the press release. Of these twelve companies, ten had a higher non-
GAAP than GAAP figure. These ten companies were clearly emphasising the more 
favourable result and not giving shareholders and prospective investors the opportunity to 
compare the non-GAAP figure to the result obtained under IFRS. The annual report must 
contain the GAAP or IFRS profit and usually contains both figures for companies reporting 
non-GAAP profits. This document is released several weeks after the press release, making it 
a less timely document for impression management purposes.  
 
In the annual report, the narrative sections located before the financial statements were the 
most common location for non-GAAP profit reporting. This part of the annual report is 
considered an effective setting for using impression management tactics as content of the 
narrative sections lies with the preparers and the sections are often not audited (Neu, Warsame 
& Pedwell 1998). The Directors’ Report or Review of Operations was the most favoured 
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location most years closely followed by the Chairman’s or CEO letter and then the highlights 
section at the beginning of the annual report (noting not all companies had such a section). 
Very few companies reported non-GAAP profit figures directly in the financial statements 
with the percentage of non-GAAP reporters that used this section decreasing from 13% in 
2005 to only 2% in 2015 (Figure 6.2). The decrease in the latter years of the study can be 
explained by the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 not allowing non-GAAP information to be 
included in financial statements, particularly the statement of comprehensive income (ASIC 
2011, p. 9). However, the use of the Notes to the Financial Statements section to report non-
GAAP profits increased in frequency from 16% in 2004 to 36% in 2015. This can be 
explained by the ASIC Regulatory Guide requirement to reconcile the non-GAAP and GAAP 
figures, with several companies choosing to do this as part of the notes.  
 
8.2.4 Terminology Used 
Concerns have been raised with regards to the wide variety of terminology used by different 
companies, and within companies across different years, when reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures (Brody & McDonald 2004; Heitger & Ballou 2003). This was clearly an area of 
concern for the AICD and FINSIA, with the second principle in their Underlying Profit: 
principles for reporting of non-statutory profit information concerning the use of terminology. 
The principle states ‘Principle 2 – Use the term “underlying profit”’ and explains that for 
consistency between companies, and to promote certainty for the investment community, the 
term ‘underlying profit’ should be used in preference to other terms (AICD & FINSIA 2009, 
p. 15). This term is viewed by the professional bodies as more neutral concerning future 
expectations. Terms such as ‘normalised’ and ‘sustainable’ are discouraged as they have 
connotations for some investors and shareholders ‘regarding “smoothing” of profit or 
adjustments based on management’s judgements’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 16). 
 
The results from this study highlight several areas of concern regarding terminology used by 
Australian companies over the years of the study. Firstly, the many different terms used by 
different companies makes it confusing and difficult for shareholders and investors to 
compare companies as they are not sure whether they are comparing the same, similar or 
different types of figures. Although the terminology used by companies has been organised 
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into ten key terms for the purpose of reporting the results in this study, the actual names given 
to the non-GAAP profits by companies were very diverse, particularly in the early years of 
the study. In 2004 and 2005, ‘profit after tax before’ was the most common key term used, but 
even this term had a number of possible endings meaning there was still a variety of names in 
this category. The AICD and FINSIA guidelines obviously had an effect on companies, with 
the term ‘underlying’ increasing in use from five companies or 10% of non-GAAP reporters 
in 2004 to 44 companies or 51% of non-GAAP reporters in 2015. However, although the term 
‘underlying’ had been adopted by half the companies in the sample by 2015, there were still 
companies using terms in each of the other nine key term categories, meaning shareholders 
and prospective investors were still faced with a wide variety of terminology being used. For 
example, five companies in the sample were still using the term ‘normalised’ in 2015 despite 
the concerns of the AICD and FINSIA about the term.  
 
A second area of concern is some companies changing the term they use from year to year 
making comparisons for the one company between years difficult. There are companies such 
as Fairfax Media Ltd that have not changed terms and therefore provide some certainty for 
shareholders by consistently using the same term, in this case ‘underlying net profit after tax’, 
for the entire period of the study. However, there are other companies that regularly change 
the term they use with one of the more extreme examples being TPG Telecom Ltd using five 
different terms in the six years in which they reported a non-GAAP profit (Section 6.3.4). 
This practice would lead shareholders to question whether the non-GAAP figures reported 
from year to year were comparable in any regard, or completely different figures as far as 
calculation and exclusions are concerned. 
 
Thirdly, it is a concern that several companies use more than one term to describe the same 
non-GAAP figure in the same year. Section 6.3.4 provides many examples of this practice, 
with two or more terms used in various locations in the documents under investigation in the 
one year. An example of this can be seen in the 2006 documents for Downer EDI Ltd. The 
non-GAAP figure of $137,775,000 (or $138 million) is called both ‘profit after tax (before 
provisions)’ and ‘underlying profit’ on the first page of the four-page press release. In the 
annual report the same figure is variously called ‘profit after tax (before provisions)’, 
‘underlying profit after tax’, ‘operating profit after tax’, ‘underlying profit’, ‘excluding one-
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offs, after tax profit’ and ‘profit after tax before significant one-off items’. Using such a 
variety of terminology for the one figure is confusing, particularly for the unsophisticated 
shareholder or investor, and it is hard to explain this as anything other than opportunistic 
behaviour designed to mislead.  
 
While some companies used a range of terms for the one figure, others reported a range of 
different non-GAAP figures all with different names. Reiterating one example given in 
Section 6.3.4, Invocare Ltd in 2009 reported a ‘normalised profit after tax’ of $33.5 million, 
an ‘underlying profit’ and ‘operating profit after tax’ (used two different terms for same 
figure) of $31.9 million and an EBITDA of $65.2 million. All these figures differ from the 
IFRS profit. The ASIC Regulatory Guide expresses concern over this practice stating that 
‘providing multiple non-IFRS profit measures in the same reporting period where that may 
cause confusion’ is an example of a practice that is ‘potentially misleading’ (ASIC 2011, p. 
21). 
 
The most concerning aspect of terminology use was the practice of a few companies to use 
the term ‘net profit after tax’ or ‘net profit’ to label non-GAAP figures. Although this practice 
was uncommon, it is of concern as there was usually no indication that the figure being 
discussed was a non-GAAP figure. The instances observed occurred prior to the release of the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide which disallows the practice with the second guideline stating: 
Appropriate label: Non-IFRS financial information should be clearly labelled in a way 
that distinguishes it from the corresponding IFRS financial information. Any term used 
to describe the information should be appropriate given the nature of the information. 
The term or label should not be apt to cause confusion with IFRS financial information 
(ASIC 2011, p. 18).  
Although changes in the use of terminology have been observed over the twelve-year period, 
such as the increased use of ‘underlying profit’ as suggested by the AICD and FINSIA 
guidelines, there is still room for improvement in this regard. 
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8.2.5 Amount of Non-GAAP Profit versus GAAP Profit 
Previous studies have found that the majority of companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures calculate an amount higher than the GAAP profit or loss for the period (Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2004; James & Michello 2003; KPMG 2010b). This was the case in this 
study in ten of the twelve years, with the only exceptions being 2006 and 2007 (see Section 
6.3.5). In 2004 and 2005 there was a smaller majority than in the years following 2007. In 
2004, for example, there were 29 companies where the non-GAAP figure exceeded the GAAP 
figure and 21 where the GAAP figure was higher, a difference of eight companies. The results 
over these first four years of the study would have been influenced by the introduction of 
IFRS. Disclosure in general around these years had an IFRS focus, including the effects of 
adopting IFRS, and greater scrutiny would have been applied by shareholders and other 
stakeholders to any disclosure. Although it is predicted that companies would disclose non-
GAAP figures around this time, the requirements concerning additional disclosure about the 
adoption of IFRS would have curbed opportunistic behaviour concerning the calculation of 
non-GAAP figures as there was a requirement for more transparency at this time.  
 
During two of the years affected by the GFC (2008 and 2009), the number of companies 
where the non-GAAP figure was higher than the GAAP figure far exceeded those where 
GAAP was the higher figure. In 2009, 56 companies reported a higher non-GAAP figure than 
the GAAP figure with only 13 reporting a higher GAAP figure. In fact, the greatest majority 
of higher non-GAAP reporters was in 2009 with 43 more companies having a higher non-
GAAP figure than the companies where the GAAP figure was higher. During times of 
economic downturn, companies would attempt to allay fears of shareholder and prospective 
investors and therefore disclose non-GAAP profits that are more indicative of future cash 
flows (amounts which do not necessarily reflect the effects of the poor economic conditions 
of the time). 
 
The greatest majority of companies reporting a non-GAAP profit figure higher than the 
GAAP profit was repeated in 2012, the year immediately following the release of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230. This is a surprising result given the findings of US studies concerning 
the reaction of companies to regulation surrounding non-GAAP profits in that country. 
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Studies in the US not only found a decrease in the number of companies reporting a non-
GAAP profit after regulation (a result not observed in this study in Australia) but also a 
change in the magnitude and type of variations made to GAAP figures. The US studies found 
a sharp decrease in the difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings per share 
(Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Heflin & Hsu 2008) and a significant decrease in the 
proportion of firms reporting a non-GAAP figure greater than the GAAP figure (85% in 2001 
to 67% in 2003 for earnings per share figures) (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a).  
 
The mean non-GAAP profit was higher than the mean GAAP profit in every year of the study 
except 2006 and 2007 (Section 6.3.5). The anomaly in these years may be explained by the 
introduction of IFRS, with 2006 being the first year that all companies had to report fully 
under the regime. The greatest differences were in 2009 and 2015. The trend over the years in 
the non-GAAP profit showed that the mean was reasonably consistent or ‘smooth’ after the 
introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide in 2011/12. This may be due in part to the 
requirement to provide a full reconciliation between the figures from that time and thereby 
clearly disclose how the non-GAAP figure was calculated. This would have prompted 
companies to consider carefully what to exclude from the GAAP profit to calculate the non-
GAAP profit, and these exclusions would have to be consistent from year to year as the 
reconciliation would make their practices more transparent. Studies in the US found a sharp 
decrease in the difference between non-GAAP and GAAP figures post regulation (Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Heflin & Hsu 2008) but Figure 6.4 (Section 6.3.5) showed that 
this was not the case in this study. Although the average non-GAAP profit figures became 
more consistent, the difference between the non-GAAP and GAAP figure did not decrease 
significantly post regulation. 
 
8.3 Research Question 1 – Influence of Company Characteristics on Non-
GAAP Reporting 
The conceptual model for this study developed in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.1) predicted that 
management of companies would undertake various forms of voluntary disclosure to 
overcome information asymmetry and attempt to bond with shareholders. The calculation and 
disclosure of a non-GAAP profit figure is one such form of voluntary disclosure. Although 
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there are benefits of voluntary disclosure (Section 2.2.2), there are also costs associated with 
the practice (Section 2.2.3) and not all companies are likely to voluntarily report non-GAAP 
profit figures. The first two research questions investigated whether company characteristics 
and specific events influenced a company’s decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure. 
Research Question 1 concerned the influence certain company characteristics had on the 
decision to report non-GAAP profit figures. The question investigated four characteristics 
which are discussed below. 
  
8.3.1 Size  
Hypothesis 1 concerned the size of a company and predicted: 
Larger companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than smaller 
companies. 
 
Agency theory espouses that issues of information asymmetry and the associated agency costs 
are exacerbated by company size due to larger companies being more complex and having a 
wider ownership base (Fama & Jensen 1983b; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Meek, Roberts & 
Gray 1995). The monitoring function is therefore more difficult in larger companies and 
managers may voluntarily disclose extra information such as non-GAAP profits to bond 
themselves to shareholders. Previous literature has also suggested that larger companies are 
better able to bear the costs involved in voluntary disclosure (Hossain, Perera & Rahman 
1995; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). Although the majority of previous studies concerning 
non-GAAP profits have not investigated the effect of characteristics such as size, the few that 
have done so have found size to be significant with larger companies more likely to report the 
figures (Johnson & Schwartz 2005; Malone, Tarca & Wee 2016; Marques 2010).  
 
In this study, results from univariate tests and multivariate logistic regression indicated 
companies reporting a non-GAAP figure are statistically significantly larger than those not 
reporting such a figure for the total sample, and for the years 2004 to 2007 and 2009 to 2012. 
This finding supports the arguments put forward using agency theory. Therefore, the results 
support this hypothesis for the total sample and all the years of the study except 2008 and the 
last three years (2013-2015). The year 2008 was one of the years most affected by the GFC 
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and factors other than size may have affected the decision to report a non-GAAP figure during 
that time of economic downturn.  
 
The fact that the variable was not statistically significant for the years 2013 to 2015 may be 
due to the sample itself rather than any particular anomaly to do with events during those 
years. The size of the companies, as measured by market capitalisation, grew each year, with 
the minimum value for the last three years being much higher than earlier years of the study 
(see Table 6.2). The standard deviation of the log of market capitalisation (the proxy used for 
size) decreased over the period of the study with the last three years being the lowest. For 
example, in the year 2004, the first year of the study, the log of market capitalisation had a 
mean of 𝑥2004 = 8.8734 and a standard deviation of s2004 = 0.8881. In 2014 the mean was 𝑥2014 = 
9.4225 and the standard deviation had decreased to s2014 = 0.5722 (similar results can be seen 
in 2013 and 2015, see Table 6.4). This means the range of sizes in those years was smaller 
and this may have affected the result for this variable.  
 
8.3.2 Ownership Concentration 
Hypothesis 2 concerned ownership concentration and predicted: 
Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures 
than companies with concentrated ownership 
 
From an agency theory perspective, larger shareholders have more incentive and are better 
able to monitor and influence management. As smaller shareholders are less able to influence 
management and may be less ‘sophisticated’ or experienced, information asymmetry is higher 
for these shareholders. Therefore, it was argued management may provide extra incremental 
information in the form of non-GAAP profits in order to bond with these smaller shareholders 
in companies with more dispersed ownership. The results from this study are pertinent as 
previous studies concerning non-GAAP profits have failed to investigate this characteristic. 
The results for the total sample were in the predicted direction but were not statistically 
significant. This was also the case for many individual years with the results being in the 
predicted direction (companies reporting a non-GAAP profit figure were more dispersed than 
companies not reporting a figure) but not statistically significant. The results were statistically 
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significant, and the hypothesis is supported, in only four of the twelve years of the study; 
2006, 2009, 2013 and 2014.  
 
The year 2006 was the first year companies had to report fully under IFRS. As there were a 
number of major differences between existing Australian Accounting Standards and IFRS, the 
adoption of IFRS ‘had major implications for how financial accounting is undertaken within 
Australia’ (Deegan 2010, p. 7) and the change to IFRS compelled companies to adopt 
different ways of expressing earnings and profits (Deloitte 2009). One way would have been 
to provide extra information in the form of non-GAAP profits as the profit calculated under 
IFRS would have varied considerably from the profits reported in previous years. This would 
have been a particular concern for companies with more dispersed shareholdings, particularly 
as smaller, less sophisticated shareholders would have struggled to understand the differences 
that had occurred, and this would account for the statistically significant result for ownership 
concentration in this year.  
 
In 2009 the AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on underlying profits were released and 
encouraged companies to ‘recognise that the different users of financial reports have different 
information needs’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 8). The guidelines state that both AICD and 
FINSIA ‘believe that companies should consider what supplementary information could be 
provided to assist shareholders and the wider investment community in understanding the 
company's financial position and performance’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 10). The release of 
these guidelines prompted management to consider the needs of smaller shareholders and this 
could explain the significant effect ownership concentration had on the decision to report a 
non-GAAP profit figure for this year.  
 
The other two years in which the variable was statistically significant were 2013 and 2014. 
These years are post the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 (released in December 
2011 so effective for most companies from 2012). The release of the Regulatory Guide would 
have forced companies to reconsider the reporting of non-GAAP profits in a deliberate and 
strategic manner as they would now face scrutiny from ASIC. The Regulatory Guide was 
issued in part to ‘promote more meaningful communication of financial information to 
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investors and other users of financial reports’ and to make sure non-IFRS information ‘is not 
misleading’ (ASIC 2011, p. 4). As ownership concentration was significant, and in the 
predicted direction, this indicates that it was a factor in the decision to report or not report a 
non-GAAP figure in these two years, prompted by the calls of ASIC to consider investors’ 
needs. However, it should be noted that this variable was not statistically significant in 2012 
or 2015, which were also post-ASIC Regulatory Guide years.  This implies other factors 
played a greater role in the decision to report in those years. 
 
Although the arguments put forward using agency theory predicted that companies with more 
dispersed ownership would report non-GAAP profit figures in order to decrease the 
information asymmetry of smaller shareholders, this argument has generally not been 
supported by this study. The fact that ownership concentration was not a significant factor in 
the reporting decision (and that Hypothesis 2 was not supported) in the overall sample and 
eight of the twelve years implies that other factors took precedence over this factor. A 
possible explanation for this result is that some companies are not as concerned about the 
needs of small shareholders as they hold little power compared to large shareholders and 
institutional investors.  
 
8.3.3 Leverage 
Hypothesis 3 concerned leverage and argued that: 
Highly leveraged companies are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than 
lower leveraged companies. 
 
Univariate results indicated that companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures were 
statistically significantly more highly leveraged than non-reporting companies in every year 
of the study. The results from multivariate logistic regression were statistically significant for 
the total sample and for the individual years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2011 to 2015; eight of the 
twelve years of the study, and Hypothesis 3 is supported in those years.  
 
The mean leverage for all companies in the study was the highest in 2007, the year the GFC 
began, and 2008, the year with the peak of the GFC in September that year. In 2008 and 2009, 
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the financial years containing this peak (depending on the year-end used), leverage was a 
statistically significant factor in the decision to report a non-GAAP profit. As the amounts of 
leverage were at their highest during the GFC, companies would have attempted to allay 
concerns shareholders may have had regarding the high amounts of leverage and the 
associated risk, particularly the risk of bankruptcy. Taking 2009 as an example, the number of 
companies reporting a higher non-GAAP profit than GAAP profit was 56 companies 
compared to only 13 reporting a higher GAAP profit. The greatest difference between the 
mean amounts of the profits in all the years of the study was also in 2009, with the mean non-
GAAP profits being $182 million higher than the mean GAAP profits. This means that for 
most companies, the non-GAAP profit was presenting a more favourable outcome to 
shareholders and potential investors and could potentially allay concerns these shareholders 
had concerning risk and high leverage in a time of economic crises. 
 
In the last five years of the study, 2011 to 2015, leverage was a statistically significant factor 
in the decision to report a non-GAAP profit. This time period covers the year of release of the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 (2011), and all the years since. The decision to report a non-
GAAP profit figure may have become more considered and deliberate over this time period 
due to the requirements of the ASIC guide. These results indicate that companies attempted to 
mitigate the higher risk associated with high leverage by voluntarily disclosing non-GAAP 
profit figures, with leverage being an important factor in the decision to provide this extra 
voluntary disclosure.  
  
8.3.4 Good/bad News Years 
Hypothesis 4 concerned the effect reporting bad news for a particular year would have on a 
company’s choice to report non-GAAP profits and argued: 
Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP 
loss, are more likely to report non-GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an 
increase in GAAP profits. 
 
Under agency theory, management provide extra information in an attempt to bond 
themselves to shareholders and reduce agency costs, particularly in years when the results 
signify bad news. Companies with bad news to report are more likely to report a non-GAAP 
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profit figure, particularly if the bad news result was caused by extraordinary, one-off items, in 
order to avoid higher monitoring costs (Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Entwistle, Feltham & 
Mbagwu 2004; Isidro & Marques 2015; Johnson & Schwartz 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 
2004). The results of this study provide some support for this hypothesis with a statistically 
significant result in the predicted direction for the total sample and in the individual years 
2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013. These particular years were amongst those with the highest 
percentage of bad news firms across the sample. The year 2009 had the highest percentage of 
bad news firms at 59% of the sample companies. In 2010, only 23% of the sample were bad 
news firms. This increased to 44% in 2011 and 51% in 2012. Therefore, in years where there 
were more companies with bad news to report, the variable became a statistically significant 
factor in the decision to report a non-GAAP profit.  
 
The GFC occurred from mid-2007 to 2009 with the peak of the crisis around September 2008 
(Reserve Bank of Australia 2010; Sinnewe, Harrison & Wijeweera 2017). The results of the 
logistic regression for the good/bad news variable for these three years were 2007: p = 0.076, 
2008: p = 0.054 and 2009: p = 0.001. Therefore, during 2009, the last year affected by the 
crisis, having to report a decrease in GAAP profits, or a GAAP loss, was a statistically 
significant factor in the decision to report a non-GAAP figure. Although conditions improved 
during the course of 2009, the ongoing effect of the GFC would have culminated in this year, 
particularly for companies with a year-end of 30 June. For these companies the 2009 reports 
covered the peak crisis period of September 2008. Agency theory predicts that agents will 
attempt to provide extra information to show they are working for the benefit of the principals 
(Fama 1980; Jensen & Meckling 1976), particularly in times of economic downturn when 
outside influences are beyond the control of management. As discussed in Section 8.2.5, 2009 
saw the largest majority of companies reporting a non-GAAP figure higher than the GAAP 
figure and the greatest difference between the mean amount of the non-GAAP figures and 
GAAP figures, indicating management were attempting to present non-GAAP results which 
were perhaps more indicative of ongoing performance.  
 
The years 2011 to 2013 represent the release year of the ASIC Regulatory Guide and the two 
years immediately following its release. Having a bad news year significantly affected the 
decision to release a non-GAAP profit in these years. This may be due to companies 
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focussing more on the reasons for reporting non-GAAP profits after the release of the Guide 
and deciding more explanation was required if they had incurred a bad news year. However, 
this factor was not significant in 2014 or 2015, indicating that the initial effect of the Guide’s 
release may have waned, and other factors became more important in the decision to report a 
non-GAAP profit in these years.  
 
8.3.5 Summary Research Question 1 
In summary, Research Question 1 concerned the influence size, ownership concentration, 
leverage and good/bad news years have on the decision to report non-GAAP profit figures. 
Taking the total sample as a whole, size, leverage and good/bad news years were found to be 
statistically significant variables affecting the decision to report non-GAAP profit figures. 
This finding supports the arguments put forward using agency theory about companies which 
are more likely to provide extra information in the form of non-GAAP profits to mitigate the 
effect of information asymmetry. Ownership concentration was not found to be a statistically 
significant factor for the total sample. The results on a year-by-year basis indicated that events 
surrounding certain periods in time do affect the influence of some of these variables.  
 
8.4 Research Question 2 – Influence of Specific Events on Non-GAAP 
Reporting 
Research Question 2 concerned the influence particular specific events may have had on the 
decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure. The influence the four specific events had on the 
decision to report a non-GAAP profit are discussed below. 
 
8.4.1 Introduction of IFRS 
Hypothesis 5 concerned the first of the specific events, the introduction of IFRS in Australia, 
and predicted: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase with the 
introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards in Australia. 
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Agency theory suggests that there will be increased voluntary disclosure in times of high 
information asymmetry as managers attempt to bond with shareholders (Fama 1980; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). The years surrounding the introduction of IFRS was such a time, with the 
adoption of the standards expected to result in changes to accounting policies that have 
significant impacts on the reported financial position and performance of companies 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board 2004b, p. 6). Management knew about the 
significant effects the introduction of the standards would have on the reported net profit 
before shareholders and investors (Wang & Welker 2011) and this would have been incentive 
for managers to provide extra disclosure concerning these effects (Gallery, Cooper & 
Sweeting 2008) with companies choosing to adopt different ways of expressing earnings and 
profits (Deloitte 2009).  
 
While this may have been the case for some companies there was not a statistically significant 
increase in the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures during these years 
(Section 6.6.2). Overall, the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profits increased 
from 50 in 2004 to 53 in 2005 and then to 57 in 2006. However, this overall increase in 
numbers does not represent the actual change in individual company behaviour during these 
years. The results from McNemar’s tests showed that several companies changed their 
behaviour in each direction with some beginning to report a non-GAAP figure and others 
ceasing to report such a figure. For example, in 2005 companies were required to provide 
disclosures concerning the effect of IFRS adoption under AASB 1047 Disclosing the Impacts 
of Adopting Australian Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(Australian Accounting Standards Board 2004b). During this year 13 companies began 
reporting a non-GAAP profit that did not do so in 2004 and 10 companies ceased to report 
one. With additional disclosure already being provided under AASB 1047, management of 
some companies may not have thought extra incremental information in the form of non-
GAAP profits was warranted or even that such information may cause extra confusion. 
However, others clearly thought that some additional profit information was warranted in this 
transition to IFRS year. In 2006, the first full year of IFRS adoption, 15 companies reported a 
non-GAAP figure that did not do so in 2005. At the same time 11 companies that had reported 
a figure in 2005 ceased to do so in 2006.  
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Overall, the results do not support the hypothesis and instead infer that individual companies 
approached the decision to report non-GAAP profit figures differently, depending on how the 
introduction of the standards affected the financial results of the company in question.  
 
8.4.2 Global Financial Crisis 
Hypothesis 6 concerned the second of the specific events, the effect of the GFC and predicted: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase during the 
Global Financial Crisis. 
 
Previous literature has argued that the increase in the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures 
over the past two decades is due to the demand for more value-relevant information, 
especially during times when the value relevance of GAAP is low and extra information is 
needed to mitigate information asymmetry (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2010; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). Non-GAAP figures could potentially 
provide incremental value relevant information during times of economic crises due to the 
increased volatility of markets and asset prices used in fair value accounting (Malone, Tarca 
& Wee 2016; Sinnewe, Harrison & Wijeweera 2017). Under agency theory, this would also 
be a time when managers would want to report the firm’s underlying economic circumstances 
as accurately as possible to keep shareholders informed, reduce monitoring costs and avoid 
damage to the manager’s reputation. It was therefore predicted that the GFC would see an 
increase in the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures. 
 
The results in this study support the hypothesis and the contention that the reporting of non-
GAAP profit figures would increase during the GFC. There was an upward trend in reporting 
behaviour between 2007 and 2008, with 11 companies beginning to report a non-GAAP 
figure in 2008 that had not done so in 2007 and only four ceasing to do so (Section 6.6.3). 
There was a statistically significant upward trend in reporting behaviour between 2007 and 
2009 (p < 0.01) with 17 companies reporting a figure in 2009 that had not done so in 2007 
and only five companies ceasing to report one. This finding is consistent with a previous 
Australian study by Malone, Tarca and Wee (2016) who found that the reporting of non-
GAAP figures was more likely during the GFC, arguing that companies may have reported a 
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non-GAAP figure due to the many asset write-downs that were not expected to recur in the 
future.  
 
8.4.3 Release of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit 
Hypothesis 7 concerned the third of the specific events, the release in March 2009 of the 
AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting non-GAAP profits and predicted: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will increase after the 
release of guidelines on reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
 
This prediction was based Principle 1 of the Guidelines, which encouraged companies to 
report on the ‘underlying’ profit as well as statutory profit as a way of overcoming 
information asymmetry between managers and investors and other stakeholders (AICD & 
FINSIA 2009, p. 15). There was a trend towards more companies reporting non-GAAP profits 
than ceasing to report them between the years studied for this event (Section 6.6.4). For 
example, between 2008 and 2010, thirteen companies began reporting non-GAAP profits with 
only six companies ceasing to do so. However, the results were not statistically significant, 
and the hypothesis was not supported. The results for Hypothesis 6 concerning the effect of 
the GFC showed that the number of companies reporting non-GAAP profits did significantly 
increase during this period and this may have affected the results for Hypothesis 7 with the 
guidelines being released as the recovery from the GFC was beginning.  
 
8.4.4 Release of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
Hypothesis 8 concerned the fourth and last of the specific events, the release in December 
2011 of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, Disclosing non-IFRS financial information and an 
accompanying Regulation Impact Statement and predicted: 
The number of companies reporting non-GAAP profit figures will not be influenced by 
the release of Regulatory Guide 230 by ASIC. 
 
The Regulatory Guide 230 acknowledged that non-GAAP financial information can be useful 
in some circumstances and did not seek to prohibit its use (ASIC 2011). However, it did 
attempt to regulate the manner in which the figures are reported, similar to Regulation G in 
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the US. As the guide neither prohibits or encourages the use of non-GAAP figures it was 
predicted that its release would not affect the decision of companies to report such figures. 
The results for the years surrounding the release of the guide all showed no statistically 
significant change in reporting behaviour in any one direction and Hypothesis 8 (which 
predicted no change) is supported (Section 6.6.5). While there were changes in reporting 
behaviour, these changes were not significantly in the same direction across the sample. For 
example, in 2011, nine companies reported a non-GAAP profit that did not do so in 2010 and 
eight companies ceased to report a non-GAAP profit. This result suggests that while 
companies may have adjusted the way they reported non-GAAP profits to meet the 
requirements of the Regulatory Guide; the guide itself did not significantly affect the decision 
to report such a figure in one particular direction.  
 
This result is similar to the findings of Rainsbury (2016) in the New Zealand context, who 
found that a Guidance Note on non-GAAP earnings from the New Zealand Financial Markets 
Authority had little effect on the number of companies reporting such a figure. However, 
these findings and those in the current study differ from the reaction in the US after the 
introduction of Regulation G in 2003. The introduction of the US regulation led to an 
immediate significant decrease in the use of non-GAAP figures, particularly in press releases 
(Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Marques 2006). The reasons postulated for this 
decline in the US included a reduction in the opportunistic use of such figures, especially as 
the new regulation required reconciliation to GAAP figures which made manipulation of non-
GAAP figures more transparent (Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a; Jennings & Marques 
2011; Marques 2006; Yi 2012; Zhang & Zheng 2011) and the bad press the use of non-GAAP 
figures had received leading up to, and at the time of regulation (Kolev, Marquardt & McVay 
2008; Marques 2006). It is possible that in the Australian context, the AICD and FINSIA 
guidelines, released two and a half years earlier than the ASIC Regulatory Guide, may have 
already prompted companies to improve the manner in which they presented non-GAAP 
figures and made them less concerned about the negative implications the practice may have 
had. 
 
More recent studies from the US have investigated beyond the initial post-Regulation G 
period and have found that the significant decline in the disclosure of non-GAAP figures after 
214 
 
regulation was only temporary (Black et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2012). By the end of 2006, the 
frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures in quarterly press releases exceeded the pre-
Regulation G period (Black et al. 2012). The results from the current study showed that the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 has not discouraged the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures 
with there being a statistically significant increase in their use between 2012 (the first 
reporting year after the release of the guide) compared to 2014 and 2012 compared to 2015. 
The effect the Regulatory Guide had on the manner in which these figures are presented is 
investigated in Research Question 4.  
 
8.4.5 Summary Research Question 2 
In summary, Research Question 2 considered four specific events (the introduction of IFRS, 
the GFC, the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the release of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230) to find if any had an influence on the decision to report a non-GAAP 
profit figure. The results showed that the introduction of IFRS and the release of the AICD 
and FINSIA guidelines did not have a statistically significant effect on the decision to report 
non-GAAP profits. However, the GFC was statistically significant in its effect. As predicted, 
the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 did not affect the decision to report a non-
GAAP profit figure with no significant change in behaviour surrounding its release. In the 
years since its release however, the increase in the number of companies reporting these 
figures has become statistically significant (comparing 2012 to 2014, and 2012 to 2015), 
showing that the trend in reporting non-GAAP if ever increasing. The addition of impression 
management in the next two research question provides another dimension to the findings. 
 
8.5 Research Question 3 – Influence of Company Characteristics on the 
use of Impression Management 
Agency theory predicts that although monitoring and bonding costs may help overcome 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, an optimum amount of 
monitoring and bonding will be reached leaving some residual agency costs, as costs will only 
be incurred until marginal costs equal marginal benefits (Fama & Jensen 1983a; Jensen 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling 1976). These remaining costs, known as the residual loss, represent the 
opportunistic behaviour not eliminated by monitoring and bonding. Under the conceptual 
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model in this study (Figure 4.1), the use of impression management tactics to emphasise non-
GAAP profit figures is one form of opportunistic behaviour used by management that 
shareholders and potential investors may be unable to decipher due to the effect of any 
residual loss. The remaining two research questions (Research Questions 3 and 4) investigated 
the influence company characteristics and specific events may have on the use of impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profit figures.  
 
The disclosure of a non-GAAP figure does not, of itself, constitute impression management. 
Rather it is how the non-GAAP figure is presented to the shareholders and potential investors 
through the use of prominence and emphasis as compared to the GAAP result that constitutes 
impression management in this study. As shareholders and potential investors generally focus 
on earnings, any reported earnings figures ‘constitute the most worthwhile information to 
manipulate in corporate narrative sections’ (Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007, p. 158) with non-
GAAP profit figures often ‘strategically emphasised by managers in order to influence the 
perception of the firm’s financial results’ (Marques 2010, p. 131).  
 
The analysis for the remaining two research questions involved the measurement of a relative 
emphasis score for impression management calculated by subtracting the impression 
management score for GAAP profit figures from the impression management score for non-
GAAP profit figures. A positive result meant that the non-GAAP figure was emphasised over 
the GAAP figure while a negative score meant the GAAP figure was emphasised. Research 
Question 3 concerned the influence specific firm characteristics may have on the use of 
impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. The four specific 
firm characteristics investigated are discussed below. 
 
8.5.1 Size 
Hypothesis 9 concerned the first firm characteristic, size, and predicted: 
Larger companies are more likely to use impression management tactics when reporting 
non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than smaller companies. 
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Arguments using agency theory suggest that larger companies are more complex than smaller 
companies and size can exacerbate agency problems and information asymmetry (Fama & 
Jensen 1983b; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Meek, Roberts & Gray 1995). Agency costs are 
increased, and it is more likely that monitoring and bonding costs will not completely 
eliminate opportunistic behaviour and a residual loss will remain. Larger companies were 
therefore predicted to be more likely to use impression management tactics in order to 
influence shareholders and investors.  
 
Limited support for this hypothesis was found in the press release in 2007. In this instance, 
larger companies were found to be statistically significantly more likely to use impression 
management tactics when presenting non-GAAP profits than smaller companies. The variable 
was also statistically significant in the press release for the total sample (all years together), 
and in 2009 in both documents and the total of both documents, but not in the predicted 
direction. Smaller companies were therefore more likely to use impression management 
tactics for the total sample (in the press release) and during 2009. The GFC may have had 
some influence on the result in 2009 with smaller companies less able to weather the effects 
of the GFC and keen to highlight any positive information to shareholders in the form of a 
higher non-GAAP profit figure. 
 
8.5.2 Ownership Concentration 
Hypothesis 10 concerned the second firm characteristic, ownership concentration, and its 
influence on the use of impression management tactics and predicted: 
Companies with dispersed ownership are more likely to use impression management 
tactics when reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than companies with 
concentrated ownership. 
 
Larger shareholders, including institutional investors, are usually more experienced or 
‘sophisticated’ and have more incentive and power to monitor and influence management. 
Smaller shareholders, on the other hand, ‘lack the necessary sophistication and experience to 
understand fully the precision and reliability of their information set’ (Young 2014, p. 453), 
are less able to verify agents are acting in their interests (Abrahamson & Park 1994; 
Eisenhardt 1989) and may be unable to decipher information presented to them. Shareholders’ 
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perceptions of the usefulness, relevance and reliability of non-GAAP figures, and their 
reaction to the figures, depends on their level of sophistication (Allee et al. 2007; 
Bhattacharya et al. 2007; Frederickson & Miller 2004; James & Michello 2010) and the effect 
these figures have on less sophisticated investors increases with the prominence given to the 
non-GAAP profit figure as compared to the GAAP result (Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006). It 
was predicted that companies with more dispersed ownership may take advantage of these 
less sophisticated investors by using impression management tactics when presenting non-
GAAP profit figures.  
 
However, the results lend little support to the proposition. Ownership concentration was 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction in the total of both documents for the 
total sample and in the press release in 2007. It was statistically significant but not in the 
predicted direction in the press release and the total of both documents in 2010, and in the 
annual report in 2015. The positive result for the total sample indicates that dispersed 
ownership has some influence on the overall use of impression management tactics when the 
years are considered in total.  
 
8.5.3 Leverage 
Hypothesis 11 concerned the third firm characteristic, the influence of leverage, and 
predicted: 
Highly leveraged companies are more likely to use impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures than lower leveraged companies. 
It was argued that shareholders may perceive a higher risk in more highly leveraged firms and 
feel more vulnerable due to creditor’s claims over profits. Companies may attempt to allay 
these concerns by emphasising non-GAAP profit figures, particularly where the figure 
exceeds the GAAP result. Management may behave opportunistically when reporting non-
GAAP profits, particularly if the company is not subject to debt covenants or if existing 
covenants have not been violated. Christensen et al. (2017) found a significant decrease in the 
disclosure of non-GAAP profit figures and an increase in their ‘quality’ following debt 
covenant violations.  
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This hypothesis was supported for the total sample in the press release, and in 2009 and 2010, 
the final year of the GFC and the year immediately following the crisis. These findings 
indicate that highly leveraged companies were using impression management to highlight 
non-GAAP profits in the latter part of, and immediately following, the GFC when concerns 
about the risk of high levels of debt may have been escalated.  
 
8.5.4 Good/bad News Years 
Hypothesis 12 concerned the last firm characteristic, influence a bad news year may have on 
the use of impression management, and predicted: 
Companies reporting a decrease in GAAP profits from the previous period, or a GAAP 
loss, are more likely to use impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures than companies reporting an increase in GAAP profits. 
 
As the reputation of management may suffer during periods of decreased earnings and 
compensation packages are often based on performance (Davidson et al. 2004), there is 
incentive to use impression management to disguise bad news. Previous studies have found 
that companies reporting bad news emphasise non-GAAP profit figures (Bowen, Davis & 
Matsumoto 2005; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012). This prediction was 
supported in this study for the total sample in both the press release and total relative 
emphasis indicating that having a bad news year generally affects the use of impression 
management to emphasise non-GAAP profit figures compared to GAAP. On a year-by-year 
basis however, the hypothesis was not supported by the results of this study, with only the 
total relative emphasis in 2012 being significant and in the predicted direction.   
 
8.5.5 Summary Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 concerned the influence size, ownership concentration, leverage and 
good/bad news years may have on the use of impression management tactics when reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures. Several models involved in the analysis of this question were not 
significant. For the total sample, leverage and good/bad news year were significant in the 
predicted direction in the press release, and ownership concentration and good/bad news year 
were significant in the predicted direction for the total of the two documents. These results 
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highlight the importance of the press release as a timely, unaudited disclosure tool for the use 
of impression management. Previous studies concerning non-GAAP profits and impression 
management have not investigated the influence of ownership concentration or leverage, so 
the results of this study provide new insights into these variables and their effect. The results 
concerning bad news years support previous findings that reporting bad news influences the 
use of impression management tactics (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Guillamon-Saorin, 
Garcia Osma & Jones 2012). The possibility that specific events may have influenced the use 
of impression management tactics is discussed in Research Question 4. 
 
8.6 Research Question 4 – Influence of Specific Events on the use of 
Impression management 
Research Question 4 concerned the influence specific events may have on the use of 
impression management tactics when reporting a non-GAAP profit figure. Two of the events 
in question (the introduction of IFRS and the GFC) would have led to an increase in 
information asymmetry which was not fully eliminated by monitoring and bonding activities. 
The resulting residual loss provides an avenue for opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
management in the form of impression management. The other two events (release of the 
AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the ASIC Regulatory Guide) highlighted the issue of non-
GAAP profit reporting and the importance of the figures not being misleading. These events 
should have decreased the ability of management to use impression management techniques 
opportunistically.  
 
Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7 gave some initial insight into the impression management behaviour 
surrounding the events under investigation through an examination of the mean relative 
emphasis scores for the press release, annual report and the total of both documents. With the 
introduction of IFRS, there was a sharp decrease in the mean relative scores indicating a trend 
towards emphasising GAAP over non-GAAP in the transition year (2005) and then the reverse 
trend towards emphasising non-GAAP over GAAP in the adoption year. In 2007 there was 
another downward trend in the mean relative emphasis scores, perhaps as the adoption of IFRS 
had already taken place. However, in 2008, there was a sharp increase in mean relative emphasis 
scores indicating a trend towards emphasising non-GAAP over GAAP as the GFC took effect. 
220 
 
There was another downward trend between 2008 and 2009 due to either the improving 
economic conditions or the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting non-GAAP 
profits or a combination of the two. This trend continued in 2010 (except in the annual report) 
and then from 2011 onward until 2014. This sharp decrease from 2010 onward showed the 
influence that the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide had on the practice of emphasising non-
GAAP profits over GAAP profits, with the mean relative emphasis score for the press release 
and the total score in the years 2012 to 2014 dropping below the zero mark.  This  indicates that 
the GAAP figure was emphasised over the non-GAAP figure. Note however, that this trend 
reversed in 2015 when once again the mean relative emphasis scores were greater than zero 
indicating that on average companies emphasised the non-GAAP figure over the GAAP in this 
year. A more in-depth analysis of the influence the specific four events investigated had on the 
decision to report a non-GAAP profit are discussed below. 
 
8.6.1 Introduction of IFRS 
Hypothesis 13 concerned the introduction of IFRS in Australia effective for annual reporting 
periods commencing on or after 1 January 2005. As management would have known about 
the effect the introduction of the standards would have on the GAAP profit before 
shareholders and investors, it was predicted that managers may exploit this exogenously 
imposed information asymmetry to their advantage (Wang & Welker 2011) and not only have 
reported a non-GAAP profit figure but may have given it undue prominence over GAAP. The 
hypothesis predicted: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will increase with the introduction of International 
Financial Reporting Standards in Australia. 
 
The analysis for this hypothesis compared the year 2004 to the transition year, 2005, and also 
to the adoption year, 2006. It also compared 2005 to 2006. Contrary to the prediction, the 
mean relative emphasis score decreased in the press release, annual report and total between 
2004 and 2005, with the mean annual report relative emphasis decreasing to below zero in 
2005. This indicates that, on average, the GAAP figure was emphasised more than the non-
GAAP figure in that year. Although these results were not statistically significant, this 
downward trend indicates that, in the transition year to IFRS, companies were attempting to 
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explain the impact the adoption of the standards would have on financial reporting. This was 
mandated by AASB 1047 Disclosing the Impacts of Adopting Australian Equivalents to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (Australian Accounting Standards Board 
2004b), which required companies to provide certain disclosures concerning the effect of 
IFRS adoption. Providing these required explanations meant that companies focussed on the 
GAAP profit figure, which in turn may have led to this figure being repeated and emphasised 
more than the non-GAAP figure. This would explain the result in the annual report for 2005, 
which is the document where companies would have provided the most information 
concerning the effect of the adoption.  
 
Between 2005 and 2006 the trend was reversed in the press release, annual report and total 
relative emphasis with all means indicating an emphasis of non-GAAP over GAAP profits. 
Although these results were not statistically significant they do indicate a trend of 
emphasising non-GAAP in the adoption year (2006), when most companies in the sample 
reported the first GAAP net profit calculated fully under IFRS. This may indicate that once 
the adoption of IFRS was fully implemented, some companies chose to emphasise the non-
GAAP figure, which may have been adjusted for some of the less favourable impacts of IFRS 
adoption on the GAAP profit. 
 
8.6.2 Global Financial Crisis 
With high information asymmetry during the GFC, shareholders were concerned and potential 
investors wary and this presents a situation where opportunistic disclosures may have 
increased. Hypothesis 14 concerned this period of time and predicts: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will increase during the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
During economic downturns resources are scarce and there is more competition for funds 
from investors. This increases the motivation to engage in impression management (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan 2007) and highlight more favourable non-GAAP profit figures. This 
hypothesis was supported between 2007 and 2008 with a statistically significant result for the 
press release. The mean relative emphasis in the annual report also increased although this 
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result was not statistically significant. This result supports the contention that press releases 
provide a timely vehicle in which to employ impression management tactics, being the first 
document that highlights performance for the year and also being voluntary and largely 
unregulated (Bowen, Davis & Matsumoto 2005; Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & Pierce 2009; 
García Osma & Guillamón-Saorín 2011; Hitz 2010; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). Press 
releases are also easily accessible, not only to shareholders but potential investors and other 
stakeholders, and are often covered by the national press (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin & 
Pierce 2009; Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012). During the GFC, concerned 
shareholders would have been particularly keen to receive information on results in a timely 
fashion. In 2008, 70% of companies reporting a non-GAAP profit figure reported a figure 
higher than the GAAP figure, and given the concern over the economic downtown, these 
companies would be motivated to emphasise the higher result and allay fears of shareholders. 
 
For companies with a year end of 30 June, the financial year 2009 contained the peak of the 
GFC (September 2008).  Between 2007 and 2009 the mean relative emphasis increased in the 
press release and total but, unlike between 2007 and 2008, not to a statistically significant 
level.  This indicates that companies used impression management tactics to emphasise the 
non-GAAP figure to the greatest extent in 2008. Between 2008 and 2009 the relative 
emphasis score decreased across both documents and the total. Therefore, although the peak 
of the crisis was in the 2009 financial year, the recovery from the crisis (during 2009) may 
have been enough for companies to lessen the emphasis of the non-GAAP figure.   
 
8.6.3 Release of AICD and FINSIA Guidelines on Underlying Profit 
Principle one of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting non-GAAP profits, released in 
March 2009, recommends that the reporting of these figures should be done ‘without giving 
undue prominence to the underlying profit figure’ (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 15). Hypothesis 
15 concerned the release of these guidelines and predicted: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will decrease with the release of guidelines on 
reporting underlying profits by AICD and FINSIA. 
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Although the results for this hypothesis were not statistically significant and the hypothesis 
therefore was not supported, the mean relative emphasis scores did decrease over this time 
period. It is unclear if this decrease in relative emphasis between 2008 and 2009 was due to the 
release of these guidelines or the fact that many companies were recovering from the GFC and 
management may no longer have seen the need to over emphasise the non-GAAP profit figures. 
For some individual companies the change in behaviour was explained by management in the 
press release and annual report as attempting to comply with the guidelines. For example, 
Stockland Stapled went from a relative emphasis score of 11 (indicating a high emphasis on non-
GAAP) in 2008 to a score of 3 in 2009. In both their press release and annual report, they state 
‘(u)nderlying profit reflects statutory profit as adjusted to reflect the Directors’ assessment of the 
result for the ongoing business activities of Stockland, in accordance with the AICD / Finsia 
principles for reporting underlying profit’ (Stockland Corporaton Ltd 2009a, p. 1; 2009b, p. 17). 
Although companies also showed a marked decrease in relative emphasis of non-GAAP profit 
figures, e.g. Caltex went from 17.5 in 2008 to 2.5 in 2009, Oz Minerals went from 6.5 in 2008 
to -10 in 2009, it is unclear as to whether these results were due to the guidelines or the recovery 
from the GFC.  
 
Although the guidelines were released by professional bodies and espoused best practice, they 
were not mandatory, and the results suggest that some companies, particularly banks, were 
not following the guidelines. For example, the relative emphasis score for the Bank of 
Queensland increased from 15 in 2008 to 19 in 2009, both scores showing a high emphasis on 
non-GAAP. Similarly, Bendigo Bank increased from -12 in 2008 (indicating an emphasis on 
GAAP profit) to 6.5 in 2009 (indicating an emphasis on non-GAAP profit). This raises 
questions about the effectiveness of guidelines from professional bodies and the willingness 
of members of the bodies to comply, as opposed to guides issued by regulators. It may also 
indicate that other factors, such as the GFC, had a more overriding influence on the behaviour 
of companies. 
 
8.6.4 Release of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 
The release of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, Disclosing non-IFRS financial information and 
an accompanying Regulation Impact Statement in December 2011 attempted to regulate the 
224 
 
manner in which non-GAAP profits were reported and required GAAP profits to be given 
equal or greater prominence (ASIC 2011). The release of this guide suggests that ASIC 
considers the use of emphasis to be a disclosure tactic that could be misleading and needed to 
be addressed. Hypothesis 16 predicted: 
The use of impression management tactics by companies when reporting non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP profit figures will decrease with the release of Regulatory Guide 230 
by ASIC. 
 
The results indicate that in the year of the Regulatory Guide’s release, and the year following 
its release, the relative emphasis in the press release, annual report and the total decreased 
indicating a move away from emphasising the non-GAAP figures towards emphasising the 
GAAP figures. There was a statistically significant decrease in the press release between 2010 
and 2012 supporting the hypothesis and signifying that the initial release of the Regulatory 
Guide had a substantial effect on behaviour. In 2012 the relative emphasis in both the press 
release and total became negative, indicating an emphasis on GAAP, and remained negative 
until 2015. Although not a statistically significant change, the results in 2015 indicate that the 
effect of the Regulatory Guide on behaviour appears to be decreasing. These results correlate 
with results from studies in the US following the release of Regulation G which also required 
non-GAAP figures not be given prominence over GAAP figures. Studies in the US found a 
move towards companies giving both figures equal prominence in press releases (Entwistle, 
Feltham & Mbagwu 2006a, 2006b; Heflin & Hsu 2008; Marques 2010).  
 
Although the results indicate that the ASIC Regulatory Guide has had a significant effect of 
reporting behaviour, particularly in the press release, this is not always the case on an 
individual company basis. In 2015, four years after the introduction of the Guide, 44 of the 86  
companies in the sample that reported a non-GAAP profit figure, had a total relative emphasis 
score greater than zero. This indicates the non-GAAP profit figure was emphasised more than 
the GAAP profit figure. One particularly concerning example is the 2015 press release (four 
years after the release of the Regulatory Guide) of Northern Star Resources Ltd reproduced as 
Figure 8.1. This press release not only emphasises the non-GAAP profit of $108.9 million 
(beginning with a large headline “UNDERLYING NPAT SOARS 198% TO A$108.9M”) but 
does not even report the GAAP profit of $91.9 million. The press release does not explain 
how the underlying figure is calculated and provides no reconciliation to GAAP. Although   
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Figure 8.1: 2015 Press Release of Northern Star Resources Ltd 
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not as extreme, there are other examples of companies not following the Regulatory Guide. 
The 2015 press release of Ardent Leisure, for example, also did not mention the GAAP profit 
choosing to only report and emphasise the non-GAAP figure.  
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ASIC listed non-IFRS (non-GAAP) profit information as an area of focus in their reviews of 
financial reports for 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Section 3.3.2). However, from 2015 to 2017 there 
was no mention of non-IFRS information in the documents concerning areas of focus (ASIC 
2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). This may have led companies to become 
more strategic in their compliance with the Regulatory Guide. For the Regulatory Guide to be 
an effective tool in the regulation framework it is imperative that ASIC maintain vigilance in 
both informing companies of the guidelines and enforcing compliance with them. 
 
8.6.5 Additional Analysis on RQ4 
The discussion for Research Question 4 above concerned the results obtained from comparing 
the relative emphasis scores. These scores are the result of subtracting the total GAAP 
impression management score for emphasis from the total non-GAAP impression 
management score for emphasis. The purpose of using relative emphasis scores was to 
determine if the GAAP profit figure was being given equal or greater prominence than the 
non-GAAP. Companies emphasising the non-GAAP figure compared to the GAAP figure 
may be using impression management tactics to mislead shareholders and investors. The 
results showed, as predicted, a significant increase in emphasis towards non-GAAP during the 
GFC and a significant decrease in emphasis away from non-GAAP after the release of the 
ASIC Regulatory Guide. However, these results give no indication of the reporting behaviour 
of companies with regards to emphasis for each type of figure, non-GAAP and GAAP. 
Changes in the mean relative emphasis score, such as the increase during the GFC and the 
decrease with the release of the Regulatory Guide from ASIC, may be due to a change in 
emphasis of the non-GAAP figure, the GAAP figure, or both. Further analysis was 
undertaken to determine patterns in the mean impression management scores for each type of 
figure to help explain the behaviour of companies concerning emphasis over the twelve years 
of the study.  
 
The results using relative emphasis for the years surrounding the introduction of IFRS in 
Australia were not statistically significant (Section 7.4.2). However, there was a downward 
trend during the transition year (2005) to almost equal emphasis between the figures and an 
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upward trend in the adoption year (2006) indicating an emphasis of non-GAAP over GAAP 
profits. Examining the impression management scores for the non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
individually, the emphasis placed on non-GAAP figures increased during these years with the 
increase being significant for the annual report and the total between 2005 and 2006 and for 
the press release and the total between 2004 and 2006. The emphasis on GAAP figures also 
increased during these years, with the increase being significant for the press release between 
2004 and 2005 and 2004 and 2006. Therefore, while there was a downward trend in relative 
emphasis between 2004 and 2005, this was not due to a decrease in emphasis on non-GAAP 
profits but rather to an increase in emphasis on GAAP profits. Companies were still reporting 
non-GAAP figures with greater emphasis than in the past but were also reporting the GAAP 
figures with greater emphasis. This demonstrates an attempt on the part of companies to 
report and explain the profits calculated under the new regime but at the same time to 
continue to report and emphasise non-GAAP profits. 
 
Between 2007 and 2008, as the GFC took effect, there was a significant increase in relative 
emphasis in the press release, meaning that the non-GAAP figure was emphasised over the 
GAAP figure (Section 7.4.3). Despite this, there were no significant changes in the emphasis 
on non-GAAP figures during this time and the change in relative emphasis was due to a 
significant decrease in emphasis of the GAAP figure between 2007 and 2008. Therefore, 
companies decreased their emphasis on GAAP figures during the time of economic crisis 
rather than increasing the emphasis on non-GAAP. 
 
The release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide saw a significant decrease in the relative emphasis 
in press releases between 2010 and 2012 (Section 7.4.5). As the Regulatory Guide sought to 
change the behaviour of companies where the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures was 
concerned it could be assumed that this decrease in relative emphasis was due to a decrease in 
the emphasis on the non-GAAP profit figures. However, this was not the case, with the 
emphasis on non-GAAP figures actually increasing in the annual report and total of the two 
documents and decreasing only slightly in the press release over the years surrounding the 
release of the guide. Companies did not change their behaviour with regard to reporting and 
emphasising non-GAAP profits. Instead they increased their emphasis on the GAAP profit 
229 
 
figures to meet the ASIC requirement of equal or greater emphasis, with this increase being 
significant in the total between 2010 and 2012.  
 
This additional analysis provides extra insight into the reporting behaviour of companies 
showing that the use of impression management tactics relating to emphasis has been 
reasonably constant as far as non-GAAP figures are concerned, particularly since 2006. The 
significant changes in the relative emphasis score reported in the results for Research 
Question 4 are the result of changes in the impression management tactics used to report the 
GAAP figure, which has been less emphasised (during the GFC) or more emphasised (with 
the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide) during the events under investigation.  
 
8.6.6 Summary Research Question 4 
In summary, Research Question 4 concerned the influence the introduction of IFRS, the GFC, 
the release of the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the ASIC Regulatory Guide had on the 
use of impression management tactics when reporting a non-GAAP profit figure. The 
emphasis of the non-GAAP figure compared to the GAAP figure was investigated and results 
showed that this relative emphasis increased significantly in the press release during the GFC 
and decreased significantly in the press release after the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 
230. These results showed that the press release was the prime document for the use of 
impression management due to its timeliness and perhaps also due to its lack of accountability 
through auditing. The results also indicate that while economic downturns significantly 
influence the emphasis of non-GAAP compared to GAAP figures, the use of impression 
management tactics can be mitigated by the introduction of regulation surrounding the 
practice. Additional analysis revealed the interesting finding that it was the emphasis or not of 
the GAAP figure which generally affected the overall relative emphasis scores with this figure 
being less emphasised during the GFC and more emphasised after the release of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide. 
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8.7 Presence of a Reconciliation 
One of the major concerns regarding the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures over the past 
two decades has been the lack of transparency, definition or consistent format for the figures 
(making comparison between companies difficult) and the possibility of manipulation of their 
presentation through impression management strategies which may mislead investors, 
particularly non-professionals (Brody & McDonald 2004; Halsey & Soybel 2002; Heitger & 
Ballou 2003; Marques 2010). However, studies have found that any confusion caused by the 
reporting of the figures may be mitigated by the presence of a clear reconciliation between the 
GAAP and non-GAAP figures (Elliott 2006; Marques 2010). For example, studies have found 
that although the presence and emphasis of non-GAAP figures affected the trading decisions 
of less sophisticated investors, the presence of a reconciliation to GAAP mitigated this effect 
(Allee et al. 2007; Elliott 2006).  
 
Although the presence of a reconciliation between non-GAAP and GAAP profit figures does 
not form part of the impression management index or relative emphasis score calculated in 
this study, a record was kept of whether companies provided a full reconciliation in 
documents where the non-GAAP figure was present (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4). Principle 3 of 
the AICD and FINSIA guidelines on reporting underlying profits, released in March 2009, 
states: 
Principle 3 – Reconcile the underlying profit figure to the statutory profit figure and 
present the adjustments in tabular form, with any accompanying explanation that may be 
necessary (AICD & FINSIA 2009, p. 16). 
 
This principle requires the non-GAAP profit figure to be reconciled to the GAAP profit in a 
table that shows each significant adjustment (impacts net profit after tax by more than 5%), 
both gross and net of tax, and includes explanatory notes. The reconciliation should be 
transparent, logical and justifiable. This principle seemed to have little effect on press releases 
containing non-GAAP profits issued by companies, with the percentage including a full and 
detailed reconciliation rising from 13% in 2008 to 17% in 2009 and 18% in 2010. An 
increased effect can be seen in the annual reports containing non-GAAP figures with the 
percentage providing a full reconciliation increasing from 38% in 2008 to 49% in 2009 and 
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50% in 2010. Several companies reported that they followed the guidelines when calculating 
and presenting the non-GAAP figures. 
 
ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, released in December 2011, also recommends the inclusion of a 
reconciliation between the two profit figures stating: 
A reconciliation between the non-IFRS and IFRS financial information should be provided, 
separately itemising and explaining each significant adjustment. Where reconciling items are 
components of IFRS financial information, they should be capable of being reconciled to the 
financial report. Where a reconciling item cannot be extracted directly from the financial report, 
the reconciliation should show how the figure is calculated. Where comparative non-IFRS 
financial information is presented for a previous period, a reconciliation to the corresponding 
IFRS financial information should be provided for that previous period (ASIC 2011, p. 18). 
 
The Regulatory Guide also requires the GAAP (IFRS) figure and a reconciliation between the 
two figures be located somewhere in each document that contains a non-GAAP figure (ASIC 
2011, p. 20). This guideline seems to have had little effect on the press releases issued by 
companies with only a slight increase from 23% including a reconciliation in 2011 to 31% in 
2012. The percentage then decreased to 23% in 2013. Only full, detailed reconciliations were 
counted in this study. Some companies briefly stated the items excluded in a sentence or 
provided a less detailed tabular version. For example, in Invocare’s 2014 media release there 
was a simple statement as to what had been excluded from the non-GAAP figure with no full 
reconciliation or any direction as to where to find one: 
Excerpt from Invocare 2014 press release 
 
 
The ASX annual report from 2012 had a table in the appendix but simply showed the 
difference between the GAAP and non-GAAP figures as being ‘Significant Items After 
Income Tax’. 
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Excerpt from table in appendix of ASX 2012 press release 
 
 
Several companies directed the reader to another document such as the financial report or 
annual report or to the company’s website to find a reconciliation. This is unsatisfactory if the 
report containing the reconciliation is not released until sometime after the press release.  
 
The requirement of the Regulatory Guide to provide a reconciliation had a greater effect on 
the annual report with full reconciliations rising from 50% in 2010 to 60% in 2011 and then to 
75% in 2012. However, there are still, on average, a quarter of the companies in the sample 
not providing a full, detailed reconciliation in their annual report up to the end of the 2015 
year and 69% of companies not providing one in their press release. This finding calls into 
question the incremental value-relevant information motive for reporting non-GAAP profit 
figures. With evidence that the non-GAAP figure can be more misleading without a 
reconciliation this behaviour appears to be opportunistic, particularly as the Regulatory Guide 
requires a reconciliation, and should be of concern to investors and regulators alike. 
 
8.8 Summary 
This chapter discussed the findings from this study into the reporting of non-GAAP profit 
figures in Australia. The findings indicate that the practice of reporting these figures has 
become entrenched in the financial reporting landscape in Australia and that although the 
release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 has gone some way towards regulating the 
practice, some companies still behave opportunistically when reporting non-GAAP profits. 
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Company characteristics can influence a company’s decision to report a non-GAAP profit, 
particularly size and leverage, but the significance of the characteristic is affected by the year 
in question. However, company characteristics had little influence on the use of impression 
management when reporting non-GAAP profits with only leverage having an effect in more 
than one year. Of the four specific events that were analysed, the GFC and the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide were statistically significant in affecting the decision to report a non-GAAP 
figure as well as in using impression management techniques. Further analysis revealed that it 
was the emphasis placed on the GAAP figure that changed rather than the emphasis on the 
non-GAAP figure. The results for Research Questions 3 and 4 highlight the importance of 
timeliness where the use of impression management tactics are concerned, with most of the 
significant results being in, or driven by, the press release. These findings reveal possible 
avenues for further research. This will be discussed in the next chapter which concludes this 
study. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to examine the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures in Australia 
over an extended period, ranging from before the introduction of IFRS to after the release of 
the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230. Two possible motives for the practice have been suggested; 
the first is that management is attempting to provide incremental, value-relevant information 
to assist shareholders and potential investors in decision making, and the second is that 
management is behaving opportunistically and attempting to mislead shareholders and 
potential investors by managing their impression of the company’s performance. This study 
acknowledged that these two motives may not be mutually exclusive and in the first instance 
investigated the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure by Australian companies. It then 
examined the use by companies of impression management tactics concerning emphasis when 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures. Four research questions and sixteen related hypotheses 
were developed to investigate which company characteristics and specific events influence a 
company’s choice to report a non-GAAP profit figure and also influence the use of 
impression management tactics to emphasise the figure. The research questions are: 
RQ1 Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit figures influenced by specific 
firm characteristics? 
RQ2 Is the company’s choice to report non-GAAP profit figures influenced by specific 
events?  
RQ3 Is the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP and 
GAAP profit figures influenced by specific firm characteristics?  
RQ4 Is the use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP and 
GAAP profit figures influenced by specific events?  
 
A summary of the key findings of the study is presented in Section 9.2 followed by the 
contributions and implications of the study in section 9.3. Limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research are discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5 respectively.  
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9.2 Summary of Key Findings 
This study used a final sample of 109 companies from the ASX 200 that were listed for the 
entire period of the study. It was evident that the reporting of non-GAAP profits has become 
entrenched in the financial reporting landscape in Australia. The results showed that the 
practice increased steadily over the twelve years of the study with 79% of the sample 
reporting a non-GAAP figure in 2015, up from 46% in 2004, the first year of the study. The 
mean non-GAAP profit figures exceeded the mean GAAP profit figures in all but two years of 
the study and the majority of companies reported a higher non-GAAP profit than GAAP 
profit in all but these same two years (2006 and 2007).  
 
Non-GAAP profit figures may be strategically calculated and emphasised to influence 
perceptions of the company’s performance and may mislead shareholders and prospective 
investors, particularly those that are less experienced or ‘sophisticated’ (Elliott 2006; 
Frederickson & Miller 2004; Godfrey, Mather & Ramsay 2003; James & Michello 2010; 
Marques 2010; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). It is therefore imperative that the reporting of 
these figures not be misleading, and that companies commit to following the guidelines 
suggested by ASIC. 
 
An analysis of the terminology used by companies to label the non-GAAP profit figures 
raised several areas of concern, including the large variety of different terms used across the 
sample, the use of different terms by the same company across different years, and the use of 
a variety of different terms by the same company for the same figure in the same year. 
Although this labelling has become more consistent between and within companies since 
2009, there is still a wide variety of labels being used by companies, which can cause 
confusion to shareholders and investors. 
 
Research Question 1 investigated the influence certain company characteristics may have on 
the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure. Size, leverage and having a ‘bad news’ year 
were statistically significantly related to this decision for the total sample as a whole. Size and 
leverage were also statistically significant in the majority of the years covered by the study, 
with larger companies and more highly leveraged companies choosing to report non-GAAP 
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profit figures. Although statistically significant in some years, the variable ‘ownership 
concentration’ did not influence the decision to report non-GAAP profits in the majority of 
the years in the study. 
 
Research Question 2 investigated whether certain events may have influenced the decision to 
report a non-GAAP profit figure. As mentioned above, the reporting of non-GAAP profits by 
the companies in the sample increased steadily over the twelve years of the study. The results 
showed that surrounding each of the events investigated, some companies began reporting 
non-GAAP profits and other companies stopped reporting non-GAAP profits, with the 
particular event not seeming to influence the decision in one particular direction. The 
exception to this was between 2007 and 2009, where a statistically significant number of 
companies began reporting non-GAAP profits. The GFC therefore significantly influenced 
behaviour in one direction as far as the decision to report a non-GAAP profit figure was 
concerned. 
 
The study then focussed on the use of impression management tactics concerning emphasis 
when reporting non-GAAP profit figures with Research Questions 3 and 4. Impression 
management tactics to strategically emphasise non-GAAP profit figures can influence 
perceptions of the company’s performance and mislead shareholders and other users (Elliott 
2006; Frederickson & Miller 2004; Godfrey, Mather & Ramsay 2003; James & Michello 
2010; Marques 2010; Merkl-Davies & Brennan 2007). Recommendations that the GAAP 
figure should be given equal or greater prominence than the non-GAAP figure were key in 
both the AICD and FINSIA guidelines and the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230, highlighting the 
importance of this issue (AICD & FINSIA 2009; ASIC 2011).  
 
Research Question 3 investigated the influence certain company characteristics may have on 
the use of impression management tactics to highlight the non-GAAP figure compared to the 
GAAP figure. For the total sample, size, leverage and good/bad news years significantly 
influenced the use of impression management tactics in the press release. Ownership 
concentration and good/bad news years were statistically significant for the total sample in the 
total of both documents investigated. On a year-by-year basis, leverage had a statistically 
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significant effect on the use of impression management tactics in seven of the ten significant 
models. Size, ownership concentration and good/bad news years were found to influence the 
choice to use impression management tactics in only a few instances.  
 
Research Question 4 investigated the influence certain events may have had on the use of 
impression management tactics to emphasise the non-GAAP profit figure compared to the 
GAAP profit figure. The use of impression management tactics to emphasise non-GAAP over 
GAAP significantly increased during the GFC in the press release and significantly decreased 
after the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 in the press release. The results for the 
annual report were not significant, highlighting the importance of the press release as a timely 
instrument for the use of impression management tactics. Results showed that the relative 
emphasis was equal, or favoured the GAAP figure, in the years directly following the release 
of the ASIC Regulatory Guide. The Guide required equal or greater prominence to be given to 
the GAAP figure and hence appeared to be effective. However, in 2015 the emphasis reverted 
to the non-GAAP figure being slightly more prominent which indicates a change in behaviour 
that may cause concern to ASIC and shareholders alike. 
 
The results highlight the importance placed on the press release, as opposed to the annual 
report, as a timely avenue for the use of impression management tactics. The annual results 
press release serves a dual purpose of imparting information about the company’s 
performance, and also a promotional or persuasive purpose of attempting to ‘favourably 
influence readers’ views of that performance’ (Henry 2008, p. 368). Previous studies have 
shown that not only are people strongly influenced by the first piece of information to which 
they are exposed, but that information biases their evaluation of any subsequent information 
(Asch 1946; Hirshleifer & Teoh 2003; Huang, Nekrasov & Teoh 2012; Lim, Benbasat & 
Ward 2000). The information in press releases is usually unaudited and the document is often 
released a couple of months or more before the annual report. This means it offers a prime 
opportunity to influence the thinking and decision making of shareholders and other users of 
financial information. This is an important finding that highlights the need for ASIC to 
monitor all disclosure documents in their annual reviews and not simply financial reports.  
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Further analysis of the use of impression management tactics concerning emphasis revealed 
that the behaviour of companies regarding the use of impression management to emphasise 
the non-GAAP profit figure has changed little over the twelve years. The more significant 
change in behaviour related to the emphasis of the GAAP profit figure. The results showed 
that since 2006, the year the majority of the sample companies had to fully implement IFRS 
for the first time, the emphasis of non-GAAP figures has been reasonably constant. There was 
a statistically significant increase in emphasis on non-GAAP figures for the annual report and 
the total of the two documents between 2005 and 2006 and for the press release and the total 
of the two documents between 2004 and 2006. However, since 2006 companies have not 
significantly emphasised the non-GAAP figure to a greater or lesser extent. Even the 
introduction of ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 had little effect on the emphasis scores for non-
GAAP figures. Instead, the statistically significant changes in behaviour since 2006 concerned 
the emphasis placed on the GAAP figure. This figure was less emphasised during the GFC 
and more emphasised since the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide. This is an 
important finding as it highlights the need for research to assess the use of impression 
management tactics for both non-GAAP and GAAP figures.  
 
The results also highlight the poor uptake of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 requirement that 
companies provide a full reconciliation between the GAAP and non-GAAP profit figures with 
adjustments separately itemised and explained (ASIC 2011, p. 18). The Guide also requires 
this reconciliation to be present in each document containing a non-GAAP figure (ASIC 
2011, p. 20). Although there has been marked improvement in providing reconciliations in 
annual reports since the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide, the practice is lacking in 
annual results press releases with only 31% of companies providing a full reconciliation in 
this document in 2015. The reconciliations that do appear in annual reports are often included 
in the “Notes” section after the financial statements, a section that inexperienced shareholders 
and investors may not necessarily read or understand. The lack of reconciliations in press 
releases could be construed as part of the impression management tactics employed by the 
companies and also challenges the value relevance argument for disclosing non-GAAP profit 
figures. If the calculation and disclosure of a non-GAAP profit figure is an attempt to provide 
incremental, value-relevant information then the presence of a detailed reconciliation should 
only enhance the provision of such information. Previous studies have shown that the 
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presence of a reconciliation mitigates the effects of impression management (Allee et al. 
2007; Elliott 2006; Marques 2010) and press releases, being unregulated and more timely than 
annual reports, are prime documents for the use of opportunistic behaviour by management. 
Therefore, not including a reconciliation, even when regulation requires it, supports the 
opportunistic motive argument. 
 
9.3 Contributions and Implications of the Study 
This study makes contributions to theory and to the literature concerning impression 
management, determinants of voluntary disclosure and agency theory. Firstly, it contributes to 
agency theory by exploring the relationship between information asymmetry, bonding 
mechanisms and the residual loss empirically in an applied situation, that is, the disclosure of 
non-GAAP profit figures. The study finds that company characteristics (such as size, leverage 
and the reporting of ‘bad’ news) and specific events (such as the GFC) exacerbate information 
asymmetry and lead to additional voluntary disclosure in the form of non-GAAP profits as a 
bonding mechanism. The study also finds that during certain events such as the GFC, 
managers behave opportunistically by taking advantage of any residual loss and use 
impression management tactics to potentially mislead shareholders and investors. However, 
this opportunistic behaviour can be tempered by regulation surrounding the provision of non-
GAAP information. The use of impression management tactics to emphasise the non-GAAP 
figure compared to the GAAP figure decreased in both the press release and annual report 
after the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 in December 2011. In fact, the relative 
emphasis score showed that after the introduction of this regulation, the GAAP profit figure 
was emphasised more than the non-GAAP profit figure, on average, for the first time since 
2005 with a statistically significant change in the relative emphasis in the press release 
between 2010 and 2012. A possible explanation for this is that the release of the Regulatory 
Guide, and follow-up surveillance by ASIC, provided additional external monitoring which 
resulted in a reduction of the residual loss. 
 
Secondly, the study contributes to the growing literature on non-GAAP profits by looking at 
the phenomenon with the same sample of companies over an extended timeframe of twelve 
years. Previous studies have generally investigated the practice over a period of one to three 
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years and often totalled the data from each year rather than investigating the years 
individually. This study uses one of the longest time periods covered in any study on non-
GAAP profits and investigates the data from each year separately as well as the total sample. 
By studying each year separately, the results illustrate how different events affect the decision 
to report a non-GAAP profit and the use of impression management tactics when doing so. It 
is one of only a few studies that investigate the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures around 
the GFC and the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230. It is also the only study that 
investigates the effect of the introduction of IFRS in Australia on the practice of reporting 
non-GAAP profit figures.  
 
The study also contributes to the literature on non-GAAP profits as it is one of a limited 
number of studies conducted in the Australian context. Marques (2017) highlights the lack of 
studies in the Australian context, calling not only for more studies from the country but also 
for studies that investigate the influence of IFRS and the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory 
Guide. This study fills these gaps in the literature. Of the limited studies based in Australia, 
only a couple have adopted an opportunistic behaviour perspective (Cameron, Percy & 
Stevenson-Clarke 2012; Johnson et al. 2014), with one of these involving an experiment and 
not based on actual company reports (Johnson et al. 2014). Studies concerning non-GAAP 
profits are overwhelmingly based in the US, which has had regulation covering the practice 
since 2002. For eight of the twelve years covered by this study, the practice of reporting non-
GAAP profits was not regulated in Australia. The results therefore provide valuable insights 
into the practice of reporting non-GAAP profits, and the use of impression management 
tactics when doing so, in an environment not constrained by regulation. ASIC’s Regulatory 
Guide 230 was released in December 2011, meaning the last four years of this study were in a 
‘regulated’ environment. However, it is important to remember that unlike Regulation G in 
the US, which was made law through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, ASIC’s Regulatory 
Guide 230 is a guide released by ASIC and is not actual law. This study is also one of only a 
few that covers the introduction of the ASIC Regulatory Guide in Australia and its effect on 
the use of impression management tactics in the time following its release. 
 
Thirdly, the study extends the body of work on impression management. Extant impression 
management literature has questioned ‘management intentionality’ with reference to the use 
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of impression management tactics and whether this behaviour is conscious or unconscious 
(Guillamon-Saorin, Garcia Osma & Jones 2012, p. 162). It could be argued that any use of 
impression management tactics concerning emphasis of the non-GAAP profit figure 
compared to the GAAP profit figure since the release of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 is a 
conscious choice as the guide explicitly prohibits this behaviour. The study also contributes to 
the impression management work through the findings that companies did not radically 
change their use of impression management tactics when reporting non-GAAP profit figures. 
In reality, the observed change in behaviour surrounding the GFC and the release of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide related to the use of impression management tactics when reporting the 
GAAP figure. This figure was less emphasised during the GFC and more emphasised post the 
Regulatory Guide’s release. This finding shows that the calculation of a relative emphasis 
score (the emphasis of non-GAAP profits relative to the emphasis of GAAP profits) is 
imperative as a tool in studies on impression management and earnings figures. A study 
focussed on changes in the use of impression management tactics and non-GAAP figures only 
would not have shown significant results around the particular events under investigation and 
the reporting behaviour as far as emphasis of one particular figure over the other would not 
have been fully comprehended and reported. 
 
Finally, the study makes a methodological contribution to the impression management 
literature through the development of a comprehensive impression management index 
concerning emphasis and prominence in both press releases and annual reports. Although 
previous studies have developed coding schemes to measure emphasis of non-GAAP profits 
or relative emphasis of non-GAAP compared to GAAP profit figures, these studies have 
overwhelmingly only coded the first occurrence of each type of number and concentrated on 
only one document (press release). This study develops a detailed coding schema that 
identifies figures beyond the first occurrence and codes both GAAP and non-GAAP figures 
for prominence and repetition in both the press release and annual report.  
 
This study also makes contributions to practice. Firstly, this study informs regulators, 
professional bodies, managers, shareholders and investors about non-GAAP profit reporting 
in Australia and the shortfalls in reporting practices. The study raises awareness of the many 
and varied labels given to non-GAAP profits by companies. These labels differ between 
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different companies, within companies from year to year and even within a single company in 
a single year (the use of multiple labels for the same figure in the same year has been 
observed in some companies). There was no standard formula for calculation which makes 
comparability across companies and over time difficult. The study also highlights some of the 
more disturbing practices of reporting companies, including excessive emphasis of non-
GAAP compared to GAAP profits and the lack of explanation in the form of a reconciliation 
between the figures. There were extreme examples in 2015 (four years post the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide) where some companies did not even report the GAAP profit in the annual 
results press release, but did report and highlight a non-GAAP profit. Although non-GAAP 
figures have been shown to have predictive value and can be useful to various stakeholders, 
their reporting is voluntary and strategic on the part of management. Consistent calculation 
and labelling and the provision of a reconciliation is therefore imperative to allow 
shareholders and investors to make informed decisions about the usefulness of these earnings 
figures. Any reconciliation needs to be prominently displayed and included in each document 
that includes a non-GAAP profit figure. 
 
Secondly, it highlights the effectiveness of guidelines from professional bodies compared to a 
Regulatory Guide from ASIC. The release in March 2009 of Underlying Profit: principles for 
reporting of non-statutory profit information by AICD and FINSIA (AICD & FINSIA 2009) 
appeared to have some effect on behaviour surrounding the reporting of non-GAAP profits 
but none of the changes were statistically significant. Simple changes suggested by the Guide, 
such as using the term ‘underlying profit’ were adopted by many companies with the use of 
that particular term increasing from 27% of the non-GAAP reporters in 2008 to 49% in 2011. 
However other suggestions such as not giving undue prominence to the non-GAAP figure and 
providing a detailed reconciliation between the figures were not significantly implemented by 
companies. The ASIC Regulatory Guide 230 had a much more prominent and significant 
effect on behaviour, particularly with respect to giving equal or greater prominence to the 
non-GAAP figure. These results indicate that professional guidelines are not as effective as 
guides from regulators such as ASIC. This finding has implications for various professional 
bodies that release guidelines to members. Much work and consideration goes into the 
development of such guidelines and the poor uptake of the suggestions should cause concern 
for the bodies involved. 
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Thirdly, it highlights issues with education and enforcement by ASIC of its Regulatory 
Guides. ASIC is the corporate regulator in Australia and has powers to administer and enforce 
the law, in particular the Corporations Act 2001. Regulatory Guides form part of the 
regulation framework and give guidance to entities by explaining how ASIC interprets the 
law. Although Regulatory Guide 230 had a significant effect on behaviour, particularly with 
respect to giving equal or greater prominence to the non-GAAP figure, the Guide was not 
being followed by all companies. This is particularly so with the requirement to provide a 
detailed reconciliation in each document where the non-GAAP profit is disclosed. Also, some 
companies still blatantly emphasised the non-GAAP profit figure over the GAAP figure after 
the release of the Guide. ASIC conducts six-monthly reviews to determine the compliance or 
otherwise with Regulatory Guides. In the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, the reporting of non-
IFRS financial information was listed as an area of focus for ASIC in its review of financial 
reports (ASIC 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b). For each of these years, ASIC 
indicated that they contacted a small number of companies with concerns about their 
compliance. However, from 2015 to 2017 there was no mention of non-IFRS information in 
the documents concerning areas of focus (ASIC 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 
2017c). If ASIC is serious about enforcement of its Regulatory Guides, then they need to 
remain vigilant in both education about requirements of the Guides, and enforcement of the 
requirements, even years after the release of particular guides.  
 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
As with any study, this study has limitations that need to be considered. The population used 
in this study was the Standard & Poor’s ASX 200 Index, obtained on 31 August 2015. The 
companies on this list accounted for 72% of the Australian equity market as at that date 
(Market Index 2015). Although the range of sizes of companies in the sample is vast (as 
measured by market capitalisation), the use of this index as the population in the study 
excludes the many medium to small companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. 
Therefore, the results of the study may not be extrapolated to smaller listed entities.  
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As this was a longitudinal study, it was imperative that the sample remained consistent 
throughout the twelve years to accurately gauge changes in behaviour. This meant that several 
companies that were not listed for this entire period were eliminated, leaving a final sample of 
109 companies. This relatively small sample size meant that some of the tests used in the 
analysis were more sensitive to the effect of outliers. The small sample size also made it 
difficult to fully investigate the effect of industry as some industry sectors were represented 
by only two or three companies. 
 
The results indicate that some managers behaved opportunistically by giving non-GAAP 
profit figures greater prominence than GAAP profits, particularly in times of economic 
downturn. Prior research has suggested that this behaviour may mislead shareholders and 
potential investors, particularly those that are inexperienced (e.g. Elliott 2006; Frederickson & 
Miller 2004; Johnson et al. 2014). However, the effect of impression management on 
investors and other users of the reports was not investigated in this study and no claim is 
made that the readers of the documents involved were actually misled. 
 
This study investigated the influence certain events may have had on the choice to calculate 
and report a non-GAAP profit figure and on the use of impression management to emphasise 
this profit over the GAAP profit. It must be acknowledged that other factors, apart from the 
specific events studied, may have caused some of the effect identified in the results. For 
example, the continued release and revision of various accounting standards over the years of 
the study may have had an influence. The initial introduction of IFRS from periods beginning 
1 January 2005 was investigated in this study but not the introduction or revisions of 
individual accounting standards after that. However, it is reasonable to expect that any 
changes to individual accounting standards would most likely influence the calculation of the 
non-GAAP profit figures in order to show financial results without the relevant changes. 
Particular items that are included or excluded in the non-GAAP profit is not part of this study. 
It is considered unlikely that an individual accounting standard would affect the decision to 
report a non-GAAP profit figure or to use impression management when doing so.  
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This study adopts the perspective that the two contrasting motives postulated by extant 
literature for the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures are not mutually exclusive and can 
indeed coexist. Events and firm characteristics influencing the decision to report non-GAAP 
profits were investigated with no assumption of opportunistic behaviour. The use of 
impression management tactics was then also investigated which does imply opportunism. 
The study did not investigate the value relevance of the non-GAAP figures and makes no 
claim as to whether the figures themselves provided incremental information to shareholders 
and other stakeholders. 
 
9.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
The findings and limitations of this study give rise to several areas for future research. To date 
only a small number of studies have been conducted into the practice of reporting non-GAAP 
profits in an Australian context and further research would enhance the understanding of both 
regulators and shareholders into the practice. The findings of this research could be enhanced 
by extending it to include a larger sample, a longer timeframe and an investigation of 
compliance with the other requirements of the ASIC Regulatory Guide 230.  The use of the 
Top 200 as the population meant that many small to medium companies were not included in 
the analysis. Similar analysis could be conducted on these smaller listed entities to see if the 
patterns observed in this study are replicated in smaller companies, where the effects of 
information asymmetry and the residual loss may not be as pronounced.  
 
Apart from this study, little to no research has yet been conducted on the effect of the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 230. This study looks at two aspects of the guide, giving equal or greater 
prominence to the GAAP profit figure and providing a detailed reconciliation between the two 
figures. However, compliance with other requirements of the guide are yet to be investigated. 
This study provides some evidence that the downward trend in emphasising non-GAAP 
compared to GAAP observed after the release of the ASIC guide was in fact beginning to 
reverse in 2015. Future research could extend the timeline of this study to the present time to 
see if the passing years, and less vigilance from ASIC in regard to non-GAAP profits, have 
resulted in the re-emergence of old habits of companies concerning emphasis of non-GAAP 
profits. This research may also involve interviews with ASIC representatives, which could be 
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conducted to determine why the organisation does not follow up more rigorously on non-
compliance with Regulatory Guides, particularly once they have been released for a few 
years. 
 
At a more general level, different aspects of the use of impression management tactics when 
reporting non-GAAP profit figures in Australia could be investigated. This study focussed on 
the use of emphasis but other topics that could be investigated include selectivity of the profit 
figures reported, the use of prior period benchmarks to make favourable comparisons to 
current performance and the manipulation of the calculation of non-GAAP profit figures to 
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. Also, the effect of factors such as board composition and 
media attention on the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures and the use of impression 
management tactics when reporting the figures could provide interesting results. 
 
The narrative surrounding the reporting of non-GAAP profit figures could also provide an 
interesting area of research, involving an analysis of the explanations and reasons given by 
companies in press releases and annual reports for the calculation and reporting of non-GAAP 
profit figures. This could then be extended to a yet to be investigated area of impression 
management. Management could be interviewed regarding their views, motives and concerns 
re the use of non-GAAP profit figures. Their reasons for highlighting one particular figure 
over another could be utilised to strengthen and complement the results of this and other 
studies.  
 
Finally, from an international perspective, few comparative studies into the practice exist. 
Interesting results and implications may be gleaned from studies that compare the Australian 
context with countries such as the US, where strict regulation has been in place since 2002, or 
other countries such as some European countries where the practice is not regulated at all.  A 
comparison between voluntary non-GAAP reporting and mandatory non-GAAP reporting could 
also be conducted by contrasting the Australian situation to that in South Africa where regulation 
makes it mandatory to report such a figure.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 - Companies included in final sample 
No 
ASX 
Code 
Company Name GICS Industry Sector 
1 ABP Abacus Property Group Stapled Real Estate 
2 ABC Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials 
3 AGI Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary 
4 ALQ Als Limited Industrials 
5 AMP AMP Limited Financials 
6 APA APA Group Stapled Utilities 
7 HT1 APN News & Media Limited (now HT&E Ltd) Consumer Discretionary 
8 ARB ARB Corporation Limited Consumer Discretionary 
9 AAD Ardent Leisure Group Stapled Consumer Discretionary 
10 ALL Aristocrat Leisure Limited Consumer Discretionary 
11 ARI Arrium Limited Materials 
12 ASX ASX Limited Financials 
13 ANZ Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Limited Financials 
14 AAC Australian Agricultural Company Limited Consumer Staples 
15 AOG Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 
16 AWE AWE Limited Energy 
17 BOQ Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 
18 BPT Beach Energy Limited Energy 
19 BEN Bendigo And Adelaide Bank Limited Financials 
20 BSL Bluescope Steel Limited Materials 
21 BLD Boral Limited Materials 
22 BRG Breville Group Limited Consumer Discretionary 
23 BWP BWP Trust Ord Units Real Estate 
24 CAB Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials 
25 CTX Caltex Australia Limited Energy 
26 CDD Cardno Limited Industrials 
27 CGF Challenger Limited Financials 
28 CQR Charter Hall Retail Reit Unit Real Estate 
29 CIM Cimic Group Limited Industrials 
30 CCL Coca-cola Amatil Limited Consumer Staples 
31 COH Cochlear Limited Health Care 
32 CBA Commonwealth Bank of Australia Financials 
33 CCP Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 
34 CMW Cromwell Property Group Stapled Real Estate 
35 CSR CSR Limited Materials 
36 DOW Downer Edi Limited Industrials 
37 DLS Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy 
38 DUE Duet Group Forus Utilities 
39 EVN Evolution Mining Limited Materials 
40 FXJ Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 
41 FLT Flight Centre Travel Group Limited Consumer Discretionary 
42 GPT GPT Group Stapled Real Estate 
43 GNC Graincorp Limited Consumer Staples 
44 GUD GUD Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
45 GWA GWA Group Limited Industrials 
46 HVN Harvey Norman Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
47 ILU Iluka Resources Limited Materials 
48 IPL Incitec Pivot Limited Materials 
49 IGO Independence Group NL Materials 
50 IAG Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials 
51 IOF Investa Office Fund Stapled Real Estate 
52 IVC Invocare Limited Consumer Discretionary 
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No 
ASX 
Code 
Company Name GICS Industry Sector 
53 IFL Ioof Holdings Limited Financials 
54 IRE Iress Limited Information Technology 
55 JBH JB Hi-fi Limited Consumer Discretionary 
59 MMS Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited Industrials 
60 MTS Metcash Limited Consumer Staples 
61 MGR Mirvac Group Stapled Real Estate 
62 MRM Mma Offshore Limited Industrials 
63 MND Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials 
64 NAB National Australia Bank Limited Financials 
65 NCM Newcrest Mining Limited Materials 
66 NST Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 
67 NUF Nufarm Limited Materials 
68 ORI Orica Limited Materials 
69 ORG Origin Energy Limited Energy 
70 OZL Oz Minerals Limited Materials 
71 PBG Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary 
72 PPT Perpetual Limited Financials 
73 PMV Premier Investments Limited Consumer Discretionary 
74 PRY Primary Health Care Limited Health Care 
75 QAN Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 
76 RHC Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 
77 REA REA Group LTD Information Technology 
78 RRL Regis Resources Limited Materials 
79 SAI SAI Global Limited Industrials 
80 SFR Sandfire Resources NL Materials 
81 STO Santos Limited Energy 
82 SHV Select Harvests Limited Consumer Staples 
83 SXY Senex Energy Limited Energy 
84 SVW Seven Group Holdings Limited Industrials 
85 SWM Seven West Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 
86 SIG Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited Health Care 
87 SGM Sims Metal Management Limited Materials 
88 SRX Sirtex Medical Limited Health Care 
89 SHL Sonic Healthcare Limited Health Care 
90 SGP Stockland Stapled Real Estate 
91 SUN Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
92 SUL Super Retail Group Limited Consumer Discretionary 
93 TAH Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
94 TGR Tassal Group Limited Consumer Staples 
95 TNE Technology One Limited Information Technology 
96 TLS Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services 
97 TEN TEN Network Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
98 TPM TPG Telecom Limited Telecommunication Services 
99 BRS Transfield Services Limited (now Broadspectrum Ltd) Industrials 
100 TCL Transurban Group Stapled Industrials 
101 UGL UGL Limited Industrials 
102 VRL Village Roadshow Limited Consumer Discretionary 
103 VOC Vocus Communications Limited Telecommunication Services 
104 WES Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 
105 WSA Western Areas Limited Materials 
106 WFD Westfield Corporation Stapled Real Estate 
107 WBC Westpac Banking Corporation Financials 
108 WOW Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 
109 WOR Worleyparsons Limited Energy 
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Appendix 2 - Coding rules for the determination of the Impression Management Index 
Rule Description 
1 Emphasis through presentation effects: Location of information, 
bullet points and types of font in Press Release 
 
Non-GAAP and GAAP figures can be located in the headline, subheadings, tables 
or in the body of the text in the press release. Also, information may be emphasised 
using bullet points, bold, italics or underlining. 
 
   Headline 
 
  Subheading 
 
• Bullet points 
• Bullet points 
 
Table   
   
   
   
 
  Bold text, italics, underlining 
 
  Plain text 
 
 
 
Coding rules for emphasis through presentation effects in Press Release, code 
ALL non-GAAP and GAAP figures: 
 
➢ code 4 if in headline 
➢ code 3 if in subheadings or bullets or bold print or table at beginning of press 
release (before any paragraphs) 
➢ code 2 if in paragraphs one or two of plain text 
➢ code 1 if in paragraphs three or four of plain text 
➢ code 1 if in a subheading or bullets or bold print or table in the body of the press 
release in amongst any paragraphs containing plain text  
➢ code 0.5 if figure comes first in document out of non-GAAP and GAAP figures 
➢ do not code plain text beyond paragraph four for emphasis 
➢ do not code ‘summary results’ table at end of press release for emphasis 
 
2 Emphasis through presentation effects: Location of information in 
Annual Report 
 
Non-GAAP and GAAP figures can be located in various sections of the annual 
report including highlights, chair or CEO letter, key financial statistics, directors’ 
report, review of operations, financial statements, and notes to the statements.  
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Coding rules for emphasis through location in Annual Report, code ALL non-
GAAP and GAAP figures: 
 
A score is given if the number is reported in a particular section of the Annual 
Report. Only one score for emphasis is given for each type of number per section. If 
the number is repeated within a section do not score the repeated number for 
emphasis.  
 
➢ code 3 if in the highlights section – this section is located at the beginning of the 
annual report and usually contains bullet points, graphs and/or tables 
➢ code 2 if in the Chairman’s letter  
➢ code 2 if in the CEO letter 
➢ code 1 if in the key financials 
➢ code 1 if in the Directors’ Report and/or the Review of Operations 
➢ code 0.5 if figure comes first in the entire document out of non-GAAP and GAAP 
figures 
➢ do not code Financial Statements, Notes to Statements or sections beyond the 
Notes to Statements 
  
3 Emphasis through repetition 
 
A non-GAAP or GAAP figure reported in one section of the press release or annual 
report can be repeated. This repetition can serve to emphasise the figure. 
 
Coding rules for emphasis through repetition of information in Press Release 
and Annual Report, code ALL non-GAAP and GAAP figures: 
 
➢ code and total repetition in press release and annual report separately 
➢ code 0 for first time mentioned in document 
➢ code 0.5 for each time a figure is repeated after the first time 
➢ code entire press release, including all paragraphs and financial summary at end of 
document 
➢ for annual report code repetition of figures to the end of the Directors’ Report or 
Review of Operations 
➢ do not code repetition in Financial Statements, Notes to Statements or sections 
beyond the Notes to Statements 
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Appendix 3 - Examples of coded press releases – non-GAAP coding in red, GAAP 
coding in blue 
 
Example 1 - CSR Annual Results Press Release 2005 
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Example 2 – IOOF Annual Results Press Release 2007 
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Example 3 – UGL Annual Results Press Release 2014 
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Appendix 4 - Frequency of non-GAAP profit figures and EBIT/EBITDA (percentages are percent of total sample) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % 
Reported an EBITDA or EBIT 
figure  
66 61 69 63 68 62 73 67 72 66 73 67 73 67 74 68 79 72 79 72 81 74 83 76 
Reported a non-GAAP profit figure 50 46 53 49 57 52 57 52 64 59 69 63 71 65 72 66 75 69 79 72 88 81 86 79 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5  - Location of non-GAAP profit figures (percentages are percent of non-GAAP reporters for that year) 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % 
 Press release 46 92 47 89 52 91 51 89 60 94 65 94 66 93 66 92 70 93 74 94 77 88 77 90 
 Annual report: Highlights 30 60 29 55 37 65 35 61 40 63 43 62 38 54 40 56 45 60 48 61 49 56 46 53 
 Chair or CEO letter 33 66 30 57 44 77 42 74 49 77 48 70 50 70 51 71 57 76 59 75 57 65 55 64 
 Directors’ Report or Review of 
Operations 
29 58 39 74 44 77 45 79 51 80 47 68 51 72 59 82 65 87 66 84 80 91 78 91 
 Financial Statements 4 8 7 13 5 9 4 7 6 9 6 9 6 8 4 6 3 4 3 4 4 5 2 2 
 Notes to Financial Statements 8 16 12 23 17 30 14 25 15 23 22 32 19 27 24 33 28 37 29 37 28 32 31 36 
 Other 9 18 8 15 9 16 10 18 16 25 16 23 16 23 16 22 18 24 19 24 19 22 20 23 
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Appendix 6 - Terminology used by companies when reporting non-GAAP profit figures 
 Key Terminology Used 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % n= % 
Underlying  5 10 12 23 9 16 11 19 17 27 22 32 29 41 35 49 39 52 40 51 45 51 44 51 
Normalised  2 4 2 4 7 12 8 14 11 17 10 14 8 11 6 8 4 5 2 3 4 5 5 6 
Operating  9 18 7 13 10 18 13 23 9 14 11 16 10 14 10 14 10 13 11 14 11 13 8 9 
Cash Earnings 3 6 3 6 4 7 5 9 5 8 3 4 4 6 4 6 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 6 
Profit after tax excluding …  6 12 5 9 8 14 3 5 3 5 6 9 4 6 3 4 2 3 4 5 7 8 5 6 
Profit after tax before (or pre) … 15 30 17 32 10 18 7 12 10 16 9 13 8 11 7 10 8 11 9 11 8 9 9 10 
Core 2 4 3 6 2 4 2 4 2 3 4 6 2 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 
Distributable 1 2 1 2 2 4 3 5 3 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Trading 0 0 1 2 2 4 2 4 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other 7 14 2 4 3 5 3 5 2 3 2 3 4 6 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 5 6 
Total 50 100 53 100 57 100 57 100 64 100 69 100 71 100 72 100 75 100 79 100 88 100 86 100 
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Appendix 7 - Descriptive statistics for independent variables for Research Question 1 
Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Panel A: SIZE (log of market capitalisation) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 8.5490 8.6579 8.8094 9.0086 8.8844 8.7502 8.8893 9.0283 9.1120 9.2790 9.3053 9.3998 
Standard Deviation 0.8985 0.8615 0.8908 0.9065 1.0006 0.8757 0.7856 0.6855 0.5198 0.5426 0.5475 0.6056 
1st Quartile 7.9178 8.1665 8.1909 8.5537 8.2964 8.3148 8.4607 8.4740 8.8123 8.9003 195.41 8.9321 
Median 8.5986 8.6667 8.7300 8.9842 8.8416 8.7572 8.8347 9.0255 8.9847 9.1607 8.9622 9.2154 
3rd Quartile 9.2001 9.2001 9.6186 9.7043 9.6990 9.2115 9.2810 9.3282 9.3014 9.5491 9.0233 9.8779 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Mean 9.2562 9.3591 9.4095 9.5179 9.3302 9.3531 9.4210 9.4228 9.3650 9.3790 9.4505 9.4295 
Standard Deviation 0.7118 0.7207 0.5941 0.5495 0.6001 0.6640 0.5847 0.5484 0.6291 0.6228 0.5775 0.6060 
1st Quartile 8.8403 9.0385 8.9694 9.1656 9.0420 8.9407 9.0000 8.9802 8.9825 8.9570 9.0332 8.9730 
Median 9.1257 9.3280 9.2620 9.4168 9.2505 9.3359 9.3992 9.3617 9.2874 9.2778 9.3402 9.3134 
3rd Quartile 9.7894 9.8164 9.8178 9.8693 9.7257 9.7166 9.7368 9.7268 9.7179 9.7606 9.8337 9.8362 
All companies  
Mean 8.8734 8.9988 9.1232 9.2749 9.1461 9.1318 9.2356 9.2889 9.2861 9.3515 9.4225 9.4233 
Standard Deviation 0.8881 0.8672 0.8052 0.7860 0.8165 0.7998 0.7055 0.6242 0.6063 0.6010 0.5722 0.6032 
1st Quartile 8.3943 8.5523 8.6619 8.8449 8.7036 8.6814 8.8347 8.9188 8.8921 8.9048 9.0092 8.9503 
Median 8.9838 9.1068 9.1832 9.3425 9.1954 9.1267 9.1994 9.2258 9.1712 9.2310 9.2968 9.3095 
3rd Quartile 9.4793 9.5888 9.6823 9.8396 9.7119 9.6574 9.6275 9.6642 9.6567 9.6906 9.7894 9.8377 
Panel B: OWN (ownership concentration = percentage shares owned by top twenty shareholder) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 61.47 60.55 65.32 65.51 68.61 68.80 67.69 68.64 73.73 75.11 77.42 75.78 
Standard Deviation 16.68 16.19 17.37 16.76 14.75 13.71 14.15 14.01 12.26 13.64 10.00 12.61 
1st Quartile 52.09 48.71 56.50 56.00 57.04 59.57 59.06 57.50 64.48 67.57 71.49 69.87 
Median 60.74 61.04 67.82 67.01 72.00 69.51 69.03 70.31 76.12 78.57 79.48 77.65 
3rd Quartile 72.86 72.15 78.93 77.29 79.92 80.55 77.85 79.91 82.70 85.47 84.67 86.32 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Mean 62.38 62.73 60.08 62.87 62.55 64.64 68.04 70.21 69.56 69.87 71.87 72.82 
Standard Deviation 19.17 18.70 17.05 17.93 17.31 15.64 14.75 14.34 14.18 13.83 14.11 14.36 
1st Quartile 46.82 44.32 49.66 50.41 49.66 51.84 57.02 59.50 58.38 59.91 60.63 61.37 
Median 63.99 67.46 59.64 61.84 62.48 65.29 68.78 70.91 71.10 71.20 73.59 75.43 
3rd Quartile 79.70 79.17 75.26 77.32 79.39 77.72 80.24 82.21 81.19 82.29 83.85 84.75 
All companies 
Mean 61.89 61.61 62.58 64.13 65.05 66.17 67.92 69.68 70.86 71.31 72.94 73.44 
Standard Deviation 17.79 17.41 17.32 17.35 16.51 15.03 14.48 14.18 13.69 13.91 13.56 14.00 
1st Quartile 48.47 48.38 50.78 53.21 52.71 56.18 57.53 58.95 59.67 62.05 63.60 63.63 
Median 62.30 62.18 62.63 64.73 65.27 66.85 68.78 70.45 72.92 74.39 74.95 76.54 
3rd Quartile 75.55 75.46 76.03 77.28 79.76 79.34 80.04 81.44 82.20 82.91 84.07 85.18 
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Statistic 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Panel C: LEV (leverage = total liabilities to total assets) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 0.4186 0.4468 0.4549 0.4703 0.4310 0.4202 0.4374 0.4220 0.4126 0.4173 0.3954 0.4112 
Standard Deviation 0.2137 0.2321 0.2148 0.2258 0.2481 0.2458 0.2287 0.2000 0.2264 0.1872 0.2160 0.1979 
1st Quartile 0.2570 0.2970 0.2881 0.3204 0.2056 0.2039 0.2519 0.2868 0.2066 0.2752 0.2209 0.2821 
Median 0.4652 0.4629 0.5069 0.4857 0.4745 0.4034 0.4271 0.4360 0.3886 0.3814 0.3390 0.3721 
3rd Quartile 0.5592 0.6022 0.6124 0.6330 0.6241 0.6385 0.6102 0.5474 0.5824 0.5690 0.5861 0.5747 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit 
Mean 0.5551 0.5563 0.6280 0.6097 0.5994 0.5453 0.5251 0.5273 0.5405 0.5389 0.5173 0.5242 
Standard Deviation 0.2101 0.2100 0.2079 0.2057 0.1990 0.2222 0.2253 0.2199 0.2051 0.1992 0.1927 0.2014 
1st Quartile 0.3911 0.4246 0.4536 0.4576 0.4618 0.3945 0.3706 0.3881 0.4259 0.4175 0.3850 0.3965 
Median 0.5188 0.5212 0.6157 0.5780 0.5682 0.4957 0.4761 0.4983 0.5241 0.5134 0.4905 0.4989 
3rd Quartile 0.6803 0.6661 0.7783 0.7904 0.7542 0.7052 0.6874 0.6673 0.6693 0.6503 0.5935 0.6410 
All companies  
Mean 0.4818 0.5000 0.5454 0.5432 0.5299 0.4994 0.4945 0.4916 0.5006 0.5055 0.4938 0.5004 
Standard Deviation 0.2219 0.2274 0.2275 0.2256 0.2348 0.2378 0.2293 0.2182 0.2192 0.2026 0.2022 0.2050 
1st Quartile 0.3428 0.3497 0.3950 0.3913 0.3918 0.3396 0.3488 0.3484 0.3661 0.3840 0.3576 0.3657 
Median 0.4806 0.5021 0.5563 0.5477 0.5344 0.4780 0.4693 0.4660 0.4763 0.4711 0.4643 0.4803 
3rd Quartile 0.6083 0.6378 0.6819 0.6842 0.6925 0.6740 0.6574 0.6252 0.6222 0.6096 0.5899 0.6046 
Panel D: BAD (bad news firm = decrease in GAAP profit or GAAP loss, good news firm = same or increase in profit) 
Companies not reporting non-GAAP profit 
Bad News Companies   n (%) 19  (32) 17  (30) 17  (33) 21  (40) 21  (47) 19  (48) 12  (32) 12  (32) 13  (38) 7  (23) 8  (38) 6  (26) 
Good News Companies  n (%) 40  (68) 39  (70) 35  (67) 31  (60) 24  (53) 21  (52) 26  (68) 25  (68) 21  (62) 23  (77) 13  (62) 17  (74) 
Total                n (%) 59 (100) 56 (100) 52 (100) 52 (100) 45 (100) 40 (100) 38 (100) 37 (100) 34 (100) 30 (100) 21 (100) 23 (100) 
Companies reporting non-GAAP profit  
Bad News Companies   n (%) 6  (12) 17  (32) 17  (30) 13  (23) 35  (55) 45  (65) 13  (18) 36  (50) 43  (57) 35  (44) 31  (35) 38  (44) 
Good News Companies  n (%) 44  (88) 36  (68) 40  (70) 44  (77) 29  (45) 24  (35)  58  (82) 36  (50) 32  (43) 44  (56) 57  (65) 48  (56) 
All companies  
Bad News Companies   n (%) 25  (23) 34  (31) 34  (31) 34  (31) 56  (51) 64  (59) 25  (23) 48  (44) 56  (51) 42  (39) 39  (36) 44  (40) 
Good News Companies  n (%) 84  (77) 75  (69) 75  (69) 75  (69) 53  (49) 45  (41) 84  (77) 61  (56) 53  (49) 67  (61) 70  (64) 65  (60) 
Total                n (%) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 
109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 (100) 109 
(100) 
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Appendix 8 - Univariate t-test results for independent variables for Research Question 1  
 Size  
(log of market capitalisation) 
Own Concentration 
(% owned by top 20) 
Leverage 
(total liabilities/total assets) 
Predicted direction + - + 
2004    
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.2562 62.3846% 55.5135% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.5490 61.4708% 41.8618% 
Difference .70718 0.91375% 13.65170% 
 t (107) = 4.496, p = 0.000** t (107) = 0.266, p = 0.396 t (106) = 3.335, p = 0.000** 
2005 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.3591 62.7309% 55.6367% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.6579 60.5588% 44.6824% 
Difference .70122 2.17219% 10.95424% 
 t (107) = 4.596, p = 0.000** t (107) = 0.649, p = 0.259 t (107) = 2.578, p = 0.006** 
2006 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.4095 60.0858% 62.8008% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.8094 65.3244% 45.4901% 
Difference .60003 -5.23863% 17.31073% 
 t (87.6) = 4.097, p = 0.000** t (107) = 1.588, p = 0.058 t (107) = 4.272, p = 0.000** 
2007 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.5179 62.8760% 60.9765% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.0086 65.5119% 47.0331% 
Difference .50925 -2.63596% 13.94340% 
 t (82.5) = 3.506, p = 0.000** t (107) = -0.791, p = 0.216 t (107) = 3.373, p = 0.000** 
2008 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.3302 62.5520% 59.9473% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.8844 68.6196% 43.1084% 
Difference .44579 -6.06752% 16.83883% 
 t (66.1) = 2.670, p = 0.005** t (107) = -1.912, p = 0.030* t (107) = 3.924, p = 0.000** 
2009 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.3531 64.6496% 54.5324% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.7502 68.8017% 42.0272% 
Difference .60280 -4.15218% 12.50517% 
 t (107) = 4.054, p = 0.000** t (107) = -1.396, p = 0.083 t (107) = 2.723, p = 0.004** 
2010 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.4210 68.0428% 52.5117% 
No non-GAAP Profit  8.8893 67.6929% 43.7422% 
Difference .53174 0.34992% 8.76943% 
 t (107) = 4.002, p = 0.000** t (107) = 0.120, p = 0.453 t (107) = 1.926, p = 0.029* 
2011 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.4228 70.2171% 52.7371% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.0283 68.6400% 42.2084% 
Difference .39443 1.57708% 10.52867% 
 t (107) = 3.260, p = 0.000** t (107) = 0.548, p = 0.293 t (107) = 2.438, p = 0.008** 
2012 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.3650 69.5605% 54.0537% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.1120 73.7324% 41.2658% 
Difference -.25293 -4.17182% 12.78782% 
 t (107) = 2.047, p = 0.022* t (107) = -1.482, p = 0.071 t (107) = 2.918, p = 0.002** 
2013 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.3790 69.8767% 53.8982% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.2790 75.1180% 41.7345% 
Difference .09997 -5.24129% 12.16369% 
 t (107) = 0.774, p = 0.220 t (107) = -1.774, p = 0.040* t (107) = 2.892, p = 0.003** 
2014 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.4505 71.8708% 51.7353% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.3053 77.4262% 39.5429% 
Difference .14521 -5.55540% 12.19240% 
 t (107) = 1.045, p = 0.149 t (41.4) = -2.095, p = 0.021* t (107) = 2.544, p = 0.006** 
2015 
Non-GAAP Profit Reported  9.4295 72.8241% 52.4253% 
No non-GAAP Profit  9.3998 75.7843% 41.1217% 
Difference .02976 -2.96028% 11.30363% 
 t (107) = 0.209, p = 0.418  t (107) = -0.899, p = 0.185 t (107) = 2.399, p = 0.009** 
NOTE: Where the Levene’s Test was significant (p ≤ 0.05), the results for ‘equal variances not assumed’ have been reported. 
Reported p values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Appendix 9 - Pearson Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables for Research 
Question 1  
 
Size (Log Market 
Cap) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Leverage 
Panel A: Total Sample 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.023 1.00  
Leverage 0.500** -0.219** 1.00 
Panel B: 2004 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.034 1.00  
Leverage 0.587** -0.028 1.00 
Panel C: 2005 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.022 1.00  
Leverage 0.611** -0.059 1.00 
Panel D: 2006 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.033 1.00  
Leverage 0.576** -0.161 1.00 
Panel E: 2007 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration 0.020 1.00  
Leverage 0.566** -0.199* 1.00 
Panel F: 2008 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.057 1.00  
Leverage 0.540** -0.251** 1.00 
Panel G: 2009 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.055 1.00  
Leverage 0.426** -0.240* 1.00 
Panel H: 2010 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.089 1.00  
Leverage 0.344** -0.225* 1.00 
Panel I: 2011 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -.090 1.00  
Leverage 0.435** -0.290** 1.00 
Panel J: 2012 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.163 1.00  
Leverage 0.466** -0.315** 1.00 
Panel K: 2013 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.142 1.00  
Leverage 0.508** -0.338** 1.00 
Panel L: 2014 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.260** 1.00  
Leverage 0.560** -0.350** 1.00 
Panel M: 2015 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.203* 1.00  
Leverage 0.540** -0.318** 1.00 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 10 - Outliers eliminated in logistic regression for total sample model – 
Research Question 1 
Company Industry 
Year Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary 
2007 -1.15693 0.01763 0.01300 
2008 -0.87389 0.01213 0.01564 
2009 -0.86840 0.01430 0.01861 
2010 -0.94143 0.01679 0.01859 
2006 -2.23817 0.01676 0.00333 
Bendigo And Adelaide Bank Limited Financials 
2004 0.62713 0.00464 0.01165 
2005 0.62047 0.00454 0.01164 
Bluescope Steel Limited Materials 2006 -2.02710 0.01661 0.00403 
Cimic Group Limited Industrials 
2007 -2.10014 0.01178 0.00266 
2008 -2.27640 0.01417 0.00273 
2015 -2.26713 0.01820 0.00353 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2008 1.14570 0.01635 0.01230 
Cromwell Property Group Stapled Real Estate 2004 -0.78847 0.00804 0.01277 
Duet Group Forus Utilities 2012 -2.07008 0.01510 0.00351 
Lend Lease Group Stapled Real Estate 2015 -2.54966 0.01741 0.00267 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials 
2004 -2.28221 0.01724 0.00330 
2005 -2.38042 0.01697 0.00299 
2007 -2.77033 0.02265 0.00294 
2008 -2.55522 0.02123 0.00324 
2009 -2.88467 0.02720 0.00326 
2010 -2.58748 0.01958 0.00292 
2011 -3.15482 0.02875 0.00288 
2012 -3.00019 0.02721 0.00301 
2013 -2.45479 0.01907 0.00315 
2014 -2.64451 0.02133 0.00304 
2015 -2.81247 0.02347 0.00296 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 
2006 -2.28273 0.01363 0.00261 
2007 -2.03887 0.01084 0.00260 
2009 -2.24334 0.01505 0.00298 
Regis Resources Limited Materials 2005 2.18693 0.02383 0.00496 
Santos Limited Energy 2007 -2.15901 0.01442 0.00308 
Senex Energy Limited Energy 
2004 -0.49640 0.00348 0.01393 
2005 -0.52989 0.00413 0.01451 
2006 -0.57870 0.00515 0.01513 
2007 -0.57709 0.00486 0.01440 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
2008 -2.97532 0.02795 0.00315 
2009 -2.78489 0.02263 0.00291 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services 
2004 -2.46334 0.03449 0.00565 
2006 -2.47811 0.02917 0.00473 
2007 -2.70881 0.02259 0.00307 
2008 -2.65799 0.02171 0.00306 
2009 -2.55465 0.01989 0.00304 
2010 -3.18471 0.03088 0.00304 
2011 -3.12959 0.02987 0.00304 
2012 -2.62809 0.02240 0.00323 
2013 -2.67113 0.02558 0.00357 
2014 -2.66855 0.02726 0.00381 
2015 -2.73099 0.02962 0.00396 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials 
2006 -2.24239 0.01303 0.00258 
2007 -2.37719 0.01450 0.00256 
2008 -2.11300 0.01095 0.00245 
2009 -2.15573 0.01217 0.00261 
2012 -2.38264 0.01575 0.00277 
Vocus Communications Limited Telecommunication Services 2010 -0.72558 0.00778 0.01456 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 
2007 -2.75979 0.03769 0.00492 
2008 -2.02070 0.02016 0.00491 
2013 -2.00770 0.02484 0.00613 
2015 -2.56686 0.04106 0.00619 
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Company Industry 
Year Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
Westfield Corporation Stapled Real Estate 
2005 -2.20118 0.01561 0.00321 
2006 -2.22099 0.01756 0.00355 
2007 -2.72979 0.03044 0.00407 
2008 -2.71224 0.02368 0.00321 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 
2005 -2.27235 0.01783 0.00344 
2006 -2.27203 0.01765 0.00341 
2007 -2.29538 0.02017 0.00381 
2008 -2.22749 0.01930 0.00387 
2009 -2.23508 0.02053 0.00409 
2010 -2.22876 0.02139 0.00429 
2011 -2.32426 0.02178 0.00402 
Worleyparsons Limited Energy 2013 -2.01771 0.01033 0.00253 
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Appendix 11 - Outliers eliminated in logistic regression for individual years – Research 
Question 1 
Year Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
2004 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited Financials 0.78055 0.1045 0.14641 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -2.12260 0.21433 0.04541 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -2.24744 0.33212 0.06170 
2005 
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited Financials 1.20387 0.23323 0.13862 
Regis Resources Limited Materials 2.71537 0.27886 0.03644 
Westfield Corporation Stapled Real Estate -2.30572 0.22548 0.04069 
2006 
Senex Energy Limited Energy -0.53893 0.05277 0.15376 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -2.59900 0.34362 0.04841 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples -2.27492 0.19943 0.03711 
2007 
Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary -0.63091 0.07067 0.15077 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -2.31297 0.19644 0.03542 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -1.98504 0.18633 0.04515 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples -2.00969 0.19084 0.04512 
2008 
Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary -1.11931 0.23305 0.15684 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -2.53971 0.22693 0.03399 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.23231 0.29791 0.02772 
2009 
Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary -0.60649 0.06389 0.14800 
Duet Group Forus Utilities -2.03552 0.15809 0.03675 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -3.63481 0.37264 0.02743 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials -2.21611 0.16516 0.03254 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.42804 0.30463 0.02527 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -2.88438 0.32489 0.03758 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials -2.28379 0.13993 0.02613 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples -2.86512 0.34674 0.04053 
2010 
Ainsworth Game Technology Limited Consumer Discretionary -0.51054 0.04919 0.15876 
Cimic Group Limited Industrials -2.55304 0.15922 0.02385 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -3.13910 0.31605 0.03108 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -2.94336 0.49630 0.05418 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials -2.22821 0.10948 0.02157 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples -3.11933 0.36324 0.03599 
2011 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -4.90729 0.60085 0.02434 
Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited Industrials -2.02992 0.20252 0.04685 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -4.45452 0.54342 0.02666 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials -1.99305 0.12269 0.02996 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples -2.20110 0.35416 0.06812 
2012 
Duet Group Forus Utilities -2.51586 0.19077 0.02926 
JB Hi-fi Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.28729 0.18729 0.03456 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -3.48774 0.35287 0.02819 
Sandfire Resources NL Materials -2.09765 0.21898 0.04741 
Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.07706 0.08580 0.01950 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -2.64322 0.43994 0.05924 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials -2.45126 0.19760 0.03184 
Western Areas Limited Materials -1.96244 0.11141 0.02812 
2013 
Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials -2.07844 0.16725 0.03727 
Aust Agricultural Company Limited Consumer Staples -2.65856 0.28080 0.03821 
JB Hi-fi Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.10253 0.15788 0.03448 
Karoon Gas Australia Limited Energy -2.16869 0.15337 0.03158 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -2.75162 0.35442 0.04472 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -2.49997 0.36355 0.05497 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples -1.06905 0.24376 0.17579 
Worleyparsons Limited Energy -2.71183 0.18555 0.02461 
2014 
Cardno Limited Industrials -2.38852 0.20543 0.03476 
JB Hi-fi Limited Consumer Discretionary -3.00014 0.24570 0.02657 
Karoon Gas Australia Limited Energy -1.11320 0.20372 0.14118 
Lend Lease Group Stapled Real Estate -2.96755 0.23884 0.02641 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -4.41321 0.67512 0.03350 
Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited Industrials -2.79124 0.30355 0.03750 
Telstra Corporation Limited Telecommunication Services -3.27848 0.81406 0.07041 
Transurban Group Stapled Industrials -2.33680 0.22491 0.03956 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 0.49989 0.05555 0.18188 
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Year Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
2015 
Breville Group Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.12566 0.19145 0.04065 
Cimic Group Limited Industrials -2.42920 0.32220 0.05177 
Cochlear Limited Health Care -2.05077 0.09177 0.02135 
Downer Edi Limited Industrials -2.42919 0.21288 0.03482 
JB Hi-fi Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.34396 0.16264 0.02875 
Lend Lease Group Stapled Real Estate -3.23595 0.29583 0.02748 
Macquarie Group Limited Financials -3.10530 0.46246 0.04576 
Sandfire Resources NL Materials -2.30800 0.21804 0.03932 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples -1.58314 0.71695 0.22243 
290 
 
Appendix 12 - Descriptive statistics for independent variables for Research Question 3 
Statistic 
2004 
n=50 
2005 
n=53 
2006 
n=57 
2007 
n=57 
2008 
n=64 
2009 
n=69 
2010 
n=71 
2011 
n=72 
2012 
n=75 
2013 
n=79 
2014 
n=88 
2015 
n=86 
Panel A: SIZE (log of market capitalisation) 
Mean 9.2562 9.3591 9.4095 9.5179 9.3302 9.3531 9.4210 9.4228 9.3650 9.3790 9.4505 9.4295 
Standard Deviation 0.7118 0.7207 0.5941 0.5495 0.6001 0.6640 0.5847 0.5484 0.6291 0.6228 0.5775 0.6060 
1st Quartile 8.8403 9.0385 8.9694 9.1656 9.0420 8.9407 9.0000 8.9802 8.9825 8.9570 9.0332 8.9730 
Median 9.1257 9.3280 9.2620 9.4168 9.2505 9.3359 9.3992 9.3617 9.2874 9.2778 9.3402 9.3134 
3rd Quartile 9.7894 9.8164 9.8178 9.8693 9.7257 9.7166 9.7368 9.7268 9.7179 9.7606 9.8337 9.8362 
Panel B: OWN (ownership concentration = percentage shares owned by top twenty shareholder) 
Mean 62.38 62.73 60.08 62.87 62.55 64.64 68.04 70.21 69.56 69.87 71.87 72.82 
Standard Deviation 19.17 18.70 17.05 17.93 17.31 15.64 14.75 14.34 14.18 13.83 14.11 14.36 
1st Quartile 46.82 44.32 49.66 50.41 49.66 51.84 57.02 59.50 58.38 59.91 60.63 61.37 
Median 63.99 67.46 59.64 61.84 62.48 65.29 68.78 70.91 71.10 71.20 73.59 75.43 
3rd Quartile 79.70 79.17 75.26 77.32 79.39 77.72 80.24 82.21 81.19 82.29 83.85 84.75 
Panel C: LEV (leverage = total liabilities to total assets) 
Mean 0.5551 0.5563 0.6280 0.6097 0.5994 0.5453 0.5251 0.5273 0.5405 0.5389 0.5173 0.5242 
Standard Deviation 0.2101 0.2100 0.2079 0.2057 0.1990 0.2222 0.2253 0.2199 0.2051 0.1992 0.1927 0.2014 
1st Quartile 0.3911 0.4246 0.4536 0.4576 0.4618 0.3945 0.3706 0.3881 0.4259 0.4175 0.3850 0.3965 
Median 0.5188 0.5212 0.6157 0.5780 0.5682 0.4957 0.4761 0.4983 0.5241 0.5134 0.4905 0.4989 
3rd Quartile 0.6803 0.6661 0.7783 0.7904 0.7542 0.7052 0.6874 0.6673 0.6693 0.6503 0.5935 0.6410 
Panel D: BAD (bad news firm = decrease in GAAP profit or GAAP loss, good news firm = same or increase in profit) 
Bad News Companies   n (%) 6  (12) 17  (32) 17  (30) 13  (23) 35  (55) 45  (65) 13  (18) 36  (50) 43  (57) 35  (44) 31  (35) 38  (44) 
Good News Companies  n (%) 44  (88) 36  (68) 40  (70) 44  (77) 29  (45) 24  (35)  58  (82) 36  (50) 32  (43) 44  (56) 57  (65) 48  (56) 
Total                n (%) 50 (100) 53 (100) 57 (100) 57 (100) 64 (100) 69 (100) 71 (100) 72 (100) 75 (100) 79 (100) 88 (100) 86 (100) 
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Appendix 13 - Descriptive statistics for dependent variables for Research Questions 3 and 4  
Statistic 
2004 
n=50 
2005 
n=53 
2006 
n=57 
2007 
n=57 
2008 
n=64 
2009 
n=69 
2010 
n=71 
2011 
n=72 
2012 
n=75 
2013 
n=79 
2014 
n=88 
2015 
n=86 
IM (Impression Management relative emphasis measure = emphasis score for non-GAAP – emphasis score for GAAP) 
Panel A: Press Release Relative Emphasis 
Mean 1.000 0.368 0.974 0.386 1.531 1.109 0.697 0.028 -0.300 -0.335 -0.489 0.134 
Standard Deviation 3.6309 4.3036 3.7302 4.8200 3.9670 4.1665 4.2084 2.8133 2.5121 2.9218 3.2154 3.3698 
1st Quartile -0.625 -2.500 -0.750 -2.750 -0.500 -0.750 -1.000 -1.000 -1.500 -0.500 -1.500 -1.500 
Median 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.500 1.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 -0.500 -0.500 -0.500 -0.250 
3rd Quartile 3.000 2.750 2.500 3.000 4.000 4.000 3.000 0.500 1.500 0.500 1.000 2.000 
Panel B: Annual Report Relative Emphasis 
Mean 0.420 -0.358 1.009 0.895 1.508 0.507 0.669 0.299 0.200 0.032 0.080 0.221 
Standard Deviation 4.9357 4.7184 4.4806 4.4035 4.2337 4.1749 4.3136 3.6189 3.5641 3.1758 4.0626 3.7050 
1st Quartile -3.375 -3.500 -2.500 -1.250 -1.875 -1.500 -2.000 -1.500 -1.500 -1.500 -1.500 -1.500 
Median 1.250 -1.500 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 
3rd Quartile 4.625 3.250 4.250 3.750 5.000 3.250 3.500 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.375 2.000 
Panel C: Total Relative Emphasis 
Mean 1.420 0.009 1.982 1.281 3.039 1.616 1.366 0.326 -0.100 -0.304 -0.409 0.355 
Standard Deviation 7.3202 8.2826 7.2407 8.1837 7.1048 7.5800 7.7418 5.3970 5.1386 5.2984 6.5524 5.8566 
1st Quartile -5.625 -6.000 -3.000 -4.250 -0.375 -2.500 -3.000 -2.875 -3.500 -3.000 -3.000 -2.500 
Median 1.000 -1.500 1.500 1.000 3.250 2.000 1.500 0.500 -0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 
3rd Quartile 7.500 6.250 7.500 8.000 7.375 6.500 5.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.625 
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Appendix 14 - Outliers eliminated in multiple regression for total sample model – 
Research Question 3 
Company Industry Year 
Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
Panel A: Relative Emphasis of Press Release 
AMP Limited Financials 2010 2.03529 0.00564 0.0055 
APA Group Stapled Utilities 2010 -2.18949 0.00565 0.0046 
APN News & Media Limited  Consumer Discretionary 
2004 2.08269 0.00246 0.00161 
2007 2.04228 0.00279 0.00211 
2008 2.26012 0.00454 0.00318 
2009 2.02789 0.0028 0.00216 
2010 2.03212 0.00348 0.00295 
Arrium Limited Materials 2006 2.02274 0.00251 0.00183 
ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials 2007 -2.68239 0.01292 0.0076 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 2009 1.971 0.00927 0.01044 
AWE Limited Energy 
2009 -1.97291 0.00604 0.00642 
2014 -2.95543 0.00963 0.00423 
Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 
2009 2.11721 0.00674 0.00619 
2010 2.7999 0.01168 0.00613 
Bendigo And Adelaide Bank Ltd Financials 2008 -2.26591 0.01244 0.01061 
Boral Limited Materials 2005 -2.06594 0.00213 0.00127 
Caltex Australia Limited Energy 
2005 2.63577 0.00572 0.00287 
2006 2.24008 0.00595 0.00464 
2007 3.46124 0.00958 0.00275 
2008 2.58825 0.00521 0.00264 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Financials 2007 2.67525 0.0155 0.00938 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2008 -0.44053 0.00082 0.01917 
Cromwell Property Group Stapled Real Estate 2014 2.0257 0.00196 0.00116 
CSR Limited Materials 
2005 2.31311 0.00289 0.00147 
2006 1.99482 0.00181 0.00105 
Downer Edi Limited Industrials 
2005 -3.10236 0.00703 0.00241 
2007 -2.95507 0.00616 0.00228 
2008 -2.95387 0.00635 0.0024 
2009 -2.95412 0.00691 0.00271 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy 2013 -2.94059 0.01182 0.00553 
Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 
2004 2.64024 0.00414 0.00174 
2008 -2.14482 0.00317 0.0022 
GPT Group Stapled Real Estate 2013 -2.08268 0.0069 0.00662 
Graincorp Limited Consumer Staples 2006 2.19647 0.00802 0.00695 
GUD Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 2006 -2.15117 0.00884 0.00815 
Harvey Norman Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 
2010 1.95863 0.00362 0.00346 
2015 -2.2745 0.00641 0.0049 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials 
2007 -2.15071 0.0036 0.00264 
2009 -2.08832 0.00398 0.00331 
2010 -2.83998 0.00701 0.00309 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials 2006 -2.01866 0.00608 0.00613 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials 2014 -1.98077 0.00519 0.00531 
National Australia Bank Limited Financials 2007 1.98466 0.0076 0.00825 
Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 2015 2.99147 0.00467 0.00138 
Orica Limited Materials 2014 -2.4404 0.00376 0.00192 
Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary 2004 2.47463 0.00553 0.00325 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 2015 2.23148 0.00666 0.00538 
Santos Limited Energy 2013 -2.00618 0.00522 0.00519 
Sonic Healthcare Limited Health Care 2009 2.35276 0.00454 0.00285 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
2004 -2.48273 0.00989 0.00668 
2005 -2.05198 0.00625 0.00609 
2007 -2.41947 0.00687 0.00458 
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Company Industry Year 
Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 2005 2.64136 0.00597 0.00303 
Tassal Group Limited Consumer Staples 2008 2.30778 0.00677 0.00506 
UGL Limited Industrials 2010 2.15139 0.00285 0.00184 
Village Roadshow Limited Consumer Discretionary 2007 -1.99569 0.01099 0.01222 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 2004 2.16633 0.00495 0.004 
Panel B: Relative Emphasis of Annual Report 
Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials 2007 -2.2684 0.00298 0.00166 
APA Group Stapled Utilities 2004 1.98287 0.00437 0.00427 
APN News & Media Limited  Consumer Discretionary 2004 -2.88833 0.00474 0.00161 
ASX Limited Financials 2014 -2.77548 0.00457 0.00173 
ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials 2007 -2.64638 0.01257 0.0076 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 
2006 -2.17366 0.00412 0.00311 
2014 2.27219 0.00522 0.00379 
AWE Limited Energy 2009 -2.9785 0.01376 0.00642 
Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 
2004 -2.4378 0.01392 0.01022 
2005 -2.68597 0.01678 0.01015 
2009 2.47962 0.00924 0.00619 
2010 2.36075 0.00831 0.00613 
Boral Limited Materials 2010 2.1715 0.0033 0.00226 
Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials 2015 -3.09224 0.01006 0.00399 
Caltex Australia Limited Energy 2007 2.02849 0.00329 0.00275 
Cimic Group Limited Industrials 2011 -2.33919 0.00608 0.00427 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 
2008 1.1594 0.00571 0.01917 
2009 2.09771 0.01411 0.01432 
2014 2.36331 0.0063 0.00436 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy 2014 -2.52164 0.00472 0.00247 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials 
2008 -2.38601 0.00397 0.00225 
2009 -2.46024 0.00553 0.00331 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials 
2010 -1.99861 0.0042 0.00398 
2011 -2.04177 0.00313 0.00251 
Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited Industrials 2015 -2.14927 0.00351 0.00255 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials 
2012 -2.67397 0.00653 0.0033 
2014 -2.50907 0.00832 0.00531 
National Australia Bank Limited Financials 2006 -2.52999 0.012 0.00799 
Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary 2005 2.00205 0.00279 0.00224 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 
2010 2.19713 0.00552 0.00443 
2014 2.07234 0.00688 0.00667 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 
2006 2.02089 0.00295 0.00237 
2010 2.38581 0.00346 0.0018 
2011 2.26544 0.00302 0.0017 
Regis Resources Limited Materials 2015 -2.27498 0.00628 0.00477 
Santos Limited Energy 2005 -2.65874 0.0053 0.0025 
Select Harvests Limited Consumer Staples 2014 -2.24479 0.00558 0.00425 
Senex Energy Limited Energy 2013 -2.29874 0.01029 0.00833 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited Health Care 2008 2.13811 0.00902 0.00845 
Stockland Stapled Real Estate 
2006 2.01426 0.00491 0.00476 
2007 2.51073 0.00689 0.00419 
2008 2.06708 0.00491 0.00447 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
2010 -2.03026 0.00399 0.00357 
2015 -3.13109 0.01075 0.00421 
Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 2006 2.11914 0.00376 0.00293 
UGL Limited Industrials 2008 2.00093 0.0018 0.00102 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 
2009 -2.29696 0.01162 0.00956 
2014 -2.29436 0.01641 0.0139 
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Company Industry Year 
Standardised 
Residual 
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 2014 1.99531 0.00766 0.00822 
Panel C: Relative Emphasis Total 
Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials 
2005 2.15905 0.00315 0.00214 
2007 -2.39939 0.00334 0.00166 
ASX Limited Financials 2014 -2.62123 0.00408 0.00173 
ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials 
2007 -3.02997 0.01648 0.0076 
2008 -1.98612 0.00828 0.00906 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 2014 2.27968 0.00526 0.00379 
AWE Limited Energy 
2009 -2.84871 0.01258 0.00642 
2014 -2.5159 0.00698 0.00423 
Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 
2005 -2.18839 0.01114 0.01015 
2009 2.6264 0.01037 0.00619 
2010 2.92141 0.01272 0.00613 
Boral Limited Materials 2010 2.2534 0.00355 0.00226 
Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials 2015 -2.4517 0.00633 0.00399 
Caltex Australia Limited Energy 
2005 2.48706 0.00509 0.00287 
2006 2.15604 0.00551 0.00464 
2007 3.07674 0.00757 0.00275 
2008 2.41138 0.00452 0.00264 
2010 1.97665 0.00312 0.00274 
Coca-cola Amatil Limited Consumer Staples 2008 1.99568 0.00494 0.00491 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 
2008 0.46021 0.0009 0.01917 
2014 2.15007 0.00522 0.00436 
Downer Edi Limited Industrials 
2005 -2.14427 0.00336 0.00241 
2007 -2.06405 0.003 0.00228 
2008 -2.21014 0.00356 0.0024 
2009 -2.1358 0.00361 0.00271 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy 2013 -2.59788 0.00923 0.00553 
Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 2004 2.40731 0.00344 0.00174 
Graincorp Limited Consumer Staples 2006 2.28974 0.00871 0.00695 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials 
2008 -2.40551 0.00404 0.00225 
2009 -2.59925 0.00617 0.00331 
2010 -2.58682 0.00582 0.00309 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials 2006 -1.99828 0.00595 0.00613 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials 2014 -2.57086 0.00874 0.00531 
National Australia Bank Limited Financials 2006 -2.29601 0.00988 0.00799 
Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 2015 2.07789 0.00226 0.00138 
Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary 2005 2.16459 0.00326 0.00224 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 
2010 2.31061 0.0061 0.00443 
2015 2.05083 0.00562 0.00538 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 
2010 2.34831 0.00335 0.0018 
2011 2.06724 0.00251 0.0017 
REA Group LTD Information Technology 2015 1.97355 0.00759 0.00834 
Santos Limited Energy 2005 -2.03045 0.00309 0.0025 
Select Harvests Limited Consumer Staples 2014 -2.06638 0.00473 0.00425 
Stockland Stapled Real Estate 2007 2.22261 0.0054 0.00419 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials 
2004 -2.27924 0.00834 0.00668 
2005 -2.1189 0.00666 0.00609 
2007 -2.01337 0.00476 0.00458 
2010 -2.16217 0.00452 0.00357 
2011 -1.98548 0.00541 0.00555 
2015 -2.88612 0.00913 0.00421 
Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 2005 2.54464 0.00554 0.00303 
UGL Limited Industrials 2008 2.13046 0.00204 0.00102 
Wesfarmers Limited Consumer Staples 
2009 -2.27009 0.01135 0.00956 
2010 -2.18646 0.01148 0.01051 
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Appendix 15 - Outliers eliminated in multiple regression for individual years – Research Question 3 
Year 
Relative 
Emphasis of: 
Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual  
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
2004 
Press Release Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary 2.02152 0.04547 0.03019 
Oz Minerals Limited Materials -2.03005 0.29516 0.19863 
Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary 1.99728 0.22945 0.16910 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.25806 0.12597 0.08005 
Annual Report APA Group Stapled Utilities 1.97223 0.04328 0.03019 
APN News & Media Limited  Consumer Discretionary -2.90168 0.08150 0.02421 
Total Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 2.01230 0.05931 0.04414 
2005 
Press Release Downer Edi Limited Industrials -2.58476 0.08550 0.03804 
Annual Report Charter Hall Retail Reit Unit Real Estate -1.97399 0.10522 0.08867 
Santos Limited Energy -2.18422 0.04787 0.02682 
Total Tabcorp Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary 1.97199 0.04718 0.03539 
2006 
Press Release Graincorp Limited Consumer Staples 1.98980 0.07696 0.06437 
GUD Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.19853 0.10745 0.07415 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials -2.23061 0.12421 0.08336 
 
Annual Report 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate -2.05705 0.04172 0.02742 
National Australia Bank Limited Financials -2.05815 0.13458 0.10481 
 
Total 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials -2.03042 0.10292 0.08336 
National Australia Bank Limited Financials -2.03135 0.13109 0.10481 
2007 
Press Release ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials -2.35041 0.16947 0.10150 
Caltex Australia Limited Energy 2.65707 0.07885 0.03282 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.11422 0.07221 0.05234 
 
Annual Report 
Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials -2.15211 0.04024 0.02248 
ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials -2.38492 0.17449 0.10150 
Stockland Stapled Real Estate 2.06079 0.08429 0.06584 
Total ANZ Banking Group Limited Financials -2.67606 0.21969 0.10150 
Caltex Australia Limited Energy 2.55512 0.07292 0.03282 
2008 
Press Release Downer Edi Limited Industrials -3.10335 0.12215 0.04083 
Fairfax Media Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.15183 0.06656 0.04746 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.09716 0.05763 0.04250 
Annual Report Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.30728 0.06976 0.04250 
Total Downer Edi Limited Industrials -2.28145 0.06602 0.04083 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.53264 0.08406 0.04250 
Year 
Relative 
Emphasis of: 
Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual  
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
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2009 
Press Release Downer Edi Limited Industrials -3.16203 0.18038 0.06238 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.00492 0.04209 0.03301 
Sonic Healthcare Limited Health Care 2.17497 0.03120 0.01648 
Annual Report AWE Limited Energy -2.40463 0.08764 0.05161 
GPT Group Stapled Real Estate 2.16146 0.06556 0.04727 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.40192 0.06041 0.03301 
Invocare Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.46526 0.10432 0.05916 
Total AWE Limited Energy -2.14222 0.06956 0.05161 
Downer Edi Limited Industrials -2.47031 0.11009 0.06238 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.46147 0.06344 0.03301 
Invocare Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.06058 0.07288 0.05916 
Sonic Healthcare Limited Health Care 1.97162 0.02564 0.01648 
2010 
Press Release Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 2.33127 0.10240 0.06569 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.97584 0.08124 0.02800 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.05548 0.04943 0.03843 
UGL Limited Industrials 2.15946 0.03591 0.02171 
Annual Report Boral Limited Materials 2.07284 0.08034 0.06517 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials -2.12352 0.11867 0.09124 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 1.97007 0.02312 0.01405 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.36294 0.06533 0.03843 
Total Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 2.30648 0.10023 0.06569 
Boral Limited Materials 1.99133 0.07414 0.06517 
Iluka Resources Limited Materials -2.62635 0.06328 0.02800 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.45155 0.07032 0.03843 
2011 
Press Release Bank of Queensland Limited Financials 2.12091 0.12362 0.09518 
Breville Group Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.05112 0.10014 0.08315 
Metcash Limited Consumer Staples -1.97013 0.02492 0.01630 
Perpetual Limited Financials 2.04346 0.14730 0.11879 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 2.79785 0.10134 0.04361 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.06215 0.03584 0.02504 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.42577 0.10784 0.06402 
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Year 
Relative 
Emphasis of: 
Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual  
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
2011 
Annual Report Boral Limited Materials 2.03028 0.02819 0.01815 
Cimic Group Limited Industrials -2.39612 0.07587 0.04467 
Insurance Australia Group Limited Financials -2.23001 0.05186 0.03343 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.53366 0.05411 0.02504 
Total Cimic Group Limited Industrials -1.98811 0.05223 0.04467 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.75640 0.06404 0.02504 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.30424 0.09730 0.06402 
2012 
Press Release Suncorp Group Limited Financials -2.02562 0.06135 0.05198 
Transfield Services Limited  Industrials 2.19532 0.05453 0.03762 
Annual Report Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -2.83088 0.17566 0.07730 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.13617 0.03781 0.02499 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited Health Care 2.08578 0.05702 0.04481 
Total Cochlear Limited Health Care -2.16479 0.03599 0.02237 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -2.00603 0.08821 0.07730 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.01951 0.03380 0.02499 
Sigma Pharmaceuticals Limited Health Care 2.31742 0.07039 0.04481 
2013 
Press Release Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2.51525 0.10495 0.05885 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy -3.34987 0.21334 0.06773 
GPT Group Stapled Real Estate -2.26607 0.09504 0.06591 
Pacific Brands Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.02517 0.04352 0.03542 
Santos Limited Energy -2.17532 0.07042 0.05239 
Annual Report Beach Energy Limited Energy 2.73481 0.09521 0.04399 
Senex Energy Limited Energy -2.19562 0.14686 0.10573 
Total BWP Trust Ord Units Real Estate 2.00140 0.06828 0.06055 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2.56036 0.10875 0.05885 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy -2.79814 0.14885 0.06773 
Ramsay Health Care Limited Health Care 2.00682 0.03464 0.02701 
Santos Limited Energy -2.24582 0.07506 0.05239 
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Year 
Relative 
Emphasis of: 
Company Industry 
Standardised 
Residual  
Cook’s 
Distance 
Leverage 
2014 
Press Release Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 1.97470 0.04024 0.03551 
AWE Limited Energy -3.14626 0.10977 0.03867 
Cromwell Property Group Stapled Real Estate 2.40090 0.03037 0.01368 
Downer Edi Limited Industrials -2.03428 0.03028 0.02277 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -1.98062 0.09037 0.08309 
Orica Limited Materials -2.48259 0.03359 0.01450 
Annual Report ASX Limited Financials -2.57139 0.03929 0.01670 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 2.02688 0.04239 0.03551 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2.67456 0.09596 0.04798 
Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy -2.56421 0.05244 0.02562 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -2.04232 0.09609 0.08309 
Select Harvests Limited Consumer Staples -2.09329 0.07657 0.06342 
Woolworths Limited Consumer Staples 2.46693 0.14636 0.08650 
Total ASX Limited Financials -2.45585 0.03584 0.01670 
Aveo Group Stapled Real Estate 2.22232 0.05096 0.03551 
AWE Limited Energy -2.30119 0.05872 0.03867 
Credit Corp Group Limited Financials 2.43203 0.07934 0.04798 
Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -2.23476 0.11505 0.08309 
Select Harvests Limited Consumer Staples -1.96825 0.06769 0.06342 
2015 
Press Release Adelaide Brighton Limited Materials -1.96955 0.02886 0.02304 
Cromwell Property Group Stapled Real Estate 2.12708 0.02866 0.01818 
Harvey Norman Holdings Limited Consumer Discretionary -2.42500 0.06343 0.03717 
Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 3.14102 0.06443 0.01905 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 2.38436 0.08130 0.05118 
Annual Report Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials -3.02157 0.08736 0.03212 
Mcmillan Shakespeare Limited Industrials -2.28838 0.05868 0.03888 
Regis Resources Limited Materials -2.28850 0.07065 0.04801 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.78065 0.16795 0.04109 
Total Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials -2.50783 0.06018 0.03212 
Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 2.45184 0.03926 0.01905 
Qantas Airways Limited Industrials 2.13387 0.06512 0.05118 
REA Group LTD Information Technology 2.07688 0.09165 0.07668 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.42079 0.13749 0.04109 
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Appendix 16 - Pearson Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables for Research 
Question 3  
 
Size (Log Market 
Cap) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Leverage 
Panel A: Total Sample 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.023 1.00  
Leverage 0.500** -0.219** 1.00 
Panel B: 2004 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.201 1.00  
Leverage 0.454** -0.324* 1.00 
Panel C: 2005 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.272* 1.00  
Leverage 0.524** -0.353** 1.00 
Panel D: 2006 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.058 1.00  
Leverage 0.478** -0.230 1.00 
Panel E: 2007 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.004 1.00  
Leverage 0.429** -0.405** 1.00 
Panel F: 2008 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.034 1.00  
Leverage 0.277* -0.418** 1.00 
Panel G: 2009 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration 0.001 1.00  
Leverage 0.188 -0.365** 1.00 
Panel H: 2010 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.168 1.00  
Leverage 0.298* -0.352** 1.00 
Panel I: 2011 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.163 1.00  
Leverage 0.425** -0.407** 1.00 
Panel J: 2012 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.123 1.00  
Leverage 0.433** -0.377** 1.00 
Panel K: 2013 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.124 1.00  
Leverage 0.524** -0.324** 1.00 
Panel L: 2014 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.246* 1.00  
Leverage 0.540** -0.331** 1.00 
Panel M: 2015 
Size (Log Market Cap) 1.00   
Ownership Concentration -0.178 1.00  
Leverage 0.523** -0.365** 1.00 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 17 - Multiple regression analysis of use of impression management tactics as a 
function of company characteristic – full results including test of significance for all 
models 
 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Panel A: Total Sample 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.018, F (4,759) = 4.470, p = 0.001 
Size + 0.192 -0.084 -2.109* 1.228 
Ownership Concentration - 0.007 -0.032 -0.826 1.151 
Leverage + 0.006 0.109 2.585** 1.372 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.219 0.091 2.505** 1.016 
Constant  1.792  1.931  
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.001, F (4,767) = 0.759, p = 0.552 
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.013, F (4,761) = 3.535, p = 0.007 
Size + .366 -.015 -.389 1.222 
Ownership Concentration - .014 -.070 -1.809* 1.157 
Leverage + .011 .058 1.375 1.374 
Good/Bad News Year + .415 .094 2.591** 1.016 
Constant  3.406  0.751  
Panel B: 2004 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.070, F (4,41) = 1.853, p = 0.137 
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.233, F (4,43) = 4.568, p = 0.004 
Size + 0.928  0.222  1.516 1.317 
Ownership Concentration - 0.032 -0.023 -0.170 1.122 
Leverage + 0.032 -0.615 -4.123** 1.366 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.778  0.053  0.410 1.031 
Constant  8.477  -0.580  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.165, F (4,44) = 3.371, p = 0.017 
Size +  1.505  0.200  1.338 1.290 
Ownership Concentration -  0.052  0.019  0.138 1.120 
Leverage +  0.052 -0.522 -3.403** 1.352 
Good/Bad News Year +  2.889  0.097  0.723 1.037 
Constant  13.659  -0.619  
Panel C: 2005 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.003, F (4,47) = 1.037, p = 0.398 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.075, F (4,46) = 2.016, p = 0.108 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.002, F (4,47) = 0.969, p = 0.433 
Panel D: 2006 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.005, F (4,49) = 0.938, p = 0.450 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.035, F (4,50) = 1.484, p = 0.221 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.002, F (4,50) = 1.028, p = 0.402 
Panel E: 2007 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.177, F (4,49) = 3.841, p = 0.009 
Size + 1.121  0.399  2.901** 1.217 
Ownership Concentration - 0.033 -0.367 -2.629** 1.254 
Leverage + 0.032 -0.133 -0.895 1.427 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.261  0.081  0.636 1.034 
Constant  9.983  -2.335  
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.022, F (4,49) = 0.719, p = 0.583 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.086, F (4,50) = 2.263, p = 0.075 
Panel F: 2008 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.069, F (4,56) = 2.107, p = 0.092 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.007, F (4,58) = 0.891, p = 0.475 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.003, F (4,57) = 0.960, p = 0.437 
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 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Panel G: 2009 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.176, F (4,61) = 4.472, p = 0.003 
Size + 0.638 -0.230 -1.997* 1.047 
Ownership Concentration - 0.030  0.192  1.560 1.193 
Leverage + 0.021  0.485  3.913** 1.212 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.891 -0.142 -1.248 1.024 
Constant  6.145   1.072  
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.150, F (4,60) = 3.821, p = 0.008 
Size + 0.631 -0.282 -2.377** 1.057 
Ownership Concentration - 0.029  0.048  0.385 1.164 
Leverage + 0.021  0.419  3.314** 1.206 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.872 -0.127 -1.092 1.019 
Constant  6.074   1.812  
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.217, F (4,59) = 5.378, p = 0.001 
Size +  1.082 -0.305 -2.664** 1.055 
Ownership Concentration -  0.050  0.170  1.394 1.200 
Leverage +  0.036  0.506  4.094** 1.228 
Good/Bad News Year +  1.527 -0.181 -1.597 1.030 
Constant  10.409   1.782  
Panel H: 2010 
Press Release – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.217, F (4,62) = 5.584, p = 0.001 
Size + 0.720 0.079  0.682 1.130 
Ownership Concentration - 0.029 0.496  4.233** 1.156 
Leverage + 0.020 0.361  3.025** 1.201 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.036 0.138  1.240 1.041 
Constant  7.247  -2.180  
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.063, F (4,62) = 2.108, p = 0.090 
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.140, F (4,62) = 3.697, p = 0.009 
Size +  1.368 0.069  0.570 1.131 
Ownership Concentration -  0.055 0.376  3.073** 1.150 
Leverage +  0.038 0.361  2.886** 1.201 
Good/Bad News Year +  2.026 0.002  0.018 1.038 
Constant  13.723  -1.694  
Panel I: 2011 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.029, F (4,60) = 1.471, p = 0.222 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.044, F (4,63) = 0.291, p = 0.883 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.022, F (4,64) = 1.387, p = 0.248 
Panel J: 2012 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.31, F (4,68) = 1.575, p = 0.191 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.076, F (4,67) = 2.453, p = 0.054 
Total – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.132, F (4,66) = 3.650, p = 0.010 
Size + 0.962  0.093  0.718 1.364 
Ownership Concentration - 0.041 -0.181 -1.475 1.214 
Leverage + 0.030 -0.081 -0.611 1.420 
Good/Bad News Year + 1.145  0.378  3.169** 1.148 
Constant  9.458  -0.366  
Panel K: 2013 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.025, F (4,69) = 0.549, p = 0.700 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.002, F (4,72) = 0.957, p = 0.437 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.069, F (4,69) = 2.357, p = 0.062 
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 Predicted 
Sign 
Standard 
Error  
Beta 
Coefficient 
t value VIF 
Panel L: 2014 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.016, F (4,77) = 0.690, p = 0.601 
Annual Report – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = 0.068, F (4,76) = 2.458, p = 0.053 
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.004, F (4,77) = 0.929, p = 0.452 
Panel M: 2015 
Press Release – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.042, F (4,76) = 0.192, p = 0.942 
Annual Report – Model Reliability: R2 = 0.072, F (4,77) = 2.579, p = 0.044 
Size + 0.647  0.181  1.341 1.591 
Ownership Concentration - 0.023  0.246  2.141* 1.151 
Leverage + 0.019  0.105  0.792 1.532 
Good/Bad News Year + 0.675 -0.109 -0.932 1.202 
Constant  6.125  -1.875  
Total – Model Reliability (not significant): R2 = -0.010, F (4,76) = 0.808, p = 0.524 
 a  Reported t values are one-tailed for variables with a directional prediction and two-tailed otherwise. 
   * Significant at the 0.05 level 
 ** Significant at the 0.01 level  
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Appendix 18 - Outliers eliminated in univariate t-tests – Research Question 4 
Year 
Relative Emphasis 
of: 
Company Industry Z Score 
2008 Press Release Downer Edi Limited Industrials -3.03283 
2012 Annual Report Monadelphous Group Limited Industrials -3.00217 
2013 
Press Release Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy -3.47892 
Total Drillsearch Energy Limited Energy -3.15117 
2014 Press Release AWE Limited Energy -3.26904 
2015 
Press Release Northern Star Resources LTD Materials 3.22462 
Annual Report 
Cabcharge Australia Limited Industrials -3.29849 
Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.43344 
Total Suncorp Group Limited Financials -3.30479 
Note: No outliers were identified for the univariate t-tests on impression 
management of non-GAAP and GAAP figures reported in Tables 7.8 and 7.9. 
 
